A companion to film theory by Toby Miller & Robert Stam
---
\ PN 
Vqq~-
b;;7lr 
A Companion to Film Theory
 
Blackwell Companions in Cultural Studies 
Advisufy editor: David Thea Goldberg, University ofCalifornia, Irvine 
This series aims to proviue theoretically ambitious but accessible volumes devoted to the major 
fields and subfieJds within cultural studies, whether as single disciplines (film studies) inspired and 
reconfigured by interventionist cultural studies approaches, or from broad interdisciplinary and 
multidisciplinary perspectives (gender studies, race and ethnic studies, postcolonial studies). Each 
volume sets out to ground and orientate the student through a broad range of specially 
commissioned articles and also to provide the more experienced scholar and teacher with a 
convenient and comprehensive overview of the latest trends and critical directions. An overarching 
Companion to Cultural Studies will map the territory as a whole. 
1. A Companion to Film Theory 
Edited by Toby Miller and Robert Starn 
2. A Companion to Postcolonial Studies 
Edited by Henry Schwarz and Sangeeta Ray 
3. A Companion to Cultural Studies 
Edited by Toby Miller 
4. A Companion to Racial and Ethnic Studies 
Edited by David Theo Goldberg alld John Solomos 
5. A Companion to Art Theory 
Edited by Paul Smith and Carolyn Wilde 
6. A Companion to Media Studies 
Edited by A ngharad Valdivia 
.Forthcoming: 
A Companion to North American Indian Studies 
Edited by Ward Churchill 
A Companion to Gender Studies 
Edited by Philomena Essed, Audrey Kobayashi, and David Theo Goldberg 
A Companion to Television Studies 
Edited by Janet Wasko 
A Companion to Afi-ican American Studies' 
F;dited by Lewis Gordon and Jane Anna Gordon 
A Companion to Third Cinema 
Edited by Teshome Gabriel 
A Companion to Literature and Film 
Edited by Robert Stam and Alessandra Raengo 
A Companion to American Studies 
Edited by John Carlos Rowe 
A Companion to Museum Studies 
Edited by Sharon Macdonald 
A Companion to Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgendcr, and Queer Studies 
Edited by George Haggerty and Molly McGany 
A Companion to Film Theory
 
Edited ~y 
Toby Miller and Robert Starn 
~A Blackwell ~ b Publishing 
© 1999,2004 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd
 
except for editorial material and organization © 1999,2004 by Toby Miller and Rohelt Stam
 
Chaptcr I I © 1999,2004 by David E. James
 
350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02\48-5020, USA
 
108 Cowley Road, Oxford OX4 I.lF, UK
 
550 Swanston Strect, Carlton, Victoria 3053, Australia
 
All rights reserved. No pali of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in
 
any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, except as permitted by
 
the UK Copyright, Designs, and Patcnts Act 1988, without the prior permission of the Tlublishcr.
 
First published 1999
 
First published in paperback 2004 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd
 
Librar)! ofCongress Cataloging-in-Publication Data 
The Blackwell comTlanion to film theory / editcd by Toby Miller and Robert Stam.
 
p. cm.-(Blackwell companions in cultural studies; I)
 
Includes bibliographical references and index.
 
ISBN 0-631-20644-2 (hardback); ISBN 0-631-20645-0 (paperback)
 
I. Motion pictures. 2. Motion pictures-Social aspects.
 
I. Miller, Toby. II. Starn, Robert, 1941-. III. Series.
 
PN1995.B495 1999
 
791.43'01-dc21 99-20206 Cll'
 
A catalogue record for this title is available from the British Library.
 
Set in J 1 on 13pt Ehrhardt
 
by Kolam Information Services Pvt Ltd, Pondicherry, India
 
Printed and bound in the United Kingdom
 
by MPG Books Ltd, Bodmin, Cornwall
 
For fLlrther information on
 
Blackwell Publishing, visit our website:
 
http://www.blackweI1Tlublishing.c011l
 
Contents
 
1 Introduction 
Toby Miller 
1 
2 Authorship 
James Naremore 
9 
3 Genre 
Sarah Berry-Flint 
25 
4 Enunciation and Narration 
Andre Gaudreault and Fran<;ois Jost 
45 
5 Film Editing 
Lucy Fischer 
64 
6 Film Semiotics 
Warren Buckland 
84 
7 Cognitivism 
Gregory Currie 
105 
8 Psychoanalytic Film Theory 
Richard Allen 
123 
9 Spectatorship and Subjectivity 
E. Deidre Pribram 
146 
10 Laura Mulvey Meets Catherine Tramell Meets the She-Man: 
Counter-History, Reclamation, and Incongruity in Lesbian, 
Gay, and Queer Film and Media Criticism 
Julia Erhart 
165 
11 Is There Class in this Text?: The Repression of Class in 
Film and Cultural Studies 
David James 
182 
V 
Contents 
12 Culture Industries 
Douglas Kellner 
202 
13 The Political Economy of Film 
Janet Wasko 
221 
14 The Work of Theory in the Age of Digital Transformation 
Henry Jenkins 
234 
15 Cultural Exchange 
Tom O'Regan 
262 
16 Shooting Back: From Ethnographic Film to Indigenous Production/ 
Ethnography of lVledia 
Faye Ginsburg 
295 
17 Psycho's Bad Tirmi7g: The Sensual Obsessions of Film Theory 
Toby Miller 
323 
18 Historical Allegory 
Ismail Xavier 
333 
19 Every Picture Tells a Story: Jose Guadalupe Posada's 
Protocinematic Graphic Art 
Charles Ramirez Berg 
363 
20 "Historical Poetics," Narrative, and Interpretation 
Ira Bhaskar 
387 
Index 413 
vi 
CHAPTER ONE 
Introduction 
Toby Miller 
Metz? How do you spell that? - .'lames Bond 
M .... Get out, you irritating little man - Dr iHelz 
Diamonds lire Forever, Guy Hamilton, 1971 
Signs may be ~naJyzed, for few love them. But films arc somehow delicate, like roses, and 
pulling the petals off a rose in order to study it is often viewed as an act of destruction. 
Sol Worth, Studying Visual Commul7lcation 
[T]he motion picture house is ... the first enemy of King Alcohol with real power where 
that king has deepest hold The peoplc will have a shelter where they can readjust 
themselves ... a substitute for many of the lines of pleasure in the groggery. 
Vachel Lindsay, The Art of the Moving PiCture 
GOing to the Cinema is part of a British book series from the 1950s that instructs 
readers on how to enjoy culture. It notes that film "has to cater for millions, and 
to do so, must make no demands on the public .... Films are easy to under­
stand." The book undertakes to rectify this lack of demands by offering 
"increased powers of perception," thus developing spectators' pleasure and 
making them more discriminating. To aid in this task, a list of "Films everyone 
should see" is included (Buchanan and Reed 1957: 13, 155-7). 
Such a project reiterates longstanding concerns of film theory, from the silent 
era's faith in "the moving picture man as a local social force ... the mere formula 
of [whose] activities" keeps the public well tempered (Lindsay 1970: 243), 
through 1930s research into the impact of cinema on American youth via the 
Payne Studies (Blumer 1933; Blumer and Hauser 1933), to post-World War II 
concerns about Hollywood's intrication of education and entertainment and the 
need for counter-knowledge among the public (Powdermaker 1950: 12-15; 
Mayer 1946: 24). 
We are sometimes told today that there has been "a general movement in 
approaches to film from a preoccupation with authorship (broadly defined), 
through a concentration upon the text and textuality, to an investigation of 
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audiences" (Hollows and ]ancovich 1995: 8) or a consecutive pursuit of knOw­
ledge about film form, then realism, followed by language, and, finally, cultural 
politics (Braudy and Cohen 1999: xv-xvi). Such accounts approximate the 
history of some humanities-based academic work, but forget the hardy perennials 
of cinema criticism, social-science technique, and cultural policy: textual analysis 
of films; identification of directors with movies; and studies of the audience 
through psychology and psychoanalysis (Worth 1981: 39). The twin tasks of 
elevation identified in Going to the Cinema - addressing spectators and examining 
texts - have always informed film theory (ManvellI950). The relevant dilemmas 
were echoed and elaborated by reviewer Andrew Sarris's 1960s search for 
"dedicated moviegoers in the reading public" capable of engaging the "adven­
turous speculations" of his pantheon of titles (1968: 17) and scholar Christian 
Metz's mid-1970s dictum "[a] film is difficult to explain because it is easy to 
understand" (1974: 69). 
To repeat, the tasks of elevation address audiences and textual ranking. Over 
time, they branch out and converge. Audience concerns include psychological, 
sociological, educational, consumer, criminological, and political promises and 
anxieties. Textual ranking involves authorship, genre, form, style, and represen­
tational politics. They cross over in the area of mimesis, with audiences inter­
preting films against their own worlds of race, gender, class, region, age, religion, 
language, politics, and nation. 
The question of pleasure has been central, as analysts have sought to account 
for and resist narrative stereotypes and explain "why socialists and feminists 
liked things they thought they ought not to" (Dyer 1992: 4). This difficulty over 
pleasure accounts for film theory being highly critical of prevailing cultural 
politics but never reifying itself into the puritanism or orthodoxy alleged by 
critics of political correctness. The extraordinary diversity of latter-day film 
anthologies makes this point clear. A feminist film anthology certainly focusses 
on issues of representation and production that are shared by many women, but it 
also attends to differences of race, history, class, sexuality, and nation, alongside 
and as part of theoretical difference (Carson, Dittmar, and Welsch 1994), while a 
black film anthology will divide between spectatorial and aesthetic dimensions 
(Diawara 1993), and a queer anthology will identify links bctwcen social oppres­
sion and film and video practice (Gever, Greyson, and Parmar 1993; Holmlund 
and Fuchs 1997). 
Concerns about representation and audience are, then, relatively stable across 
time. What has changed is the implicit and explicit Eurocentrism and universal­
ism of earlier theory, as social movements and Third and Fourth World dis­
courses have pointed to silences and generated new methods (Shohat/Stam 1994; 
Carson and Friedman 1995). Even here, though, there is a long history of protest 
at, for example, Hollywood's portrayal of foreigners and minorities (Vasey 1997). 
This continuity of concern with audiences and representational politics docs 
not, however, mean that there is agreement over the constitution, history, 
practice, or value of film theory. Alan Parker, Chair of the world's leading 
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film-culture site, the British Film Institute, and also a noted Hollywood director, 
has famously stated that: "Film needs theory like it needs a scratch on the 
neg'ative" (quoted in Lapsley and Westlake 1988: vi), a reaction to the complaint 
that such writing "is unreadable to the uninitiated" and "often sounds like 
gobbledygook to filmmakers" (Barbash and Taylor 1997: 3). Students frequently 
argue that theorizing' film removes its pleasure (to which their professors fre­
quently reply that pleasure is only one aspect of study and that new forms of 
enjoyment may flow from new forms of knowledge). 
Parker and other critics of film theory generally follow a tripartite line of 
reasoning: (a) filmmakers.use imagination and practical knowledge; (b) filmgoers 
work with common sense; and (c) film theorists unravel the magic and escape of 
cinema. But each time a director selects a location or angle, or asks for a script to 
be rewritten, she or he is operating from various implied understandings of space, 
time, vision, and meaning. The same is true of viewers. The task of film theory is 
to make those processes available for debate, whether they are deliberate or 
unconscious, individual or collective, human or institutional. The chapters in 
this book assist this task by examining a wide variety of approaches to cinema, 
summarizing them in a scholarly and readable fashion, and offering' some new 
directions. We have sought diversity of intellectual, geographical, and cultural 
background in our authors, in keeping with the plural approaches to film theory 
they address. Some contributors are well known to cinema studies while others 
are newer figures on the landscape, and their backgrounds criss-cross literature, 
philosophy, communications, education, sociology, and anthropology. They 
come from five continents, as part of our desire to push the field further toward 
deprovincialization. 
In almost all cases, the material in these chapters has political implications. Of 
course, some film academics separate their work from politics, seeking instead a 
means of registering and developing aesthetic discrimination "in a relationship of 
tutelage, to the more established disciplines" (Bennett, Boyd-Bowman, Mercer, 
and Woollacott 1981: ix). They seek to isolate the "basic features of film which 
can constitute it as an art" (Bordwell and Thompson 1997: ix). But even that old­
fashioned cultural elitism, whereby professors define what is art and then instruct 
others, can be of use. First, a seemingly abstracted formalism necessarily looks at 
the materiality of cinema, its sound and image, in ways that encourage a careful 
explanation of meaning. And second, the avowed project of "art" is doomed to 
failure in its attempt to cordon off the social. Film always exceeds attempts to 
institute such New-Critical readings, because of its history. As a governmental 
and business technology that spread with urbanization and colonialism, alongside 
multifarious attempts to comprehend the modernity that it brought into vision 
(Shohat/Stam 1994: 100-36), film is impossible to delimit in a fetishized manner 
for very long in all but the most intramural cloisters. The medium's promiscuity 
points every day and in every way toward the social. It is three things, all at once: 
a recorder of reality (the unstaged pro-filmic event); a manufacturer of reality (the 
staged and edited event); and part ~freality (watching film as a social event on a 
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Saturday night, or a protest event over sexual, racial, or religious stereotyping). 
Film is a marker of culture: 
not even the final target of enquiry, but part of a wider argument about representa­
tion - the social process ofmaking images, sounds, signs stand for something ... In 
efIect, film theory becomes part of the wider field of disciplines and approaches 
called cultural studies. (Turner 1988: 38) 
This suggests that the study ofcinema is about how consciousness and systems of 
value are created and either bind society together or illuminate its fissures. Film 
attained its majority as one of the principal new forms of inter-war communica­
tion. Along with the popular press and radio, it was designated as ideal for 
propaganda and social uplift (choose your terms). The imbrication of audiences 
and aesthetics through questions of representation is an abiding effect of this 
history (Lopez 1985: 57, 59). Depending on your politics, that may lead to 
uncovering "the cultural codes of patriarchy" (Wexman 1985: 62) or the "mode 
ofrepresentation %therness" (Bhabha 1983: 34). This history ensured Siegfried 
Kracauer's preference for "a material aesthetics, not a formal one" (1965: ix). 
Perhaps the most significant innovation in recent film theory has been a radical 
historicization of context, such that the analysis of textual properties and specta­
torial processes must now be supplemented by an account of occasionality that 
details the conditions under which a text is made, circulated, received, inter­
preted, and criticized. The life of any popular or praised film is a passage across 
space and time, a life remade again and again by institutions, discourses, and 
practices of distribution and reception - in short, all the shifts and shocks that 
characterize the existence of cultural commodities, their ongoing renewal as the 
temporary "property" of varied, productive workers and publics, and their stasis 
as the abiding "property" of businesspeople. Ana Lopez asks: 
Is Gone with the Wind the same kind of theoretical object on the TV screen today 
as it was in Radio City Music Hall in 1939? Should we study this phenom­
enon through a feminist, formalist, semiotic, or hermeneutic methodology? (1985: 
56-7) 
I would add the lens of black film theory to the list of textual methods, and ask 
social history, Africana, and American studies to assist with locating the film's 
intertexts, notably white racism of the 18605, the 1930s, and today. 
Despite the continuity of textual and audience axes within film theory, latter­
day lines have been drawn dividing media, communication, cultural, and film 
studies for reasons of rent-seeking academic professionalism. The theorization of 
production and spectatorship relations between film and television, for instance, 
continues to be dogged by the separation of mass communication's interest in 
economics, technology, and policy from film theory's preoccupations with aes­
thetics and cultural address, although attempts are underway to transform both 
sides of the divide (Balio 1990; Hill and McLoone n.d. [1997]). 
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The push for a radical contextualization of interpretation is aided by a surpris­
ing turn - the early history of film as part of a vaudeville bill is being reprised. 
The moving image is again part of a multi-form, animated, diverse network of 
entertainment, via CD-ROMs, computer games, the Web, and multiplexes. The 
brief moment when cinema could be viewed as a fairly unitary phenomenon in 
terms of exhibition (say, 1930 to 1950) set up the prospect of its textual fetishiza­
tion in academia, something that became technologically feasible with videocas­
sette recorders -- just when that technology's popularity compromised the very 
discourse of stable aestheticization! Now that viewing environments, audiences, 
technologies, and genres are so multiple, the cinema is restored to a mixed­
medium mode. At this crueial juncture, the division between the analysis of text 
and context is breaking up. Contemporary approaches model themselves on the 
abiding discourses identified at the beginning of this introduction, rather than on 
text alone (Hill and Church Gibson 1998). 
In keeping with the argument that there is as much repetition as difference in 
film theory, this Companion is organized conceptually rather than development­
ally. We begin with five chapters on film form and style Games Naremore on 
authorship, Sarah Berry-Flint on genre, Andre Gaudreault and Frans:ois Jost on 
narration, Lucy Fischer on editing, and Warren Buckland on semiotics). These 
chapters cover methods of cataloging and analyzing films as well as unpacking the 
sounds, images, and tendencies of the cinema and its critical apparatus. They are 
matched by three chapters addressing spectatorship (Gregory Currie on cognit­
ivism, Richard Allen on psychoanalysis, and E. Deidre Pribram on subjectivity). 
These papers represent dominant and competing theories of the film audience. 
The second half of the volume looks at topics that cross these boundaries, 
starting with two meta-critiques of film scholarship Gulia Erhart on queer theory 
and David James on class politics). We then take up marginalized approaches in 
film theory that are nevertheless central to understanding the cinema (Douglas 
Kellner on the eulture industries and Janet Wasko on political economy) before 
examining three emergent developments (Henry Jenkins on digitalization, Tom 
O'Regan on cultural exchange, and Faye Ginsburg on First People's film and 
media ethnography). The Companion concludes with four applications of some of 
the precepts illustrated in earlier chapters, modeling meta-criticism (Ira Bhaskar 
and Ismail Xavier) and textual analysis (Charles Ramirez Berg and Toby Miller). 
Although this book is designed to stand alone, it can also be used in concert 
with two other projects from Blackwell: Robert Stam's Film Theory: An Intro­
duction and our coedited Film and Theory: An Anthology. Film Theory: An 
Introduction takes readers through the history of the subject, summarizing and 
debating the field from early film theory, such as formalism and montage; 
through structuralism, early Third World critiques, and auteurism; on to psy­
choanalysis, feminisms, and post-structuralisms; and later queer theory and 
cultural studies, amongst others. Film and Theory: An Anthology includes key 
writings since the 1960s. Various rubrics (such as authorship, film languag'e, class 
and the culture industries, the historical spectator/audience, and the nature of 
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the gaze, plus many more) are introduced by analytic essays, followed by selec­
tions of the most significant (and sometimes surprising) papers on the subject 
over the past 30 years. 
For all its pluralism, this project is not proclaiming a happy moment of 
Whiggism, where all feasible methods of understanding films can be distilled. 
A scholarly paper combining all the methods outlined in this book, for example, 
would be not only unwieldy, but internally contradictory, striving to deny the 
incommensurability of various discourses (such as cognitivism and psychoana­
lysis, or auteurism and political economy). Attempts to marry neoformalist 
textual analysis, where politics is accidental, with neo-Marxist analysis of pro­
duction, where politics is central, have not always ended happily (Clark 1995: x; 
Wasko 1994: 17-18). 
If you walk away from reading this book with one message, however, it might 
be the necessity for a plural and political approach to film that follows Roger 
Chartier's dicta from the history of books: (a) a reconstruction of "the diversity of 
older readings from their sparse and multiple traces"; (b) a focus on "the text 
itself, the object that conveys it, and the act that grasps it"; and (c) an identifica­
tion of "the strategies by which authors and publishers tried to impose an 
orthodoxy or a prescribed reading on the text." Such syncretism looks for 
meaning in the interstices, the interactions, and the relative autonomy of each 
part of a film: how technology, labor, image, sound, paratext, intertext, and social 
text change (Chartier 1989: 157,161-3,166). 
In short, theory should produce "a verbal representation of the film complex" 
(Andrew 1984: 3). As such, it must acknowledge that "film is not only entertain­
ment but ... part of industrial and political culture" (Kolker 1999: xi). Our aim in 
compiling this Companion has been to encourage readers to utilize the full wealth 
of the human sciences in order to make a credible intervention into film culture. 
We trust it is useful and thank our contributors for their efforts in generating a 
summary of the past and the present and a challenge to the future. 
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CHAPTER TWO
 
Authorship 
James Naremore 
Motion pictures and television are often described as collaborative media, but 
their modes of production are hierarchical, involving a mixture of industrialized, 
theatrical, and artisanal practices. Given the circumstances under which parti­
cular films are made, it is possible to think of any of the creative individuals who 
contribute to them as a kind of author. In books about classic Hollywood, the 
term has been applied with more or less justification to writers (Anita Loos, 
Raymond Chandler), photographers Gohn Alton, Gordon Willis), composers 
(Max Steiner, Bernard Herrmann), choreographers (Busby Berkeley, Michael 
Kidd), and stars (the Marx Brothers, Bette Davis). It has even described the old­
style corporate executives (David Selznick, Darryl Zanuck), who functioned as 
impresarios and who wanted to keep their names before the public. For the most 
part, however, film authorship is associated with directors, who are said to play 
the most important role in the production process. Directorial names such as D. 
W. Griffith and F. W. Murnau have been fundamental to the establishment of 
movies as "respectable" art, and until recently histories of film styles and 
institutions were organized around them, just as literary history is organized 
around the names of poets or novelists. As a result, "Sergei Eisenstein," "Robert 
Flaherty," and "Alfre,d;,Hitchcock" have come to signify not only persons but 
also traditions, theories, and genres. 
The study of authorship is not in itself a theory, only a topic or theme. It can 
involve a g·reat variety of political positions and theoretical assumptions; and, like 
all types of criticism, it can be performed well or badly. And yet the discourse on 
the director-as-author has always been problematic - not only because of the 
industrial basis of the film medium, but also because the film director emerged as 
a creative type at the very moment when authorship in general was becoming an 
embattled concept. At no point was the irony of the situation more evident than 
during· the 1950s and '60s, when certain directors in classic Hollywood and the 
international art cinema became known throughout the world as "auteurs," and 
when film criticism as a whole underwent a kind of revolution. This was the 
period of the French politique des auteurs, or "policy" of canonizing directors in 
9 
James Naremore 
the name of art, and it remains crucial to an understanding of contemporary film 
studies. I therefore want to postpone my discussion of theoretical debates 
surrounding authorship until I have commented on film culture in the middle 
decades of the century. In this way, I can historicize recent film theory, making a 
useful distinction between the study of authors (which, although it involves all 
the arts, has strong literary associations) and the more influential, movie-specific 
phenomenon called auteurism. 
1 Auteurism 
As its suffix implies, auteurism is less a scientific approach to the problem of the 
author than a kind of aesthetic ideology or movement. Like countless other 
movements, it was generated by what Raymond Williams terms a "cultural 
formation" - a loose confederation of intellectuals and critics (in this case made 
up almost entirely of white males) who had roughly similar objectives, and who 
developed a body of polemical writing to justify their opinions. Such formations 
are especially important to the modern era, and sociological research might help 
us to understand their significance. As Williams notes, they are typically centered 
in a metropolis, at points of "transition and intersection" within a complex social 
history; and the individuals who both compose and are composed by them always 
have a "range of diverse positions, interests and influences, some of which are 
resolved (if at times only temporarily) ... , others of which remain as internal 
differences" (1981: 85-6). In every modern case, the formations are ephemeral, 
spinning off into individual careers or breakaway movements; but they some­
times disseminate their ideas widely, leaving more or less permanent traces on the 
general culture. 
Auteurism fits the profile of a modern cultural formation almost perfectly. It 
originated in Paris during the 1950s, at a moment when France was becoming 
increasingly Americanized, and in many respects it imitated what Peter Burger 
and other writers have called the "historical" avant-garde of the 1910s and '20s. 
Like the old avant-garde, it possessed an intellectual or "left: bank" aura; it made 
iconoclastic or shocking value judgments; it was articulated in specialized maga­
zines (the most famous of which was Cahiers du cinema); it embraced certain 
elements of pop culture and used them as a weapon to attack bourgeois values; it 
published manifestos (such as Frans;ois Truffaut's "A Certain Tendency of the 
French Cinema"); and it served as a kind of banner to help publicize the early 
work of its own adherents. 
The last point is especially important, because many of the auteurists (includ­
ing Truffaut, Jean-Luc Godard, Claude Chabrol, Eric Rohmer, and Jacques 
Rivette) were themselves directors who wanted to foreground their own creativ­
ity. Their call for a "personal" cinema was inspired to some extent by Alexandre 
Astruc's 1948 essay, "The Birth of a New Avant-Garde: La Camera-Stylo," 
published in the socialist film journal L 'Ecran franrais, which spoke metaphor­
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ically of the camera as a pen, the screen as a piece of paper, and the director as an 
author. Astruc, who was both a novelist and a director, strongly emphasized the 
inscribable properties of cinematic mise-en-scene, locating them "in every ges­
ture of the characters, in every line of dialogue, in those camera movements that 
relate objects to objects and characters to objects." The auteurists strongly 
supported such ideas, and gave thcm a practical application by moving from 
critical writing into filmmaking. Meanwhile, their reviews and essays were filled 
with flamboyant descriptions of directors as existentialist authors. Godard 
remarked apropos of Ingmar Bcrgman that "The cinema is not a craft. It is an 
art. It does not mean teamwork. One is always alone on the set as before the blank 
page" (1972: 76). Truffaut, speaking of Robert Aldrich's Kiss Me Deadly, 
declared, "It is easy to picture its author as a man overflowing with vitality, as 
much at ease behind a camera as Henry Miller facing a blank page" (1978: 94). 
As Godard himself wittily remarked about this attitude, "Nothing could be 
more classically romantic" (76). There was also a certain irony in the French 
fascination with the American cinema: the auteurists' rise to success as film­
makers was facilitated by the decline of the Hollywood studios, which had 
dominated the marketplace in the years between the two world wars. In the 
United States, the major production companies were no longer in control of 
exhibition, censorship regulations were becoming liberalized, and European art 
films were making significant inroads in urban theaters. The French New Wave 
was particularly well suited to the period, because it managed to fuse certain 
elements of Italian neorealism with a fond, insouciant, distinctively Gallic atti­
tude toward old-fashioned Hollywood genres and directors. In certain American 
contexts, its name became useful as a kind of marketing strategy. 
This does not mean, however, that either the New Wave or auteurism can be 
reduced to a device for self-promotion. The latter began as a purely critical 
undertaking, and in some of its most impressive cinematic instances it dissolved 
the distinctions between criticism and art. Equally significant, auteurism marked 
an important change in the history of taste. One of the best sources for an 
understanding of what the French movement achieved is Jim Hillier's intelli­
gently edited Cahiers du Cinema in the 19S0s, which illustrates the diversity of 
opinion among the writers of the period, and places French debates over Amer­
ican cinema in the context of larger concerns about neorealism, modernism, and 
the French film industry. As Hillier indicates, auteurism was never a product of 
Cahiers du cinema alone, and was not simply about American-based directors such 
as Samuel Fuller, Alfred Hitchcock, and Nicholas Ray. All the Parisian cineastes 
were interested in American auteurs, including the left critics at Positif and the 
right critics at Presence du cinema; in general, however, French writing about 
Hollywood was tempered by an even stronger admiration for Roberto Rosselini, 
Michaelangelo Antonioni, Alain Resnais, and the authors of the "nouveau 
roman." Nor were the auteurists exclusively concerned with authorship. Parti­
cularly at Cahiers, their practice usually implied a contradictory set of theories 
about the phenomenology and semiotics of the cinema, and it produced excellent 
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essays on stars and genres. Above all, it g'enerated a relentlessly evaluative kind of 
criticism, involving a policy of liking some directors and films more than others. 
Thus if you wrote for Cahiers, you tended to favor Jean Renoir, Howard Hawks, 
and Kenji Mizoguchi over Eisenstein, J olm Huston, and Akira Kurosawa; you 
disliked well-made literary adaptations of Great Books, especially when they 
suggested a slick, middle-brow attitude toward Art; you had a quasi-surrealistic 
passion for l'amour flu in pictures like Gun Crazy, Letter from an UnknOlvn 
Woman, and Vertigo; you preferred low-budget films noirs such as Kiss Me 
Deadly over Big Productions with Important Themes such as Bridge on the 
River Kwai; and you praised wide-screen, color-coded melodramas like Some 
Came Running instead of Academy-Award-winning "little" movies like Marty. 
Much of the philosophical underpinnings of 1950s criticism at Cahiers derived 
from Andre Bazin, the editor of the journal. It must be emphasized, however, 
that Bazin himself was never an auteurist in the sense I have described above. 
Although he produced seminal writings on a number of directors (Renoir, Robert 
Bresson, William Wyler, Orson Welles, and the Italian neorealists), he chastised 
his younger colleagues for their habit of falling into uncritical hero worship, and 
he was explicitly disapproving of the "Hichcocko-Hawksian" tendency in Truf­
faut's work. For his own part, Bazin wrote a great deal about well-made literary 
adaptations, and praised "the genius of the system" in classic Hollywood. His 
influence on the younger generation lay not so much in the authors he favored as 
in his broad historical knowledge of the cinema and the arts generally, his abili ty 
to take Hollywood genres and technical developments seriously, and his keen 
understanding of the way style gives rise to meaning. Above all, Bazin imbued the 
early New Wave with a spirit of existential humanism, which placed great 
emphasis on the cinema's ability to view the world from an objective standpoint. 
(The very word for the photographic lens in French is objectif) He and the 
auteurists repeatedly favored "realistic," "democratic," or untendentious uses of 
the camera; as a result, Cahiers in the 1950s was preoccupied with the "ethics" of 
mise-en-scene, and with directors who used invisible editing, long takes, or 
sequence shots rather than montag'e. Sometimes this ideology was joined with a 
belief that the best American auteurs were existentialists avant la lettre. In his 
excellent 1960 review of Fuller's Verboten!, for example, Truffaut describes the 
director of the film as if he were an action painter, making instinctive or primal 
decisions about what should be put on the screen: "This is direct cinema, 
uncriticizable, irreproachable, 'given' cinema, rather than assimilated, digested, 
or reflected upon. Fuller doesn't take time to think; it is clear that he is in his 
glory when he is shooting" (1978: 108). 
There was a tension, however, between Truffaut's existentialist ideas, which 
made him sympathetic to a Bazinian or "open" cinema of the kind practiced by 
Renoir and Rosselini, and his equally strong love of genre directors like Fuller 
and modernist auteurs like Welles. Whatever attitude he may have had toward 
phenomenal reality, it seems clear that what chiefly attracted Truffaut to the 
Americans was their sense of fairy tales or pure artifice. As Leo Braudy has 
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pointed out, Truffaut and Godard were part of a movie-obsessed generation who 
were hyper-aware of the conventions of the medium, and who "showed their 
involvement with the special aesthetics of film most clearly when they considered 
genre films - the westerns, the detective films, the musicals - in which realistic 
materials were used unrealistically in a structure dictated less by story than by 
myth." Even when Truffaut discussed Citizen Kane, Braudy notes, "he impli­
citly contradicted Bazin's assumption of a realist teleology in film history by 
celebrating the virtues of self-conscious stylization" (1991: 47). 
Where the auteurists chiefly differed from Bazin was in the delirious style of 
their cinephilia, and in their tendency to place directors of pop genres or 
assembly-line films alongside the work of more highly respected artists. One of 
their favorite devices for achieving these effects was the ten-best list, which could 
be used as a weapon against prevailing opinion. (Godard announced not only the 
ten best films of each year, but also such things as the "Ten Best American 
Sound Films" and the "Six Best French Films Since the Liberation.") The 
typical list in Cahiers contained several key works of the Nouvelle Vague, 
together with such unexpected choices as Hatari!, Bigger Than Life, or A Time 
to Love and a Time to Die. Both here and in their more discursive writings, the 
auteurists loved to elevate the low-brow over the middle-brow. Godard was 
perhaps better than anyone at the technique - as when he remarked that "an 
alert Frank Tashlin is worth two Billy Wilders" (1972: 3.5). His reviews repeat­
edly blurred the distinction between mass media and the avant-garde, and 
balanced sophistication with a swooning idealism about certain Hollywood 
films. In most cases, he employed a language of puns, epigrams, and breath­
takingly unorthodox pronouncements that turned the dominant critical values on 
their heads. Thus in 19.52, writing under the name "Hans Lucas," he answered 
the Bazinian question, "What is Cinema?," with a single phrase, basing his 
response on the work of old-fashioned auteurs like Griffith, Flaherty, Renoir, 
and Hitcheock: "the expression of lofty sentiments" (31). 
Godard's Olympian pronouncement illustrates one of the fundamental para­
doxes of auteurism. Although the movement was in every sense youthful, 
impetuous, and romantic (some would say adolescent), it was often dedicated 
to antique virtues, and to praising the work of directors who were entering their 
twilight years. We should recall that Josef von Sternberg's Jet Pilot, Fritz Lang's 
The Thousand Eyes o{Dr. Mabuse, Renoir's Le Dejeuner sur l'herbe, John Ford's 
Seven Women, and Hawks's Red Line 7000 were all made during roughly the same 
period as the early films of the Nouvelle Vague. These pictures occupied a world 
apart from both the current Hollywood hits and the new European art cinema, as 
if they were still clinging to dated formulas or dead modes of production. Few 
mainstream critics in the Anglo-Saxon world took them seriously, but the 
auteurists passionately embraced them, sometimes ranking them above the 
same directors' more celebrated films of the 1930s and '40s. One of the most 
sweetly charming features of auteurism lay in its love for old pros or cinematic 
father-figures who were still alive, making unpretentious genre movies or quiet, 
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meditative films such as Ford's The Sun Shines Bright. Truffaut, who could be 
devastatingly sarcastic in some contexts, was quite touching when he spoke of 
such films, or when he used them to rebuke current fashions. 
The paradoxes or tensions I have been describing - between old and new, 
between pop and modernism, between a humanist philosophy and a nascent idea 
of cinematic ecriture - are also apparent in the early films of the Nouvelle Vague. 
Truffaut's directorial style, for example, rises out of two apparently incompatible 
approaches to cinema: Renoir's free-flowing tolerance, which breaks down gen­
eric conventions, and Hitchcock's "murderous gaze," which exploits generic 
conventions to the utmost. Godard's Breathless employs a similar dialectic, but 
the effect is much more conflicted or ambivalent. A highly personal movie (at 
least in the intellectual sense), Breathless gives its auteur an opportunity to 
identify with both Michel Uean-Paul Belmondo), a French wise guy who is 
infatuated with everything American, and Patricia Uean Seberg), a sensitive, 
rather intellectual young woman from America who fears that she might be 
getting too deeply involved with the underworld. The two facets of the director's 
imaginary identity are represented in the form of a perversely romantic and failed 
relationship, much like the ones in Hollywood film noir; and the relationship is 
echoed in a dense pattern of allusions to two different kinds of text: genre movies, 
mostly associated with Michel, and high-cultural literature, music, or painting, 
mostly associated with Patricia. The film alludes not only to Aldrich, Fuller, 
Budd Boetticher, Otto Preminger, and Raoul Walsh, but also to William Faulk­
ner, Rainer-Marie Rilke, Louis Aragon, Guillaume Apollinaire, and William 
Shakespeare. Godard is the implicit source of these allusions and is therefore 
identified with both the man of action and the would-be artist, with both the 
rebel and the conformist - although it may be significant that he makes a cameo 
appearance (imitating Hitchcock) as a man on the street who points Michel out to 
the cops. 
In retrospect, both French auteurism and the Nouvelle Vague could be under­
stood as early symptoms of what Andreas Huyssen, in After the Great Divide 
(1986), describes as a "postmodern" sensibility. Huyssen chooses 1960 as the 
date when the postmodern style became dominant in Western culture, manifest­
ing itself in the Pop Art movement, the criticism of Susan Sontag and Leslie 
Fiedler, and the architectural theory of Robert Venturi. Auteurism is contem­
porary with these events, and it shares one of their defining characteristics: a 
tendency to blur or dissolve the boundaries between high and mass art. Godard 
in particular often seems like a Pop Artist, especially when he writes about 
Hollywood directors like Fuller or Douglas Sirk, or when he inserts loving 
tributes to pulp thrillers or big-budget musicals into his films. Notice, moreover, 
that auteurism is contemporary with the end of the Fordist system in Hollywood 
and the sale of old movies to television. By 1960 the postmodern economy of 
electronic communication had fully arrived, and viewers everywhere were 
becoming accustomed to an aesthetic based on allusion, pastiche, or recycled 
photographic imagery.l 
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Although the Nouvelle Vague was fostered by postmodernity or "late capital­
ism," it also retained certain features of romanticism and critical modernism. 
However it might be described, the important point is that French success in the 
art theaters gave the auteurist writings of Godard, 'I'ruffaut, Rohmer, and 
Chabrol a special authority. By the early 1960s the movement had spread far 
beyond France. In England, it influenced the best critics of the period, including 
Robin Wood, Raymond Durgnat, Victor Perkins, Peter Wollen, David Thom­
son, and the group of writers associated with Movie. Over the next decade, it had 
a similar influence in America, shaping the work of critic-filmmakers Paul 
Schrader and Peter Bogdanovitch, and eventually affecting what came to be 
known as "New American Cinema." During the 1960s, its presence was quite 
strong in New York, where the avant-garde filmmaker Jonas Mekas briefly 
provided a space for auteurist criticism in the pages of Film Culture, where select 
revival cinemas featured retrospectives of Hollywood auteurs, and where Film 
Comment became an important auteurist jOl\rnal. 
The maverick critic Manny Farber, who anticipated many of these develop­
ments, had written his famous essay on "Underground Films" in 1957, praising 
Hollywood's male-action genre movies and attacking the middle-brow or "qual­
ity" tradition in America (meanwhile persuading us that Howard Hawks, one of 
the most successful producer-directors of the previous two decades, was some­
how an underground artist). The most influential American exponent of auteur­
ism, however, was Andrew Sarris, whose columns for The Village Voice and 
writings on directors in The American Cinema (1968) helped to establish the 
canonical works of classic Hollywood. Sarris's major achievement was to reinter­
pret the French movement for America. Like Truffaut, he launched a polemical 
attack against a tradition of quality, made up chiefly of literary adaptations and 
social-problem pictures; his principal targets, however, were not Claude Autant­
Lara, Marcel Carne, and Jean Delannoy, but John Huston, William Wyler, and 
Elia Kazan. Along similar lines, he attacked prevailing intellectual opinions 
(especially the disdain for Hollywood glamour and the taste for movies with 
"proletarian" significance). But because Sarris was a university teacher rather 
than a would-be director, he gave auteurism a strong academic inflection, using 
its basic assumptions to write a full-scale history. One of the explicit aims of The 
American Cinema was to make film historiography less of an amateur calling. To 
this end, Sarris modeled himself to some degree on the New Critics in American 
literary studies: he placed great emphasis on personal style and was contemp­
tuous of the positivists, the sociologists, and their nonprofessional allies, the 
hobbyists or "stamp collectors." His most powerful technique was the evaluative 
list, which he borrowed from the French and elaborated into a map of popular 
movies from Griffith to the present. In The American Cinema he listed approx­
imately two hundred directors, placing them in hierarchical categories; he listed 
each director's films chronologically, italicizing the pictures he favored; and he 
listed the best films of each year from 1915 onward (after their directors' names), 
italicizing the masterpieces. 
15 
James Naremore 
At the time The American Cinema was written, Sarris's evaluations were 
iconoclastic and politically incorrect. With the exception of Rouben Mamoulian, 
Lewis Milestone, and William Wellman, all the directors he placed in the "Less 
Than Meets the Eye" and "Strained Seriousness" categories were active, and 
most were highly regarded. Ford's greatest pictures were generally thought to be 
The Informer and The Grapes of Wrath (Sarris preferred Steamboat 'Round the 
Bend and Wee Willie Winkie), and melodramatists such as Sirk or low-budget 
action directors such as Fuller and Anthony Mann had nothing like their present 
reputations. Even so, the overwhelming majority of names in Sarris's 
"Pantheon" belonged to the old-time producer-directors who worked slightly 
apart from studio executives. There was nothing especially unusual about a book 
that praised these individuals. Sarris was most unorthodox not when he argued 
on behalf of Chaplin or Welles, but when he defended Limelight or The Lady fiwn 
Shanghai. He was also challenging when he showed admiration for Hollywood 
soap operas, and when he placed an unfashionable director such as Cecil B. de 
Mille (the very symbol of Hollywood vulgarity and right-wing bombast) on the 
"Far Side of Paradise," next to the most honored figures. 
In this respect and others, The American Cinema is a book of sharp but 
productive contradictions - a mixture of populism and elitism, of appeals to 
individual expression and vigorous praise for Hollywood. Even while it offers a 
montage of epigrammatic comments on directors, it shares Bazin's fondness for 
long takes and the continuity style. Notice, too, that while its critical opinions 
reflect the latest continental trends, its basic values are old. Sarris is skeptical of 
art-house modernism (which he describes more than once as "Antonionien­
nui"), and he greatly admires the cinema of nostalgia or memory - especially 
the films of Griffith, Chaplin, Ford, and Welles, all of whom look back to the 
nineteenth century. By the same token, he responds passionately to the old-world 
aestheticism of Sternberg and Max Ophiils, and he insists that proper apprecia­
tion of their films should not be confused with the 1960s vogue for camp or 
kitsch. 
Sarris, like all the other auteurists, is a latter-day aesthete (albeit a heterosexual 
one), finding autonomous personal expression in places where the studio bosses, 
the puritans of the American left, and the artistic trend-setters had not thought to 
look. He and his colleagues were surely among the last romantics. Their judg­
ments of specific films and directors, however, have withstood a great many 
changes in intellectual fashion; furthermore, as I hope to indicate, their interest in 
creative agency still has relevance and ought to be taken seriously by anyone who 
thinks of the movies as an art. 
2 The Death (and Survival) of the Author 
Auteurism had a significant impact. It profoundly affected Hollywood's view of 
its own past, and in the process greatly enhanced the reputation of directors like 
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Hawks and Hitchcock, who were making their late films at the height of the 
movement? Equally important, it influenced the spread of college film societies, 
inspired a new generation of academics to write about film, and contributed to 
the growth of film studies as an academic discipline. 
In the Anglo-Saxon world especially, film study proliferated in literature 
departments rather than in drama or art-history departments, probably because 
the very term "auteur" tended to encourage an association with literature. 
Literary specialists found auteurism especially compatible because it offered a 
provisional canon and a program for research into a vast, largely unexplored area 
of twentieth-century narrative; it also required a scholarly effort to see every­
thing, not for the purpose of cataloging or building an archive, but for the 
purpose of making informed value judgments. To British auteurists such as 
Robin Wood, this project had something in common with the severely evaluative, 
somewhat anti-modernist literary criticism practiced by F. R. Leavis and his 
followers at Scrutiny in the 1930s and '40s. Thus Wood began his famous book on 
Hitchcock with a chapter entitled "Why We Should Take Hitchcock Seriously," 
and went on to stress the "complex moral implications" of certain Hitchcock 
films (1989: 4). In a more qualified and complex fashion, the first edition of Peter 
Wollen's Signs and Meaning in the Cinema (1969) concluded with the suggestion 
that film study might join forces with the dominant, Arnoldian form ofeducation: 
Hitchcock is at least as important an artist as, say, Scott Fitzgerald, much more 
important than many other modern American novelists who have found their way 
on to the university curriculum. I do not think time is wasted in writing about these 
novelists, all things being equal, and I do not think it would be wasted if hundreds 
of post-graduates were writing research theses on Jean Renoir, Max Ophuls or 
John Ford. (160-1) 
Arnold and Leavis, however, were strange models for film critics to imitate. 
Leavis in particular had been a thoroughgoing opponent of mass culture, who 
offered literature as a civilizing defense against industrial modernity. To apply 
his methods to film was to unwittingly parody or appropriate the British culture­
and-society debates of the previous century; it was also to realign or decenter the 
academic canon, and to encourage a certain curiosity about how canons are 
formed in the first place. In this regard and in many others, auteurism began 
to deconstruct at the very moment when it achieved its greatest success. Ultim­
ately it fell victim to a variety of internal contradictions in its own practice, to 
growing acceptance by the culture industries, to the professionalism of academia, 
and to theoretical challenges from both the right and the left. 
The first of the theoretical challenges, barely noticed at the time, was already 
inherent in the literary methodology that some of the American auteurists had 
adopted. Disregarding the question of what kind of work directors actually 
perform, we do not need to know their names (just as we do not need to know 
the names of stars) in order to comprehend the stories we see on the screen, or to 
construct a sophisticated poetics of the cinema. The very idea of modern poetics 
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in the Anglo-Saxon world derives from an "objective" formalism of a type best 
exemplified by T. S. Eliot, who argued in "Tradition and the Individual Talent" 
(1919) that "Honest criticism and sensitive appreciation is directed not upon the 
poet but upon the poetry." In the literary sphere, Eliot and the New Critics 
mounted a devastating attack on a dusty, genteel, academic historicism, in which 
the names of great writers figured prominently. In the process, they warned us 
not to commit the "intentional fallacy," and always to trust the tale, not the teller. 
Prior to the 1920s, the study ofliterature in the United States was essentially a 
branch of intellectual biography, guided by the Arnoldian attempt to shape the 
morality and taste of young gentlemen, and by the idea that art was something in 
the "real" world, existing prior to language. In sweeping aside major parts of this 
tradition, the New Criticism had democratic effects: it called attention to the way 
sign systems construct the world, and, in the words ofJonathan Culler, it enabled 
"the meanest student who lacked the scholarly information of his betters" to 
make "valid comments on the language and structure of the text" (1981: 3-4). 
Even though the New Criticism gradually died out, all subsequent developments 
in textual analysis - including structuralism, post-structuralism, and contempor­
ary narratology - have been equally formalist or objective in their methodologies. 
Moreover, the overwhelming majority of introductory classes on media "lan­
guage" taught in the universities are still based on New-Critical precepts. The 
most influential textbook in film studies, David Bordwell and Kristin Thomp­
son's Film Art, argues that films should be evaluated along formal lines, accord­
ing to internal criteria such as unity, coherence, complexity, originality, and 
intensity. Given this advice, we have not moved as far as we might think from the 
New-Critical ideal of the "well-wrought urn." 
But here we encounter another paradox. Although the main current of instruc­
tion and analytic criticism tends to leave the question of the author to one side, 
the major achievements in modern poetics, as represented by such diverse figures 
as Erich Auerbach, Leo Spitzer, Roland Barthes, or Emile Benviniste, are 
derived from close analysis of the Western canon. For its part, Film Art is replete 
with the names of celebrated directors, and David Bordwell himself is the author 
of fine books on Carl Dreyer, Yasujiro Ozu, and Eisenstein. There would appear 
to be an unstated link between formalism, aestheticism, and the tendency to favor 
certain artists. In this context, we should recall that for all its apparent objectivity 
of method, the New Criticism advanced implicit ideological agendas, some of 
which were anti-democratic, and it created both a canon of modernist authors 
and a kind of priesthood of interpretation. It achieved such ends despite (or 
perhaps because of) the fact that it bracketed the important issue of historical 
authors and readers, leaving them outside the field of study, as unexamined 
entities who were extraneous to the understanding of self-sufficient works of art. 
Auteurism was different, not only because it validated Hollywood, but also 
because it openly fostered a cult of authorship and an impulse toward historical 
research. There were nevertheless a good many affinities between the New­
Critical study of language and the auteurist emphasis on the "camera-stylo." 
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The auteurists faced much greater challenges from inside film culture, which 
was deeply affected by the radical politics of the Vietnam years, and by a new and 
more truly avant-garde movement centered in Paris. The late 1960s and '70s 
were a period when the "Langois affair" led to student riots and a general strike, 
when the Situationists made collage films, when Godard joined the "Dziga 
Vertov collective," and when the radicalized elements of the French film indus­
try began to express dissatisfaction with any system that designated directors as 
"bosses of meaning.,,3 At roughly the same time, "Third Cinema" developed in 
Latin America and in several nations that had once been colonized; this led to a 
militantly political type of filmmaking which, although it was indebted in 
certain ways to the Italian neorealists and the French New Wave, defined itself 
in opposition to both Hollywood entertainment and personalized European 
art. 
Meanwhile, French anti-humanist "Theory" (a term that hardly existed in the 
Anglo-Saxon world) began to change the priorities for academic film criticism 
throughout the West. Outside France, the change first became widely apparent 
in the British journal Screen, which published Colin MacCabe's writings on 
Brecht, Stephen Heath's two-part analysis of Touch oj Evil, Laura Mulvey's 
study of "Visual Pleasure," and many other seminal essays. Screen theory as a 
whole was indebted to the program outlined in "Cinema/Ideology/Criticism," a 
1968 Cahiers du cinema manifesto by Pierre Narboni and Jean-Louis Comolli, 
which marked a turn away from auteurism. Like Narboni and Comolli, Screen 
was suspicious of Hollywood entertainment. It tended to subsume individual 
practices under generalized formal categories, to which it attributed ideological 
effects; it closely examined the ways a hypostasized "subject" was positioned by 
narrative conventions and the technical apparatus; and it repeatedly argued on 
behalf of a modernist or avant-garde cinema that was both politically activist and 
critically self-reflexive. 
Although nearly all theory in this period was Marxist (via Louis Althusser), it 
was just as disdainful of social realism as the auteurists had been. Nearly all of it 
was also in some sense Freudian (via Jaques Lacan), but it was not at all interested 
in the neuroses of individual artists; instead, it argued that the dominant tradition 
of cinematic language (described by Christian Metz as an "imaginary signifier") 
was structured by a systemically patriarchal unconscious. On every front, theory 
replaced the study of the author with the study of the sign systems through which 
ideology was represented. The author became a kind of epiphenomenon -- an 
ideological or historical construction. Two French essays strongly influenced this 
tendency: in "\Vhat Is an Author?" Michel Foucault deconstructed the authorial 
"function," showing its relationship to early Christian exegesis, to the rationalist 
episteme of bourgeois society, and to legal or property rights; and in "From 
Work to Text," Roland Barthes contrasted the authorized work of art -- which, 
he argued, was little more than a reifled commodity - with the open-ended 
process of textuality, which seemed to belong to the reader, or to nobody in 
particular. 
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Where film study was concerned, the names of theorists now became more 
important than the names of directors. The new writing nevertheless favoured a 
wide range of filmmakers who could be interpreted in avant-garde terms ­
including Soviet radicals (Eisenstein, Dziga Vertov), pre-Hollywood pioneers 
(Edwin Porter and the photographers who worked before Griffith), certain 
Japanese directors (Ozu and Nagisa Oshima), and a group of contemporaries 
who practiced "counter cinema" (Godard, Jean-Marie Straub and Daniel Huil­
let, Peter Wollen and Laura Mulvey). Moreover, the auteurist canon did not 
completely disappear from the advanced film journals. When the editorial col­
lective at Cahiers du cinema undertook a close ideological analysis of Hollywood, 
the representative text they chose was John Ford's Young Mr. Lincoln; most of 
the French essays on cinema and psychoanalysis were centered on Hitchcock; 
and even in "Cinema/Ideology/Criticism," Narboni and Comolli said a good 
word about Jerry Lewis's The Bellboy. Several of the original British auteurists, 
including Wollen and Wood, who for some time had been associated with the 
New Left, made increasing use of post-structuralist theory; but again and again 
they chose to write about pictures by Hitchcock or \\lelles. In the pages of Screen 
and elsewhere, cutting-edge theoretical papers were often devoted to films by 
Hawks, Walsh, Sirk, and Ophiils. These papers did not try to establish particular 
individuals as artists; nevertheless, they had the indirect effect of keeping artistic 
reputations and auteurist tastes alive. 
Over the next decade, the Vietnam era gave way to the Reagan-Thatcher 
years. Hollywood learned to profit from blockbusters; the media were increas­
ingly consolidated and globalized; and social protest fragmented along genera­
tional, ethnic, and gender lines. The succeeding generation of academic writers 
on film became skeptical of authoritarian or top-down models of communication 
(in part because Barthes had already pointed to the importance of the reader), and 
the theoretical conjunction of Saussurian linguistics, Althusserian Marxism, and 
Lacanian psychoanalysis was gradually replaced by another paradigm, associated 
with such figures as Antonio Gramsci, Michel de Certeau, Pierre Bourdieu, and 
the British and Australian exponents of cultural studies. The critical emphasis 
shifted from the avant-garde to the popular, and from the "interpellating" effects 
of cinematic narrative to the techniques of "resistance" or "poaching" employed 
by audiences. As a result, we began to hear more about reception than produc­
tion, and more about Jean-Luc Picard than about Jean-Luc Godard. 
Today, after more than two decades of sophisticated film theory, academic 
writing tends to oscillate between large-scale arguments about the Hollywood 
"apparatus" and studies of genres or particular audiences. The critical study of 
authors is no longer a central activity. A great deal of contemporary historiogra­
phy continues to treat the author in the manner of Foucault, as little more than a 
discursive "function," and this tendency is reinforced by a long tradition of 
cultural theory, ranging from radicals like Walter Benjamin to conservatives like 
Daniel Bell, who argue that technology and the mass media systematically 
undermine the bourgeois values of originality, autonomy, and aestheticism 
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upon which the idea of authorship depends. Each new technical development 
since the beginning of the century helps to confirm the theory. Thus in the age of 
the computer, the media are able to g'enerate "hypertexts" - apparently author­
less words, sounds, and images manipulated by the reader/viewer according to 
structural conventions and a repertoire of older styles. A great many postmodern 
artists adopt a similar strategy; more like hricoleurs than creators, they make new 
texts out of borrowed or retro motifs, becoming ironic about their originality. 
And yet, as anyone can see from the latest movies, individual style has not gone 
away, and the star director is more visible than ever. Timothy Corrigan has 
argued that such figures are especially important to the contemporary market­
place because they serve as a "commercial strategy for organizing audience 
reception ... bound to distribution and marketing' aims that identify and address 
the potential cult status of an auteur" (1991: 103).4 I would agree, although 
Corrigan tends to overstate the differences between the past and the present. 
Orson Welles was a vastly more important artist than Kenneth Branagh or 
Woody Allen, but he was deeply involved in vulgar showbusiness, and the 
marketing of his early pictures depended heavily on RKO's ballyhoo about his 
"genius." In their own day, Cecil B. DeMille and Frank Capra were publicized 
no less than Steven Spielberg and James Cameron. What makes the contempor­
ary situation relatively new is the presence of a well-organized boutique cinema, 
geared to an up-market audience. In America, this cinema is promoted by high­
profile film festivals such as Sundance (which is regularly featured in The New 
York Times), and by the large advertising budgets of distributors such as Mir­
amax. Its films are aimed at people who read reviews, and who make discrimina­
tions on the basis of directorial names like David Lynch, Sally Potter, and Atom 
Egoyan. Meanwhile, in Europe, the international art cinema is more alive than 
ever, and is still dependent upon auteurs. Cahiers du cinema recently acknow­
ledged this situation by speculating on the question, "What happened to the 
politique des auteurs?" The ultimate answer: nothing. As proof of an ongoing 
"auteuromorphisme" (defined as a persistent desire to make the film resemble the 
body of its creator), the journal offered interviews with five directors Pedro 
Almodovar, Takeshi Kitano, Alain Resnais, Robert Guediguian, and Abbas 
Kiarostami - whose work had opened in Paris within the preceding month. 5 
The academic deemphasis on authors seems oddly out of key with this situa­
tion, although in one sense it has been salutary, offering a counterweight to the 
overwhelming emphasis on stars, celebrities, and biographies in the mainstream 
market. Perhaps, however, we have reached a point where an author criticism 
could join with cultural studies and contemporary theory in productive ways, 
contributing a good deal to our understanding of media history and sociology. 
French auteurism as a historical movement may be dead (its greatest influence 
lasted roughly two decades), but so are the tedious debates about the death of the 
author. The residual "auteur theory" in its various manifestations still affects our 
view of film history, and it still has lessons to teach us - among them, the three I 
have listed below: 
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1. The author is just as real (or as illusory and fetishized) as the money and 
the mechanical apparatus behind the cinema. The classic auteurs such as Hitch­
cock and Hawks imposed a style upon their films (as do contemporary directors), 
and any "materialistic" criticism needs to take this fact into account. It is of 
course true that authors are "written by" a series of historical, social, and cultural 
determinants; but the author does not become less real simply because she is 
socially constructed. Critics need to understand the phenomenon of the author 
dialectically, with an awareness of the complicated, dynamic relationship 
between institutions and artists, and with an appreciation of the aesthetic choices 
made by individual agents in particular circumstances. 
2. The study of authors is useful because it enables us to differentiate films 
more precisely. To be sure, we can make valid generalizations about Hollywood 
genres, studios, and the dominant ideology; but every western and every film noir 
is not the same. Within the institutional context of the classic studios, for 
example, the name "Hitchcock" points to a different nexus of ideological and 
psychological concerns from the name "Capra." The two individuals were 
themselves situated differently in history, and a study of their careers can 
produce a fine-grained understanding of both film style and the general culture. 
A similar point has been made by Robin Wood, who, in an echo of a famous 
statement by F. R. Leavis, argues that it is "only through the medium of the 
individual that ideological tensions come into particular focus" (1989: 292). 
3. Contrary to what Foucault sugg'ests in his famous essay on the idea of the 
author, it is very important indeed for us to know who is speaking. Readers or 
viewers always decode messages by positing a source, even if only an imaginary or 
unconscious one, and the source has a political meaning. A good deal is at stake, 
for example, when we decide to view Citizen Kane as an accident of collaboration 
at RKO rather than as a product of Orson Welles's career. One way oflooking at 
the film makes it seem like a Hollywood classic, whereas the other recognizes its 
critical or subversive edge. We can of course derive a political interpretation from 
purely internal evidence, avoiding the question of the source altogether. \Vhen 
we do, however, we fail to engage with what Andreas Huyssen calls "the ideology 
of the subject (as male, white, middle-class)," and we forsake the chance of 
"developing alternative and different notions of subjectivity" (1986: 213). In 
other words, there is no good reason why everyone needs to follow the example of 
Barthes and Foucault - who, as European male intellectuals, were deeply 
invested in the attempt to kill off the paternal creator. On the contrary, a good 
many previously marginalized groups need some identification with authors to 
help shape their identities. Thus in a recent book on Italian director Elvira 
Notari, Giuliana Bruno poses a rhetorical question: "Can or should we consider 
as dead an author, such as the female author, who is yet to be fully established in 
the public sphere and theorized?" (1993: 234).6 
In the current situation, writing about authors ought to be encouraged, if only· 
because it is a remarkably adaptable form of criticism that can make use of theory 
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while at the same time focussing on particular cases. Such writing does not need 
to center on directors: for example, it has a natural affinity with books or essays 
about stars, performance, and celebrity. Nor does it need to ignore studios, 
genres, and "collaboration." As one instance of the synthetic quality it can 
achieve, I would point to Peter Wollen's excellent monograph on MGM's Singin' 
in the Rain, which views the film as a summation of Gene Kelly's career, while at 
the same time discussing the work of the other contributors, the history of dance 
in movies, and the politics of American entertainment in the 1950s. Wollen notes 
that "Auteur structures can be superimposed in the same film ... but, in anyone 
instance, there is an implicit hierarchy of auteurs and, in the end, a threshold 
below which individual input becomes increasingly difficult to single out" (1992: 
29). Whatever limitations such an approach might have, in Wollen's hands it 
gives the film a dense historical specificity, and it greatly enhances our under­
standing of popular art. 
In many cases the study of authors is an exclusionary, conservative activity, 
bound up with the perpetuation of traditions and the manufacture of commod­
ities. But in certain contexts it can also serve as an attack on convention and a 
form of resistance. The best of the early auteurist criticism had these last 
qualities; it was romantic, but it flew in the face of received wisdom; it was ironic, 
but it never used irony as a defense against popular pleasure; it was subjective, but 
it implicitly demonstrated that the personal is the political. We can learn from 
what it accomplished without sacrificing theoretical insights or cultural critique. 
The canon of Hollywood, largely established by the original French auteurists, 
has yet to be explored, expanded, and challenged. We have plenty of biographies 
on major directors, but surprisingly few good books of criticism on their films. 
Meanwhile, the vast area of post-1970s cinema and made-for-TV movies is 
largely uncharted territory, containing undiscovered auteurs. Perhaps the old 
French strategy of announcing ten-best lists of directors and films (which 
survives today in lists of box-office receipts, kitsch, "guilty pleasures," and the 
appallingly bad" 100 best films" chosen by the American Film Institute) ought to 
be revived, with the understanding that canons are not monuments graven in 
stone - only provisional tables ofvalue or expressions of enthusiasm, meant to tell 
others about ourselves and to stimulate debate. \""Ie need to develop more of them, 
shaped by new constituencies who work outside the studio marketing depart­
ments. Above all, we need to restore to film criticism the sense of iconoclasm and 
aesthetic sensitivity it had in the days of the politique des auteurs. 
Notes 
I have discussed the connections between auteurism, the avant-garde, and postmo­
dernism in Naremore 1990. 
2 For an account of auteurism's influence and effect on the reputation of one of the 
most famous directors, see Kapsis 1992. 
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3 For a useful summary of these years, see Harvey 1978. 
4 Other commentaries on postmodern authorship include Andrew 1993 and Lehmann 
1997. For an interesting essay on the signature of an auteur, see Thomas 1998. 
5 See Baecque 1997. 
6 Additional commentary on authorship from a feminist perspcctivc may be [{mnd in 
Silverman 1988. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
Genre 
Sarah Berry-Flint 
The books in a library must be arranged in one way or another. ... Who can deny the 
necessity and the utility of such arrangements? But what should we say if some one began 
seriously to seek out the literary laws ... of shelf A or shelf 13, that is to say, of those 
altogether arbitrary groupings whose sole object was their practical utility? 
Benedetto Croce, Aesthetic 
According to popular usage, film genres are ways of grouping movies by style and 
story; a "genre film" is one that can be easily categorized with reference to a 
culturally familiar rubric. Genres offer prospective consumers a way to choose 
between films and help indicate the kind of audience for whom a particular movie 
was made. This emphasis on genres as means of popular market segmentation is, 
however, fairly recent. This chapter will offer a brief overview of how genres 
have been defined within film studies, beginning with post-war mythology and 
iconology studies and ending with contemporary debates about genres as broad 
discursive practices. 
Western genre theory is often traced back to Aristotle's Poetics and its influ­
ence on eighteenth-century European classicism, when genres were seen as ideal 
types of artistic expression to be emulated and refined. Classical genres, however, 
quickly turned into academically defined rules governing style and content in the 
arts. With the nineteenth-century Romantic movement, many artists and writers 
came to see classical genres as an over-regulation of both representation and 
reception Gameson 1981: 106; Buscombe 1995: 11). By the time of cinema's 
arrival in the 1890s, genres had become even more discredited through associa­
tion with mass-market publishing, which displaced the Victorian "gentle reader" 
at the center of the publishing world (Wilson 1983: 41). As a result, genres were 
associated with popular culture and a "brand name system against which any 
authentic artistic expression must necessarily struggle" Gameson 1981: 107). 
Early film critics thus tended to see genre as something to be derided or 
overlooked, since Romantic and nascent modernist aesthetics defined art in terms 
of individual formative vision, not commercial or popular forms. Although 
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individual critics and avant-garde groups like the surrealists admired slapstick 
comedy or Feuillade's detective serials, it was not until after World War II that 
film writers began to question the priority of authorship over genre in critical 
evaluation. Under the influence of the Cahiers du cinema, mainstream film critics 
began to take genre films more seriously, but their praise of individual genre films 
still implied that such works transcended generic mediocrity thanks to their 
directors' personal vision. Andrew Sarris, for example, used the term "genre 
film" to describe works without distinction - although he occasionally described 
genre films as having "unexpected deposits of feeling" (cited in Alloway 
1969: 11). 
In 1969, however, British writer Lawrence Alloway argued for a radically 
different approach to film criticism. In his catalog for a screening' of popular 
American crime films at the Museum of Modern Art, Alloway wrote: 
The proper point of departure for a film critic who is going to write apout the 
movies is membership in the large audience for whom they are intended ... the 
majority of film reviewers write as a hostile minority interested primarily in works 
that are above obsolescence. The emphasis in this book is on a description of 
popular movies, viewed in sets and cycles rather than as single entities. It is an 
approach that accepts obsolescence and in which judgments derive from the 
sympathetic consumption of a great many films. In terms of continuing themes 
and motifs, the obsolescence of single films is compensated for by the prolongation 
of ideas in film after film. (1969: 19) 
Alloway's argument that genre films should be seen as part of "sets and cycles" 
has resonance today in rclation to television studies and the recognition of how 
intertextuality and repetition structure individual television programs (ef. 
Browne 1987). Alloway's work offered a significant challeng'e to criticism that 
evaluated popular films solely in terms derived from more elite, individualized 
forms of cultural production. Instead, Alloway supported an approach based on 
the recurring "themes and motifs" of popular films, g'rouping them into loosely 
defined categories to be described and interpreted by genre critics. 
1 Problems of Definition 
Current debates on the status of film genres arise, in part, because of the different 
reasons for invoking them: filin scholars tend to define genres for purposes of 
interpretation and critical analysis, while producers, publicists, and audiences 
may use them as descriptive tools. Genres are part of film production and 
reception around the world, and although many Hollywood genres are inter­
nationally recognized, they always have culturally specific meanings. The variety 
of contexts and uses for generic labels is important because it indicates the 
provisional nature of such categories. In practical terms, genres are vehicles for 
the circulation of films in industrial, critical, and popular discourses. As the 
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culture industries rapidly expand their global reach, questions of the cross­
cultural circulation of genres become increasingly central to an understanding 
of how cinematic meaning is constructed and "translated." 
One might argue for a more limited, textual definition of genres by pointing 
out that generic conventions are not merely part of the circulation and reception 
of films, but are often inscribed as central aspects of film form and intelligibility. 
The film Singin' in the Rain (1952), for example, is not merely considered a 
musical by broad consensus; it also comments on and formally typifies the 
conventions of the "Hollywood musical." But generic meaning can never be 
inscribed within a single film - the repetition of genre motifs can only be 
experienced intertextually. Genre studies set out to define and codify such 
intertextual fields, and thereby create their own objects rather than simply 
discovering them. Certain formal or narrative patterns are seen as paradigmatic 
and thus serve, as Derrida suggests, to demarcate sameness and difference 
(Derrida 1980: 204). If we assume, however, that each film culture tends to 
generate some broadly agreed-upon generic categories, the question remains as to 
what significance they have. Are genres part of the dominant ideological bias of 
entertainment industries, functioning primarily to reconcile viewers to the status 
quo? Are they manifestations of the popular imagination, selected and repeated 
because of the viewing habits of sovereign film consumers? Are they simply 
stylistic and narrative patterns that engage viewers in pleasurable kinds of 
cognitive hypotheses and variations? 
These questions have often been addressed by seeing genres as part of an 
interdependent relationship between audience, industry, text (Ryall, cited in 
Gledhill 1985: 58), although most genre studies tend to focus on one of these 
three sites of genre use. For example, audience reception studies tend to define 
genres as "reading practices": socio-discursive frameworks and "horizons of 
expectation" brought by viewers to each new film they sec. In this sense, 
genres are social rather than textual constraints, allowing viewers to modify 
their generic frameworks and participate in the construction of meaning rather 
than simply "absorbing" it from the screen. For industry analysts, the ways that 
genres are used in relation to marketing strategies (advertising, merchandising, 
the star system, etc.) are seen to have a definitive influence on such reading 
practices. Lastly, texual and formal analysis in film studies tends to focus on the 
ways that narrative and stylistic conventions are "encoded" with genre-specific 
meanings. These aesthetic devices are seen to cue viewers to anticipate certain 
experiences (music or editing patterns that create suspense, for example, or the 
use of filters and sepia tones to indicate a period film). The history of such 
aesthetic codes is significant even when they are seen, ultimately, as dependent 
on larger discourses for their meaning (once we know we are watching a period 
film, for example, what kind of reading practices might come into play?). 
Ultimately, this circulation of meaning between audience, industry, and film 
text is irresolvable, but it is also central to any discussion of the significance of 
film genres. 
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2 Early Genre Study: Classicism and Myth 
Early film genres were derived by the transposition of visual, narrative, and 
discursive patterns from older media onto cinematic forms. Early Japanese films, 
for example, not only adapted traditional storytelling and theatrical "content" for 
the screen, but they were also incorporated into theatrical productions, with films 
projected as backdrops for Kabuki and shimpa plays (Nolletti and Desser 1992: 
ix). In the US and Europe, early film categories were primarily derived from 
other popular forms such as melodrama, religious and occult spectacle, journal­
istic and pictorial photography, the Wild West show, the travel or scientific 
lecture, and the dime novel. In spite of this history of polyglot genre formation, 
the task of genre analysis in film studies has often been seen as one of clarifying 
the key qualities and limits of each genre. Like Aristotle's Poetics, such 
approaches imply that genres have highly specific qualities which, like art 
forms more generally, demonstrate their essence when developed into a classical 
or ideal form. David Bordwell has detailed the degree to which early film scholars 
adopted such developmental models of art, which proposed: 
a progressive development from simpler to more complex forms, treated according 
to that biological analogy of birth/childhood/maturity so common among art 
historians since Vasari. (1997: 9) 
But Bordwell also notes that early film criticism adopted many tenets of aesthetic 
modernism, such as "the need for perpetual breaks with academicism" and a 
"radical' interrogation" of the medium (1997: 9). Early film critics thus tended to 
valorize individual works and see most genre films as formulaic products of a 
low-brow industry. Individual genre films were occasionally canonized, but it 
was not until the post-war reappraisal of Hollywood cinema by critics like Andre 
Bazin that the relationship between genre filmmaking and the Romantic/mod­
ernist model of artistic production was seriously explored. 
The advent of genre criticism was marked by a shift in focus away from film's 
aesthetically "transformative" and medium-specific attributes toward a more 
sociological interest in relations between style, popular narrative, and myth. 
Andre Bazin's praise of the western, for example, centered on its representation 
of an imaginary past, and he described its formal motifs as "signs or symbols of its 
profound reality, namely the myth" (Bazin 1971 b: 142). But Bazin also main­
tained the developmental assumptions and genre essentialism of traditional art 
history, seeing Stagecoach (1939), for example, in highly Platonic terms: 
Stagecoach is the ideal example of the maturity of a style brought to classic 
perfection. John Ford struck the ideal balance between social myth, historical 
reconstruction, psychological truth, and the traditional theme of the Western 
mise-en-scene . .. [it] is like a wheel, so perfectly made that it remains in equilibrium 
on its axis in any position. (Bazin 1971a: 149) 
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post-war westerns, he argued, often abandoned this sense of the "profound 
reality" of the myth by becoming more self-conscious and thematically diverse 
(149). 
This model of film genres' birth, evolution to a classical form, and inevitable 
decline is derived from art historians' periodization of stylistic movements into 
"experimental," "classical," and "baroque" phases. Although Bazin wrote that 
he did not claim to "explain everything by the famous law of successive aesthetic 
periods," such a teleology is implicit in his statement that "by 1938 or 1939 the 
talking film ... had reached a level of classical perfcction" due to the "maturing" 
of its dramatic and technical vocabulary (cited in Alloway 1969: 11). Thomas 
Schatz has cited art historian Henri Focillon's notion that the life-cycle mor­
phology is "inherent in [art] forms themselves," although Schatz also draws on 
Russian formalist theory, which proposes that "as a genre gains popularity it loses 
its defamiliarizing role and moves inevitably into decadence, giving way to new 
forms" (Schatz 1981: 37; Gunning 1990: 87). 
In early genre criticism, this genre morphology was frequently combined with 
a genre/myth analogy, relating generic rise and fall in a mimetic relationship to 
changes in social consciousness. This audience-driven morphology assumes that 
film viewers either validate existing mythological forms or require that they 
undergo revision. John Cawelti has argued, for example, that following their 
phases of innovation and classicism, genres go through a period of revisionist 
"self-awareness on the part of both creators and audiences," resulting in the 
popularity of "parodic and satiric treatments," and the eventual formation ofnew 
genres (Cawelti 1979: 578). Although invoked by numerous film theorists, many 
have noted that this model of generic change relies on the degree to which 
commercial film genres "reflect" the collective sensibilities of a mass audience 
- a problematic thesis that will be explored in more detail below. 
On the other hand, Steven Neale has argued that when seen in a larger 
historical context, the formalist approach to generic change can indicate the 
social dimensions of genre as a changing set of reading practices, rather than a 
fixed one. He notes that this requires equal attention to all three sites of generic 
meaning, however: audiences, industries, and texts. Citing Hans Robert Jauss, 
Neale argues that each new film seen by a particular viewer becomes part of the 
"founding and altering" of that viewer's horizon of generic expectations (Neale 
1990: 57). Such an approach appeals to individual experience, since every film 
spectator has a personal viewing history and a set of cinematic associations and 
expectations; but how generic change is implemented remains unclear. Neale 
cites Jauss's suggestion that: "[s]uccessful genres ... gradually lose their effective 
power through continual reproduction; they are forced to the periphery by new 
genres" (Neale 1990: 60). How a genre's "effective power" is determined, and 
how generic innovation is derived from reader responses remains unspecified, 
however; Neale concludes that the model "allows for a variety of factors" (61). 
Earlier genre theorists often argued that, like myths, genres have an organic 
relation to social consciousness - an assumption that arises from traditional 
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literary studies as well as art history. Post-Enlightenment models of literary 
history, following Kant and Hegel, described literary works as functioning to 
mirror a culture back to itself in a process of dialectical evolution toward cultural 
self:"realization and -understanding (Corngold 1988: 139). The film/myth ana­
logy applied this model of art as a form of cultural self:"reflection to the more 
populist context of cinema. Significantly, this helped to dissolve film criticism's 
tendency to dismiss genre films as "formulaic" and thus unartistic: if the 
formulas themselves could be shown to be significant aspects of cultural self­
awareness and evolution, they could be incorporated into "high-art" methods of 
articulating aesthetic value and meaning. 
One disadvantage of this model, however, is that the search for the mytholo­
gical essence of a particular genre is inevitably retrospective and elegiac. For if a 
genre is seen as a mythical form, how can the myth's essential meaning be defined 
unless it has already reached its "classical" phase of articulation? One can only 
interpret a set of films definitively by closing it off from new additions and thus 
locating its expressive acme in the past. It is not surprising, therefore, that the 
genre most easily characterized as mythological was the Hollywood western. By 
the mid-1950s, the western had enough canonical exemplars to be seen as having 
reached a "classical" peak in the 1930s and '40s, subsequently entering a period 
of "reinterpretation" and decline. 
The American critic Robert Warshow was, along with Bazin, an early inter­
preter of film genre, and his book Movie Chronicle: The Westerner (1954) offered a 
comparative analysis of the heroes of Hollywood gangster films and westerns. 
Warshow points out that these "men with guns" represent a basic American 
fascination with violence, but he is more interested in the differences between the 
two types of hero and their relationship to violence. The gangster is, for example, 
a figure of "enterprise and success" whose frenetic career is nevertheless "a 
nightmare inversion of the values of ambition and opportunity." The western 
hero, on the other hand, is "the last gentleman," demonstrating such a restrained 
sense of purpose that he often "appears to be unemployed" (Warshow 1979: 471). 
His nobility is always somewhat anachronistic, as well as morally ambiguous, due 
to the fact that, "whatever his justifications, he is a killer of men." What makes 
the western compelling for Warshow is its "serious orientation to the problem of 
violence" and its ritualistic repetition of the "value" of violence under certain 
moral conditions. The fact that such heroic vigilantism is incompatible with the 
legal precepts of democracy simply adds to the western hero's mythical potency: 
What redeems him is that he no longer believes in this drama and nevertheless will 
continue to play his role perfectly: the pattern is all. (Warshow 1979: 480) 
The consistency and purity of purpose that Warshow values in the western 
hero is also central to his definition of the "classical" western form. He writes, for 
example, that the western is "an art form for connoisseurs, where the spectator 
derives his pleasure from the appreciation of minor variations within the working 
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out of a pre-established order" (1979: 480). Like Aristotle, Warshow is highly 
prescriptive in his definition of the genre's essence: he argues that westerns 
should avoid excesses of realism or stylization as well as the incorporation of 
any new motifs not present in the exemplary classical works. The Virginian 
(1929), for example, is "an archetypal Western movie" about the leader of a 
posse (Gary Cooper) who must oversee the lynching of his best friend for stealing 
cattle. But The Ox-Bow Incident (1943), which deals with the injustice and 
psychological implications of a lynching, is regarded as an "anti-Western" 
(Warshow 1979: 475). Purity of generic form is thus predicated on the anti-realist 
abstraction of its thematic content. Women, for example, represent "civilization" 
in the classic western, but in this capacity their role must remain marginal; 
Warshaw complains that "in The Gunfighter the women and children are a little 
too much in evidence, threatening constantly to become a real focus of concern 
instead of simply part of the given framework" (Warshow 1979: 481; cf. Modleski 
1997). Thus, while raising important issues about the representation of violent 
masculinity in American film, Warshow's work demonstrates the drawbacks of 
defining a genre's essential or "classical" qualities, which requires their abstrac­
tion from the socio-political and discursive contexts that organize their meaning. 
The genre studies of Bazin, Warshow, and Alloway, together with the Cahiers 
du cinema critics' valorization of mise-en-scene over script in regard to Holly­
wood film, allowed genres to be seen as expressive vocabularies rather than 
simply as constraints imposed by the film industry (cf. McArthur 1972). They 
were also compared positively by some scholars to classical traditions in the arts; 
in the mid-1970s, for example, Leo Braudy argued that by returning to pre­
Romantic models of artistic production, genre films could be seen as "the 
equivalent of conscious reference to tradition in the other arts." The vision of 
the film auteur was seen as a process of "picking and choosing among possible 
conventions" in order to revivify classical forms. Braudy's ideal genre film is thus 
a "self-conscious mastery" of formal and narrative patterns that could raise genre 
films to the same level of expressivity as less generically coded films (Braudy 
1979: 448). Jean-Loup Bourget has pointed out that genre auteurism reconciled 
"two apparently antagonistic approaches: the auteur theory, which claims that a 
film is the work of one creative iridividual, and the iconological approach, which 
assumes that a film is a sequence of images whose real meaning may well be 
unconscious on the part of its makers" (Bourget 1995: 51). As a result, Holly­
wood's conventionality could be seen, paradoxically, as the "reason for its 
creativity," forcing talented directors to transcend hackneyed plots through the 
"pure poetry" of visual elements (50). 
3 Iconology and Genre Structuralism 
In addition to the genre/myth analogy outlined by Bazin and Warshow, a 
primary influence on early genre studies was the work of art historian Erwin 
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Panofsky (cf. Alloway 1969; McArthur 1972). His 1939 book Studies in Iconology 
concerned itself with the denotative and symbolic content of art, rather than its 
formal qualities. For Panofsky, the recognition of conventional meanings 
attached to images ("that a male figure with a knife represents St. Bartholomew, 
that a female figure with a peach in her hand is a personification of Veracity") 
constitutes iconographic analysis in a "narrow" sense. The deeper sense of 
iconographic meaning, however, 
is apprehended by ascertaining those underlying principles which reveal the basic 
attitude of a nation, a period, a class, a religious or philosophical persuasion. 
(Panofsky 1939: 7) 
Works of art are thus directly mimetic of their Zeitgeist, and culture itself is seen 
as an expressive totality. The visual motifs found in a particular period and art 
form thus allow the art historian to: 
deal with the work of art as a symptom of something else which expresses itself in a 
countless variety of other symptoms, and ... interpret its compositional and icono­
graphical features as more particularized evidence of this "something else." (8) 
Panofsky's iconology was useful to the study of film genre because it emphasized 
the visual motifs and symbolic language of art rather than individual authorship 
or mythic narrative. To some extent, it can be seen as a kind of visual content 
analysis, especially when iconology is applied to cinematic motifs without Panofs­
ky's emphasis on interpretation. Alloway, for example, suggests that since "there 
is no body of literature" that defines the meaning of cinematic imagery, "it is 
necessary to derive the information from adequate samples of the films them­
selves" (Alloway 1969: 41). Alloway also rejects the notion that film iconology 
amounts to a kind of myth analysis, since he emphasizes the constant change and 
ephemerality ofvisual patterns in popular art (54). His application of iconology to 
film genres is thus more descriptive than interpretive. But Panofsky's own 
method presupposed that symbolic vocabularies reflected the essential concerns 
ofa particular culture and period, which could be conceived as an organic essence 
manifesting itself consistently in all forms of expression. His work thus typifies 
E. H. Gombrich's critique of art history as "Hegelianism without metaphysics" 
(cited in Bordwell 1997: 44). 
In "The Idea of Genre in the American Cinema," Ed Buscombe takes a 
position similar to Alloway's use of iconology, suggesting that generic visual 
conventions can be productively analyzed without assuming that they are part of 
a comprehensive thematic structure. For Buscombe, describing the western in 
terms of its mise-en-scene (the landscapes, towns, clothes, guns, horses, etc.) is 
not comprehensive or definitive of what westerns are about, but it is saying 
"something both intelligible and useful," namely that '.'the visual conventions 
provide a framework within which the story can be told" (Buscombe 1995: 15). 
Iconography is thus a palette of familiar motifs that can be recombined creatively 
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(or ironically) in ways that provide both familiarity and variety. Buscombe's 
emphasis on familiarity and variation is reminiscent of Warshow's notion of the 
western as a genre for "connoisseurs," but without the nostalgia for a "pure" 
western form that had died out. A more thematic definition may nevertheless be 
implicit, since Buscombe notes that: 
the essential theme of CUtiS itl the Afternoon (1962; U.S. title, Ride the High 
Country) is one that, while it could be put into other forms, is ideally suited to 
the one chosen. The film describes the situation of men who have outlived their 
time. Used to a world where issues were decided simply, on a test of strength, they 
now find this way of life threatened by complications and developments they do 
not understand. Since they cannot, or will not, adapt, all that remains to them is a 
tragic and bitter heroism. (24) 
But the question of why this story is "ideally suited" to the western's icono­
graphic language is not really addressed in Buscombe's descriptive paradigm. 
Definitions of genre based on loosely grouped sets of repeated motifs are thus 
open to shifting, intertextual, and historical meanings, but they often rely on 
implicitly mythological or auteur-based interpretations (Kitses and McArthur 
both combine iconographic genre analyses with auteur studies). What is lacking 
in most iconological analyses is a more historical approach to visual and thematic 
intertextuality, which might address the social semiotics of specific genre motifs 
for particular audiences. 
Panofsky emphasized the art historian's search for "symptomatic" meanings, 
which must be inferred based on the totality of cultural production from anyone 
period. The uptake of iconographic analysis in film studies, however, was equally 
informed by structural linguistics and anthropology. Structuralism assumes that 
the meanings attributed to signs within any symbolic language arise comparat­
ively - they do not express a pre-existing cultural essence. No object or word can 
have meaning in a vacuum - its meaning must be derived by contrast with a 
different kind of meaning. Symbolic systems are thus structured by core tensions 
or differential values, and it is the task of the analyst to perceive those "deep 
structures." The difference between this model and Panofsky's is that a struc­
turalist one sees forms of communication not as the expressions of a pre-existing 
social essence, but as systems of meaning' that structure the social itself by 
encouraging certain forms of conceptualization and not others. 
The structuralist genre studies of Jim Kitses (Horizons West, 1969), Will 
Wright (Sixguns and Society, 1975), and Thomas Schatz (Hollywood Genres, 
1981) thus viewed g'enres as structures of differential meaning and as part of 
larger frameworks of difference between generic paradigms. Kitses, for example, 
begins his analysis of the Hollywood western by looking at the opposition 
proposed by Henry Nash Smith in Virgin Land between representations of the 
US West as garden and desert. Kitses defines this dichotomy as a core opposition 
between the wilderness and civilization, with additional oppositions aligned as 
sub-themes: tradition vs. chang-e, restriction vs. freedom, community vs. indivi­
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duality, etc. (Kitses 1969: 11). In addition to this thematic structure, Kitses sees 
the genre as drawing' its meanings from frontier history, the chivalric codes of 
medieval romance, and pre-cinematic representations of the West. The core 
binary oppositions that structure the western film are thus seen to offer a certain 
socio-historical, narrative, and visual "language" for filmmakers to work within. 
For Kitses this structure has social significance because it is rooted in mytholo­
gical and historical tensions, but it produces meaning dialectically by incorporat­
ing new approaches rather than evolving to a "classical" form and then 
dissipating. 
Thomas Schatz's HollY1JJood Genres is explicitly informed by Levi-Strauss's 
structuralist reading of myth. Schatz thus defines genres around sets of thematic 
binary oppositions, arguing that their narrative patterns work to temporarily 
resolve particular cultural tensions. However, as Levi-Strauss suggests, such 
stories only provide a temporary resolution of these tensions and therefore 
must be told repeatedly in various ways. Schatz divides the major Hollywood 
genres into those that work to reestablish social order (westerns, crime and 
detective films) and those that work to establish social integration (the musical, 
comedy, and melodrama). Central to each of these genres is the social community 
they define, which consists of a set of character types who enact the conflicts 
inherent within that community. Often opposing value systems are mediated by 
an individual, or a romantic coupling' signifies their integration. The resolution of 
these conflicts, according to Schatz, constitutes "the genre film's function as 
cultural ritual." Will Wright, in Sixguns and Socie~y, made a similarly compre­
hensive analysis of the western, drawing on the work of Russian formalists such 
as Vladimir Propp and his analysis of narrative and character types in folktales. In 
this way, Wright analyzes not only the core conflicts that structure the western, 
but also the "character functions" that structure its plot patterns and offer "a 
conceptual response to the requirements of human action in a social situation" 
(Wright 1975: 17). 
Both Schatz and Wright thus utilize analytical models drawn from earlier 
forms of narrative (myth and folktale) and apply them to the commercial cinema. 
The relatively close relations between producers and users of pre-industrial 
folkways are thus transposed to the capitalist marketplace for entertainment, 
which raises a number of problems. Schatz refers, for example, to generic change 
as the result of a "conversation" between filmmakers and audiences, whereby 
"the genre film reaffirms what the audience believes both on individual and on 
communal levels" (Schatz 1981: 38). On this point, he cites Leo Braudy's 
description of film audiences as agents of generic development: "change in 
genre occurs when the audience says 'that's too infantile a form of what we 
believe. Show us something more complicated'" (Schatz 1981: 38). Like Schatz, 
Will Wright proposes that the popularity of Hollywood film, measured in box­
office dollars, stands as evidence of viewer demand for just such films and genres 
(Wright 1975: 12). Wright thus limits his study to films that grossed at least 
$4,000,000 on initial release. 
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Schatz and Wright, in other words, base their interpretation of Hollywood 
genres' social sig'nificance on the presumed existence of a feedback loop between 
audiences and film industries. This popularity, however, is measured in terms of 
attendance, just as television ratings are used in the US to argue that viewers get 
exactly what they want. This argument assumes that the market for entertain­
ment works democratically, with each potential viewer having the financial power 
to "vote" by making consumer choices. The American film industry, however, 
has long controlled markets through vertical integration and anti-competitive 
distribution systems. To read profitability as a blanket endorsement of main­
stream genres assumes a model of consumer sovereignty and "free market" 
competition inappropriate to highly monopolized media industries. In addition, 
as Steven Neale notes, it collapses the "multiplicity of reasons for consumer 
'choices'" and varieties of viewing pleasure into a fictive unanimity of taste 
(Neale 1990: 64; cf. Jowett 1985). 
Rick Altman has usefully summarized the differences between iconographic 
and structural approaches to genre in his essay "A Semantic/Syntactic Approach 
to Film Genre." Altman points out that these debates center on the classification 
of genres according to either broadly inclusive, iconographic definitions (a 
western is a film with cowboys and horses) or more interpretive definitions 
(a western is about historical tensions between American individualism and 
society). Altman notes that inclusive definitions, like Buscombe's and 
McArthur's, are descriptivciy useful but do not explain the social significance 
of genres. Interpretive definitions, such as Schatz's "genres of order/genres of 
integration" model, explain their social significance by simply excluding films 
that do not repeat those patterns found significant by the analyst. Altman calls 
inclusive definitions "semantic," since they describe the "building blocks" of 
genres; explanatory definitions are called "syntactic," since they describe the 
"structures" into which these elements are narratively presented. Altman pro­
poses that these two definitional strategies are complementary, and that the full 
significance of film genre can only be understood by utilizing both approaches. 
He points out that: 
not all genre films relate to their g'enre in the same way or to the same extent .... In 
addition, a dual approach permits a far more accurate description of the numerous 
inter-generic connections typically suppressed by single-minded approaches ... 
numerous films ... innovate by combining the syntax of one g'enre with the 
semantics of another. (1995) 
Such an approach indicates, for example, that the category of film nair is 
semantically distinctive (nair lighting, framing, and character types) but shares 
its syntactical patterns with larger categories like the thriller and detective film. It 
also facilitates analysis of how a film like The R(~ht Stuff(l983), which is about 
astronauts, also uses many of the visual and characterological patterns of the 
western; or how Blade Runner (1982) combines a science-fiction narrative with 
film nair mise-en-scene. 
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4 Genres and Ideology 
In melodrama two themes are important: the triumph of moral virtuc over villainy, and thc 
consequent idealizing of the moral views assumed to bc held by the audience. In the 
melodrama of thc brutal thriller we come as close as it is normally possible for art to 
come to the pure self-rightcousness of the lynching mob. We should have to say, then, that 
all forms of melodrama, the detective story in particular, wcre advance propaganda for the 
poliec state, in so far as that represen ts the regularizing of mob violence, if it were possible 
to take them serionsly. But it seems not to bc possible. 
Northrop Frye, Anatomy of CritiCism 
At roughly the same time that Schatz and Wright proposed a ritual significance 
for Hollywood genres as expressions of collective imagination, the film journals 
Cahias du cinema and Screen were arguing, instead, that Hollywood film imposed 
dominant ideological meanings on audiences. In the 1980s, genre theory was thus 
marked by two very contradictory definitions of genre - as social ritual and 
ideological tool. Robert Kapsis has described the ritual model as a "reflection of 
society perspective," while the argument that genres are ideological is referred to 
by Kapsis as the "production of culture perspective" (1991: 68--9). He offers a 
critique of Wright, Schatz, and Cawelti's "reflection" approach based on his 
analysis of the "interorganizational relationships" that dominate the American 
film industry's decision-making processes, arguing' that although historical audi­
ences may exercise some influence over g'eneral market trends, "the very exist­
ence of genre films and cycles is a product of the film industry's attempt to 
overcome the problem of uncertainty, that is, of not knowing the future tastes of 
the mass audience" (70). 
For the most part, however, ideological readings of film genre have been based 
on textual rather than industrial analysis. The 1970s and '80s genre debates in 
Screen, for example, tended to see genre as a sub-set of the journal's broader 
ideological critique of classical Hollywood narrative, since genres provided and 
regulated variety while still binding the viewer to the cinematic institution as a 
whole in a position of textually inscribed subjectivity. There were also those who 
argued for a more straightforward ideological interpretation of genre. For ex­
ample, in an article called "Genre Film and the Status Quo," Judith Hess Wright 
argued that, as products of the capitalist culture industry, genre films "serve the 
interests of the ruling' class by assisting in the maintenance of the status quo" 
(Hess Wright 1995: 41). This, as Steven Neale pointed out, amounts to "reduc­
tivism, economism, and cultural pessimism" (Neale 1990: 65). Such a position, 
like the "reflection of culture" perspective, uses an overly simplified model of 
spectatorship, seeing only the influence of industry over audience rather than the 
ritual theory's inverse schema. Text-based ideology critique often assumes a 
degree of textual determinism, whereby viewers are more passive than active in 
relation to cinematic meaning. However, in the 1980s, specific genres such as 
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melodrama and film noir were also seen as textual structures that manifested 
ideological contradictions and thus invited viewers to negotiate or question the 
conventional resolutions and patterns of Hollywood narrative. 
In the case of melodrama, critical interest in the dynamic between auteurs and 
the limits imposed by generic Hollywood scripts (in journals such as Movie and 
Posit~f) focussed attention on the ability of filmmakers like Douglas Sirk, Nicho­
las Ray, Max Ophiils and Vincente Minnelli to transform familiar melodramatic 
stories through mise-en-scene and the "formal play of distanciation and irony" 
(Gledhill 1985: 73). Eventually, as Barbara Klinger notes, "critics began to 
consider the relation of melodramatic form to ideology, without an exclusive 
emphasis on the director as enabler of critique" (1994: 20). Christine Gledhill 
states, for example, that, "through discovery of Sirk, a genre came into view" 
(cited in Klinger 1994: xii). For example, in 1978, when Laura Mulvey's "Notes 
on Sirk and Melodrama" was published in Movie, it took a somewhat critical 
view of Paul Willemen's earlier praise of Sirk for subverting the normatively 
conservative melodramatic form. Instead, Mulvey argued that the ideological 
tensions foregrounded in Sirk's films were "not produced by the exercise of a 
special authorial agency, but are a congenital feature of melodrama as a genre 
filled with ideological inconsistencies" (cited in Klinger 1994: 20). 
The notion that genres can manifest "unconscious dynamics" which contradict 
the ideological values implied by their narratives suggests that they are both 
symptomatic and ideologically structured. Such an account rests on Althusser's 
notion of overdetermination, whereby texts are seen as sites of unconsciously 
conflicting structural forces. For example, one can argue that 1950s American 
melodrama "raised the contradictions inherent in bourgeois and patriarchal 
ideologies" (Klinger 1994: 22) or that American film noir exposed the misogyny 
of post-war angst over masculine self-determination. Such descriptions see the 
"subversive" genre as a particularly rich constellation of tensions within the 
dominant culture that structures mainstream filmmaking. Such readings, how­
ever, tend to rely on a definition of genres as loosely defined sets ofexpressive and 
narrative tropes. In his 1981 article "The 'Force-Field' of Melodrama," Stuart 
Cunningham argues that the inevitable problems of such textual definitions arise 
"only if melodrama is approached as an exclusively aesthetic category" (1981: 
348). Instead, he proposes that melodrama be seen as a broader discursive 
category of "religious, moral, political, as well as aesthetic experience." Like 
Peter Brooks, Cunningham sees melodramatic discourse as a response to modern­
ity and its shift from "the traditional Sacred and its representative institutions 
(Church and Monarch)" to a democratic society that must "propagate the new 
'sacred' in purely ethical and personal terms" (Brooks 1976: 14-15; Cunningham 
1981: 348). Melodrama thus becomes "the principal mode for uncovering, 
demonstrating, and making operative the essential moral universe in a post-sacred 
era." Cunningham argues that melodrama should be seen as a broadly discursive 
"mode, function, or effect," because its meaning is produced socially, historically, 
and "in a wide variety of media, narrative structures and aesthetic forms" (354). 
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If genres are seen as inter-media modes of discourse, then the problem of 
whether film industries or audiences are the source of generic meaning is 
displaced by the question of how film genres relate to other social, political, 
and aesthetic formations in particular historical contexts. This concept of genres 
as aspects of social discourse draws on a post-structuralist model of the ways texts 
take on meaning according to the epistemological and rhetorical modes to which 
they are linked. Discourses, in other words, are culturally specific frameworks of 
knowledge that determine what can be considered fiction, news, entertainment, 
obscenity, history, etc. From this perspective, it is not only a question of how 
genres work, but also what kind of "truth" they both presume and preclude. As 
Tony Bennett has argued, genres can thus be seen as socially rather than textually 
constituted: 
texts constitute sites around which the pre-eminently social affair of the struggle 
for the production of meaning is conducted, principally in the form of a series of 
bids and counter-bids to determine which system of inter-textual coordinates 
should be granted an effective social role in organising reading practices. (1990: 
59-60) 
In practice this approach is not incompatible with Altman's synthesis of semantic 
and syntactic genre analysis, but a discursive approach also requires attention to 
the historically particular cultural norms that govern both aesthetics and recep­
tion. Such an approach to genre does not disregard the importance of textual 
organization; it simply sees films as sites rather than sources of meaning. Their 
reception is thus primarily determined socio-culturally because of the ways that 
social discourses organize what sense viewers make of films' aesthetic and 
phenomenological effects. 
5 From "Genre" to Generic Readings 
If genres are most productively seen as aspects of historically specific discourses, 
what are the implications for genre studies? One, as Barbara Klinger summarizes, 
is that the object of study shifts, 
fi'om the text to the intertext- the network of discourses, social institutions, and 
historical conditions surrounding a work .... Such contextual analysis hopes to 
reveal the intimate impact ofdiscursive and social situations on cinematic meaning. 
(1997: 108) 
Second, the transnational circulation of film genres becomes more clearly con­
stituted as an arena for culturally specific, contextual research. As Mitsuhiro 
Yoshimoto argues with regard to melodrama, 
An examination of melodrama in the postwar Japanese cinema merely from a 
formal perspective does not lead to any significant conclusion; instead, we must 
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place melodrama in a particular sociopolitical background of postwar Japan. 
Although various studies of what the melodramatic form of the Hollywood cinema 
signified in the 1950s' America are extremely significant, they cannot be a direct 
model. (1993: 101) 
The hegemony of the American film industry has ensured that Hollywood genres 
are globally familiar; but their meanings in relation to localized generic structures 
are complex. For example, in his analysis of Hong' Kong action film, Julian 
Stringer argues that while American genres are gender-·coded as "male action or 
'doing' genres (the Western, war films) and female 'suffering' genres (melo­
drama, the woman's film)", the Hong Kong action films of John Woo "collapse 
these two paradigms of masculinity into one. They combine simultaneously 
doing and suffering' heroes" (1997: 29--30). String'er concludes that Woo's work 
needs to be seen in rclation to events such as the 1989 Tiananmen Square 
massacre and the 1997 handover of Hong Kong in order to see how: 
Ilong Kong action cinema is somewhat unique in its crisis-ridden logic precisely 
because it cannot provide the system within which any new masculinity can be 
reconsolidated. (40) 
Although the uneven global flow of media has made non-Western cinemas 
particularly marked by such genre hybridity due to the negotiation of Hollywood 
influence, hybridity is itself a hallmark of genre. Derrida even suggests that the 
tendency of critics to identify "mixed" generic objects simply confirms the 
fantasy that an "essential purity" of unmixed genres is possible (cited in Brunette 
and Wills 1989: 46). As Peter Brunette and David Wills conclude, "[gJenre is 
thus always indispensable and impossible at the same time" (49). Historical 
research on "classical Hollywood" genres certainly supports a Bakhtinian or 
Kristevan model of texts as multi-vocal and citational; even in the studio era 
the use of g'enre categories was far from consistent, and usually involved mixed­
genre descriptions. Similarly, film audiences have been found to utilize a wide 
variety of descriptive categories; for example, Richard Koszarski has described a 
1923 poll of hig'h school students that produced the following categories: "not 
true to life," "bad artistically," "immoral," and "brutality" (1990: 28-9). What is 
interesting is that these categories blur narrative, aesthetic, and ethical criteria, 
underscoring the regulatory aspect of genre classifications and their similarity to 
content ratings (the determination of who is allowed to see certain kinds of film). 
This raises the question of whether g-enre definition, as a social practice, can be 
separated from attempts to define the effects of film on audiences. Since the 
definition of concepts like "obscenity" ultimately rely on assumptions about what 
a text's effect will be on the typical viewer, how do assumptions about audiences 
underpin the definitions of categories like "romance" or "documentary"? Gen­
re's relationship to fictive audiences is not limited to the targeting of particular 
markets as demographic and cultural types. As film theorists have pointed out, 
popular genre definitions are often made according to films' presumed effect: 
39 
Sarah Berry-Flint 
horror, suspense, "thrillers," "weepies," or "tear-jerkers" (cf. Williams 1995; 
Sobchack 1995). This practice of categorizing films according to their effects 011 
particular kinds of viewers underscores the extent to which genres organize 
reading practices as much as they organize texts, by indicating to viewers what 
kinds of experiences to expect. 
The instability of generic labels thus arises not only from the Bakhtinian 
"heteroglossia" of generic allusion that limits any attempt at film classification, 
but from the fact that genres function as tools for predicting and regulating 
the reception of texts. A text that cannot be located within some sort of genre 
is, for practical purposes, unreadable. What is important from an analytical 
standpoint, however, is that generic readings are not produced from a "virtual 
continuum of meaning containing all possible genres, but from a particular 
historical matrix supporting a handful of actual genres" (Hunter 1988: 219). 
The object of genre analysis should thus be the social constitution of their uses: 
the way they organize texts, identify them with certain modes of rhetoric and of 
discourse, and thus suggest the kind of reception and significance they should 
have. 
6 Conclusion: The Politics of Genre 
I take it ... as one of the moments of "high seriousness" in the history of recent Marxist 
thought that when the aging Lukacs felt the urgency of supporting Solzhenitsyn's denun­
ciation of Stalinism but also of responding to the religious and antisocialist propaganda to 
which the latter lent his talent and the authority of his personal suffering, he did so by 
sitting down at his desk and producing a piece of genre criticism. 
Fredric Jameson, The Political Unconscious 
It has been suggested that the confusion over film genre definition might be 
addressed by focussing on the more general categories of "narrative film, experi­
mental!avant-garde film, and documentary" (Williams 1984: 121). This 
approach, modeled on traditional literary distinctions, would simply define 
westerns, melodramas, action films, etc., as narrative film sub-genres. As sensible 
as this may seem, it does not address the question of how genres function in 
relation to cinematic meaning: how, for example, do we differentiate between 
narrative fiction and documentary? In the United States, the 1980s and 1990s 
have seen a remarkable resurgence of popular interest in documentary film, 
indicated by the theatrical success of Errol Morris's The Thin Blue Line (1987), 
Michael Moore's Roger and Me (1989), Jennie Livingston's P{~ris is Burning 
(1991), and Michael Apted's 35 Up (1991), among others. At the same time, 
the rise in the US of numerous television-based, hybrid formats has blurred the 
hypothetical line between documentary and fictional representation (verite-style 
programs like Cops, "infotainment" magazine formats such as 20/20, 48 Hours, 
and Dateline, fact-based reenactment shows like Emergency 911 and America's 
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Most Wanted, and televised trials on Court TV) (cf. Corner 1995; Petley 1996; 
Bondebjerg 1996). Ironically, however, the 1990s has also seen the repeal oflaws 
requiring television networks to air a minimum amount of public affairs pro­
gramming. The notion that the television documentary functions, like the news, 
to provide viewers with information necessary for active citizenship has, in the 
US, been superseded by the documentary's ability to rate reasonably well as 
entertainment. Such a shift is not merely a textual one from, say, the civic 
exhortation of Edward Murrow's HanJest of Shame (1960) to the video-game 
images of US government-censored Gulf War coverage. It is an institutional and 
political one, based on a redefinition of the viewer as a consumer rather than a 
eitizen. 
Genres are socially organized sets of relations between texts that function to 
enable certain relations between texts and viewers. Because they organize the 
framework of expectations within which reading takes place, they help to enable 
the possibility of communication; the blurring of certain genres, therefore, can be 
seen as a politieal move to discourage certain forms of communication. For 
example, the 1934 US Federal Communieations Act eodified the notion that 
commercial broadcasters were responsible for producing programs in "the public 
interest"; the genres of television doeumentary, public affairs, and news were 
later defined as sites for the potential articulation of such publie interests. But the 
potential viewer-use of these television genres has been increasingly limited since 
the deregulation polieies of the Reagan-era Federal Communieations Commis­
sion. Ameriean nonfiction television still shows the impact of Reagan's FCC 
Director Mark Fowler, who argued that "broadcasting is simply a business, and 
should be freed from myths ... about service to the community" (cited in Kellner 
1990: 92). 
The loss of publie financing for American documentary film due to attacks on 
the National Endowments for the Arts and Humanities has also had a direct 
effect on what kinds of discourse viewers ean expect from nonfiction formats. 
The deregulation of television and the radical privatization of film funding thus 
constitute a more significant form of "genre revisionism" than any maverick 
auteur eould provide. As Linda Williams has noted, contemporary documentary 
is marked by the postmodern recognition that the screen is less a "mirror with a 
memory" than a hall ofmirrors. But, as she points out, epistemological reflexivity 
does not threaten the significance of documentary as a commitment to commun­
icating "the 'truths' which matter in people's lives but which cannot be trans­
parently represented" (Williams 1993: 13). With the loss of any generie (i.e. 
institutional and economic) protection for representations of "public interest," 
however, film and television viewers may become hard pressed to find any 
"truths" represented that run eounter to the economic interests of corporate 
media owners and sponsors. Genre is thus about social as well as textual rules. 
Genres indicate what kind of communication will be facilitated in specific social 
formations, and it is in this regard that genre criticism can be a matter of "hig'h 
seriousness. " 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Enunciation and Narration l 
Andre Gaudreault and Franc;ois Jost 
There are no stories without a storytelling instance. Virtually all narratologists 
agree on this point. Films differ, however, from novels in that a film can show an 
action rather than tell it. In that regime of showing (monstration), notably in 
theatrical staging or in the "documentary" recordings of the Lumiere Brothers, 
the discursive instance is less apparent than in a written tale. Events seem to tell 
their own stories. Yet this is misleading, because without any mediation there 
would have been no recording and we would not have seen the events at all. This 
perception of events recounting themselves, which some spectators might have 
(for example in watching a surveillance video) or certain critics might argue for 
(such as Andre Bazin, when he invokes the "impartiality of the camera" or "the 
fragment of 'raw reality' in Italian neorealism" [Bazin 1981: 280-1J), does not 
stand up to analysis. 
We are confronted with a key question: should narratology start from specta­
torial perception, however flawed, or look for a system of narrative instances 
capable of explaining the textuality of film? This question was posed at a time 
when the possibility of a film as a narrative was no longer accepted as a postulate 
and after the decline of the euphoria of those who believed there was a necessary 
correspondence between messages sent and messages understood in a commun­
ication system where every message encoded by a sender was supposed to be 
received intact, or almost intact, by a receiver. 
Since then, narratologists have responded diversely to this methodological 
question. To simplify what is at stake, consider this image: a ventriloquist and his 
dummy, for example the impertinent Hugo of Dead of the Night (Alberto 
Cavalcanti, 1945). Here, the dummy has a monologue, confiding his love for 
this or that well-known singer. If the situation seems comic, that is because the 
spectator believes (or pretends to believe) that the dummy is responsible for what 
it "says". But if it turns to the man holding it on his knee to begin a dialogue, the 
spectator momentarily adheres to the fiction that these two figures are autono­
mous subjects, sometimes in disagreement with one another. That belief will be 
strong or weak, depending' on whether the viewer is a child or an adult, a "good" 
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or "bad" audience. This can only work if spectators bracket their knowledge that 
dummies do not actually talk. When, by error, the dummy's voice changes itself 
into the ventriloquist's, it becomes clear that we are being deceived. Now, if we 
are asked to explain what the ventriloquist has been doing, we eould simply state 
that a man is speaking the words that seem to come from the toy while keeping 
his own lips still. 
Back to film. As a double narrative, in such cases where the soundtrack allows 
us to hear the words of a narrator, film calls on two narrative instances. But while 
one tells one story in an overt manner, as in a living voice, the grand image-maker 
does now show himself. For example, "a fictional, invisible person turns the 
leaves of an album, drawing our attention to a specific item" (LafTay 1964: 81--2). 
How should we conceptualize the narrative relationship between this instance 
and those characters who, from within the films themselves, tell us oral or written 
stories? There are two approaches: 
The first answer focusses on the spectator's grasp of what is seen and heard. 
This solution envisions the ways that the presence of a grand image-maker 
can be made more or less felt as responsible for the filmic enunciation, an 
organizer of various narratives (as if one looked at the earlier example 
from the perspective of the dummy, then moved to the ventriloquist as 
manipulator). 
2	 The second answer focusses on the properties of the film. This concentrates 
on film narrative per se, leaving to one side spectatorial reading. 
We shall examine these two methods in turn. 
1 First Approach to Narratology: Moving from Film to 
l'Jarrative Instances 
1.1 From enunciation to narration 
Enunciation has several meanings. In the broadest sense, it signifies "the rela­
tions between what is said and the different sources that produce statements: 
the protagonists of discourse [sender and receiver] 
the situation of communication." 
In a more restricted sense, enunciation refers to everything from the narrow sense 
of "linguistic traces of the speaker's presence within his utterance" (Kerbrat­
Orecchioni 1980: 30-1) to the broader phenomena that Benveniste groups under 
"subjectivity in language." The latter conception is undoubtedly the most 
common one among narratologists, notably in Benveniste's celebrated opposition 
between "histoire" and "discours," or "story" and "discourse." If, in the story, 
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"events seem to recount themselves," then in discourse we see a mode of 
enunciation that "presumes the presence of both a speaker and a listener" 
(Benveniste 1966: 241). 
In order to study narrative instances in novels, Genette takes off from Benve­
niste's distinction and stresses its ambiguity: the opposition between story and 
discourse is less an absolute boundary than the product ofperceiving, in a varying 
way, the presence of the speaker in what he says. This is more obvious in the case 
of a statement such as "For a long time, I had always gone to bed early" (from 
Marcel Proust's Remembrance of Things Past) than in an historical story such as 
"Napoleon died at Saint-Helena," but the latter still comes from somewhere, 
since it uses the past tense, "a time before the narration that is the story" 
(Genette 1972: 225), and therefore implies a storytelling instance. No story exists 
without discourse. Nevertheless, one can see discourse as a sort of "cyst," 
because language has marks, signs, that bear the trace of the teller, the holder 
of the discourse: these marks are deictics. 
When a novel begins with "I am alone here, now, sheltered" (from The 
Labyrinth, Alain Robbe-Grillet, 1959), the reader immediately asks: who is this 
"I?", when is "now" in the story? and what defines "here" and being "shel­
tered"? These questions cannot be answered until we can identify the storyteller 
with a name or description, along with the place or moment of speaking. In a 
situation oforal discourse, it is as if"the correlatives of the situation allow one not 
to describe the places, situations, and objects in great detail, because it is common 
knowledge" (Slama-Cazacu 1961: 213). Without this knowledge, which is not 
offered by the written text, the signification of "I am alone here, now, sheltered" 
varying in meaning with its speaker. Think of what happens to that remark when 
spoken in a bunker, a phone box, or said softly by James Bond near a swimming 
pool to the "Bond girls," while under surveillance from above by a spyglass. 
An utterance that only uses deictics (the adverbs "here" and "now," the 
pronoun "I," and the present tense) can only be deciphered when we know the 
speaker's identity, unlike a statement such as: "On 12th April 1979, Corporal 
Wilson was alone in his nuclear shelter," which can be understood without 
knowing who is saying it. 
Starting from these phenomena of subjectivity in language, linguistics moved 
from "the analysis of utterances to the analysis of the relationship between these 
utterances and their productive instances" (Genette 1972: 225), their enuncia­
tion, which Genette tried to study at "the productive moment of narrative 
discourse, narration." Naturally, theorists of cinematographic enunciation have 
looked for such deictic markers in film. Within that paradigm, we can discern six 
cases where the subjectivity of the image is clear Qost 1983): 
an exaggerated foreground, suggesting the proximity of the lens, produced by 
either discrepancy of scale (obtained, for example, by deep focus: see, at the 
end of Citizen Kane [Welles, 1942], the moment when Susan, seated on the 
ground, tries to finish a puzzle, her face as high as Kane's figure, which 
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appears at the door, in the background), or by an opposition between fuzzi­
ness and clarity (as when one sees, across almost indistinct bushes, a land­
scape); 
2	 a point of view below eye level: Orson Welles's work provides many ex­
amples; 
3	 representation of a body-part in the foreground, which makes it look as 
though the camera is anchored in a point of view: the countryside seen 
from the flick of hair (Notorious, Hitchcock, 1946), the road that is seen as 
double when drunk (North by NorthTJJest, Hitchcock, 1959), and, more widely, 
all those images that seem to conflict with "normal" vision - double vision, 
deliberately fuzzy focus, and so on, that replicate the perception of drunken­
ness or myopia; 
4 a character's shadow;
 
5 seeing the viewfinder, framing devices, or a keyhole in the image;
 
6 a shaking camera, its motion jerky or so mechanical that we notice the point of
 
view is that of an apparatus. 
To all these criteria, we must add the look at the camera. 
Without embarking on a comprehensive account of point of view, which we 
have addressed elsewhere Oost 1989; Gaudreault and Jost 1990), the most 
important thing for our purposes here is this: in language, deictics construct a 
"speakcr-observer" (Kerbrat-Orrechioni 1980: 49), the person who offers the 
discourse and his position in space. "I am alone here; on my right is the chest of 
drawers, on my left the window" reveals not only a discourse situation, but a 
discourse situation from a perspective. In the case of film the marks of subjec­
tivity suggest someone watching the scene, a person located in the diegesis, while, 
on other occasions, they trace the presence of something beyond the diegesis, a 
"grand image-maker." Consider category (6), comparing its use in two celebrated 
pictures: Dark Passage (Delmer Daves, 1947) and Citizen Kane. 
The former begins with a turning landscape shot, seen through a circular 
matte, then a barrel fallen from a truck, rolling down a slope. Then a hand, in the 
foreground, is visible pushing back the foliage. The camera moves from one end 
of the landscape to the other to follow motorbikes on the road. 
In Welles's film, the newsreel "News on the March" shows us images of Kane 
at the end of his life between the fretwork of a barrier in the foreground, which 
conceals much of the view; the camera shakes. 
While in the first extract the spectator understands quite quickly, thanks to the 
image of the barrel and the voice-over, that he is seeing through the eyes of a 
character, in the second the marks of subjectivity don't belong to anyone from 
within the story. They are there only to give the impression that the shots of 
Kane have been stolen, as it were, from reality, as if by some paparazzi. They 
imitate the difficulties of filming for journalistic purposes. Unlike deictics in 
language, these marks can construct a look internal to the diegesis, a character as 
much as the grand image-make, who by definition is situated outside the diegetic 
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world. To a certain extent, therefore, there is in the cinema only enunciative use 
of signs and not enunciative signs per se. But there is something else: experience 
shows that when we screen the "News on the March" sequence to film studies 
students, some of them bracket the trembling camera, from the moment when 
the camera pans to follow the movement of the wheelchair. As J.-P. Simon notes, 
the "distortions (wide angle, high angle, low angle) don't have the same effect in 
all types of film because of the discursive context, since the marks of enunciation 
often get buried in the utterance itself" (Simon 1979: 113). 
Perception of enunciation therefore varies according to both the audiovisual 
context and the sensibility of the spectator. Throughout its history, the cinema 
has created procedures for concealing these marks, to the point where it has been 
said that "the special trait of the classical text was to hide the discursive instance 
that produced it, as if it were nothing more than the simple transcription of an 
. anterior and homogeneous continuity" (Marie 1976: 24), so that, strictly speak­
ing, "the events seem to recount themselves." The eyeline matches, the matches 
on movement and action, are part of these procedures, so that if a Wellesian angle 
appears so forcefully, it's because it doesn't have to do with a character lying on 
the ground, and therefore seems to come fi'om a grand image-maker who is 
"speaking cinema." 
Here we have an example of cinematic enunciation: the moment where 
spectators, escaping the fiction-effect, find themselves confronted by cinematic 
language as sllch - from "This is cinema," acknowledged by various cinematic 
devices, to "I am at the cinema" (Sorlin 1984: 306). This realization does not 
arise only from the traits we have already mentioned. It can also arise from the 
observation of light (it is rarely night in the films: for example, we still see a 
person after they have turned off all the lights), makeup (blood as red paint in 
Godard), montage (jump cuts), punctuation (iris, superimposition). The percep­
tion of cinematic enunciation varies according to the spectator, as differentiated 
by knowledge, age, social class, and historical period. 
Thus, in early cinema, the famous look at the camera, which was commonly in 
use, was not often noticed by spectators, as films often replicated the conditions 
of the vaudeville attraction, which were based on the relationship between an on­
stage artist and his audience. It was only when film began to develop continuous 
stories, which required the creation of an autonomous diegetic world, that the 
look at the camera was systematically banished (cf. Woods 1911, cited in Gun­
ning 1984: 130). In the same way, narrative cross-cutting might have been seen as 
shocking when it was introduced at the beginning of the century, whereas today it 
is a normal montage figure, no longer noticed, as long as the rules of cutting are 
respected. 
Pastiche offers very revealing exercises of cinematic enunciation. We have 
already cited Welles's "News on the March," but Zelig (Woody Allen, 1983), 
which generalizes this procedure, would merit a detailed analysis. All of the 
paramaters of filming sounds and imag'es, framing, and music that we associate 
with classical Hollywood and TV reportage are imitated, reworked, and, in this 
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way, designated as enunciative marks. The pastiche here culminates in the end 
scene, during which an actor replays a part of the life of the character previously 
played by Allen himself. The cutting, the gestures, the mise- en-scene, mimic the 
Hollywood B-film. 
Without expressly using the term "enunciation," in the same spirit louri 
Lotman defines cinematic language as a system of gaps in rclation to a system 
of expectations dictated by experience. Supposing, on the one hand, "a spectator 
who knows nothing of cinematic language, and on the other, a spectator formed 
by the history of film" (Lotman 1977: 59), he demonstrates that for the former 
there is cinematic language only where an element is marked as different from 
what he expected, whereas for the latter meaning is created in the opposition 
between marked and unmarked. 
1.2 The explicit narrator and the grand image-maker 
If a certain modernist cinema accentuates the marks of filmic enunCIatIOn 
(Resnais, Robbe-Grillet, Godard, Duras, etc.), classical cinema always tried, as 
we have suggested, to suppress these marks to stress what was happening to the 
characters or what was told by explicit narrators. In the same way, documentaries 
are generally made in such a way that we pay more attention to what an 
interviewee says than the manner in which the interviewee is filmed. 
Nevertheless, in both cases, the presence of the grand image-maker stays more 
or less perceptible. Let's take the case of the flashback in which a character 
becomes a storyteller, such as Walter Neff in Double Indemnity (Billy Wilder, 
1944) who confesses his crime to a colleague on a dictaphone. After recording a 
few sentences of his story, images come to show us his life and his story: he drives 
to a villa where he will meet the woman who will turn his life upside down. How 
does this movement, from the said to the shown, operate? 
To understand the story, the spectator must suppose that the narrator, Walter 
Neff, takes responsibility for this audiovisual story, which covers the images of 
the recording of his confession. The spectator must assume that this "audio­
visualization", this trans-semioticization, is faithful to the verbal narrative that 
Neff is supposedly still dictating. It's in the name of this postulate of sincerity 
that the spectator is ready to tolerate a number of bizarre occurrences, or forget 
them: the narrator himself is, within the diegetic world of the story that he's 
telling, shown from outside; each of the characters has his own voice and not that 
of the narrator; and every detail is shown, even though the memory of the 
narrator would logically be limited. These strange phenomena, which create a 
veritable "paralepsis" (Genette's [1972: 212] term), are conventions we accept in 
order to believe in the diegesis, to identify with characters and their points of 
VIew. 
But sometimes there are narrative delinkages which go beyond the conventions 
of a given period. In other words, there are gaps that create a canyon between the 
verbal narrative and its trans-semioticization. For example: 
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Gaps between what the character is supposed to have seen and what we 
see. In this sense, the audiovisualizations of the narratives of Thatcher and 
Bernstein in Kane are very different. The fact that the first shows us Thatcher 
from outside doesn't surprise us, since most flashbacks function in this way and 
to the degree that we only see scenes that he witnessed. On the other hand, 
Bernstein's narrative begins with a shot of Kane and Leland arriving at the 
Inquirer building. The fact that we hear their conversation is somewhat strange 
because the narrator, Bernstein, only enters the shot a few seconds later on a pile 
of furniture, behind his two friends- so he wasn't a witness to these events, 
unlike Thatcher in the previous example, which nevertheless he is supposed to be 
relating to the journalist Thompson who came to interview him. Even less 
explicable, in the story of Susan singing opera, are the multiplicity of the shots 
which describe the opera house, the prompter, Kane in the balcony seat, Leland 
ripping up his program - in this case, we see multiple actions which the narrator, 
Susan, could not possibly have witnessed. 
2 Gaps between what the character tells us and what we see. In Diar.y ofa 
Country Priest (Robert Bresson, ]95]), for example, which seems to show only 
what the priest notes day by day in his notebooks, we see behind him the 
countess's daughter, who witnesses the conversation between her mother and 
the priest. In the diegesis, the priest has no idea about this indiscretion until the 
priest from Torcy tells him, much later, "You were seen while you were speaking 
with the countess," and it is hard to comprehend how such a shot could be a 
visualization of his diary. Furthermore, in the Bernanos novel, there is no 
equivalent to this image - at least, not at this point, in the priest's narrative. 
We learn about the daughter's indiscretion only much later, thanks to the Torcy 
priest's revelation: "I imagine that she was in the garden, beneath the window, 
where the sill is high above the ground." Here, the authority of the author/ 
narrator of the diary is questioned. What is said can be contradicted by what is 
shown. The audiovisualization implies and constructs for the spectator, more 
obviously than other films with voice-over, a superior narrator whose existence is 
even more perceptible since the intimate-diary genre usually entails only a single 
narrative instance - that of the diarist. 
These gaps can also be found in documentaries and news reports. The first ­
between what the interviewee is supposed to see and what we see - is when 
images are superimposed that are not invoked in his speech, whether with an 
ironic intention or to evaluate him. The second, revealing a disparity of enun­
ciative instances, occurs when, in the case of an on-camera interview, there is a 
jump in the image, revealing that something has been edited out (as mocked by 
Welles in "News on the March"). 
In all these cases, if the spectator is not sensitive to the enunciation, if he has 
mentally erased the specifically cinematic procedures, he is suddenly reminded 
that alongside this verbal narrator (explicit, intradiegetic, and visualized) 
whom he took at his word, there is also a grand filmic image-maker (implicit, 
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extradiegetic, and invisible) manipulating this audiovisual network. This un­
mistakable realization is reaffirmed in a new way. In the case of fiction, we would 
call this organizing function the implicit narrator. But in the case of a document­
ary or news report, we would call it a documentarist or journalist. 
To move from the perception of cinematic language to the idea of enunciation, 
or from the visualization of an explicit story to an implied one - these are two 
ways to deduce the cinematic discourse. That does not mean that it ever 
disappears. It only means that its presence is always more or less perceptible. 
And this way of thinking about the narrative instances of film is very close to 
certain linguistic theories about language. 
What happens, in fact, when Pierre says "Jean told me: 'I shall come' "? There 
are two speakers: Jean and Pierre. Nevertheless, says the linguist Ducrot (1984: 
196), "it is also possible that parts of the utterance g'enerally imputed to a primary 
speaker, nevertheless can be imputed to a secondary speaker L... ] just as, in the 
novel, a principal narrator can insert into his own narrative another narrative told 
to him by a secondary narrator." One tends to think that the primary speaker, 
Pierre, doesn't betray the words of the secondary narrator, Jean. Nevertheless, it 
is enough that Pierre appears to be lying to make one doubt the postulate of 
sincerity that is the condition of one's listening. Then one strongly dissociates the 
primary speaker and the secondary one. 
This embedding of speakers brings with it a double attribution of the utter­
ance, according to the linguist. This does not mean that two people speak 
physically in the utterance: the speaker is not the speaking subject. In the 
novel, diacritical marks permit us to distinguish the primary narrator from the 
secondary one: they speak the same language, "natural language. " In the cinema, 
the primary speaker, the implicit narrator, speaks cinema using images and 
sounds; the explicit narrator only uses words. That explains why, as the film's 
spectator, I tend to attribute the narrative to the one who claims to be telling it, 
just as I attribute the phrase "I shall come" to Jean, even though Pierre is telling 
me about it. It is only in the gap that the second level becomes necessary for my 
comprehension, just as in language it is at the moment when something tells me 
that Pierre is not relating Jean's words correctly, or that he lies, that I have to 
dissociate the two speakers and attach differential credence to them. 
Silent cinema already worked with different visualizations of verbal narratives 
(for example, the contradictory versions of the two lawyers in Les Deux timides 
[Rene Clair, 1928]). 
2 Second Approach to Narratology: Moving from 
l\Jarrative Instances to Film 
2.1 From narration to sub-narration 
Cinema has an almost natural predilection for narrative delegation, for embedded 
discourses. The reason for this is quite simple: the cinema shows characters in 
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action who imitate human beings in their diverse daily activities, and one of these 
activities, in which all of us are involved some time or another, is to speak. And in 
speaking, many human beings are led, by circumstance, to use the narrative 
function of language, to tell, and to tell themselves. And for the cinema this 
phenomenon is accentuated even more by the fact that it deploys five modes of 
expression -- that is to say, images, sounds, words, written materials, and music­
and that film, as we said, is always a double narrative. 
In a sense, we can therefore claim that in the cinema, a narrative that is the 
product of a visualized narrator (e.g. Leland, Bernstein, Susan, and Raymond in 
Citizen Kane) is merely a sub-narrative (in the same sense that Genette [1972: 
239] speaks of a meta-narrative and Mieke Bal [1977: 24] of a hypo-narrative). In 
effect, at a primary level cinema always already tells, if only in showing the 
visualized narrator, himself in the process of telling, or to be more precise, in the 
process of undertelling. 
Here we see what is tendentious in the expression "undertelling" (sous­
raconter). The expression is a function of this second narratological approach, 
which tries to respect the order of things versus how they appear to the spectator. 
It makes the only real narrator of the film the grand image-maker, or the 
megananator (Gaudreault 1988), the equivalent of the implicit narrator men­
tioned earlier. From this perspective, all the other narrators present in the film 
are only delegated narrators, second narrators, whose activity is a sub-narration, 
an activity which could be distinguished from first-degree narration. Citizen 
Kane, once again, is a prime example for clarifying this model. 
2.2 Secondary narrators 
The problem of sub-narration varies depending on whether we are referring to 
written or filmic narrative. In the first case, the sub-narration of the secondary 
narrator is conveyed through the same semiotic medium that is used by the 
primary narrator: verbal language (even if, in certain cases, the movement to 
writing down the oral involves difficulties of transcription, such as how to convey 
intonations, accents, nervous tics, etc.). 
Consider the case of The Thousand and One Nights. The primary narrator of 
this written story, the first one to speak, tells the story of a king who, in order to 
take vengeance on women, successively marries several women who must be 
killed immediately after the wedding night. When Scheherazade's turn comes, in 
order to delay the deadly fate that awaits her, she undertakes to tell a story each 
night, each more captivating than the last. As a result, the king indefinitely 
postpones her execution. Each of these stories is told by this sub-narrator, 
Scheherazade, who is herself part of the primary diegesis on the level told by 
the primary narrator (she is in this sense what Genette would call an "intradie­
getic narrator"). 
Summing up, in such a case, a verbal narrator tells verbally what another 
verbal narrator has (under)told verbally. There is a homogeneity of materials. It 
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is notable that in such cases of narrative delegation the primary narrator is almost 
invisible; when Scheherazade speaks, the reader completely forgets the very 
existence of the primary narrator. It is almost as if the primary narrator were 
literally drowned in the flow of words of the secondary narrator. 
This situation, which belong's to written narrative, is less frequent in the case 
of cinematic narrative, This is due to the homogeneous nature of written 
narrative, which engages only one mode of expression, language, compared to 
the essentially polyphonic character of filmic narrative, Given the homog'eneous 
matter of linguistic expression, narrators within written narratives, like that of 
The Thousand and One Nights, delegate the narration to a sub-narrator, giving up 
their own role, This explains the ease with which many sub-narrators and many 
second narrators, such as Scheherazade, manage to recover the "voices" of and 
conceal the presence of the primary narrator. 
This is clearly a paradoxical situation, which is not unknown in the cinema, 
even if to a lesser degrce. In this scnsc, the cinema secms to havc an exemplary 
value for narratology as a whole because, unlike verbal stories, in thc cinema it is 
relatively difficult to make invisible thc presence of the primary instance, which 
is the grand image-maker, thc meganarrator, by interposing a secondary one. 
This allows various combinations bctween narrative levels, much more complex 
than in literature, and enables the double narrative to be completely manifest. 
Thus the film narratologist is very sensitive to the hierarchization of these 
different instances. 
2.3 Oral narrative, audiovisual 
In cffect, in film the double narrative is hierarchizcd, as we havc seen, and it is 
speech, above all, that effects these narrative articulations. Let's take the case of 
Leland in Citizen Kane, Thompson visits him in the hospital, where Leland 
begins to tell him about Kane's life with his first wife: 
She was like all the young' girls I knew in dancing school. Charming, Utterly 
charming. Emily was a little more charming' than the others. Well, after the first 
couple of months, they never saw much of each other except at breakfast. It was a 
marriag'e like any other. 
If Leland gives an oral narration, or more precisely a sub-narration, it is never­
theless true that the meganarrator continues, throughout this verbal storytelling, 
to show Leland in his wheelchair, to have us hear him and also follow his "own" 
narration. In this casc, the narrative is an audiovisual narrative, which tells us, by 
showing it, the story of Thompson, the journalist, paying a visit to Leland and 
making him (under)narrate his own story. Therefore, the narrative is truly 
double to the extent that the narrative voice of the filmic meganarrator, respons­
ible for the audiovisual narrativc, is simultaneous to that of the verbal (sub-) 
narrator, responsible for the oral (sub-)narrative. 
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The situation becomes more complex on the narratolog-ical plane when the 
image of the secondary narrator vanishes, as when Leland in his wheelchair g'ives 
way to the visualization of the diegetic world he is telling us about. The plot of 
the audiovisual story thus gives way to the sub-nartative, which is just as 
audiovisual as the first. And as in the case of the primary narrator of the written 
narrative, the filmic meganarrator crases himself in favor of a secondary narrator 
who, just as polyphonous as he, occupies the five tracks of transmission of the 
filmic narration. Here, too, we find identity between the semiotic materials of 
storytelling (the primary narrative which is the film Citizen Kane) and the 
semiotic materials of that which is told (the secondary narrative which tells of 
the deterioration in relations between Kane and his wife), and thus we confront a 
phenomenon of the primary narrator becoming invisible, a situation comparable, 
at least apparently, to the case of The Thousand and One Nights. 
However, the difference between these two situations is that in the latter, the 
story is told through the device of a semiotic mechanism - the verbal language ­
which the responsible, the secondary narrator (for example, Scheherazade, who is 
a speaking subject) uses. Q!.1ite a different situation applies in the case of the 
transvisualized sub-narratives in film, such as the one which accompanies, or more 
precisely substitutes for, Leland's verbal narration (he is in effect not a filming 
subject). Once the verbal narrative of the secondary narrator (Leland) has under­
gone its transmutation, its transcoding, into an audiovisual language of which 
Leland himself is not a user, it becomes difficult to answer the question, who 
speaks and who is telling the story? It is either the grand image-maker speaking or 
the secondary narrator. Since the latter is not a user of the audiovisual language (he 
is not supposed to communicate with his narratee [here the journalist Thompson] 
and with words), who is then telling this audiovisual sub-narrative? This question 
must be asked because often such transvisualized sub-narratives give us informa­
tion not available to the secondary narrator (for example, see the particularly clear 
example cited above: the sub-narrative of Kane's arrival at the Inquirer as told by 
Bernstein). In such cases we must recognize that the meganarrator is the one 
responsible for that .... But how do we distinguish the respective fields of 
intervention of the filmic meganarrator and the verbal sub-narrators? 
The history of the cinema is very instructive concerning the relationship 
between certain sub-narrators and the transvisualization that stems from their 
verbal narrative. In a film like The Sultan of Love (Le Somptier and Burg'uet, 
1918), when the heroine tells the story of meeting the sultan, she looks off into the 
distance; we have the impression that she is seeing the images which she is 
describing verbally to her servant (i.e. her narratee). In the first decade of sound 
film, this codification of the look sometimes signaled the beginning of the sub­
narrative. Thus, in The Story ofa Poor Young Man (Abel Gance, 1935), when the 
conductor begins his story, we see him superimposed on the events he is telling. 
We don't hear him anymore, but he continues to speak, his gaze lost in the void. 
It is only very slowly that the verbal narration becomes dissociated fi"om the 
marked position of the narrator in relationship to the visualization of his story. 
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2.4 Instances in collusion 
Let's return to the breakfast sequence mentioned earlier. How can we think that 
its contents, which visualize Leland's discourse, are a perfectly faithful repres­
entation of what he says? Isn't it extremely unlikely that Leland's verbal 
discourse would have been so cinematic and allusive in showing the degradation 
of their conjugal relationship? Let's remember that we see a series of shots 
separated by swishpans in which Kane and his wife have breakfast, at first gazing 
into each other's eyes, then talking in a more and more tense manner, until each is 
reading a different newspaper at the end of a very long table. Admittedly, Leland 
begins his story by alluding directly to the breakfasts ("Well, after the first couple 
of months, they never saw much of each other except at breakfast. It was a 
marriage like any other"), but it is hard to imagine that the contents of this 
sequence are in any way a literal transcription of Lcland's words. These breakfast 
scenes only have an exemplary and symbolic value: there were obviously other 
breakfasts, and Leland never witnessed them. 
The case is a bit different when we think about Thatcher's memories. This 
sub-narrative has a hybrid status if only because it is through the device of a 
written narrative, rather than an oral one (as with Leland, Susan, Bernstein, and 
Raymond), that the retrospective narrative information about Kane's life is 
delivered to the journalist-investigator and thus to the spectator. Unlike Leland's 
narrative, which is told to Thompson here and now, Thatcher's narrative has 
been written before, at a time prior to the moment where Thompson becomes 
aware of it. 
Nevertheless this apparently changes nothing in terms of the audiovisual 
narrative designed to illustrate the words of the filmic sub-narrator, Thatcher. 
At bottom, it doesn't matter whether these words come in oral or written form. In 
order to establish the illocutionary origin of an audiovisual sub-narrative of this 
type, in order to parcel out the responsibility of the diverse narrative instances 
implied in such cases, it is more important to examine carefully the gaps between 
the diverse forms of knowledge, what the characters might have seen, etc. In a 
case like Thatcher's memoirs, we must agTee that the point of view inscribed in 
the audiovisual sub-narrative matches that of the secondary narrator, even 
though he is seen from outside. In this case there is collusion between the filmic 
meganarrator and the verbal sub-narrator: nothing is shown that isn't known to 
Thatcher and perhaps written by him (for we must remember that the spectator 
doesn't know exactly what Thatcher wrote since we only see a few lines of the 
text of the memoirs). 
But as we saw with the breakfast sequence, the collusion between the filmic 
meganarrator and the verbal sub-narrator is not always so extensive. That 
explains the progressive increase in the gaps between the knowledge of the sub­
narrator and that of the meganarrator in Citizen Kane, from Kane's arrival at the 
Inquirer office, as told by Bernstein, to the evening at the opera, as told by Susan. 
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The multiplicity of modes of expression provokes, or permits, a variety of 
"narrative situations" that go far beyond those available in written literature. It 
follows therefore that cinematic narratives are particularly good at superimposing 
discourses over one another, and working from a variety of planes of enunciation 
and points of view, which might even enter into collision. Cinematic polyphony, 
its signifying density, means that, contrary to the situation in any written narrat­
ives, "covering' over" the voice of the basic narrator, i.e. the meganarrator, with 
the voice of the secondary narrator, the sub-narrator, is far from being the rule. 
Nevertheless, we do encounter in the cinema a situation analogous to that of 
Scheherazade's speaking in The Thousand and One Nights, which allows a com­
plete covering over of the primary narrator's voice by the secondary narrator's. 
This rendering invisible supposes that the secondary narrator utilizes, in telling 
the sub-story, the same means as those of the former, the primary narrator. If in a 
narrative written in one language, this presumes that the sub-narrator also begins 
to speak in that language and occupies the transmission channel of the narration; 
in the cinema the analogous situation presumes that the sub-narrator begins 
literally to "speak cinema." We see this process in the sequence "News on the 
March" within Citizen Kane. This film-within-a-film demonstrates very clearly, 
as a sub-narrative, the diverse channels of narrative transmission (i.e. the five 
filmic modes of expression) and its hidden agent, in its way and for a short 
period, the fundamental filmic meganarrator, responsible for the cinematic 
narrative that is Citizen Kane. 
2. S Who recounts the film? 
In the model we have just developed, we see that the fundamental instance of 
filmic narration is not unitary, since the cinema, as a mixture of modes of 
expression, is not unitary. From this perspective we have proposed a model 
where the primary narrator, responsible for communicating the filmic narrative, 
could be said to manipulate the diverse modes of filmic expression, to orchestrate 
them, make them function, and regulate their play in order to provide the 
spectator with diverse narrative information. One could even imagine regrouping 
the modes of expression in terms of their particular sub-instances: thus Andre 
Gardies (1987) divides into three sub-groups the diverse narrative responsibil­
ities of the real conductor, who is the "filmic enunciator" who would modulate 
the voice of three sub-enunciators, each one responsible, respectively, for the 
iconic, the verbal, and the musical. 
To the extent that the filmic process implies a certain kind of articulation 
between diverse operations of signification (mise-en-scene, framing, and sequen­
cing), it is also possible to mold a "story system" which takes account of what has 
been called "the process of filmic discursivization" (Gaudreault 1988: 119). This 
hypothesis is based on the diverse operations necessary to the material making of 
a film and on the diverse manipulations by the agency responsible for the 
production of a film. It identifies two superimposed layers of narrativity. The 
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first of these layers, resulting from the combined work of mise-en-scene and 
framing, is limited to what has been called monstration. It arises from a first form 
of cinematic articulation, that between frames, which forms the very basis of 
cinematic process and permits the presentation, in continuity on the screen, of 
successive photographic frames. 
Once articulated with each other, these first-level units, called frames, create 
the illusion of continuous movement, giving birth to second-level units - the 
shot. The second layer of narrativity, at a level superior to that of monstration, 
according to this hypothesis, is equivalent to narration, if only as a function of its 
greater possibilities for a temporal modulation. It arises from the activity of 
sequencing called montage, a procedure that filmmakers have used to tell their 
stories. This second layer of narrativity is thus based on a second cinematic 
articulation: that between shots. 
These two layers of narrativity presuppose at least two different instances, the 
monstrator and the narrator, responsible respectively for each. Thus, in order to 
make a pluri-punctual filmic narrative, we would need a monstrator, or show-er, 
who would be this responsible instance, during the shooting of the film and the 
putting into the can of this multitude of micro-narratives called shots. Then the 
filmic narrator would intervene and would inscribe, throug'h montage, a reading, 
after having looked at the primary narrative substance - the shots. At a higher 
level, the voice of these two instances would be modulated and regulated by the 
primary instance, which is the filmic meganarrator responsible for the meganar­
rative - the film itself. Hence the following figure (from Gaudreault 1988: 116): 
articulation from 
frame to frame 
filmic monstrator: { 
unipunctuality 
Mcganarrator { 
(grand image-maker) 
,------------------, 
articulation from 
{ shot to shot 
filmic narrator: 
pluripunctuality 
3 Filmic Narratology in Perspective 
The ideas we have just outlined here conform, to a certain extent, to the 
narratological tradition, in the sense that the models follow the same axis of 
research opened up recently by Gerard Genette, whose principles were elabo­
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rated in his book Figures III - despite the relative distance between what is being 
said here and Genette's hypotheses. 
Other researchers have explored the problem of filmic narration from different 
angles, notably Roger Odin (1988), who developed a semio-pragmatic approach. 
Within this approach, spectators and their diverse affects must be taken into 
account from the beginning, to the extent that the production and the reception 
of films are "socially programmed practices" (Odin 1988: 121). For Odin, the 
consumer of a filmic narrative fiction, known as the "reader-actant," is called 
upon to make, in a relatively imperative fashion, a "network of fictionalizing 
determinations" identifiable as seven operations: figurativization (recognition of 
analogical signs); diegetization (construction of a world); narrativization (produc­
tion of a narrative); monstration (construction of the world shown as "real"); 
belief (a corollary of the preceding); the synchronization of phases (homogeniza­
tion of narration via the collusion of diverse instances), and fictivization (recogni­
tion of the fictionalizing status of the enunciator). The story thus communicated 
to the spectator always presupposes, for Odin (127), the intervention of a 
narrator: "a story is always told, in the cinema as elsewhere." 
There has also been, from a more semiological angle and more involved with 
the problematic of enunciation, the work of Metz (1988 and 1991) and of 
Francesco Casetti (1990). In his 1991 book, Metz made a series of proposals 
which, if they are primarily concerned with questions of enunciation, equally 
address the problematic of narration. This is hardly surprising in relation to 
cinema, given the extent to which enunciation and narration are intimately 
connected. Metz mobilizes a conceptual apparatus which aims to get to the 
bottom of the illusions that surround the issue of enunciation, this "capacity of 
many utterances to fold in on themselves, to appear here and there as if in bas 
relief, to create a thin layer which is engraved with cues revealing another level, 
which has to do with the production and not the product" (Metz 1988: 22). The 
phrase "to do with the production and not the product" explains why Metz can 
claim that "enunciation is the semiological act through which some parts of the 
text speak to us of this text as of an act." For Metz, filmic enunciation is, above all, 
"metadiscursive," in the sense that what it indicates in the first place is the film 
itself as an object - so much so that "the enunciator" becomes for Metz the film 
itself, and not some instance situated below or above (or, at any rate, outside) the 
film. Hence his option of having his analysis remain at the level of the text, 
eliminating from the metafilmic discourse any anthropomorphic instance, such 
as "narrator," "enunciator," "addressee," and other such concepts, basing him­
self rather on those "sites of enunciation," which are, at the beginning of the text, 
at its source, the "focus" of the utterance, and at the other end, its target: "the 
enunciator is the film, the film as focus, acting as such, oriented as such, the film as 
an activity" (1988: 26). 
Basing his argument on the idea that, by its nonverbal nature, the filmic 
utterance, unlike the linguistic utterance, is not attributed to a specific person, 
Metz makes the following claim: 
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Those who believe that "enunciation in the cinema" means something, should not 
take this argument lightly, for it is very strong. It obliges us to change our 
conception: to conceive an enunciative apparatus which is not essentially deictic, 
and therefore anthropomorphic, not personal, as one says of pronouns, and which 
does not imitate in any close way a specific linguistic apparatus, because the 
linguistic inspiration is more successful at a distance. (1988: 21) 
For his part, Francesco Casetti founds his enterprise on Greimas's principles 
about narrativity. For that school, the founding principle of narrative discourse is 
"shifting out," that operation by which thc enunciative instance projects beyond 
itself categories of time, place, and subject: the action of telling, like any other 
discursive form, "appears as a creative schism, on the one hand of the subject, the 
space, and the time of the representation, and on the other of the actantial, 
spatial, and temporal representation of the utterance" (Greimas and Courtes 
1979: 79). It is on this basis that Casctti (1990) identifies the filmic enunciator 
with the "I," the enunciataire, that is the addressee of the utterance as "you," and 
finally, the utterance itself as "he." The three instances of I, you, and he, for 
Casetti, are always present in the text, but their relative value and function can 
vary. Hence Casetti's four "discursive figurations" of point of view, potentially 
inscribed in the narrative filmic discourse are as follows: 
The configuration said to be objective: those shots, the most common of all, 
which present profilmic reality as if it were a question of seizing the essence of 
the action without underlining who runs through the shots or shows them, 
that is to say without showing either the enunciator (or narrator) or the 
enunciataire (or spectator). This is the "nobody's shot": a neutral shot, 
which represents the point of view of "no one" and where "he" (the 
utterance) is more important than the "I" (the enunciator) or the "you" 
(the addressee). 
2	 The configuration of the addressee: in this case, the character acts as if he 
were the one offering and showing the film and directly interpellates those to 
whom the film is addressed: the spectator-addressee. An example would be 
the look at the camera. In this configuration, the "I," the enunciator, is 
concealed in the "he" that constitutes the whole of the utterance to inter­
pellate the "you," the addressee-spectator. 
3	 The subjective configuration, for example the figure, usually produced 
through montage, which is the famous "subjective shot" and which has the 
looking activity of the character coincide with that of the spectator. Melding 
with the "he"-character, the "you" (addressee--spectator) shares what is seen 
with the "I"-enunciator. 
4	 The objectively unreal configuration: this arises, for example, every time the 
camera overtly manifests its omnipotence, when the camera opens up a 
perversion, since things no longer have their "normal" appearance. Thus 
Wellesian low-angle shots indicate, in a powerful way, through their out­
60 
Enunciation and Narration 
rageous character, the presence of an "I"-enunciator who affirms himself as 
such and reaffirms to the "you"-spectator his power over the "he" utterance. 
Cassetti's theorization is relevant because what is at stake here is quite crucial, 
if only because of the importance that film theorists, and especially those con­
cerned with cinematic narrative, have always accorded to different "enunciative 
postures." Those postures which bring closer the enunciator and the addressee, 
for example with the look at the camera and the subjective shot, are of central 
interest to those who are concerned with cinematic narration, like Marc Vernet 
with his chapters revealingly titled "the look at the camera" and "the look of the 
camera," which also draws on the fundamental figures of narrative cinema that 
engage the diverse instances of narration (Vernet 1988). 
4 Narration without l\Jarrator 
As we have seen, the story given to the spectator always presupposes for Odin, as 
for most film narratologists, the intervention of a narrator. On this question, the 
narratological theory of cinema, even when it was not yet formally constituted, 
has always enjoyed a broad consensus. The "tradition" has always recognized the 
beautiful unanimity, the necessity (the theoretical necessity, obviously) of a basic 
narrative instance, responsible for the filmic narrative utterances. And it matters 
little what name has been given to these instances (shower of images, grand 
image-maker, narrator, filmic narrator, enunciator, etc.). Since the cinema, 
unlike literature, is an audiovisual rather than a strictly verbal medium, such 
unanimity might seem astonishing, and one might expect it to be broken. And 
indeed it was: a rare discordant voice has appeared, that of David Bordwell, who 
rejects the necessity for film theory of recognizing the existence of an illocu­
tionary source to narrative utterances, the narrator. 
Basing himself on the rejection of the application to filmic stories of]akobson's 
famous communication schema, Bordwell claims the following: "On the princi­
ple that we ought not to proliferate theoretical entities without need, there is no 
point in positing communication as the fundamental process of all narration, only 
to grant that most films 'efface' or 'conceal' this process" (1985: 62). We thus see 
that, for Bordwell, this condemnation is complete. And actually his condemna­
tion applies to any form of narration, not only the cinema. Bordwell points out, 
with some acuity, certain problems in enunciation theory as applied to the 
cinema, but the solutions he proposes often appear more difficult to work with 
than the problems they have been created to solve. Let's look at the problems 
more closely. 
In fact, Bordwell doesn't completely liquidate the theory of the narrator. For 
him, there exist at least two types of text: those which presuppose the existence of 
a narrator and those in relation to which it is useless to posit a narrator. His first 
suggestion is only to recognize the narrator when there are evident traces of the 
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presence of such an organizing instance. On the one hand, there are classical films 
in which, apparently, no one "speaks cinema": in this case there is no need to 
posit a narrator. Such a position would entail an anthropomorphic fiction. On the 
other hand, basing' his argument on a very different corpus, which includes the 
work of the Soviets and also those of Godard, Resnais, and Bresson, these are 
narrative texts which present multiple indices suggesting the existence of a 
narrational figure. 
Such a position is problematic to the extent that it doesn't manage its own 
relation with anthropomorphism, of which, as we saw earlier, we are supposed to 
be suspicious. However, Bordwell is nevertheless conscious of the dangers, since 
he has shown earlier a concern with deanthropomorphizing narrative instances. It 
is exactly from this perspective that he substitutes for the word "narrator" the 
word "narration," in order to identify the agent responsible for the cinematic 
narrative. But through a boomerang, the operation is accompanied by a return of 
anthropomorphism, since this instance of "narration" is granted clearly human 
attributes: "Furthermore, the pensive ending [to Antonioni's La Notte] acknow­
ledges the narration as not simply powerful but humble: the narration knows that 
life is more complex than art can ever be" (Bordwell 1985: 209-10). 
This seems to us to constitute a paradoxical and indefensible position. What 
use is it to emphasize further the abstraction of narration, by naming it "narra­
tion" rather than "narrator," in a first movement, and thus distance it even more 
from the authorial instance, the manifest empirical author, the concrete author, if 
it is only, with a swing back of the pendulum, to grant this abstract instance with 
some concrete characteristics, which could only apply to a concrete author? For 
who knows, after all, that life is more complex than art, if not Antonioni himself? 
Whether it is a question of cinema or any other form of narrative, it is 
impossible, in our view, without running useless risks, to do away with the notion 
of the "narrator." 
Note 
English version of chapter 2 from their book Le Recit cinematographique (1990). 
Translated by Robert Starn and Toby Miller. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
Film Editing 
Lucy Fischer 
Editing is one of the most significant instruments of effect possessed by the film technician. 
V. I. Pudovkin, Film Technique and Film Acting 
Of all the technical properties of film, the most general and indispensable is editing. 
Siegfried Kracauer, Theory of Film 
As the quotes above indicate, editing has long been viewed by film critics and 
practitioners alike as a major component of cinematic form. As such, it has 
received considerable attention in the annals of film theory. Yet, it is not a simple 
term to define. 
While some scholars speak of editing entirely in relation to film production 
(Ephraim Katz deems it: "The process of selecting, assembling, and arranging 
motion picture shots and corresponding sound tracks in coherent sequence and 
flowing continuity" [1994: 405]), others extend it to the film text itself. Reflect­
ing this, David Bordwell and Kristin Thompson conceive editing in a double 
sense as: "1. In filmmaking, the task of selecting and joining camera takes [and] 2. 
In the finished film, the set of techniques that govern the relations among shots" 
(1990: 409). 
While Katz specifically includes sound within his description of editing, 
Bordwell and Thompson sidestep the issue, mentioning only the assembly of 
"camera takes." None of the critics highlights the liminal case of "editing Jpithin 
the camera" - shooting film footage (either planned or unplanned) in the order in 
which it will ultimately appear, thus nullifying the need for recombining images 
(and sounds) at a later point. Finally, biases can surface in definitions of editing. 
Katz speaks of the editor creating "coherent sequence and flowing continuity," 
thus assuming conventional narrative form and denying the possibility of 
abstraction. Clearly, the best definition will reveal the full complexity of 
editing: its status as production craft and discursive mode; its efficacy for 
structuring dramatic and experimental works; its potential application to sound 
and image. 
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In discussing the theorization of film editing, it is also necessary to invoke an 
historical perspective. On a certain level, in the early years of cinema (during its 
so-called "Primitive" stage, from around 1895 to 1900), there really was no film 
editing. Producers (like the Brothers Lumiere in France, or Thomas Alva Edison 
in the United States) supervised the making of one-shot films: a subject was 
selected for shooting; it was suitably framed for the lens; then the camera ran 
until the film "magazine" was depleted. There were no changes in camera set-up 
(to be conjoined later in a multi-shot format). Among such notable one-shot 
works (made between 1894 and 1896) are Edison's Sandow the Strongman, 
Morning Bath, Black Diamond Express, Serpentine Dances, and The Kiss, as well 
as the Lumiere Brothers' Feeding the Baby, The Arrival of a Train, Workers 
Leaving the Lumiere FactOlY, and Leaving Jerusalem by Railway. 
There was one major exception to this rule in the early years, though it was not 
labeled as film editing per se. I refer to the in-camera device known as the 
"substitution trick" - generally used for "special" effects. For example, in a 
film by Georges MeIies (a former stage magician), a woman might suddenly 
disappear (as one does in The Vanishing Lady [1896]). Melies achieved this by 
shooting the first part of the footage with the woman before the camera, then 
stopping the apparatus while she was removed from the scene. Filming was then 
resumed and .her body (in projection) seemed, mysteriously, to have evaporated. 
Similar techniques (of in-cameralstop-motion photography) were used in more 
serious works. In The Execution of Ma~y Queen 4 Scots (1895) - an historical 
event which took place in the sixteenth century - an actress poses while an axe is 
lowered to her neck, then (with the camera shut off) her body is "exchanged" for 
that of a dummy (whose head eventually "rolls"). 
By 1903, with works like Edwin Porter's The Great Train Robbery (made for 
the Edison Company), one finds the rudiments of sophisticated film editing - at 
least within a dramatic context. The story unfolds in multiple shots: those of 
bandits riding toward the train; those of the robbery within the bank car; those of 
men scurrying atop the train; those of the posse riding to the rescue. Beyond the 
narrative genre, editing became important in other modes. The primitive one­
shot documentary (like Edison's President McKinley at Home [1897]) was 
replaced by such multi-shot films as Cricks and Martin's A Visit to Peek Frean 
and Company's Biscuit Works (1906) - a British actualite that, in sequential 
images, shows every aspect of the bakery's production process ("Rolling out 
Dough," "Packing Biscuits"). 
As the craft of film editing evolved through the 1910s and '20s, critics and 
theorists struggled to explain its techniques and to formulate its significance: 
How does film editing work? Does it constitute a language? Does it mimic the 
workings of the human mind? What formal principles guide its use? As an 
aesthetic tool, how does it compare to those of the more established arts (e.g. 
literature and theater)? Which filmmakers have been masters of the technique? 
As is clear from these questions, theorists invoked editing in a variety of 
different contexts. For some, it shored up notions of the "specificity" of the 
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film medium. For others, it fueled arguments championing experimentation or 
realism. For some, it demonstrated film's relation to cognition or the psyche. For 
others, it helped characterize the style of film auteurs. 
Hence, if the physical act of editing entails a juxtaposition of film images, 
providing an overview of its theorization requires a "montage of theories" (to 
borrow the title of Richard Dyer MacCann's pioneering anthology of film 
criticism). 
1 Editing and Realism 
Even while being shot, a film must be thought of already as an editable sequence of separate 
pieces of celluloid. The filmic form is never identical with the real appearance, but only 
similar to it. 
V. I. Pudovkin, Film Technique and Film Acting 
One of the major ways in which an art form can be valorized and justified is in 
terms of its difference from everyday reality - a feature that, ostensibly, bestows 
upon it an elevated status. In the early years of cinema, such an argument was 
made by Rudolph Arnheim, a German critic. Significantly, for Arnheim, one 
of the major synthetic aspects of the cinema was its recourse to editing. His 
theorization of the issue appears in his influential book Film (1933), 1 as part of his 
discussion of cinema's absence of the normal "Space-Time Continuum": 
In real life every experience or chain of experiences is enacted for every observer in 
an uninterrupted spatial and temporal sequence .... There are no jerks in time or 
space in real life. Time and space are continuous. Not so in film. The period of 
time being photographed may be interrupted at any point. One scene may be 
immediately followed by another that takes place at a totally different time. And 
the continuity of space may be broken in the same manner. (1971: 20-1) 
While Arnheim does not specifically use the term "editing," it is clear from his 
remarks that this is the practice to which he refers -- speaking of "jerks" in time 
and space, of the camera being "interrupted," of "broken" continuity, of one 
scene (by which he means shot) being followed by another. 
Arnheim also attempts to explain why film's aesthetic distance from reality 
does not, ultimately, disturb the spectator or cause her "a physical discomfort 
akin to seasickness" (27). He concludes that it fails to do so because we apprehend 
the cinema as only a "partial illusion": 
Up to a certain degree it gives the impression of real life .... On the other hand, it 
partakes strongly of the nature of a picture. (26) 
While Arnheim sees the discourse of editing as entirely unconstrained (as 
compared to the rules of the world's space-time axis), he understands that 
montage can be used to create a sense of reality on-screen: 
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To be sure, in practice this freedom [of editing] is usually restricted in that the 
subject of the film is an account of some action, and a certain logical unity of time 
and space must be observed into which the various scenes are fitted. (21) 
On the other hand, for Arnheim, montage often reflects the abstraction of the 
editing process itself: "Sometimes ... shots are associated by montage whose 
connection is not realistic but conceptual or poetic" (89). 
While Arnheim champions a cinema which is distinguished from the quotidian 
universe through editing, other critics have taken the reverse position. Among 
them is the German writer Siegfried Kracauer, who, in The01:Y of Film: The 
Redemption ofPhysical Reality (1960), argues (as the title indicates) for cinema's 
ability to capture the material world. Of the two major tendencies he sees in film 
history (Lumiere and realism vs. Melies and formalism), he prefers the former 
and praises Lumiere for "avoid[ing] any personal interference with the given 
data" (31). Meli(~s, on the other hand, with his edited illusions, "did not take 
advantage of the camera's ability to record and reveal the physical world" (33). 
Summing up his position, Kracauer sees the film director as uneasily pulled 
between two opposing tendencies of the medium - the impulse to edit or not: 
Any film maker evolving a narrative is faced with the task of simultaneously living 
up to two obligations which seem to be difficult to reconcile. On the one hand, he 
will have to advance the action by assigning to each shot a meaning relevant to 
the plot.... [T]his reduction of meanings falls to editing .... On the other hand, 
the film maker will wish to exhibit and penetrate physical reality for its own sake. 
And this calls for shots not yet stripped of their mUltiple meanings, shots still able 
to release their psychological correspondences. (69) 
Clearly, the "stripping" process is one Kracauer ascribes to editing. Ultimately, 
for Kracauer, editing is only useful to the extent that it supports the "basic 
property" of the film medium - its pull toward realism: 
The interest lies not with editing in itself, regardless of the purposes it serves, but 
with editing as a mcans of implementing- or defying ... such potentialities of the 
medium as are in accordance with its substantive charactcristics. (II) 
Like Kracauer, French critic Andre Bazin, in a famous essay, "The Evolution 
of the Language of Cinema" (1950), celebrates those filmmakers who "put their 
faith" in reality instead of the plastic image. Clearly, Bazin does not imagine a 
cinema devoid of editing. Rather, he favors the kind of "invisible" cutting 
identified with D. W. Griffith (and the classic American cinema) over the 
aesthetics of "montage" (associated with the assertive editing of the revolutionary 
Soviet cinema [1967: 24-5]). While the former is fairly subtle, providing' a 
"window" onto the world, the latter creates "meaning not proper to the images 
themselves but derived exclusively from their juxtaposition" (25). Ultimately, 
Bazin lends a moral tone to his distinction between a cinema of editing and that of 
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photographic representation. He uses the term "cheat" to describe the "tricks of 
montage" (27) and concludes that filmmakers who eschew showy editing 
have a "respect for the continuity of dramatic space and, of course, of its dura­
tion" (34). 
Writing in later years, French theorist Christian Metz sees the cinema as 
tracing a similar binary trajectory. In the first camp are filmmakers who down­
play editing. Here, Metz quotes Roberto Rossellini: " 'Things are. Why manip­
ulate them?'" (1974: 41). In the second camp are the "montage or bust" 
filmmakers. As Metz remarks of the Soviet director Sergei Eisenstein, "all he 
can see anywhere are prefragmented pieces, which ingenious manipulation will 
then join together .... Eisenstein refused to admit any kind ofdescriptive realism 
into the cinema" (33). To some degree, Metz sees his own work (on the semiotics 
of cinema) as striking a median position between the two poles. 
2 Editing and Creativity 
Film editors speak eloquently using their splicers. They make order out of chaos ... 
Vincent LoBrutto, Selected Takes 
For theorists like Arnheim, cinema's distance from crude reality was not simply 
an ontological point. Rather its recognition demonstrated cinema's status as a 
high cultural form (hence the title of Arnheim's major work, Film as Art). For 
Arnheim (and those who shared his perspective), editing was a privileged aspect 
of cinematic craft, since it gave clear evidence of the artist's hand. As Arnheim 
notes, montage is "the royal road to film art" (1971: 87). He continues: 
The single image, after all, arises from a recording process, which is controlled by 
man but which, regarded superficially, does no more than reproduce nature. But 
when it comes to montage man takes a hand in the process - time is broken up, 
things that are disconnected in time and space are joined together. This looks much 
more like a tang'ibly creative and formative process. (87-8) 
In a similar vein, theorist-filmmaker Maya Deren saw editing as one of the 
primary tools of the cinema artist: 
In film, the image can and should be only the beginning, the basic material of the 
creative action. All invention and creation consist primarily of a new relationship 
between known parts .... The editing' of a film creates the sequential relationship 
which g'ives particular or new meaning to the images. (1992: 66-7) 
For Deren, tour-de-force editing involved both a rejection of conventional 
narrative and a negation of the space-time continuum so beloved of Kracauer 
and Bazin. She remarks: 
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[Film] must relinquish the narrative disciplines it has borrowed from literature and 
its timid imitation of the causal logic of narrative plots, a form which flowered as a 
celebration of the earthbound, step-by-step concept of time, space and relationship 
which was part of the primitive materialism of the nineteenth century. Instead, it 
must develop the vocabulary of filmic images and evolve the syntax of filmic 
techniques which relate those. It must determine the disciplines inherent in the 
medium, discover its own structural modes, explore the new realms and dimen­
sions accessible to it and so enrich our culture artistically. (70) 
It was, in fact, such editing that Deren used in her own films - seminal works 
of the New American Cinema. In A Study in Choreography.liJr Camera (1945), 
sequential shots depict a male dancer beginning a leap in one space and landing in 
another. In Meshes of the Afternoon (a dream-like fantasy starring the director), 
Deren arises (with dagger in hand) to approach a second sleeping figure of 
herself. She then takes a series of steps whieh are edited into a synthetic 
continuity - by the sea, on soil, on grass, on pavement, and on carpet. Clearly, 
through editing, Deren achieves her goal of forging a "creative film form" (69). 
3 Editing and the Other Arts 
[O]ur cinema is not altogether without parents and without pedigre(~, without a past, 
without the traditions and rich cultural heritage of past epochs. 
Sergei Eisenstein, "From 'Dickens, Griffith and the Film Today'" 
One of the principal ways in which film theorists have traditionally framed their 
discussion of the cinema has been to compare it to other established arts. On one 
level, this impulse bespeaks an aesthetic curiosity: How does a new medium 
extend or revamp our understanding of earlier artistic forms? On another plane, 
however, such diatribes are meant to "legitimize" the cinema - by heralding its 
ancestry and origins in more respectable forms. For some critics, editing played a 
prominent role in their line of "hereditary" argument. 
Since cinema borrowed significantly from nineteenth-century theater (and was 
known as the "photoplay"), it was natural for writers to compare the two media. 
As regards editing, it was cinema's capacity for presenting shifting perspectives 
that was seen to distinguish it from the stage. As Arnheim notes: 
Whereas the theater stage differs from real life only in that the fourth wall is 
missing, the setting of the action changes, and the people talk in theatrical 
language, the film deviates much more profoundly. The position of the spectator 
is continually changing since we must consider him located at the station point of 
the camera. (1971: 28) 
Pudovkin, however, stresses other issues. While, for him, the theater director 
works with "reality," the film artist's "active raw material is no other than those 
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pieces ofcelluloid"; hence, film craft is more plastic and material than theatrical art 
(1970: 84). Pudovkin also recognizes that, due to editing, screen acting requires a 
different skill from that of the stage: 
The editing of separate camera angles in the cinema is the more vivid and expressive 
equivalent of the technique that obliges a stage aelor TPho has inward(y absorbed his 
acting image to "theatricalise" its outer jiJrm. 
The film actor must clearly understand that the moving of the camera from place to 
place is not simply a means of realising purely directorial methods. The under­
standing and feci of the possibilities of the shooting of shots from various angles 
must be organically included in the process of the actor's own work on the external 
shaping of his role. (285) 
Finally, Sergei Eisenstein sees in the style of Japanese classical theater a proto­
type for cinematic montage. He writes of one such performance: 
[1]n the Kabuki play Narukami the actor Sadanji must change from drunkenness to 
madness. This transition is solved by a mechanical cut .... This method is organic 
to film. (l992a: 136) 
If comparisons between cinema and theater have been legion in the history of 
film theory, so have analogies to literature. One of the earliest and most well­
known treatises on the topic was Eisenstein's "Dickens, Griffith and the Film 
Today." Significantly, the essay identifies film editing as the central feature that 
connects the two arts. As Eisenstein notes: "Griffith arrived at montage through 
the method of parallel action, and he was led to the idea of parallel action by ­
Dickens!" (1974: 303). Having stated this, Eisenstein proceeds to analyze the 
"montage structure" of Dickens's writing, along with its strong visual quality 
(304). Seeing the limitations of overstating the parallels between literature and 
film, Eisenstein warns: 
Analogies and resemblances cannot be pursued too far - they lose conviction and 
charm. They begin to take on the air of machination or card-tricks. (303) 
4 Editing and the Psyche 
The photoplay obeys the laws of the mind rather than those of the outer world. 
Hugo Munsterberg, The Film 
For many theorists, the major interest of film editing (and the textual discourse it 
creates) has been its capacity to "mimic" the workings of the human mind. 
Prominent among these critics is Hugo Munsterberg, who, in the very early years 
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of the cinema, wrote The Film: A Psychological Study (The Silent Photoplay in 
1916). While Munsterberg does not specifically use the term "editing," his focus 
on cinema's propensity for "rapid changes of scenes" is clearly a way of referen­
cing the device (1970: 47). 
Munsterberg deals with editing primarily in his section on "Memory and 
Imagination" -- often comparing the cinema with theater in order to emphasize 
film's unique psychological mode. In speaking of memory, for example, he 
notes: 
The theater cannot do more than suggest to our memory this looking back­
ward .... The photoplay can. We see the jungle, we see the hero at the height of 
his danger; and suddenly there flashes upon the screen a picture of the past. For 
not more than two seconds does the idyllic New England scene slip into the 
exciting African events. When one deep breath is over we are stirred again by 
the event of the present. That home scene of the past flitted by just as a hasty 
thought of bygone days darts through the mind. (40) 
Thus, for Munsterberg, the cinema provides "an objectivation of our memory 
function .... It is as if the outer world itself became molded in accordance with 
our ... passing memory ideas" (41). In addition to rendering a sense of reverie, 
the cinema, for Munsterberg, has particular powers for visualizing the human 
imagination: 
Just as we can follow the reminiscences of the hero, we may share the fancies of his 
imagination .... We see the boy who is to enter the navy and who sleeps on 
shipboard the first night; the walls disappear and his imagination flutters from 
port to port. (43) 
While the previous examples pertain to editing's capacity for representing the 
consciousness of screen characters, Munsterberg is equally interested in how 
cutting affects the mind of the spectator. Here, he finds that movies allow the 
viewer a certain mental "omnipresence" and distraction: 
The photoplay alone gives us our chance for ... omnipresence. We see the banker, 
who had told his young wife that he has a directors' meeting, at a late hour in a 
cabaret feasting with a stenographer from his office. She had promised her poor old 
parents to be home early. We see the gorgeous roof garden and the tango dances, 
but our dramatic interest is divided among the frivolous pair, the jealous young 
woman in the suburban cottage, and the anxious old people in the attic. Our mind 
wavers among the three scenes. The photoplay shows one after another. Yet it can 
hardly be said that we think of them as successive. It is as if we were really at all 
three places at once. (45) 
So, for .Munsterberg, film works by "overcoming the forms of the outer world, 
namely, space, time, and causality, and by adjusting the events to the forms of the 
inner world, namely, attention, memory, imagination, and emotion" (74). 
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Though Munsterberg wrote in 1916, the issues he examines remain vital in 
contemporary film theory. Recently, Maureen Turim has extended Munster­
berg's concern with film and memory by tracing the history of the "flashback" ­
a crucial editing structure in film. As she notes: "We can easily sugg'est that the 
flashback developed as a means of mimetic representation of memory, dreams, or 
confession" (1989: 6). While many conventional films have had sig'nificant flash­
back sequences - ones that are, g'enerally, well marked (Humoresque [1946], 
Casablanca [1943], Body and Soul [1947], The Snake Pit [1948]) - there are 
some innovative works that are structured around the indeterminate borders 
between past and present, fantasy and reality, Among the most intriguing is Alain 
Resnais's Hiroshima, Mon Amour (1959) - a work of the French New Wave, 
which constitutes a high point of modernist cinema, In that film, a contemporary 
tryst between a French woman and a Japanese man (which occurs during' her visit 
to Tokyo) is ambig'uously interlaced with references to a prior love affair between 
the woman (as a young' girl in wartime France) and a German soldier. Continu­
ally, the narrative shifts abruptly from her present-day activities to such unex­
plained scenes as that of her, as a young girl, hidden in her parents' basement ­
her head shaven by an angTY mob, Gradually, the tragedy of her romance is 
revealed throug'h temporally scrambled flashbacks that portray her liaison with a 
forbidden lover, While, by the 1990s, such enigmatic flashbacks have become 
quite common, in the late 1950s they were groundbreaking. 
5 Editing and Cognition 
[T]he filmmaker carefully structures the motion picture to interact directly with the mind 
of the viewer. 
John D, Anderson, "A Cognitive Approach to Continuity" 
While Munsterberg was interested in film's relation to the psychological states of 
memory and fantasy, other critics have been concerned with cinema's association 
with cognition. Again, a theorization of editing has been central to their inves­
tig'ation, 
In the early years of the cinema, V. L Pudovkin both analyzed narrative film 
editing and offered prospective directors a "guide" for constructing cinema 
dramas, Paramount, in his theory, was the use of editing to guide the viewer's 
conscIOusness: 
We have established, , , the basic significance of the constructive editing of scenes. 
It builds the scenes from separate pieces, of which each concentrates the attention 
of the spectator only on that element important to the action. The sequence of 
these pieces must not be uncontrolled, but must correspond to the natural trans­
ference of attention of an imaginary observer (who, in the end, is represented by 
the spectator. (1970: 70-1) 
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In recent years, other writers have confronted the issue of cognition and film 
form. Noel Carroll has focussed on how cinematic discourse interacts in a 
"natural" way with the workings of the spectator's mind, offering the viewer 
cinematic tropes that hold his or her attention. For example, he sees the shifting 
assortment of shots presented through editing as a form of movement that keep~ 
"the screen palpitating with visual activity" (1996: 18). This strategy works to 
insure the viewer's interest, because, as humans, "we are naturally disposed to 
shift our attention to other sectors of the environment, unless some change, such 
as a movement, keeps us focused on the object of our present attention" (19). 
Editing is such a "change," and the straight cut its most abrupt and effective 
transition (22). According to Carroll, other editing techniques enjoy a "natural" 
fit with human perception. For example, the common "point-of-view" trope is 
an "elaboration of our ordinary cognitive and perceptual experience" (39), which 
impels us to follow the trajectory of another person's sight line. As Carroll notes, 
this functions as: 
a way in which one animal derives information about another animal. The glance of 
a creature exhibits its interests and often its practical intents. In this respect, 
following the gaze of another creature possesses survival value. (39) 
Carroll also sees the structure of point-of-view editing as dictated by the 
dynamics of human emotion: "The function of the point/object shot [the shot 
which depicts what a character apprehends] is to supply the audience with the 
cause or object of the character's emotional state" (43). Hence, it is "natural" that 
if we see a character appearing shocked in one shot, we would want to see, in the 
next, a representation of the reason for that reaction. Similarly, for John Ander­
son, editing's "fit" with the dynamics of human perception explains the popu­
larity of mainstream cinema: 
the wide accessibility of Hollywood film rests in no small part upon the discovery 
and subsequent incorporation into convention of a number of rules for filmic 
construction which allow the film to interact directly with the human perceptual 
system. (1993: 65) 
While the guidance of attention is a part of all film construction and apprehen­
sion, certain works (both experimental and mainstream) have foregrounded this 
issue as part of their discourse. Jacques Tati's comedy Playtime (1968) embeds 
myriad sight gags within a single long-shot/long-take image, highlighting each 
through methods of composition, color, and movement. Nonetheless, each shot is 
so complex and confusing that it constitutes a cognitive challenge or "game" for 
the spectator (Fischer 1980: 83-8). American independent filmmaker Robert 
Nelson models his work Bleu Shut (1970) on the television quiz show, and the 
viewer is instructed, by an off-screen voice, to keep track of time by watching a 
small on-screen clock. Similarly, George Landow's Institutional f2Jtality (1969) ­
which parodies an instructional movie about film projection - asks viewers to 
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respond, as though to a standardized exam -- including marking answers in a 
nonexistent test booklet. The ironic joke in both these texts is the impossibility or 
unsuitability of the cognitive acts required of the audience. 
6 Editing as Communication and Language 
Editing is the language of the film director. Just as in living' speech, so, one may say, in 
editing: there is a word -- the piece of exposed film, the image; a phrase ~ the combination of 
these pieces. 
V. I. Pudovkin, Film Technique and Film Acting 
IfCarroll is interested in issues ofediting and cognition, he is also concerned with 
cinema as a means of human communication. As he writcs: 
editing involves more than chemistry and mechanics. It is a means of communica­
tion within the social institution of world cinema. It provides a means of articula­
tion whose practice enables filmmakers to convey stories, metaphors and even 
theories to spectators. (1978/9: 79) 
Once more, in his view, cinema's communicative powers interfacc with propen­
sities of the human mind - especially its ability to reason. As Carroll notes, when 
a spectator is presented with a series of sequential film shots: 
the task engages the viewer's inductive capacities. The viewer must infer the 
relation between the new material and antecedent information. Editing does not 
supply the whole story; the very concept of editing implies that it is only a partial 
representation. The viewer must fill in the gaps. (80) 
Clearly, the more conventional the film, the less intellectual work is required of 
the audience. 
While other critics have embraced the notion of cinema as communication, 
they have tended to regard the tropes of montage as less "natural" than Carroll, 
likening them to linguistic structures or codes. Early on in film theory, Sergei 
Eisenstein targeted the Japanese "ideogram" as a model for montage. What 
appealed to him was the pictorial/hieroglyphic nature of the Japanese language. 
As he notes, "their writing is primarily representational" (l992a: 127). 
More recently, parallels between cinematic and linguistic systems have been 
proposed by French theorist Christian Metz. He has been careful, however, to 
avoid implying that film editing creates a formal linguistic ~:ystetn (1974: 48). 
Rather, he catalogs a series of features of the cinema (based on its reliance on the 
photographic image) that are opposed to verbal modes: its instant intelligibility, 
its suppression ofabstraction, its heterogeneity, its universality, its lack of"double 
articulation," its cxcess of connotation, its one-way communicative dynamic. 
Despite these differences, Metz is "persuaded ... that the 'filmolinguistic' 
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venture is entirely justified" (60), but prefers to speak of a "semiotics" of cinema 
(89). Here, the proper area of study is the dramatic film. As Metz states: "it was 
precisely to the extent that the cinema confronted the problems (~rnarration that, in the 
course of successive groupings, it came to produce a body of specific signifying 
procedures" (95). Thus, he studies the syntagmatic units of film (created by 
editing) and attempts to answer the following questions: 
How does the cinema indicate successivity, precession, temporal breaks, causality, 
adversative relationships, consequence, spatial proximity, or distance, etc'? These 
are central questions to the semiotics of the cinema. (105) 
For Metz (and others who conceive of cinema as "language"), its discursive 
structures (fashioned, in part, through editing) must be learned. Opposing this 
view, Carroll denies that films "are decoded by audiences who have learned the 
conventions of cinema" (1996: 11). Rather, he finds that such comprehension 
depends more upon "recognition" (14). 
7 Editing and Ideology 
[Ideology] must hide its operations, "naturalizing" its functioning and its messages in some 
way. 
Daniel Dayan, 'The Tutor-Code of Classical Cinema" 
As we have seen, certain theories of editing have ideological implications. Andre 
Bazin's preference for filmmakers who "put their f:lith" in the realistic image has 
a quasi-religious tone to it. His love of the long-take format (which, allegedly, 
leaves the spectator more "freedom" of interpretation) also harbors a pro-demo­
cratic resonance - especially since Bazin contrasts it with the school of editing 
championed by Soviet artists. 
7.1 Editing and dialectics 
For Sergei Eisenstein, "art is always conflict" (1992b: 138), and in the cinema 
this is realized through montage. Arguing against the notion of editing as shot-to­
shot "linkage" (a theory associated with Lev Kuleshov), Eisenstein poses and 
answers the following question: 
By what, then, is montage characterized and, consequently, its cell - the shot? 
By collision. By the conflict of two pieces in opposition to each other. By conflict. 
By collision. (l992a: 133) 
Clearly, this dynamic notion of creation relates to Eisenstein's embrace of 
revolutionary Soviet politics. As he remarks: 
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According to Marx and Engels the dialectic system is only the conscIOus 
reproduction of the dialectic course (substance) of the external events of the 
world. (138) 
Hence, while, on a dramatic level, a film like Strike (1925) depicts a socio­
economic conflict between workers and industrialists, its editing reflects a 
sense of aesthetic struggle through the "principle of optical counterpoint." 
Potentially, this may involve shot-to-shot contrasts of scale, volume, mass, 
depth, direction, illumination, color, and/or duration (134-5). 
7.2 Editing and the construction 0/gender 
In the contemporary era, with the rise of feminist criticism, a major concern of 
film theory has been the consideration of cinema's elaboration ofgender. Central 
to this debate is the notion of point-of-view editing and the articulation of the so­
called "gaze." According to such arguments, the "look" (both on-screen and in 
the audience) is selectively identified with the male. Typically, the editing trope 
that renders the masculine gaze of an on-screen character involves two shots: that 
of a man looking, and that of the woman he apprehends. According to Laura 
Mulvey: 
Traditionally, the woman displayed has functioned on two levels: as erotic object 
for the characters within the screen story, and as erotic object for the spectator 
within the auditorium, with a shifting tension between the looks on either side of 
the screen .... As the spectator identifies with the main male protagonist, he 
projects his look on to that of his like, his screen surrog'ate, so that the power of 
the male protagonist as he controls events coincides with the active power of the 
erotic look. (1992: 751). 
Mulvey sees such editing tropes as evoking psychoanalytic notions of scopophilia 
-- giving the male spectator "the satisfaction, pleasure and privilege of [anJ 
'invisible guest' and highlight[ingJ how film has depended on voyeuristic 
active/passive mechanisms" (757). 
7.3 Editing and "bourgeois s~Jlle" 
Beyond the sexual politics of the point-of:"view trope, critics have seen it as more 
broadly tainted by bourgeois ideology. Daniel Dayan examines the shot-reverse 
structure, by which he means a sequence in which "shot one" frames a person or 
object and "shot two" portrays the individual who apparently has sighted the 
contents of shot one. For Dayan, this type of sequence works in the following 
manner: 
The spectator's pleasure, dependent upon his identification with the visual field [of 
shot one], is interrupted when he perceives the frame. From this perception he 
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infers the presence of the absent-one and that other field from which the absent­
one is looking. Shot two reveals a character who is presented as the owner of the 
glance corresponding to shot one. That is, the character in shot two occupies the 
place of the absent-one emanating from shot one's other stage into a presence. 
(1992: 188) 
According to Dayan, the ideological problem with such editing is that it "tricks" 
the spectator (189): rather than acknowledging that shot one is simply framed by 
the camera, it presents a figure in shot two who stands in for the mythical 
"absent-one" and appropriates the camera's visual field. Thus, "[u]nable to see 
the workings of the code, the spectator is at its mercy. His imaginary is sealed into 
the film; the spectator thus absorbs an ideological effect without being aware of 
it" (188). So Dayan sees classical cinema as "present[ing] itself as a product 
without a producer, a discourse without an orig'in" (191). Rather than revealing 
who really "speaks" (director, actor, camera, screenwriter, etc.), bourgeois 
cincma makes things seem to "spcak for themselves". Hence, such a form is 
"establishe[d] as the ventriloquist of ideology" (191). 
Since its publication, Dayan's interpretation of classical film editing has been 
hotly contested. vVilliam Rothman, for example, feels that Dayan's analysis of the 
shot/reverse-shot structure is wrong-headed, and concludes that "[n]o ghostly 
sovereign is invoked by the point-of-view sequence" (1992: 196). 
8 Editing and Authorship 
Now, by the auteur theory, if a director has not technical competence, no elementary flair 
for the cinema, he is automatically cast out from the pantheon of directors. 
Andrew Sarris, "Notes on the Auteur Theory in 1962" 
We have already seen how certain theorists, in their discussion of film history and 
aesthetics, identify styles of editing with various directors. Bazin, for example, in 
proclaiming his preference for the long-shot/long-take/deep-focus mode, 
singled out particular filmmakers as exemplary of that tradition: F. W. Murnau, 
Jean Renoir, Orson Welles, William Wyler, Roberto Rossellini. Similarly, in 
writing of the major tendencies of film editing, Christian Metz linked Eisenstein 
to the "montage or bust" camp. These diverse formulations illustrate how film 
critics see cinematic authorship as tied to styles of editing (as well as to a 
director's other aesthetic and thematic leanings). 
Of course, the major theorists to advance conceptions of cinema authorship 
were the French "auteurist" critics identified, in the post-vVorid War II era, with 
the journal Cahiers du cinema. One of those writers was Jean-LllC Godard, who 
later was championed as a modernist film author himself. Writing on Godard, 
David Bordwell sees the filmmaker's status as "auteur" linked, historically, to 
his association with nontraditional (anti-continuity) editing. In particular, it is 
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Godard's fame for the "jump cut" (starting with Breathless [1960]) that "proves" 
his cinematic genius. As Bordwell notes: 
If we take a simple but uncommon stylistic device, we can see how it became 
identified and analyzed only after changes within the cinematic institution were 
able to link it to conceptions of the author - author as the source of the film, as 
unique creative temperament and as the "narrator" in film. (1984: 4) 
Significantly, the "jump cut" had existed in some form as far back as the days of 
Melies (5). 
Also concerned with questions of editing and authorship is theorist Gilles 
Deleuze, who, in Cinema 1: The Movement-Image, devotes a chapter to "Mon­
tage" (1986: 29-56). De1euze sees four types of editing as characterizing the 
broad sweep of film history. While each is identified with a particular national 
style, it is also linked to a specific director. The American school of montage (tied 
to Griffith) is "org'anic" and "empiricist"; the Soviet school (affiliated with 
Eisenstein) is "materialist" and "dialectical"; the French school (associated 
with Abel Gance) is "quantitative-psychic"; and the German school (identified 
with Paul Wegener, Fritz Lang, and F. W. Murnau) is "intensive--spiritual" 
(55). 
9 Technological Development and Editing 
It is an easy self-deception to assume that better editing is related to the latest tools for the 
job .... We do well to remember this as we sit in front of our very expensive electronic 
wizardry. 
Roger Crittenden, Film and Video Editing 
Given that film theory has generally favored the image, most wntmgs have 
concentrated on visual editing at the expense of sound. At a particular moment 
in cinema history, however, the question of acoustic montage was paramount. 
This p~riod was, of course, the "Coming of Sound," which lasted from the mid­
1920s to the mid-1930s (depending upon which national industry was involved). 
There was great fear that sound would ruin the poetic art of cinema developed 
in the silent era - reducing all film to banal talking heads or ringing phones. In 
response to that depressing scenario, various theorists proposed more radical 
conceptions of the sound/ image relation. Primary in such formulations (espe­
cially among Soviet artists) was the notion of liberating the screen from literal 
sound/image-matching (lips moving as a person speaks) in favor of "audiovisual 
counterpoint" (Eisenstein 1992b: 144). As Pudovkin notes: "it is not generally 
recognised that the principal elements in sound film are the asynchronous and 
not the synchronous" (1970: 185). In "A Statement [on Sound]", signed by 
Eisenstein, Pudovkin, and G. V. Alexandrov, it is noted that: 
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To use sound in [an illusionistic] way will destroy the culture ofmontage, for every 
ADHESION of sound to a visual montage piece increases its inertia as a montage 
piece and increases the independence of its meaning -- and this will undoubtedly be 
to the detriment of montage, operating' in the first place not on the montage pieces 
but on the JUXTAPOSITION. (1992: 318) 
The writers conclude: "[s]ound, treated as a new montage element (as a factor 
divorced from the visual image), will inevitably introduce new means of enor­
mous power to the" cinema (318). 
One of the most stunning instantiations of this theory occurs in the work of 
Soviet filmmaker Dziga Vertov (not a signatory to the document). In Enthusiasm 
(1931) he applies the notion of acoustic montage to the documentary film - a 
genre which had not received great attention in the early years of sound, due to 
theorists' focus on drama and talking heads. What is most striking about Enthu­
siasm is the incredible tension that exists between the sound and visuals - as 
though the acoustic track were physically pushing itself away from the 
screen. This happens because of the film's hyperbolic asynchronization. For 
example, a shot of some interior is matched to an exterior sound; a shot of drunks 
is matched to the voices of a church choir. Vertov also edits the sound itself in 
highly complex ways- drawing upon techniques of superimposition, 
collage, reversal, and distortion. Throughout the film, a woman (who seems to 
be a stand-in for filmmaker and audience) is shown wearing headphones -- as 
though to remind us of the technical!synthetic nature of sound recording and 
montage. 
Despite such tour-de-force films as Enthusiasm, and the early outcries of Soviet 
theorists, most sound films were made in a standard fashion - with voices and lips 
matched. Subsequently, many theorists struggled to comprehend this relation ­
one created through synchronous audiovisual editing. Mary Ann Doane stresses 
classical cinema's impulse to create a sense of the real human body, with the voice 
contributing to the feel of its corporeal presence: 
The attributes of this fantasmatic body are first and foremost unity (throug-h the 
emphasis on a coherence of the senses) and presence-to-itself The addition of 
sound to the cinema introduces the possibility of re-presenting- a fuller (and 
organically unified) body. (1980: 34) 
For Doane, there are moments in mainstream cinema when the illusionist sound/ 
image relation is threatened. One of them occurs when the shot is edited with a 
"voice-off' (e.g. depicting a close-up of a door with a character heard talking 
hehind the door - outside of the visual range). As she notes: 
the use of the voice-off always entails a risk -- that of exposing the material 
heterogeneity of the cinema. Synchronous sound masks the problem and this at 
least partially explains its dominance .... There is always something uncanny 
about a voice which emanates from a source outside the hame. (40) 
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Less radical is the case of "voice-over" used as interior monologue. Here, "the 
voice and body are represented simultaneously, but the voice, far from being an 
extension of that body, manifests its inner lining .... The voice here is the 
privileged mark of interiority, turning the body 'inside-out' " (41). 
Rick Altman, on the other hand, wants to reverse the established priority of 
image over sound, using the metaphor of ventriloquism to establish sound as the 
controlling force: 
[T]he sound track is a ventriloquist who, by moving his dummy (the image) in time 
with the words he secretly speaks, creates the illusion that the words are produced 
by the dummy/image whereas in fact the dummy/image is actually created in 
order to disguise the source of the sound. Far from being subservient to the image, 
the sound track uses the illusion of subservience to serve its own ends. (1980: 67) 
Because "[s]ound editing is first and foremost word editing," Altman argues that 
the basic tenet of the cinema is "1 speak, therefore 1 am seen" (68). 
To some degree, Altman also shares the kind of ideological concerns about 
classical cinema raised by Dayan - seeing synchronous sound/image editing' as, 
essentially, manipulative: 
The fundamental scandal of sound film - and thus the proper starting point for a 
theory of sound film - is that sound and image are different phenomena, recorded 
by different methods, printed many frames apart on the film, and reproduced by an 
illusionistic technology. (79) 
Some noteworthy films have especially foregrounded this "scandal." One thinks 
of Fritz Lang's The Testament ofDr. Mabuse (1933), an early sound film in which 
an unseen criminal leader is revealed to be a phonograph behind a curtain. One 
thinks, as well, of Hollis Frampton's experimental work Critical Mass (1971), in 
which an argument between a young man and woman is made to seem comic and 
bizarre through a purposeful failure in voice/lip synchronization. Finally, one 
recalls a Hollywood film like Singin' in the Rain (1952) - set in the early sound 
period - which mocks silent screen actors whose vocals must be dubbed because 
their voices are sub-par. 
Like Altman, Kaja Silverman finds sound editing inflected by ideological 
implications - especially those relating to gender. In her view, female screen 
characters are far more likely to be edited with synchronous sound than are male: 
To allow [a female character] to be heard without being seen would be ... danger­
ous, since it would disrupt the specular regime upon which dominant cinema 
relies .... Finally, to disembody the female voice in this way would be to challenge 
every conception by means of which we have previously known woman within 
Hollywood film, since it is precisely as body that she is constructed there. (1988: 164) 
Feminist cinema, on the other hand, "generally pulls away from any fixed locus 
within the image track, away from the constraints of synchronization" (141). 
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This tendency can be seen in such experimental women's films as Laura Mulvey 
and Peter Wollen's Riddles o/the Sphinx (1977), which counterpoises dramatized 
domestic scenes with free-associative interior monologues. Similarly, in Su 
Friedrich's The Tzes that Bind (1984), a film portrait of the artist's mother, the 
viewer never sees Friedrich or her parent speak in synchronous sound. Finally, 
Chantal Akerman's News from Home (1976) is comprised offootage of city streets 
linked to the voice of Akerman reading letters. 
While in the 1920s and 1930s the coming of sound created one kind of crisis in 
editing, today the advent ofnew, high-tech methods precipitates another. In 1992, 
Needful Things became one of the first features to be entirely cut on a digital 
computer editor; and since then, according to David Ansen and Ray Sawhill, "a 
quiet revolution has occurred in the world of ... filmmaking" (1996: 64). Because 
of this new technology, the tasks of film editing and special-effects designing have 
merged, with editors able to seamlessly combine parts of separate shots within the 
same image. As technician Rob Kobrin notes: "'I'm now editing within the 
frame' " (Ansen and Sawhill 1996: 64). The implication of such gadgetry is truly 
radical as "all Iive action films [now] have the potential to become animation" (64). 
Moving beyond cinematography itself, in Spielberg's Jurassic Park (1993) and 
The Lost World (1997), while certain dinosaur figures derive from elaborately 
crafted three-dimensional models (some of them life-size), others are entirely 
computer-generated - "absent," in the photographic sense, from profilmic space, 
though eventually inserted (by editing) within the frame. Hence, in the era of 
virtual reality, we find ourselves in a virtual cinema - one that questions the 
"integrity" of the shot. As writer James Gleick notes: "We have long had 
distorting lenses and airbrushes. Still we trust photographs, or we did. We 
admit them into evidence." Clearly, this confidence erodes as a "new visual 
virtuosity becomes the ... norm" (1997: 22). 
Whereas, for the theorists considered in this essay, film editing meant plastic 
relationships between shots, for the theorists of the future, editing equally implies 
synthetic relations within shots. Given the consequent transformation of cinema's 
traditional association with realism, a new philosophy or ontology of the medium 
may be in order. 
Note 
1 Arnheim's Film has been long out of print. Most of it was republished in sections of 
Film as Art (1957,1971). 
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Film Semiotics 
Warren Buckland 
Twentieth-century thought is marked by a shift from idealist philosophy to the 
Language Analysis tradition (see Apel 1976). The structural linguist Ferdinand 
de Saussure and the American semiotician C. S. Peirce initiated a radical critique 
of Descartes's and Kant's philosophy of the subject, in which language and signs 
replaced mental entities as the locus of knowledge. Language Analysis therefore 
rejects idealism, transforming its "first-person perspective" (focus on private 
mental events, as in Descartes's method of introspection) to the public, "third­
person perspective" of language and signs. The problem with introspection, 
writes Thomas Daddesio, is that "it was perceived as being unable to provide 
the objective, repeatable observations that science requires" (1995: 49). Prior to 
the Language Analysis tradition philosophers believed that mental processes 
founded knowledge (including self-knowledge). But Daddesio adds: 
once this privilege came to be viewed as illusory, introspection was replaced by 
methods relying on a third-person perspective. From this new perspective, the 
access individuals have to their own thoughts could no longer be taken as the 
foundation for knowledge and, consequently, private events were replaced, in 
discussions of language, meaning, and reason, by events that were open to public 
scrutiny such as the behavior of others, the words they utter, and the uses to which 
they put words. (50) 
The Language Analysts' assumption of indirect access to one's thoughts via 
language and other intersubjective sign systems replaced the idealists' assump­
tion of immediate access to the thoughts in one's own mind. 
In the late 1950s cognitive processes made a decisive return 1J)ithin the Lan­
guage Analysis tradition, beginning with Noam Chomsky's transformational 
generative grammar (together with his decisive critique of B. F. Skinner's 
behaviorism). In the form of Chomsky's linguistics, the Language Analysis 
tradition created a synthesis of both idealism and the intersubjective nature of 
language, thus (in principle at least) avoiding the idealism and first-person 
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perspective and the (quasi-)behaviorism of the Language Analysts' third-person 
perspective. 
This history of twentieth-century thought is reflected in film theory, particu­
larly in the shift from "classical film theory" (of Arnheim, Bazin, etc.) to 
"classical film semiotics" (the early research of Christian Metz, based on struc­
tural linguistics) and finally to "cognitive film semiotics", influenced by 
Chomsky and cognitive science generally (the research of Dominique Chateau, 
Michel Colin, Francesco Casetti, and Roger Odin). In this chapter I aim to outline 
the foundations ofsemiotics, summarize its institutional context, analyze the basic 
tenets of classical film semiotics, and answer a number of its critics (particularly 
Gregory Currie), before ending with an overview of cognitive film semiotics. 
1 Linguistic and Semiotic Models 
The ultimate objective of structural linguistics is to offer a theoretical descrip­
tion, or model, of the nonobservable underlying linguistic reality. For Rudolf 
Botha a model is not a mere summary of directly recorded data, but a description 
offering "an image, representation or replica of something which cannot be 
observed in any direct manner" (1981: 129). The function of a model is to 
mediate between a theory and its object of study. The relation between theory 
and its object is therefore indirect. For this reason, theory does not discover its 
specific object of study, but must construct it, for this object is defined as being 
inaccessible to empirical perception. Saussure realized this in relation to the 
specific object of linguistic study when he stated that "The object is not given 
in advance of the viewpoint: far from it. Rather, one might say that it is the 
viewpoint adopted which creates the object" (1983: 8). For Samuel Weber: "This 
assertion marks out the epistemological space ofSaussure's theoretical effort, and 
to neglect its far-reaching implications has inevitably meant to misconstrue the 
status of his arguments." (1976: 916). 
Structural linguistics and semiotics, including film semiotics, therefore 
construct hypotheses and models, founded on the hierarchy between underlying 
(latent, nonobservable) reality and surface (manifest, observable) reality. 
Structural linguistics is founded on the hierarchy between langue!parole, 
and its ultimate objective is to construct a model of la langue. For Chomsky, 
the hierarchy consists of competence and performance, and the ultimate aim 
of his linguistics is to model competence. The specific underlying reality of 
film to be modeled is called cinematic language, which is opposed to individual 
films. 
I shall now outline some of the concepts Saussure developed to modella langue 
- particularly arbitrariness, language as speech circuit, commutation, recursivity, 
syntagmatic and paradigmatic relations, as well as Andre Martinet's concept of 
double articulation. These concepts are important because Metz used them to 
construct his semiotic theory of film. 
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Saussure delimited the specific object of linguistic study - la langue -- by the 
metaphor of speech as a circuit, as Roy Harris explains: "The Cours is the first 
treatise on language to insist that speech communication is to be viewed as a 
'circuit,' and to attach any theoretical significance to the fact that individuals 
linked by this circuit act in turn as initiators of spoken messages and as recipients 
of such messages" (1987: 24-5). The metaphor "speech circuit" enabled Saussure 
to conceive a language as an intersubjective (or social) system of communication. 
To study a language as a system of communication, Saussure developed a 
deductive method to analyze the "invisible" boundaries within the continuous 
speech chain, boundaries that confer meaning upon the signs in this chain. This 
method involved segmentation and classification, carried out by means of com­
mutation which enables linguists to identify the boundaries of a phoneme-- the 
units that distinguish one phoneme from another. In principle, a commutation 
involves the correlation between a change on the surface level and a change on the 
underlying level. A change on the surface may either be a variation of the same 
phoneme (or other linguistic unit) or a new phoneme. By means of commutation, 
linguists are able to identify the changes on the surface level that correlate with 
the changes on the underlying level. 
Saussure described la parole as an infinitude of manifestations generated by la 
langue, which is necessarily finite. Generating an infinity of utterances with finite 
means is possible by recognizing that all utterances are composed from the same 
small number of signs used recursively in different combinations. All the infinite 
manifestations could thereby be described in terms of the finite system that 
evoked them. This system is not a mere conglomerate of signs, but consists of 
interdependent, formal relationships. Furthermore - and here Saussure located 
the "ultimate law oflanguage" - signs were defined only in terms of their relation 
to, or difference from, other signs .- both the paradigmatic relations they enter into 
in la langue, and the syntagmatic relations they enter into in la parole. 
Andre Martinet (1964) characterized la langue as a doubly articulated system, 
consisting of the first (the higher) level, analyzable into meaningful units (mor­
phemes, or monemes), and a second, lower level, consisting of non-meaningful 
units (phonemes), which have no semantic content in themselves but combine 
with one another on the higher level to form morphemes. Roman Jakobson and 
Morris Halle (1971) then broke down the phoneme into a bundle of distinct 
features, which were defined in terms of binary oppositions. 
In identifying la langue Saussure justified his idea that the relation between 
each signifier and signified is arbitrary. This implies that la langue does not 
"inherit" properties from what it represents, but is an autonomous system of 
differential values that structures each language user's experience of reality. 
One fundamental difference between the various underlying realities studied 
by linguists and semioticians is that natural language's underlying system, la 
langue, is of a much higher level of organization than the underlying systems of 
other semiotic languag-es. Care needs to be taken to qualify the term "language" to 
indicate whether we mean natural language (a narrow use of the word "language") 
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or semiotic language (a much broader use of the word). To arg'ue that a semiotic 
lang'uage is the same as natural language is to commit a category mistake, one that 
confuses the logical type of the semiotic language under discussion. 
2 Institutional Context 
I shall briefly review Niilo Kauppi's analysis of the institutional context in which 
linguistics and semiotics emerged in France in the 1950s (Kauppi 1994). He 
shows that there were two simultaneous forces shaping French universities at 
that time: (1) the rapid expansion of higher education, which allowed for the 
setting up of new university departments that distinguished themselves from 
other departments by teaching novel subjects, such as semiotics; and (2) the 
decline of some traditional areas of research, such as Romance philology, history 
of the French language, and lexicology. Kauppi notes that in the 1950s both 
Roland Barthes and A. J. Greimas initially worked in lexicology but were unable 
to obtain funding. Both, therefore, had to expand their research interests in order 
to encompass more novel and dynamic subjects such as anthropology, which was 
well funded partly due to the influence of Levi-Strauss. To accommodate the 
rapid increase in university departments, new journals and book series were 
published. Like the departments they addressed, these new publishing ventures 
had to distinguish themselves from traditional university research, either by 
applying novel theories to traditional French culture (Derrida on Rousseau, 
Barthes on Racine and Michelet) or by combining novel theories with novel 
subject matter (Barthes's Mythologies). 
Kauppi also points out that the institutions that introduced semiotics into the 
university were marginal to the French university system. It was in the Sixth 
Section of the Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes that semiotics originated in 
France. This school is unique in that it docs not g'ive awards to its students. It 
therefore attracts students by distinguishing itself from other, more established 
institutions (such as the University of Paris), placing itself at the vanguard of 
intellectual development and functioning primarily as a research institution. It 
attracts the most innovative researchers to its staff and, uniquely, acts as an 
intermediary between academics and artists, particularly avant-garde artists. As 
Kauppi points out, "in the 1950s the faculty of the Sixth Section included names 
like Levi-Strauss, Fernand Braudel, Lucien Febvre, and in the 1960s in 
semiotics, Barthes, Greimas, Christian Metz as Barthes's assistant, Barthes's 
student Gerard Genette, Oswald Ducrot, and Louis Marin" (1994: 190). It is 
precisely from this innovative context that semiotics emerged in France in the 
late 1950s. 
The Ecole Pratique also publishes its own journal, Communications. It is in this 
journal that Metz presented much of his most important research, including his 
essay "Cinema: langue ou lang'age?" (Communications 4, 1964), the first version of 
his grande ~yntagmatique ("La Grande Syntagmatique du film narratif," 
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Communications 8, 1966), and his essay "I.e Signifiant imaginaire" (Communica­
tions 23,1975). 
3 Classical Film Semiotics 
What type of inquiry is film semiotics? What role does linguistic theory play in its 
study of film? Is there any justification for using semiotics to study an iconic 
medium such as film? And how does film semiotics analyze, describe, construct, 
and evaluate problems? I shall approach these fundamental questions in this 
section. 
Film semiotics does not conceive "film" to be a pre-given, unproblematic 
entity. Instead, it defines film's specificity -- its uniqueness in terms of its 
underlying reality, rather than its immediately perceptible qualities. The role 
of theory is to make visible this invisible reality by constructing a model of it. 
Like other semiotic studies, film semiotics adopted the two-tier semiotic hier­
archy (between manifest/latent levels of reality) and formulated hypotheses 
describing that underlying reality. One way to justify the linguistic analysis of 
film is to determine if it carries out its own agenda - modeling film's underlying 
reality. 
But first, I need to clarify a few misunderstandings. The very idea of "film 
language" for film semioticians is not a simple analogy (as it was in the pre­
linguistic film-language comparisons of Raymond Spottiswoode, the filmology 
movement, etc.) but suggests that film is a coded medium like natural language 
and possesses a specific, autonomous, underlying system -- again, as does natural 
language. The semioticians' claim that film is a language was therefore made, not 
through any direct resemblance between film and natural language, but on 
methodological grounds: film's specific, underlying reality could be recon­
structed by the methods of structural linguistics. At least from this methodolo­
gical viewpoint, film semioticians were justified in using structural linguistics to 
study film because this discipline is the most sophisticated for analyzing a 
discourse's underlying reality. 
Theory therefore consists of "hypothetical systems of concepts which repre­
sent an underlying ... reality" (Botha 1981: 20). A theory is a system of inter­
related hypotheses, or tentative assumptions, about the unobservable nature of 
reality (a reality assumed to be a regular, economical, cohesive structure under­
lying a chaotic, heterogeneous, observable phenomenon). Formulating hypoth­
eses is dependent upon heuristic strategies: "A heuristic strategy represents any 
means which may be systematically used to create more favourable circumstances 
for the construction of hypotheses" (Botha 1981: 109). Botha lists three common 
heuristic strategies: (1) problem decomposition, in which large problems are 
broken down into smaller, more elementary problems; (2) analogies, in which 
the analyst looks for previously solved problems in similar areas of research; 
and (3) abstraction/idealization, in which a problem is simplified to make it 
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manageable. In classical film semiotics, Metz borrowed strateg'ies (1) and (3) from 
Saussure and therefore employed Saussure's analysis of natural language to 
research the semiotics of film (strategy (2». 
As well as offering the most sophisticated method for analyzing underlying 
codes, Saussure's work also enabled linguistics to become an autonomous dis­
cipline. For Saussure linguistics can only become autonomous when it identifies 
and studies a specific object (or dimension of language - la langue for Saussure), 
an object not studied by other disciplines. Like Saussure, Metz argued that film 
studies could only become an autonomous discipline by adopting a methodology 
that studied the irreducible specificity of film (cinematic language). 
By transporting structural linguistics into film studies, Metz established a new 
object of study, new problematics to be confronted, and a new methodology with 
which to approach film, therefore making it possible to identify and establish film 
studies as an autonomous discipline. The new object of study was of a new level 
of filmic reality - the unobservable, latent level that makes filmic meaning 
possible and defines its specificity. The first immediate objective of film semio­
tics was to identify and describe this specific object of study, which Metz did by 
employing the three heuristic strategies mentioned above (problem decomposi­
tion, analogies, abstractionlidealization). 
1 shall now cxamine the activities involved in formulating theoretical problems 
and then illustrate this activity at work in three canonical texts by Metz: 
"Cinema: Language or Language System?" (in Metz 1974a: 31-91), "Problems 
of Denotation in the Fiction Film" (in Metz 1974a: 108-46), and Language and 
Cinema (1974b). 
Botha (1981: 54) lists four activities involved in formulating theoretical pro­
blems: (a) analyzing the problematic state ofaffairs; (b) describing the problematic 
state ofaffairs; (c) constructing problems; and (d) evaluating problems with regard 
to well-formedness and significance. This list is based on the distinction between a 
"problematic state of affairs" and "problems." Whereas the former refers to an 
aspect of reality not understood by a theorist, a problem formulates what the 
theorist needs to look for in order to resolve the problematic state of affairs. 
In carrying out (a), analysis, the theorist must know exactly what is proble­
matic, isolate each component of the problematic state of affairs, determine how 
they are interrelated, and identify the background assumptions informing her 
inquiry, such as the nature conferred upon the object of analysis. The back­
ground assumptions of semiotics include: the object of analysis consisting of a 
hierarchy of two levels - manifest and latent; and the latent being the more 
significant level to analyze. 
In carrying out (b), description, the problematic state of affairs must be 
accurately recorded and formally described. For Botha (66), this involves three 
processes: (i) collecting data; (ii) systematizing data; (iii) symbolizing the results. 
In collecting data, the theorist must determine whether the data or the theory 
generates the problematic state of affairs. Systematizing data involves the activ­
ities of classifying, correlating, and ordering. These activities enable the theorist 
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to identify common properties among data, put similar data into classes, and 
determine the relations between the classes. Finally, symbolizing simply involves 
representing data in a concise and accurate manner. 
In carrying out (c), the construction of problems, the theorist employs several 
different concepts (since a problem is made up of concepts). Botha (85) identifies 
four types of concept involved in the construction of problems: phenomenologiml 
concepts, which concern factual data and are intuitively known; grammatical 
concepts (here,jilmic concepts), which concern general background assumptions 
concerning the nature of individual languages (or the nature of film); general 
linguistic concepts (here, semiotic concepts), which concern background assump­
tions about the nature oflinguistic/semiotic inquiry; and metascienti/ic concepts, 
which concern the aims and nature of linguistic/semiotic inquiry. 
Finally, in carrying out (d), evaluating problems, Botha recognizes that only 
problems satisfying the criteria of well-formedness and significance are relevant 
problems worth pursuing. A well-formed problem is solvable- that is, it is based 
on correct assumptions and is clearly formulated. A significant problem is one 
that expands our existing knowledge of film. A problem may, therefore, be well 
formed but not significant. 
3.1 "Cinema: Language or Language System?" 
(a) Ana~yzing the problematic state of4.fairs. The problem analyzed in Metz's 
first essay in film semiotics is conveniently stated in the essay's title: is there a 
filmic equivalent to la langue (translated in Metz's essay as language system)? An 
answer to this question would then offer a definition of filmic specificity, the 
primary objective of film semiotics. In other words, filmic specificity should be 
defined in terms of an underlying reality (modeled on natural language's under­
lying reality -la langue), not in terms of the immediately perceptible level of film, 
as classical (pre-semiotic) film theorists had attempted to do. Metz's background 
assumption in this essay is that film must possess an equivalent to la langue to be 
defined as a language (langage). 
(b) Describing the problematic state of affairs. Not surprisingly, with a back­
ground assumption listed in (a), Metz describes the state of affairs negatively (he 
concludes by stating that cinema is a langage sans langue). Much of his description 
involves documenting how the underlying reality of film does not resemble la 
langue. 
The negative results are not unexpected, for the semiotic language of film 
obviously does not possess the same system specific to natural language. For 
example, Metz states: "the image discourse is an open system, and it is not easily 
codified, with its nondiscrete basic units (the images), its intelligibility (which is 
too natural), its lack of distance [i.e. lack of arbitrariness] between the [signified] 
and the signifier" (l974a: 59). Metz emphasizes that the image does not derive its 
meaning in opposition to other images, but from a direct correspondence to 
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profilmic events. In other words, film has no paradigm on the level of the image; 
consequently, it has no langue, and no double articulation. 
The reasons are twofold: (I) Metz believed, under the influence of the classical 
film theorist Andre Bazin, that the image is analogical, not coded, for it is 
constituted by a continuous, nondiscrete resemblance to the thing it represents; 
and (2) "The image is always actualized" (67). That is, filmic images do not 
belong to a collective, non-manifest, closed system existing prior to usage; rather, 
each image is at the outset a complete, manifest, and individual unit of discourse. 
In Metz's famous example: "A close-up of a revolver does not mean 'revolver' (a 
purely virtual [non-manifest] lexical unit [morpheme]), but at the very least, and 
without speaking of the connotations, it signifies 'Here is a revolver!' " (67). This 
led Metz to state that "the cinematographic image is primarily speech [parole]" 
(69), which is the same as saying that "The filmic shot is of the magnitude ofthe 
sentence" (86). 
But this terminology has often confused how the linguistic status of the image 
is understood. Metz merely characterized the relation between image and sen­
tence in exterior terms, in which there is no structural similarity between them, 
because the sentence is also analyzable into units that signify paradigmatically: 
"The difference [between sentence and image] is that the sentences of verbal 
language eventually break down into words, whereas in the cinema, they do not: 
A film may be segmented into large units ('shots'), but these shots are not 
reducible (in Jakobson's sense) into small, basic, and specific units" (88). The 
"irreducibility" of filmic images suggests that they are potentially infinite in 
number and that each one is unique. This explains why they cannot be formed 
into a closed paradigm. 
Metz also concluded that the cinema does not form a speech circuit: "The 
cinema is not a language system, because it contradicts three important char­
acteristics of the linguistic fact: a language is a system of signs used for inter­
communication. Three elements to the definition. Now, like all the arts, and 
because it is itself an art, the cinema is one-way communication" (75). Language 
as a "speech circuit," so crucial for Saussure, does not, therefore, apply to film. 
Two reasons explain Metz's failure to establish a semiotics of the cinema on 
the level of the image. (l) The first is a genuine inability to articulate a new 
perspective on film by means of two fundamental criteria that make linguistics 
scientific (at least for Saussure) - the arbitrary relation between signifier and 
signified, and the metaphor oflanguage as a speech circuit - for these two criteria 
do not hold on the level of the filmic image. To achieve his objective - to define 
filmic specificity in semiotic terms - Metz sought the above two criteria on the 
level of image sequences. (In fact, it was evident that film does not form a speech 
circuit on any level, so Metz attempted to establish a principle of arbitrariness in 
the filmic chain.) (2) The second reason has to do with Metz's unnecessary 
adoption of Barthes's reversal of Saussure's hierarchy between linguistics and 
semiotics (resulting in a translinguistics). This reversal simply forced Metz into a 
strait-jacket; it meant he did not directly apply structural linguistics to film (i.e. 
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the methodological concepts syntagm/paradigm, signifier/signified, etc.) but 
took the results of the analysis of the system of articulation specific to natural 
language and attempted to find the same ~ystem (la langue) in film. Hence, at this 
stage he did not search for filmic paradigms, for example, but for paradigms 
organized along double articulation. And because the filmic imag'e does not 
conform to the same system of articulation as that revealed by the structural 
linguistic analysis of natural language, Metz concluded that the structural lin­
guistic research into the specificity of film language on the level of the image is an 
inappropriate starting point for a film semiotics. This is because, for him, 
semiotics must operate within the narrow confines of structural linguistics, 
which is geared exclusively to the study of systems such as la langue, rather 
than to analogical systems (such as la j!arole), to a system of arbitrary signs 
systematically organized into paradigms. He believed all semiotic systems to be 
regulated by la langue composed of nonsignifying - that is, purely differential ­
units (such as phonemes), which constitute la langue as a doubly articulated 
system. The lack of all these features on the level of the image forced Metz to 
conclude that film is, in some sense, a "langage sans langue." And in later essays 
he attempted to clarify this statement by arguing that the specific system of filmic 
language begins on the level of the syntagm. 
Stephen Heath writes that, for Metz in "Cinema: Language or Language 
System?," "cinema lacks any equivalent to the double articulation of linguistic 
langue, its very economy, the combination of systematically defined units of a 
lower level (phonemes) to form units of a higher level (monemes); instead of 
articulation, duplication, instead of economy, an infinity of analogical resem­
blance" (1981: 142). Because Metz could not codify the filmic image in terms of 
la langue, he concluded that it is completely uncoded, a mechanical duplication or 
analogical resemblance. In Saussurean terms, Metz thought of images as parole ­
as uncoded actualized discourse. Furthermore, he concluded that cinema is a 
langage sans langue because it is one-way communication (or expression, rather 
than communication), unlike natural language, which is two-way communica­
tion; it lacks signs (since filmic images are motivated); and it does not form a 
system (precisely because filmic images are motivated they do not require a 
system of paradigms and syntagms to generate meaning). There is no system of 
virtual, or non-manifest, images that a film then manifests; instead, each image is 
an invention. In one sentence, cinema suffers from a paradigmatic poverty. This 
wasn't the most promising start for initiating a semiotics of the cinema! 
(c) Constructing problems. In transposing linguistic concepts to film, Metz 
confused filmic concepts with linguistic concepts (the background assumptions 
concerning the nature of film with the background assumptions concerning the 
nature of natural language). In other words, he believed that the reality under­
lying all languages should conform to the reality underlying natural language 
(here we encounter one problem with translinguistics). More positively, 
"Cinema: Language or Language System?" employs general and metascientific 
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concepts: it uses the hierarchy between underlying/manifest levels and identifies 
the aim of film semiotics as the activity of identifying pertinent underlying units 
(although here modeled on la langue). 
(d) Evaluating problems. It is doubtful whether "Cinema: Language or Lan­
guage System?" formulated a well-formed and significant problem, since it is not 
a significant problem whether film is a langue or langage, for the simple reason 
that la langue is unique to natural language- it is natural language's underlying 
reality. Metz did not perceive that film has its own underlying reality that does 
not resemble the structure of la langue (Metz therefore directly compared film to 
natural language, an erroneous activity which inspired pre-semiotic film theor­
ists). In effect, Metz was attempting to define filmic specificity in terms of the 
specificity of natural language as formulated by structural linguistics, since he 
believed that double articulation is the only form of articulation. He even contra­
dicted the basic semiotic premise that the aim of film semiotics is to define filmic 
specificity in terms of an underlying reality, since he argued that film is always 
actualized. But if film has no langue, what is actualized? Surely, to say that film is 
actualized implies a prior set of terms that are actualized. However, Metz did 
manage to identify a prior set of terms in his subsequent work. 
3.2 "Problems ofDenotation in the Fiction Film" 
(a) Ana(yzing the problematic state of affairs. The assumption that film is a 
langage sans langue led Metz, in "Problems of Denotation," to explore the 
syntagmatic dimension of film, which in turn generated another background 
assumption - that filmic specificity (or cinematic language) is to be identified 
with narrativity (a single, superstructural code): "it is precise(y to the extent that the 
cinema confronted the problems of narration that ... it came to produce a body of 
specific signifying procedures" (l974a: 95). 
(b) Describing the problematic state of affairs. Above all else, "Problems of 
Denotation" is concerned almost exclusively with classifying, correlating, and 
ordering data. The main purpose of the essay is to identify a prior set of sequence 
(or syntagmatic) types operative in classical cinema, a paradigm of syntagmas 
from which a filmmaker can choose to represent profilmic events in a particular 
sequence. Each syntagma is identifiable by the particular way it structures the 
spatio-temporal relations between the profilmic events it depicts. Syntagmas are 
commutable because the same events depicted by means of a different syntagma 
will have a different meaning. 
These spatio-temporal relationships between the images constitute cinematic 
language for Metz because they articulate the profilmic events in terms of 
a specific cinematic space and time. In other words, this cinematic space and 
time confers upon these events a meaning that goes beyond their analogical 
relation to the image. These image orderings therefore conform to the principle 
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of arbitrariness, since there is no strict motivation governing the choice of one 
syntagma over another in representing a particular profilmic event. 
Metz detected eight different spatio-temporal relationships in total, which 
constitute eight different forms of image ordering syntagmas. Metz called the 
resulting "paradigm of syntagmas" the grande ~:yntagmatique of the image track. 
These image syntagmas form a paradigm to the extent that they offer eight 
different commutable ways of constructing an image sequence. As Metz himself 
has said: "These montage figures [film syntagmas] derive their meaning to a large 
extent in relation to one another. One, then, has to deal, so to speak, with a 
paradigm of syntagmas. It is only by a sort of commutation that one can identify 
and enumerate them" (1976: 587). 
The grande .~yntagmatique identifies syntagmatic units only when a change in 
shot produces a change in meaning - that is, when a spatio-temporal transition 
(the cut, etc.) on the level of the filmic signifier correlates with a change in 
meaning on the level of the signified (the spatio-temporal relationship between 
the profilmic events). Each filmic syntagma is constituted by the same spatio­
temporal relationship between its images. As long as the same relation holds 
across cuts, there is no commutation. A commutation, or change in meaning, 
therefore occurs when a spatio-temporal transition on the level of the 
filmic signifier is correlated with a new spatio-temporal relation between 
profilmic events, for a new relation signals the end of one syntagma and the 
beginning of another. (See Metz 1974a: 124-33, for an outline of the eight 
syntagmatic types.) 
(c) Constructing problems. Metascientific and general problems: in "Problems of 
Denotation" Metz employs the hierarchy between underlying/manifest levels (in 
which the system of syntagmas constitute the underlying level) and identifies the 
aim of film semiotics as the activity of identifying pertinent underlying units 
(codes) and their rules of combination. Filmic concepts: Metz makes the well­
known assumption that film language is to be equated with narrative. This is one 
of the major limitations of the grande ~yntagmatique, with the result that Metz 
equates narrative with filmic specificity (cinematic language), because narrative 
in the cinema conforms to the principle of arbitrariness. In other words, narrative 
is presented as being intrinsic, rather than contingent, to film form. 
(d) Evaluating problems. "Problems of Denotation" formulates a well-formed 
and significant problem, since it successfully identifies an autonomous level of 
articulation in the cinema (syntagmas) and constructs a paradigm of eight 
syntagmas (thus overcoming cinema's paradigmatic poverty). As Heath points 
out: "The focus on syntagmatic relations 'saves' semiology (in so far as it is held 
in the language or langage debate) in the face of the paradigmatic poverty of 
cinema" (1981: 144). Yet two problems remain: Metz's identification of filmic 
specificity with narrativity (confusion of types), and the uncoded, transparent 
nature conferred on the image (a problem carried over from "Cinema: Language 
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or Language System?" and merely displaced in the grande syntagmatique). Metz 
approached both problems in Language and Cinema. 
3.3 Language and Cinema 
(aJ Analyzing the problematic state ofaffairs: "We could summarize the task of 
the semiotics of the filmic fact as follows: to analyze film texts in order to discover 
either textual systems, cinematic codes, or sub-codes" (Metz 1974b: 150).1 In 
Language and Cinema Metz continues to pursue the question "What is the 
specificity of film?" but now answers by distinguishing between film and cinema 
and then defining specificity in terms of a combination of cinematic codes and 
sub-codes: 
We shall call.filmic ... all the traits which appear in films (i.e., in the messages of 
the cinema), whether they are or are not peculiar to this means of expression, and 
no matter what idea one has of this specificity or of its absence. We shall call 
cinematic certain filmic facts which are supposed to playa part ... in one or the 
other of the codes specific to the cinema. The cinematic is but a part of the filmic. 
Certain phenomena are filmic and cinematic, others filmic but not cinematic. (47) 
Metz now regards the study of singular filmic systems to be an equally important 
dimension of film semiotics. In other words, he no longer limits film semiotics to 
the study of filmic specificity, but also includes study of the way specific and 
nonspecific codes combine in single films. 
The study of film (the filmic) involves the analysis of singular textual systems, 
while the study of cinema (the cinematic) involves the analysis of codes: "In this 
sense, film and cinema are opposed as a real object to an ideal one, as an uttemnce 
to a language system" (24).2 In Language and Cinema Metz no longer uses the term 
la langue to discuss cinematic language, but replaces it with the more general 
term code, which has no linguistic connotations; there is therefore no obligation to 
search for double articulation, etc. 
"Cinematic language" refers to a generality not exhausted by any film, whereas 
"singular textual system" refers to the specific organization of one film. A 
singular textual system therefore lacks the generality of a code, and is not 
concerned with cinematic specificity but with the way specific and nonspecific 
codes combine in a particular film. 
Two background assumptions of Language and Cinema not evident in Metz's 
previous film semIotics are that: "(1) the specificity which interests semiotics is 
the specificity of codes, not the 'crude' specificity of physical signitiers; (2) the 
specificity of specific codes nevertheless refers to certain features of the material 
of expression" (Metz 1974b: 219) Earlier, Metz stated: 
there is a great difference between a specificity defined directly according to 
material criteria and one that is defined in terms of codes, even if the specification 
of codes cannot be accomplished without a consideration of certain traits of the 
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material of the sig'nifier (and not of this material itself, taken as a whole and without 
further analysis). (43) 
No single code is unique to the cinema, although this doesn't prevent Metz from 
defining codes as specific: "A code may ... be specific for several languages .... 
This notion of an obvious~y multiple spec~ficiZy is paradoxical only in appearance. 
Sameness is not the only form of specificity, and a circumscribed multiplicity also 
forms a specific group; a specific field is not necessarily a very small one" (224). 
Instead, he defines cinematic language in terms of a combination of (more or less) 
specific codes. A consequence of this is that Metz identifies a hierarchy of 
specificity amongst these codes, a hierarchy defined in terms of material of 
expression. This adds a degree of complexity to the second and third aspects 
of the activities involved in constructing theoretical problems. 
(b) Describing the problematic state ofaffairs. Metz systematizes his data (cine­
matic and filmic codes, and their relation to film's matter of expression) in the 
form of concentric circles, which enables him to establish classes of codes and 
define their relation to one another. Each circle represents a code and also a group 
of languages associated with it. In chapter 10.4 of Language and Cinema, Metz 
defines the specificity of film's image track in terms of a specific combination of 
the following codes: iconicity, mechanical duplication, multiplicity, and move­
ment. Metz's lengthy description can be represented visually (see figure 1), a 
practice Metz would have done well to follow. 
1. Iconicity 
2. Mechanical duplication 
3. Multiplicity 
4. Movement 
5. Mechanically produced multiple moving images 
Figure 1 
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This description of film semiotics' problematic state of affairs is motivated by 
the fact that the relation between these codes is one of inclusion (as well as 
intersection). Iconicity is a code specific to all visual languages; its degree of 
specificity therefore remains rather low. More specific is the fact that filmic 
images are produced by mechanical duplication (circle 2) and are multiple (circle 
3). The combination of these three codes attains a high degree of specificity but 
does not define film's unique specificity. Moreover, multiplicity is not included 
within circle 2 but intersects with it (as well as with circle 1), because some 
languages (such as cartoons) are made up of a multiplicity of non-mechanically 
produced images. A fourth characteristic of filmic specificity is that its multiple 
mechanical images move. Because movement depends upon a multiplicity of 
images, it is included within circle 3 (multiplicity) and also intersects mechanical 
duplication and iconicity (circles 2 and 1 respectively). Film belongs to a fifth 
group of languages included within circle 4 - namely, mechanically produced 
multiple moving images (the shaded area in figure 1). This fifth group is the 
logical product of 4 and 2. 
In terms of the image track, filmic specificity has been defined by a combination 
ofcodes and their material ofexpression. Because all these codes can be manifest in 
film's material of expression, they attain a degree of specificity. However, both 
film and television images belong to the shaded area of figure I. It seems, then, that 
cinema has no unique codification. Metz (l974b: 235-40) resorts to a technological 
criterion to distinguish them: a televisual image is electronically rather than 
photographically produced, although both modes of production function to man­
ifest the same code - that of movement. Furthermore, there is, of course, a purely 
perceptual difference, in that filmic images are projected on a large screen, whereas 
televisual images are electronically transmitted on a small screen. Nonetheless, 
what appears on the big and small screens is still the same set of codes. 
(c) Constructing problems. Metascientific and general: Language and Cinema 
rigorously employs the hierarchy between underlying/manifest levels (cinema 
and film respectively), and continues to identify the aim of film semiotics as the 
activity of identifying' pertinent underlying units (codes) and their rules of 
combination. Filmic: the nature of film is significantly expanded in Language 
and Cinema, overcoming the two problems identified in "Problems of Denota­
tion": iconicity is defined as coded, and film consists of a combination of codes 
(rather than one code - narrativity); furthermore, some of those codes are defined 
in terms of the matter of expression in which they are manifest. This directly 
leads to the employment of phenomenological concepts: a definition of specific 
codes with reference to film's sensory dimension. 
The latter two types of concept are significant additions to film semiotics in 
that they show Metz tackling the issue of iconicity within a semiotic framework. 
In "Cinema: Language or Language System?" and "Problems of Denotation in 
the Fiction Film," Metz worked with the realist conception of the imag'e-as­
analogue (as a mechanical duplication of reality). Heath called this "the blind 
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spot of Metz's formulations" for it is "the point at which the articulation of 
significance collapses in the face of analogy" (1981: 141). Metz overcame this 
blind spot under the influence of Dmberto Eco. Eco was one of the first 
semioticians to successfully study the image in terms of codes, which enabled 
him to define its apparent analog'ical (nonsemiotic) nature as a system of iconic 
codes organized into a triple hierarchy (Eco 1976a).3 
Once semiotic analysis had overcome the problem of analogy, the rich semiotic 
field of the cinema was opened up to analysis because film theorists were able to 
analyze the multiple systems of codes that constitute the complex act of filmic 
signification. Within this framework the social and ideological determination of 
all semiotic systems were finally recognized. Heath commented that: "It is this 
recognition of codes at work in the image, of the possibility of analogy being itself 
the result of codes, which marks a decisive process of rethinking in Metz's 
writings" (1981: 143). 
Language and Cinema represents this process of rethinking. In earlier work, 
Metz preferred to reject the status of film as a complete semiotic system rather 
than challenge the realist status of the photographic image. But using the 
concept of code in Language and Cinema developed "a response to cinema as a 
complexity of codes of differing kind and degree of systematicity" (Heath 1981: 
144). 
(d) Evaluating problems. It is arguable whether all the answers Metz formulates 
to the problems he poses in Language and Cinema (see (a) above) are well formed, 
since some of the logic is dubious (Metz's argument that some codes are not 
specific to one language, and that there is a hierarchy of specificity amongst 
codes). In Language and Cinema Metz reaches the limits of the question of filmic 
specificity and the limitations of a structuralist answer to this question. (These 
are, of course, interrelated, since the study of filmic specificity - of an autono­
mous realm of film .~ is approached by film semioticians with the methodology of 
structural linguistics.) These two limitations are evident in Metz's use of classical 
set theory to represent filmic specificity, which gives the impression that it can be 
defined simply in terms of an addition, or culmination, of codes. That is, the 
single component codes are seen to culminate into a complex set of component 
codes. But such a representation of information can be misleading, as George 
Lakoff has shown (1987: ch. 9). He gives many examples showing how the 
intersection of two components does not necessarily form a complex set of 
components. For one of his examples, "pet fish," he writes: "A guppy might 
be a good example of a pet fish, but a bad example of a pet, and a bad example of a 
fish" (141). "Pet fish" is not therefore a simple combination of "pet" and "fish." 
This criticism also applies to Metz's representation of filmic specificity in 
Language and Cinema. Iconicity, mechanical duplication, movement, and multi­
ple images do not simply overlap and intersect with one another (i.e. culminate) 
but interact in more dynamic ways to form filmic specificity. Metz did in fact 
begin to explore this issue at the end of Language and Cinema, with the concept of 
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filmic writing, in which the codes are thought to displace one another rather than 
simply culminate. But the whole book is built upon a classical theory of classi­
fication, and the theory of filmic writing sits uneasily within that context. 
In conclusion, we can say that in Language and Cinema Metz attempted to 
develop a complex definition of filmic specificity (based on a combination of 
codes) using the methodology employed to develop a simple definition of filmic 
specificity (defined in terms of a single, master code). But such a methodology is 
not equipped to develop a complex definition (since it cannot adequately repre­
sent the way the multiple codes combine without resorting to the simple princi­
ple of culmination). 
4 Critiques of Classical Film Semiotics 
My CritIcIsm in the previous section of Metz's early research is based on 
identifying and clari(ying its internal logic and inconsistencies. However, it is 
now fashionable to reject film semiotics outright. Here I shall briefly review 
Gregory Currie's recent critique. 
Currie considers two hypotheses from film semiotics: the strong hypothesis 
that film is like a natural language, and the weak hypothesis that film is a semiotic 
system. Most of chapter 4 of his book Image and Mind (1995) is devoted to 
refuting the strong hypothesis. Currie has made an unfortunate choice because he 
is simply repeating the arguments Metz presented back in 1964, in "Cinema: 
langue ou langage?" As we saw above, in this essay Metz compared film images 
with natural language (un langage avec langue) and found that no similarities exist, 
which led him to conclude that film is a langage sans langue (that film is not a 
natural language). 
Metz abandoned the direct comparison between film and natural language 
(langue) and argued, in his subsequent work on image sequences, that film is a 
language in the sense of a semiotic system (the second hypothesis that Currie 
does not attempt to reject, even though it characterizes the dominant position in 
film semiotics). Currie has not considered the history of film semiotics, nor has 
he adequately characterized its basic hypotheses. When Currie writes "I shall 
argue that, in crucial respects, film is very unlike natural language" (119), he is 
simply repeating Metz's statement that film is a langage sans langue. There is no 
disagreement between Metz and Currie, simply Currie's misunderstanding, 
caused by his failure to grasp the status of Metz's arguments and the history of 
film semiotics. 
Even though Metz tried without success to compare film to natural language, 
he never argued that film is like a natural language. He did not commit the 
category mistake of arguing that film has the same status as English, French, 
Japanese, and so on. Yet Currie attributes this view to film semiotics. To repeat: 
film semiotics argues that film is a lang'uage (a semiotic system) but docs not 
argue that film is like a naturallanguag'e, such as English, French, or Japanese. 
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By attributing the proposition "film is like a natural language" to film semio­
tics, Currie has simply constructed his own straw man to attack. This is due to his 
narrow definition of the term "language," in which it always means "natural 
language." Film is not a language for Currie because it is not like a natural 
language. But for Metz, even though film is not like a natural language, it is 
still a lang'uag'e (a semiotic system). 
The clearest moment when Currie collapses the distinction between language 
and natural language is in the last section of chapter 4 of Image and Mind, when 
he briefly considers whether the comparison between film and natural language 
can be made in the study of image sequences: 
Perhaps the claim that there is a language of cinematic images is not the claim that 
these images themselves have a language-like structure, but rather that these 
images enter into language-like combinations with each other. In films, there are 
combinations of images; sometimes these combinations form identifiable and 
recurrent patterns, and these combinations can have a meaning which partly 
depends on the manner of their combination. Isn't there something here like the 
articulated structure of a sentence? No. As many film theorists have recognized, 
the representational content of a cinema image cannot be equated with that of a 
name, predicate, or other sub-sentential part of speech. (134) 
I agree with Currie that we can only give the answer "no" to the question: "Isn't 
there something here [in the recurrent patterns of image combinations] like the 
articulated structure of a sentence?" But this is because it is the wrong question, 
since film semioticians do not fall into the trap of making comparisons between 
the specific structure of natural language sentences and image combinations. (Or 
if they do, their results are negative.) If Currie asked "Isn't there something here 
[in the recurrent patterns of image combinations] like semiotic articulation?" 
(that is, articulation not reducible to natural language's specific system of codes, 
la langue), the answer would be "yes." Metz's grande syntagmatique is a model of 
the eight recurrent types of imag'e combinations (syntagmas) that dominate 
classical cinema. The problem here is Currie's purely argumentative engagement 
with film semiotics, an engagement that only offers decontextualized criticism. 
Murray Smith's claim that "Currie's argument [in chapter 4 of Image and Mind] 
is in stark contrast to the lingering and vague belief in the language-like structure 
of film among semiotic thinkers, and constitutes perhaps the most comprehen­
sive demolition of this article offaith to date" (1998: 326) is entirely misplaced. 
5 Cognitive Film Semiotics 
David Bordwell has noted the absence of references to the work of Chomsky in 
film theory: "it is surprising that theorists who assign language a key role in 
determining subjectivity have almost completely ignored the two most important 
contemporary developments in ling'uistic theory: Chomsky's Transformational 
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Generative Grammar and his Principles-and-Parameters theory" (1996: 22). He 
adds that: "no film theorist has mounted an argument for why the comparatively 
informal theories of Saussure, Emile Benveniste, or Bakhtin are superior to the 
Chomskyan paradigm. For over two decades film theorists have made pro­
nouncements about language without eng"aging with the major theoretical rival 
to their position" (22). The truth is that over the last two decades a number of 
film theorists have been engaging with Chomskyan linguistics and, furthermore, 
have deemed it to be superior to structural linguistics. Here I shall briefly chart 
the relation between classical film semiotics and cognitive film semiotics. 
During the 1970s Metz's classical film semiotics was modified and trans­
formed. Its fundamental problems lay in its total reliance upon structural lin­
guistics. One major transformation came from post-structural film theory, which 
did not draw upon autonomous linguistic theories, but based itself primarily 
upon the Marxism of Louis Althusser and the psychoanalysis of Jacques 
Lacan. 
The second transformation was carried out by cognitive film semiotics. For 
most Anglo-American film scholars, film semiotics takes only one form - namely, 
Metz's early film semiotics, represented by the three pieces of research analyzed 
above. But as Metz himself acknowledged in the opening chapter of Language 
and Cinema, "By its very nature, the semiotic enterprise must expand or dis­
appear" (1974b: 19). Although Language and Cinema marks the logical conclusion 
to classical film semiotics, it does not mark the end of film semiotics per se. In his 
subsequent work - particularly his essay "The Imaginary Signifier" (1982: 1-87) 
-- Metz adopted a psychoanalytical framework, which aided the formation of 
post-structural film theory. However, many of his students and colleagues 
continued to work within a semiotic framework, which they combined with 
cognitive science. Research in film semiotics has continued unabated in the 
1970's, '80s, and '90s, especially in Europe. Far from disappearing, film semiotics 
has expanded into a new framework, one that overcomes the problems of classical 
film semiotics by embracing three new theories: (1) transformational g"enerative 
grammar and cognitive science generally (in the work of Dominique Chateau 
[e.g". 1986, 1995] and Michel Colin [1995]); (2) a renewed interest in enunciation 
theory (particularly in the work of Francesco Casetti [1~86, 1995] and Metz of 
L 'Enonciation impersonnelle, ou Ie site du film [1991]); and (3) pragmatics (in the 
work of Roger Odin [1988, 1995a, 1995b]). 
In his essay "The Grande Syntagmatique Revisited" (1995) Michel Colin 
redefined Metz's eight syntagmatic types in terms of selectional (or semantic) 
features. Selectional features represent the inherent grammatical and semantic 
components of lexical items (or "words"). For example, the lexical item "cat" 
can be represented in terms of the following selectional features: +Common, 
+Count, +Animate, -Human. Every lexical item can be characterized in terms 
of these and other selectional features. The most remarkable outcome of Colin's 
rereading of Metz's work is that, as with all generative m~dels, the actual, 
manifest syntagmatic types are posited as merely the result (the epiphenomenon) 
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of the generative process. Within the generative framework, we can identify and 
analyze not only actual syntagmas, but also possible (i.e. potential) syntagmas and 
impossible syntagmas. Once all the finite selectional features have been identi­
fied, the potentially infinite number of syntagmatic types can be conceived and 
generated. These selectional features constitute the finite underlying level of 
filmic discourse (or its system of codes) from which a potentially infinite number 
of film sequences can be generated. For Colin, then, the primary aim of the 
grande syntagmatique is not to identify actual syntagmatic types, but to identify 
the more fundamental selectional features that combine to form these 
syntagmatic types. (See Buckland 1995a for a detailed analysis of Colin's 
research.) 
In linguistics, cognitive pragmatics designates a discipline that describes a type 
of linguistic competence that governs the relation between utterances and the 
appropriate contexts in which they are uttered. Cognitive pragmatics is therefore 
a study of the immediate discursive nature of language. Roger Odin (1995a, 
1995b) develops a cognitive--pragmatic theory of film semiotics. He distinguishes 
between institutions, modes, and operations in order to characterize the film 
spectator's pragmatic competence in comprehending films. From this he identi­
fies the different filmic institutions, modes, and operations, with particular focus 
on fiction films, documentaries, home movies, and what Odin calls the 
"dynamic" mode of filmmaking (1988). 
Enunciation designates the activity that results in speech, in the production of 
utterances (enonces). Emile Benveniste identified two form of utterance: discourse 
(discours) and story (histoire). Discours employs deictic categories - words such as 
personal, possessive, and demonstrative pronouns that grammaticalize within the 
utterance particular aspects of its spatio-temporal context (e.g. the speaker and 
hearer), whereas histoire is a form of utterance that excludes deixis. Francesco 
Casetti (1986, 1995) takes to its logical conclusions the analysis of the deictic 
dimension of film - of film as discours. Using the deictic categories "I," "you," 
and "he," he develops a seminal typology of four shot types, which aim to 
describe the way film orients itself in relation to the spectator. However, in his 
final published book Metz (1991) disputes this deictic theory of film, and instead 
argues that film can only be studied as histoire. 
The psychologist Karl Buhler used the term "deixis" to refer to systems of 
orientation that position an individual's body and consciousness in relation to her 
environment. In the sense of systems of orientation, deixis refers to a general 
cognitive process. Deictic systems of orientation include bodily gestures (e.g. 
pointing), language expressions, and imagination. Casetti conducted his research 
within the framework of one of these general systems of orientation - personal 
pronouns in linguistic expressions. Metz criticizes Casetti's use of personal 
pronouns to describe how the spectator is oriented in relation to film. (He is 
therefore criticizing Casetti's over-reliance on linguistic concepts.) Metz then 
replaces orientation by means of personal pronouns with orientation by means of 
anaphora - a narrow system of orientation in which one textual element points to 
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another textual element. Moreover, Metz identifies anaphora as a reflexive 
moment in a film, which results in his identifying filmic enunciation with 
reflexivity. 
The work of the cognitive film semioticians represents the current state of film 
semiotics, which is united by the same project - to combine film semiotics and 
cognitive science with the aim of modeling filmic competence. Far from dis­
appearing, film semiotics has continued to expand, even though its results 
haven't becn in the spotlight of Angolo-American film theory. 
Notes 
The distinction between cinematic codes and sub-codes is irrelevant to my discussion 
here. But briefly, cinematic codes are codes specific to film, whereas cinematic sub­
codes, while also specific to film, are specific only to some films. Moreover, whereas 
codes syntagmatically combine with one another (lighting, montage, etc.), sub-codes 
(of the same code) are in a paradigmatic relation of substitution. Hence, the code of 
punctuation is a cinematic code, whereas the fade and the dissolve are sub-codes of 
this code. As such, they cannot appear at the same time in the same film (this being 
due to their paradigmatic nature) and may not appear in a film at all (this being due to 
their nature as sub-codes). 
2 Raymond Bellour's film semiotics focusses primarily on this issue of singular textual 
systems. See Buckland 1993 for an overview of Bellour's film semiotics. 
3 For additional semiotic studies oficonicity, see Eco 1976b: 191--217, Kjorup 1978, 
and Prince 1993. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
Cognitivism 
Gregory Currie 
This survey is the work of a philosopher with an intense interest in the relations 
between film and the mind, and sympathy for, if not a universal admiration of, 
the work of cognitivist film theorists so far. It emphasizes the broader, more 
programmatic and philosophical aspects of cognitivism and seeks always to place 
doctrines in the context of a view of method - surely the most distinctive feature 
of cognitivism. My apologies go to those cognitivists and their allies whose work 
on film history and on particular genres, directors, and films I have passed over. 
1 The Growth of Cognitivism 
Elements of broadly cognitivist thinking can be found in work on film through­
out this century (e.g. Munsterberg 1970). But cognitivism as a distinctive and 
self-conscious research program took shape in the 1980s. I It has been gaining 
impetus since then and has recently been brought to bear on topics well beyond 
what is sometimes thought to be its natural domain: classical Hollywood narrative 
and the European/Japanese "art cinema." We now have cognitivist studies, at 
least of a preliminary kind, of the avant-garde (Carroll 1981/2; Peterson 1996), 
the documentary (Carroll 1996c; Currie 1999), film music (J. Smith 1999), the 
woman's film (Leibowitz 1996), horror (Carroll 1990; Freeland 1996), mass art 
generally (Carroll 1998), and industry studies focussing on corporate and global 
marketing aspects (Vasey 1997). A series of recent and forthcoming books and 
essay collections showcase the multiple strengths of the cognitive program, while 
offering important criticisms of other, more institutionally established views 
(Carroll 1988; Bordwell, 198%; Bordwell and Carroll 1996; Allen and Smith 
1997; Plantinga and Smith 1999). Yet cognitivism remains at some distance from 
the center of the film/screen studies enterprise, often dismissed or ignored, 
sometimes castigated for a supposed adherence to positivism and hence for a 
betrayal of the new, radical insights of those approaches to film that have 
emerged in the wake of structuralism. 
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2 The Content of Cognitivism 
What, then, is the claim ofcognitivism? Several things stand in the way of a sharp 
characterization, despite the cognitivist's commitment to clarity of exposition 
and argument. First, there are few, if any, specific doctrines with which all or 
most people who regard themselves as cognitivists would agree - one sign that 
cognitivism is a program rather than a specific theory. Second, there is a strand in 
cognitivist thought that is chary ofsystem-building, opting' instead for an eclectic 
mix of theories and models determined by the purpose in hand (see the "Intro­
duction" to Bordwell and Carroll 1996). 
But we shall get nowhere without at least a rough characterization, and the 
following corresponds to at least a central theme of cognitivist thought. It comes 
in two parts. It is important to see that both parts are assertions about where it is 
necessary to start one's inquiries, rather than putatively exceptionless general­
izations; they are, in other words, heuristic rules. The first part says that our 
response to film is primarily to be seen as a rationally motivated and informed 
attempt to make sense of the work at each of the levels it presents: sensory 
stimulus in light and sound, narrative, and object charged with higher-order 
meanings and expression. Second, the cognitive and perceptual resources we 
deploy in this project of making sense of film are, to a significant degree, 
those that we deploy in the project of making sense of the real world. Thus 
there is a strong realist tendency in cognitivism - a tendency to empha~ize ways 
in which our experience of cinematic images and cinematic narrative resemble 
our experiences of seeing and comprehending events and processes in reality. 
Thus characterized, cognitivism is capable of being embodied in various more 
specific and more tightly knit bodies of propositions, some of them mutually 
contradictory. 
The leading idea suggests a method as well as a doctrine: in seeking to under­
stand our responses to film, apply the best available theories of perception, 
information-processing, hypothesis-building, and interpretation. Thus cognit­
ivism in film theory leans toward cognitive science, and toward the kind of 
philosophy that is its natural ally - a philosophy that is science-oriented, com­
mitted to the power of rigorous argument, and focussed on particular problems 
rather than on building a grand historical synthesis. 
3 Cognitivism as Criticism 
In doctrine, method, and style, cognitivism stands in sharp contrast to the 
program that has been its main rival: this program combines ideas from Marxist 
theories of ideology, psychoanalytic theories of dream, fantasy, and voyeurism, 
and semiotic theories of signification. It has been for some time sufficiently 
dominant within the world of film-theory writing and teaching, as well as within 
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the institutions of job placement, tenure, and promotion, to be called "the 
orthodox view." Its approach is political and often polemical, especially in its 
treatment of what it conceives of as standard tropes of narrative representation. 
Thus it has been argued by the feminist theorists who represent one important 
line of thought within the orthodox view that much or even all filmmaking 
emanating from or influenced by Hollywood privileges an essentially male 
perspective, both in the literal sense of a point of view and in the more extended 
sense of an outlook on the world - the world of the fiction, and also the social 
world the viewer inhabits. 
While acknowledging the tremendous economic and ideological power of 
movies and their capacity to reinforce, if not to impose, systems of value through 
the artifice of representation, cognitivists have generally rejected the methods 
and doctrines of the orthodox program. Thus the psycholog'ist of film perception 
Virginia Brooks described the semiotic work of Christian Metz as "devoid of any 
experimental content or even any suggestions as to how decisions might be 
reached as to the rightness or wrongness of its assertions" (1984: 118).2 Cognit­
ivists expect that claims about how people respond to and are affected by movies 
would be treated as matters to be investigated by observation and experiment, 
and to be formulated within the context of psychological theories judged the 
best available by those best able to make those judgments. But orthodox 
theorists show little interest in experimental work in this area and appeal to 
psychological theories (such as Lacan's version of psychoanalysis) that are rarely 
given serious consideration by academic psychologists.3 In recent years there has 
been an explosive growth in our understanding of the psychological processes 
underlying the child's development of both language and comprehension of self 
and other. 4 While no body of data-cum-theory is inviolable, cognitivists hold that 
this material - often deriving from large-scale and statistically sophisticated 
studies- should at least be taken into account by those film theorists who 
claim, for example, that a sense of self is intimately linked to the development 
of language, or who explain the drive to filmic horror in terms of infantile male 
helplessness.S 
4 Cognitivism, Deep Psychology, and Folk Psychology 
While cognitivists have occasionally spoken as if their hostility to psychoanalytic 
approaches to cinema is definitive of their position, this is not really so. For a 
start, cognitivism and psychoanalysis are not strictly at odds. Someone convinced 
of the basic soundness of a cognitive approach to human psychology might hold, 
for example, that some version of psychoanalysis has an important role to play in 
explaining irrationality (Gardner 1993). Presumably we are as capable of 
responding irrationally to cinema as to anything else, so there is little reason a 
priori to exclude psychoanalysis as a potential tool for understanding our 
response to cinema. The most a cognitivist need hold is that psychoanalysis is 
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not the central or, a fortiori, the exclusive means by which we understand the 
psychology of film. 
Also, cognitivists do not regard it as signifying progress if, as happens from 
time to time, theorists abandon psychoanalytic models for some other large-scale 
psychodynamic theory with similar features: neglect of systematic empirical 
testing, heavy reliance on metaphor, analogy and other rhetorical devices, a 
technical but not clearly defined terminology, etc. 6 The cognitivist's fundamental 
objection is to a certain kind of theorizing, of which psychoanalysis-applied-to­
cinema is just one example. But what then would they put in its place? As we 
shall see, cognitivists have made use of theories and results in the more acade­
mically mainstream areas of psychology, particularly studies of perception and 
cognition. BUl a point that seems to underlie a good deal of cognitivist work is 
this: it is a mistake to think that we can speak and write productively about the 
experience of film only by appealing to a "deep" psychological theory, that is, 
one which postulates states, processes, and mechanisms not acknowledged by our 
quotidian psychological knowledge - the "folk psychology" we unreflectively use 
every day in order to predict and explain the behavior of others and perhaps of 
ourselves. Much of the revolt against traditional humanistic studies of the arts 
has been based on a rejection of that tradition's casual assumption of a commun­
ity of values, concerns, and interests -- indeed of a whole conception of human 
flourishing -- which many contemporary scholars reject as unsystematic, sub­
jective, and deriving from the unacknowledged hegemony of a certain class, race, 
and sex. The "common-sense" view of human beings having been unmasked as 
the insidious creature of interest, an alternative had to be found: thus the appeal 
of psychoanalysis and similar constructions. 
All this, the cognitivist might say, is a bad mistake. Folk psychology is, in 
fact, a subtle and successful instrument for helping us make sense of the 
community of minds in which we find ourselves immersed.7 We employ it so 
often, with such facility and success, that it can be surprising to learn that one is 
using "knowledge of other minds." While a cognitive film theorist's official 
position is that we should use the best available psychological theory, her strong 
and well-founded impression may be that folk psychology fits that description 
very well. 
Now a commitment to the explanatory power of folk psychology is not the 
same as a casual acceptance of everything you, I, or anyone else happens unre­
flectively to say or think about the mind, still less an acceptance of one group's 
articulation of the folk theory. Folk psychology must be regimented, refined, and 
indeed corrected by more academic constructions, so long as the supplements 
show signs of explanatory fecundity. The point is that it is not necessary to 
jettison the concepts, terminology, and principles of our folk-theoretic wisdom in 
favor of a radical, more scientific-sounding, but probably less reliable "depth 
psychology" in order to say illuminating things about the appeal of images, the 
lure of narrative, the fascinations of horror, the emotional power of melodrama, 
and a range of other matters that engage the fiJm theorist. 
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5 Cognitivism and Perceptual Psychology 
As well as rejecting the orthodox theorist's commitment to depth psychology, 
cognitivists have questioned the semiotic assumption that film can be understood 
as, or in any interesting way akin to, a language, arguing that there is a funda­
mental difference between the ways in which words and sentences on the one 
hand, and images on the other are processed (Carroll, 1988; Currie 1995a: ch. 4). 
While studies in the perceptual psychology of film-viewing do not seem to have 
been explicitly directed at this issue, some work here (see Hochberg and Brooks 
1978, 1996) has tended to confirm this view by showing that the visual processing 
and interpretation of cinematic images is done in much the same way as the visual 
processing of objects in the real world. For example, the cues that indicate to us 
such things as shape, object identity, depth, relative size, the occlusion of one 
object by another when we look at objects in the real world are also the cues 
we use to determine those features of what is represented in a cinematic 
image. 8 This is hard to reconcile with the view that there is some interesting 
affinity between cinematic images and signs in a conventional language; one thing 
we can be fairly sure of with respect to our linguistic competence in this post­
Piagetian age is that it is not a function of our perceptual skills or experience. Nor 
is it plausible to maintain that the connections between cinematic images are 
substantially a matter of rules, as are the connections between the elements 
within a natural language like English or Mandarin. Contemporary linguistic 
theory is by and large committed to the view that such lang'uages need to be 
described in terms of rules which determine the meaning of a combination of 
signs as a function of the meanings of the components. While a few kinds of shot­
combination in cinema have acquired the status of recurrent and familiar patterns 
(e.g. point-of-view editing),9 these in no sense constitute or even approach the 
status of meaning-determining rules: no combination of shots, however unortho­
dox, is strictly meaningless, there are no "basic" or word-like elements of 
meaning from which filmic meanings can be built, and one does not need 
exposure to a large or even a modest body of shot-combinations before one can 
follow a conventional cinematic narrative. All this contrasts sharply with the 
linguistic case. Of course most films employ language in the ordinary sense, as 
when the characters speak or the intertitles announce, but the "language of film" 
thesis was supposed to be something more exciting than the platitude that you 
have to be competent with English to understand the utterances of Eng'lish 
characters: it was the claim that there is a specifically cinematic language or 
"sign system," and this is a claim unsupported by the psychology oflanguage and 
of perception. 
But if understanding cinematic images is not assimilable to understanding 
language, how is it done? The central puzzle of cinematic perception is basically 
the same as that of pictorial perception in general: how is it that a flat, colored 
surface presents to us the appearance of three-dimensional objects and their 
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relations? The fact that film images are moving pictures merely adds further 
relations, for it seems that cinematic pictures present to us the appearance of 
change as well as shape, color, relative position, and other static properties of 
objects we are familiar with from painting and drawing. Now a particularly 
thoroughgoing cognitivism mig'ht insist that the answer to this problem must 
invoke mental activity that is, exactly, cognitive: that is, involving processes 
defined over contentful states (beliefs, for example) and which can be seen as 
rationally sensitive to those contents (PylyshynI981: 159). That way we arrive at 
the picture of the viewer struggling to make rational sense of a "deviant" input 
and doing so by structuring it in accordance with beliefs and presuppositions. 
But if pictorial perception is a matter of interpretation, we might well expect 
considerable interpersonal and especially intercultural variation in how and 
whether pictures are understood. 
Such views have had distinguished supporters (Goodman 1976) but have come 
under heavy fire from three directions: anthropological studies, which has dealt 
unkindly with the notion that non-Western people have to "learn" to compre­
hend photographs and other perspectival representations (Messaris 1994); phi­
losophical arguments in favor of the natural interpretability of pictures (Schier 
1986); theories of perception, which have emphasized the extent to which the 
workings of vision are insulated from the subject's general beliefs (Marr 1982). 
On current evidence the more reasonable view would seem to be that the human 
visual system is built to respond quickly and decisively to stimuli and therefore 
operates by means of mechanisms that do not depend on calling up general 
knowledge. Such a system is naturally prone to error: the visual stimuli which a 
horse will cause can be approximated by a mule, a stuffed horse, a picture of a 
horse- and a cinematic image of one (Currie 1995a: ch. 3). 
It is therefore natural to think that cinematic and other pictures work by means 
of illusion, and indeed it has been suggested that illusions such as the "Ames 
room" provide a model for cinematic perception. lO But in a crucial respect we 
seem to be dealing with very different phenomena. In the case of the Ames room 
(or the simpler Muller-LyeI' illusion, whereby lines of equal length can be made 
to look unequal by the addition of differently directed arrowheads), the content 
of one's perceptual experience contradicts reality and indeed what one believes 
about reality. The people in the room are of roughly equal size, and I know this to 
be the case, yet my visual experience when looking through the peephole is 
stubbornly of one person much larger than the other. And try as I may, I cannot 
reconcile my knowledge that the lines in the Muller-LyeI' illusion are of the same 
length with their appearance of distinctness (Fodor 1983). It is this tension 
between appearance and reality which entitles us to say that we have here cases 
of perceptual illusion. By contrast, the content of even an engrossed experience of 
watching' cinematic images docs not in the same way contradict belief: one is not 
constantly struggling to avoid believing that acts of violence and passion are being 
perpetrated right in front of one, however intensely one responds to them at the 
level of the fictional. 
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If we are going to speak of illusions in this context, it will be useful to 
distinguish two kinds of illusion here: personal and sub-personal. The Ames­
room illusion is a personal one: I am subject to the illusion, and the illusory 
experience, being one I have, conflicts with my beliefs. In the case of film­
viewing, it seems better to say that it is a part of my visual object-recognition 
system that is subject to an illusion, registering as output "there is a horse 
directly ahead" when I see an image of a horse; but my perceptual experience, 
only partially determined by that output, is one of there being a cinematic image 
of a horse, and that experience does not have an illusory content. I I 
6 Cognitivism and Meaning 
Studies of film-viewing from the point of view of perceptual psychology have so 
far had a limited impact on our understanding of how films, considered as works 
of cinematic narrative rather than merely cinematic presentations of objects and 
scenes, are responded to. Indeed, one advocate of cognitive film theory has said 
that the role of psychological studies of film-viewing is limited to the discovery of 
"causal generalization," leaving to film theory proper the discovery of "systems 
of signification," thereby suggesting that psychology cannot help us to uncover 
cinematic meaning (Carroll 1981/2).12 One argument for this would appeal to the 
well-known philosopher's distinction between the world of science and the world 
of appearances (Sellars 1956): meanings are part of the world as it appears to us; a 
causal--scientific story about how cinematic images are processed can tell us no 
more about what they mean for us than a causal story about light waves and 
spectral reflectance properties can tell us about how red things look to us. 
We should agree that we cannot decide specific questions about the meanings 
of particular narratives by carrying out experiments, for the meaning that the 
work makes available to us has to be available through the ordinary process of 
attentive watching. But there is much that is located within the viewer which is 
relevant to understanding the signification of the work, and here experiments 
might give us more than mere causal generalizations. We might, for example, 
follow this line of thought: a major issue to be sorted out before we can under­
stand the meaning of a cinematic narrative is the nature of the viewer's imagined 
relation to that narrative. It is frequently assumed, for example, that the viewer 
imagines himself to be located within the space of the action, moving as the 
camera moves. But is this standardly the case? I have argued that such imaginings 
would be a cause of distraction from the narrative and would sometimes collide 
with the project of imagining the events of the story. How, for instance, would I 
reconcile my own imagined presence within the room of dismally crated objects 
at the end of Citizen Kane and my own imagined looking at the objects within 
that room, including the "rosebud" sledge, with imagining - what the narrative 
surely requires me to imagine- that no one sees this key to the mystery (Currie 
1995a: ch. 5)? 
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Here we surely have a substantive general issue about narrative meaning that 
can be resolved only by empirical psychology, possibly, at least in principle, in 
the following way. We identify, using the most refined techniques of brain­
imaging, those brain areas implicated in imagined movement, and we see whether 
those areas are activated by viewing film scenes that, on independent grounds, we 
regard as thosc most apt to induce imaginings as of movement. Subject of course 
to the normal doubts that attend the interpretation of psychological experiments, 
the outcome would be strong evidence either for or against the hypothesis of 
imagined movement. And our decision to accept or to reject that hypothesis will 
have profound implications for the kinds of meaning we are prepared to attribute 
to films. For we shall think one way about the meaning ofa film ifwe suppose the 
viewer to be an imagined participant in its action, and another way if wc don't. 
7 Cognitivisl11 and Constructivism 
To say this is, of course, to say that filmic meaning must be in some way 
dependent on the ways in which an audience is apt to respond to it and cannot 
be considered as something intrinsic to the work. This raises the question: to 
what extent is cinematic meaning a construction of the viewer rather than 
something the viewer finds in the work? David Bordwell, a founder of cognit­
ivism, has said that audiences construct meaning (l989b). His arguments are very 
much in the spirit of a Gombrichian thesis of the "beholder's share" and stand in 
opposition to the orthodox view, which, with obvious Marxist antecedents, tends 
to see the viewer as a passive receiver of signification in need of the semiotician's 
skillful analysis of the film's (probably sinister) message. For Bordwell, everyone, 
from the unreflective casual movie-watcher to the self-conscious, professional 
interpreter whose work we read in academic journals, is a constructor ofmeaning. 
Thus the contrast between the passive viewer and the penetrating criticltheorist, 
able to see the truth about meaning, dissipates. 
On reflection, Bordwell's constructivism seems poorly motivated. There need 
be no more (or less) mental activity involved in constructing meaning than in 
decoding or interpreting it. From the point of view of stressing mental activity, 
there is nothing to choose between saying that the viewer creates meaning and 
saying that she finds it, for ofcourse found meaning is not simply stumbled across. 
In the philosophy of mathematics there is a question about whether numbers are 
human constructs or pre-existent entities that we discover. But this debate has no 
implications for whether we should think of mathematicians as active or passive; 
on both views the mathematician's art is one of activity, and to think of the 
numbers as created by thought is not to attribute greater efforts to the thinker. 
So the inference "cognition implies activity implies construction" will not do. 
Nor will it do to observe that the meaning of a narrative depends, in some sense, 
on the responses to it of the audience - a point I emphasized earlier. The 
audience-dependent nature of meaning in narrative is consistent with thinking 
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of that meaning as residing in the narrative, and not in us, just as the observer­
dependent nature of color - the way the color of a thing can be specified only in 
relation to a community of observers who normally see it as having a certain color 
- is consistent with thinking that colors reside in the objects themselves, and that 
perceiving color is the way we have of finding out what colors things have. 
What would convince us that color is constructed rather than discovered? A 
relevant factor is consensus, across persons and times. Most of us, most of the 
time, agree with each other and with our earlier selves about the colors of things, 
and where we disagree we can usually find independently verifiable causes that 
constitute disturbance. If we could not, the colors might seem to be subjective 
constructions, projected onto the world (as moral values seem to be, at least 
according to some philosophers). 
If we g'ive strong weight to consensus or the lack of it, the question of whether 
the meaning of a filmic narrative is constructed or found can have no general 
answer. The right thing to say seems to be that some aspects of the work's 
meaning command a broad consensus and some do not. So the conclusion would 
be that while, for example, the thought that Ethan Edwards (in Ford's The 
Searchers) is a civil-war veteran is itself part of the work and therefore discovered 
by the audience, who generally agree about this feature of the narrative, some 
particular - and disputed- view about his motives for pursuing his search might 
fairly be called a construct. 
But why should consensus decide the issue as between discovery and con­
struction? There is after all no consensus in some areas of science, but we ought 
not to conclude that in such areas discovery is off the ag·enda. In science, it makes 
sense to think of "the world out there" holding an answer to our questions, even 
when there is nothing we can do to determine what the answer is. 13 With fiction, 
on the other hand, such a picture makes no sense (that would be too extreme a 
realism, even for a cognitivist). There is no real Ethan Edwards whose mental 
states determine the truth about his motives. If, with all the relevant evidence in, 
we can still rationally disagree about Ethan's motives, those motives are indeter­
minate. That's why lack of consensus, as long as it represents irresolvable 
disagreement, is grounds for thinking that we are in the business of constructing 
filmic meanings rather than finding them (Currie 1993). 
To the degree that one is a constructivist about narrative meaning, one is also 
an anti-realist about it, in the sense that one rejects the idea of a narrative 
meaning "really there" to be discovered. But there are different senses of realism, 
and one can be a constructivist and a realist (as Bordwell is) on the important 
issue of the existence and significance of connections between the narrative and 
the real world. I began by noting that cognitivists have a prejudice in favor of a 
realism that says we make sense of films in substantially the same ways as we 
make sense of the real world. We have seen this exemplified in the arguments 
about the perceptual realism of cinematic images. This is not to say that viewers 
mistake the film's narrative for a "slice of life" or that there are no substantial 
differences between the experience of film and of reality. But cognitivists hold 
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that when we understand, interpret, and respond to filmic narratives we are 
bringing to them a good deal of the knowledge and skills we deploy to under­
stand, interpret, and respond to people and events in the real world. Thus 
Bordwell argues that we simply could not make sense of fictional narratives if 
we did not bring to them something like a default assumption that the characters 
have motives and feelings of basically the same kinds as real people do, that 
physical and social processes operate in much the same way in the world of the 
fiction as they do in reality (1989b).14 Like the guiding principles of cognitivism, 
this is a default assumption and not an iron rule, so there are many occasions 
where fictions deviate from the "background conditions" of reality; the point is 
that the default assumptions are abandoned only when there is positive evidence 
that they should be. 
So the cognitivist's realism demands of her that she develop theories of our 
emotional and other responses to fictions and their characters based on the best 
psychological theories of our responses to real people. Let us now see how the 
cognitivist might do this. 
8 Cognitivism and Emotion 
As the discussion of theories of perception indicated, the cognitivist is always in 
danger of being too much a cognitivist, believing that every aspect of our 
response to film is an act of interpretation. Thus Schacter and Singer's "attribu­
tion theory of emotions" has appealed to some cognitivists because it says that 
emotions are the product of our attempt to make sense of our bodily reactions to 
stimuli (Schacter and Singer 1962, cited in Brooks 1984). But the data produced 
by Schacter and Singer simply do not support the idea that all or even most 
emotions result from an act of self-interpretation; many emotions are more than 
simply feelings or their bodily correlates and involve thoughts of various kinds. 
Shame, for example, is not separable from the thought that one has done 
wrong. IS And since such a thought is typically a purely reflexive response to a 
situation, an emotion can be cognitive in this sense without being something the 
subject constructs. At least in the case of shame and like emotions, the bodily 
feeling results from the thought, not the other way around. Also, there seems to 
be a significant and highly noncognitive connection between certain emotions 
and the perception of facial expression. Faces that express an emotion can, to a 
certain extent, transmit that emotion to the viewer - an important facet of the 
earliest interactions between infants and careg·ivers. Thus cinematic images share 
with other pictorial media an important capacity to transmit emotions via 
cognitively quite primitive mechanisms. 16 And film's capacity to do this is 
heightened by its use of moving images: the visual experience of a changing 
facial expression seems to be more affecting than that of a static one. 
While cognitive theorists have acknowledged these probably "hard-wired" 
aspects of the emotional transaction between film and viewer, they have devoted 
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greater attention to a more sophisticated kind of emotion transmission which may 
be important for understanding film. EmjJathy is a notion first systematically 
developed by the English moral philosophers of the eighteenth century and 
revived by philosophers of history and the social sciences early this century.17 
The basic idea is that we are capable of putting ourselves imaginatively in the 
position ofanother, coming thereby to feel and also to think as the other does, and 
that this act of imaginative projection can be the basis of our prediction or 
explanation of the other's behavior. Orthodox theorists of cinema often speak 
of a process of "identification," which they believe to be central to the experience 
of film, and cognitivists have complained that this notion, taken literally, is too 
blunt an instrument to explain cinematic experience: wholesale identification 
with a character is surely a rare thing. If, on the other hand, "identification" is a 
theorist's term of art, its justification and domain of application are unclear and 
anyway derive from theories the cognitivist is unlikely to accept. However, at 
least part of what people have intended to convey by means of identification may 
be reconstructible within a theory of empathy, since empathy is, of its nature, a 
kind of partial identification (Smith 1995). And recent developments in cognitive 
science suggest that empathy is itself a notion capable of being made more precise 
and therefore subject to the kind of empirical investigation cognitivists look for. 
"Simulation theory" offers a hypothesis about the mental mechanism underlying 
empathy and suggests that there may be identifiable pathologies that derive from 
a malfunction of the mechanism (Gordon 1986; Currie 1996). 
Empathy / simulation has the potential to play two distinct roles in explaining 
our engagement with the fiction film. First of all, if we think of the film as an 
elaborate prop in a game of make-believe (Walton 1990) and the viewer as a 
game-player who engages imaginatively with that prop, the viewer would seem 
naturally to be describable as one who projects himself imaginatively into the 
situation of one who is learning facts about the acts and events the fiction 
describes (Currie 1995a: ch. 6). Second, our responses to the characters and 
events of the film (and here I include emotional responses but also judgments, 
unemotional desires, etc.) may be, to some extent, explicable as the result of our 
coming to think, to desire, and to feel as the characters do themselves (Neill 
1996). But cognitivists are by no means united in their enthusiasm for empathy / 
simulation, and cognitive theories of horror, suspense, and other genres have 
been elaborated without substantial appeal to the notion (Carroll 1990, 1996e). 
Empathy/ simulation theory is also well placed to validate the cognitivist's 
insistence on one kind of realism in cinema: that to some extent we respond to the 
cinema as we do to reality. For simulation postulates a mechanism of empathetic 
response in order to explain, exactly, our capacity to cope with real people, their 
thoughts, feelings, and behavior; that mechanism can then be pressed into service 
to explain our response to the fictions we see on screen. But simulation theory 
challenges, at least in part, an assumption made by the most influential cognitivist 
thinker, David Bordwell: that our response to film is mediated by "schemata," or 
bodies of often unarticulated knowledge and belief that we can bring to bear on 
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particular real-world situations. Thus it is crucial to the simulation theory that 
my understanding, via empathetic contact, of your decisions, feelings, and other 
psychological responses is not a matter of my inferring those responses from a 
tacit and perhaps rudimentary theory of human psychology. Rather, it is a matter 
of my modeling those responses within my own mind, a process which can take 
place independently of whether I know anything about how the process works. 
Simulation/empathy does not suggest that all knowledge or belief is irrelevant to 
the cinematic experience, but it does suggest that we might get by with less 
appeal to specifically psychological knowledge than we would otherwise think. 
9 Fictional and Nonfictional Cinema 
Orthodox theorists are sometimes skeptical of the distinction between the fiction 
and the nonfiction film, partly on the grounds that all films embody a subjective 
point of view. Cognitivists have protested that the fiction/nonfiction divide is 
neither the same as nor a function of the subjective/objective distinction and that 
the highly subjective vision of a Leni Riefenstahl or a Michael Moore can give 
rise to something describable as documentary and distinguishable from fictions 
like The Great Dictator or Blue Collar. How? 
Before answering that question, the cognitivist might want to set some ground 
rules for the debate. She might reject a characterization of the debate as one 
concerning whether there is, after all, such a thing as the documentary, claiming 
instead that it is sensible simply to presuppose this. The cognitivist's enterprise 
would then be to show where the difference between documentary and non­
documentary lies, and failure to achieve that goal would not count as reason for 
thinking that there is, after all, no such thing as documentary. After all, philo­
sophers cannot agree on what precisely is the difference between right and 
wrong, error and opinion, and a host of other traditional contrasts. But few (at 
least among those inclined to cognitivism) would want to conclude from this that 
there are no such contrasts, and the cognitivist may well take it to be part of the 
mistake of "grand theory" to suppose that the onus is on those who want to 
defend a common-sense distinction like that between documentary and non­
documentary. She may also remind us that the difference between documentary 
and nondocumentary can be vague or a matter of degree, without ceasing to be a 
real difference; not every man is bald, despite the fact that there is no minimum 
number of hairs which constitutes hirsuteness. 
So far I have moved without qualification between the nonfiction/fiction 
divide and the documentary/ nondocumentary divide. And indeed some theorists 
do take the project of analyzing documentary to be tantamount to the construc­
tion of a theory of the nonfiction film. Thus Noel Carroll has focussed on what he 
calls the film of "presumptive assertion," within which category would fall 
dramatic reconstructions as well as documentaries in the narrower sense. Car­
roll's analysis suggests that films of presumptive assertion form a natural and 
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coherent category within which one could distinguish between documentaries 
proper and other nonfiction films in an artificial way (Carroll 1996c). On the 
other hand one might argue for a quite distinctive characterization of the 
documentary, as does Currie, who appeals to the idea of a cinematic trace. A 
photographic film is a trace of its subject, and that is true whether we are 
speaking of the sober documentary or the wildest fantasy: shots from Drifters 
are traces of the fishing boats that reflected light into the camera when the film 
was exposed, and shots from Bringing up Baby are traces of Cary Grant and 
Katherine Hepburn. Simplifying somewhat, we can then say that Dr~fters is a 
documentary because the maker's primary intention was to get an audience to 
form beliefs about the things and events of which the shots they see are traces. 
But with Bringing up Baby it is different: the intention primary to the project of 
the fiction film is to get the audience to have imaginings (rather than beliefs) 
concerning events other than those of which the shots they see are traces, in this 
case events involving a hapless paleontologist, a young woman with Connecticut 
connections, and a lost bone (Currie 1999). 
laThe Limits of Cognitivism 
Cognitivism is too recent a theory to be judged with much confidence; its most 
striking success is probably the negative one of having inspired important criti­
cism of the orthodox view. But cognitivism as a program in film theory cannot be 
given credit simply for the weakness of its rivals. There has been little illuminat­
ing connection made so far between the analysis of film style, narrative, and genre 
and the researches of cognitive and perceptual psychologists. Cognitive work on 
film and emotion is just beginning; analyses of the documentary and nonfiction 
films are barely announced. 
Cognitivists will need to sort out some fairly basic issues for themselves, 
primarily what their commitment to the label "cognitive" entails for their view 
of psychological processes and mechanisms. Which of these are to be understood 
as interpretive (as is fairly obviously the case with acts of narrative reconstruc­
tion) and which automatic and brute-causal (as may be the case with much visual 
processing and possibly also with some acts of empathetic contact)? And what 
exactly is it to be a cognitivist if you recognize a significant contribution to filmic 
experience from processes of the latter kind? At a more parochial level, cognit­
ivists ought to decide where they stand on the specific doctrines that have shaped 
cognitivism more or less through an accident of history. Without detracting from 
the achievement of David Bordwell in having done so much to set the cognitivist 
program in motion, it needs to be remembered that many of his specific views are 
not constitutive of that program. His anti-intentionalism, his constructivism 
about interpretation, and his enthusiasm for notions of "schemata" and "seman­
tic field" are all, I believe, logically detachable from the basic cognitivist program 
and may indeed be questioned from within that program. 
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As I have characterized it, cogmtlvlsm is a realist posltlOn, insofar as it 
emphasizes the similarities between our responses to film and to events and 
processes in the real world. But of course no cognitivist supposes that film and 
reality are interchangeable; film is not just "more reality," and if it were it would 
be hard to see what its interest for us could be. Again influenced by Gombrich, 
cog'nitivists are likely to assert that the aesthetic and other kinds of interest that 
film has for us are determined by the boundaries between its realism and 
unrealism, and especially by attempts to shift, or to highlight, or to comment 
on those boundaries. As with much else, there is no one theory of the mechanisms 
involved here to which a cognitivist must assent. But we do need better-devel­
oped theories of the unrealism of film than we currently possess. 
But the most significant challenge ahead for cognitivists must surely be in the 
area of normative issues. What will they say about issues of value g'enerally? 
Much recent film theory has tended to combine an official relativism about the 
value, particularly the aesthetic value, of films with a clear preference in practice 
for films that can be seen in some way to undermine conventional social assump­
tions, particularly if they combine this with anti-classical stylistic and generic 
moves. Cognitivists are more likely to want a positive theory of value and a 
practice of distinguishing' judgments about the aesthetic or more generally artistic 
value of filmic works from their moral values (thoug'h this would not preclude the 
natural thought that moral value can, in complex ways, contribute to or detract 
from aesthetic value). Cognitivists are also more likely to be hospitable to the idea 
of a canon than are their orthodox colleagues, though they may want to tailor that 
notion to the specific needs of an industrialized mass art. It is currently unclear 
how such a theory of value will relate to the doctrines of cognitive and perceptual 
processing espoused by cognitivists. 
Some cognitivists will see the success or failure of their program ultimately in 
terms of the illumination it brings to particular films. For cognitivists regard 
themselves as the servants rather than the masters of the works they study, 
complaining of a tendency, which they claim to detect in orthodox theorists, to 
use particular works to validate their own world-view, even at the cost of distort­
ing and even falsifying those works. Cognitivists have neither the resources nor 
the inclination to closely constrain criticism by theory; certainly they will not wish 
to relive the Bazinian nightmare of equivocation, inferring from the doctrine of 
filmic realism to the exhortation "make more realistic films." Perhaps their 
victory will be a resurgence of imaginative criticism not tightly confined by a 
commitment to a view about what film in general does or should mean. 
Notes 
Probably the single most important work of this period was Bordwell, Making 
Meaning (1989b). But this cannot be regarded as a "founding document"; as I shall 
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suggest below, there is too much in it log'ically separable fi'om the cognitivist's 
project. 
2 The comment was directed explicitly against Metz's Film and Language (1974), but 
would apply as well to later writing. 
3	 For criticisms of psychoanalytic theories of spectatorship along these lines, see 
Prince 1996, as well as the comprehensive attack on the orthodox program in Carroll 
1988. 
4	 For accessible introductions to this material see e.g. Wellman 1990, Baron-Cohen 
et al. 1993, and Gopnik and Meltzofl' 1997. 
5 See e.g. Carroll 1996a. 
6 Most eognitivists would regard the work of Derrida and of Deleuze as falling into 
this category. 
7	 The assumption here of a community of minds is the relatively weak assumption 
that, as a matter of fact, we are good at knowing what other people think, want, and 
decide in a broad rang'e of day-to-day settings. (Conversational success supports this 
assumption; mundane talk exchange would be impossible if we were not able to 
presuppose a shared background of knowledge, interest, and intended direction.) It 
is not the assumption that the minds of others are "wholly transparent" to us, which 
they clearly are not. 
8	 Hochberg and Brooks also note that we perceive cinematic motion and real-world 
motion in the same way (which is somewhat surprising', given that they are such 
different phenomena): "A continuous motion in the world is, of course, captured by 
successive displaced images on film (or their video equivalent). For most events 
these displacements are small, and within the range of the low-level sensory 
receptors of the visual system; these respond identically to the small displacements 
on the screen and to the differences provided from one moment to the next by 
smooth physical motion in the world" (1996: 368-9). 
9	 For a cognitivist account of point-of-view editing which treats the device not as a 
"code" but as a rational response to certain natural human perceptual tendencies, 
sec Carroll 1996b. See also Bordwell 1996. 
10	 See e.g. Anderson and Anderson 1996. At this point cognitivist thinking converges 
with the "illusionistic" strand in orthodox theory. 
11	 This issue is briefly touched on in the debate between Dom Lopes and Gregory 
Currie, in Currie 1998. 
12	 But he more recently suggests that this is "too conservative" (1996d: 159). 
13	 At least, cognitivist film theorists will be liable to see science in this way, even if 
students of cultural phenomena with different theoretical commitments may think 
of science as "all a matter of social construction." 
14	 This principle of narrative has a parallel in a principle of perception, Helmholtz's 
Likelihood Principle: "We perceive that which would in our normal life most likely 
have produced the effective sensory stimulation we have received" (see Hochberg 
and Brooks 1996: 373). 
15	 Ed Tan, in some ways an advocate of cognitivism, seems to be committed to the 
view that we can decide whether a state is genuinely one of fear by measuring 
responses like breathing rate, and disregard the accompanying thought contents (see 
Tan 1996, and the discussion at pp. 230-2 of Carroll 1990). 
16	 Sec e.g. Plantinga 1999 for a discussion of the ways that film exploits this mechan­
ism and for references to the psychological literature. The expression and recogni­
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tion of emotion is also, to a considerable extent, invariant across cultures (see e.g. 
Ekman 1982; Izard 1977; see also Hatfield et al. 1994). 
17	 "Empathy" or "Einfuhlung" is most directly associated with the psychological­
aesthetic theories of the late nineteenth-century writer Theodor Lipps, whose work 
is now largely forgotten but has clear connections to the moral theories of Adam 
Smith and David Hume, and to the theory of historical explanation of R. G. 
Collingwood. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
Psychoanalytic Film Theory 
Richard Allen 
In this chapter I shall outline some of the main contours of psychoanalytic film 
theory in the Anglo-American context since the late 1960s. I shall begin with a 
number ofmethodological remarks. First, since a vast amount ofwords have been 
expended on the subject, my account will necessarily be selective. Second, since 
the field is so wide and varied, 1 have, where possible, focussed on the elucidation 
ofkey concepts, positions, and arguments that cut across the writings of different 
authors. Third, psychoanalytic film theory is a notoriously opaque discourse and 
often assumes a large amount of prior knowledge on the part of thc vcxed and 
taxed reader. In order to remain intelligible, I have employed the stratcgy of 
trying to reconstruct the arguments of psychuanalytic theorists in my own words. 
Fourth, the history of psychoanalytic film theory is one that often displays an 
arbitrary selection and deployment of psychoanalytic ideas and manifests a 
blurred or distorted self-understanding by film theorists of the status of the 
concepts they are using. This chapter seeks to diagnose some of the conceptual 
confusions and misunderstandings that are manifested in psychoanalytic film 
theory, as well as to plot a history of ideas. The result, I hope, is an account of 
psychoanalytic film theory that will provide impetus for reflection and reconsid­
eration, rather than simply regurgitate a seemingly obscure and arguably mor­
Ibund set of doctrines. 
In the first section I shall sketch the reasons why psychoanalysis has occupied 
such a prominent place in thinking about cinema and layout a series of distinc­
tions that will serve as a framework for subsequent discussion. In section 2, I shall 
sketch in more detail the ways in which Freudian and Lacanian theories have 
been used to explain the affinities of cinema with the irrational and the nature of 
the spectator's identification with the cinematic image and with visual fictions. In 
section 3 I shall explore how, by using psychoanalysis to diagnose the hypnotic 
power of mass culture, cultural theorists in the Marxist tradition sought to 
explain the seemingly irrational allegiance of the masses to a system that perpe­
tuated their own subordination, and how Freud's dream analysis became a model 
for decoding and thereby exposing the ideological character of specific films. 
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Psychoanalysis seemed to offer feminist theorists a way of understanding how 
film and kindred forms of representation have served to perpetuate gender 
imbalance and oppression. In section 4 I shall present some of the ways in 
which psychoanalysis has been used by feminist film theorists to argue this. In 
conclusion, I shall reflect more generally on the relationship between psycho­
analytic theory and interpretation. 
1 Psychoanalysis and Cinema: Some Preliminary Distinctions 
Film theorists, critics, and commentators have been drawn to psychoanalytic 
ideas to explain cinema, because cinema seems to display a fundamental kinship 
with the irrational that psychoanalysis seeks to explain. This kinship between 
cinema and irrationality is suggested by two distinct aspects of the cinema: the 
distinctive visual properties of the medium, and the character and quality ofmass 
cultural narratives. The relationship between the visual properties of film and 
irrationality has been pursued in two related but distinct ways. The first stresses 
the affinity of film to irrational thought and dream. The second explores the 
significance for human understanding of cinema's augmentation of perception; it 
emphasizes what and how the cinema allows us to see, and how this effects our 
self-understanding. The second kinship between cinema and the irrational has its 
roots in the goal of mass culture to mobilize the whole population in the 
consumption of pleasure. To this end, it has been argued, the cinema mobilizes 
the most primitive (and therefore least differentiated and most universal) desires 
of the spectator by telling stories of everyday romance that take on mythic 
proportions and by casting the human being, in the figure of the star, as a 
transcendent, god-like creature. 
From his initial encounter with female hysterics in Charcot's clinic, Freud was 
interested in trying to understand and explain the phenomenon of irrational 
behavior. Freud hypothesized the existence of unconscious mental states of 
archaic infantile origin that motivated this behavior. They consist in powerful 
inchoate wishes that emerge in a person's life before they have the capacity to be 
conscious of them or to own them. These wishes center on the child's sexualized 
desire for its parent or parents (the Oedipus complex) and its prohibition which, 
Freud argued, the male child experienced in fantasy as the threat of castration at 
the hands of a punitive, all-powerful, internalized father figure (the super-ego). 
Successful negotiation of the Oedipus complex, issuing in self-individuation, is 
predicated on the repression of these wishes - they are barred from rational 
articulation - for they contain ideas that are intolerable for the newly formed ego 
to consciously entertain. Since little girls do not experience the threat ofcastration 
like little boys (they are already castrated) their individuation is less complete, and 
the mechanism of repression is less rigorously installed in their psychic life. 
Repression explains how unconscious mental states exist, but how are these 
mental states sustained? Freud argued that unconscious mental states gain their 
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effectivity in the life of the mind through the imagination in its capacity to evoke, 
to varying degrees, the force and significance of an event we have actually lived 
throug'h, even though the event is merely represented to us in the imagination. 
The imagination thus provides a stage upon which the mind can represent to 
itself, in the form of fantasies, desires that are otherwise unrealizable. Dreams are 
the stage of the imagination that are perhaps most readily apprehensible. The 
narrative forms that fantasy adopts disguises the desire that animates it and, by 
disguising it, at once prevents it from being consciously entertained and simul­
taneously ensures that it continues to be directly, though unconsciously, experi­
enced in the life of the mind. Under certain conditions fantasy may break 
through the fabric of reality and manifest itself in what might otherwise seem 
inexplicable human activity. Material that is ready to hand, especially the agent's 
own body, is mobilized as the stage upon which fantasy is acted out or projected, 
such as in hysteria. 
The way psychoanalytic theory is applied to the cinema depends upon which 
aspect of the medium is being illuminated. Apparatus theories use psychoanalysis 
to illuminate the peculiar way that cinema seems to augment or transform vision. 
Some emphasize the analogy between film and dream and use psychoanalytic 
theory to explain how film works upon the mind of the spectator as an image that 
is akin to the screen upon which we may imagine our dreams are projected 
(Eberwein 1984). Others emphasize the real rather than the imaginary quality of 
looking at motion pictures and suggest the way in which the intensification or 
omnipotence of vision in the cinema yields perverse pleasures. Psychoanalytic 
film criticism takes its cue from the way in which the visual fictions of mass 
culture function as wish-fulfilling narratives or collective fantasies and employs 
Freud's method of dream analysis in order to interpret their meaning. This 
follows the practice of Freud's disciples, who analyzed art not simply as a method 
of investigating the psychology of the artist behind the work but to demonstrate 
the ways in which characteristic forms taken by fiction and kinds of fiction 
demonstrate a kinship with fantasy and dream (see Jones 1951; Bonaparte 1949). 
There is a second fundamental distinction to be drawn within the practice of 
psychoanalytic film theory that cuts across the distinction between apparatus 
, theory and psychoanalytic interpretation. This distinction turns upon how the 
kinships between cinema and the irrational are to be evaluated. One tradition of 
psychoanalytic film theory construes the power of cinema to circumvent reason 
and sobriety as a wonderful thing; the second construes the power of cinema as 
profoundly dangerous and manipulative, as something that must be diagnosed 
and defended against by the cool light of reason. The first tradition originates in 
the writings of the French surrealists and their commentators (see Hammond 
1978) that is resumed in the remarkable and neglected writings of Parker Tyler 
(1944, 1947). The second tradition originates in the arguments of Western 
Marxists such as Theodor Adorno in the 1940s and 1950s, who drew on Freud's 
analysis of group psychology to describe the way in which the irrational powers of 
cinema were orchestrated by capital to create a docile and compliant population. 
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The Marxist critique ofculture was reinvigorated throug'h the intoxicating mix of 
Althusserian Marxism, Lacanian psychoanalytic theory, and semiotics in the 
1970s, which was itself sustained and transformed through the 1970s and 1980s 
through the work of feminist psychoanalytic theorists who argued that the 
perverse pleasures of the cinema operated at the expense of women. This Marx­
ist-feminist tradition, until recently, formed the dominant strand of psycho­
analytic film theory. 
While this distinction between the celebration and condemnation of irration­
ality and perversity is a fundamental cleavage in psychoanalytic film theory, it is 
nonetheless less straightforward than it first appears. Laura Mulvey's famous 
psychoanalytic diagnosis of the subjection of women in cinema, "Visual Pleasure 
and Narrative Cinema," is predicated upon a call for the abandonment of the 
pleasures of cinema, which forcefully suggests that those pleasures held their lure 
(Mulvey 1989b; see also Mulvey 1989a). Furthermore, although the writings 
of Christian Metz on psychoanalysis were appropriated by the Marxist and 
feminist tradition of psychoanalytic film theory, their relationship to that tradi­
tion is an ambivalent one. For in his psychoanalytic essays Metz writes as a 
cognitive semiotician whose anatomization of the perverse pleasures of cinema 
could be considered evaluatively neutral. There is also an important intellectual 
tradition that combines Marxism and surrealism, represented in film theory 
through Walter Benjamin's one-of-a-kind but enormously influential essay 
"Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction" (1969), which seeks to combine 
a Marxist diagnosis of mass culture with a surrealist celebration of its liberatory 
potential afforded by cinema's augmentation of vision (see Hansen 1999). 
Furthermore, it was the psychoanalytic theory of Jacques Lacan rather than 
Freud that was most influential upon psychoanalytic film theorists of the 1970s 
and 1980s, yet Lacanian psychoanalysis was profoundly informed by surrealism, 
in which psychoanalysis was used to subvert rather than restore rationality. The 
writings of Lacanian Slavoj Zizek arguably redeem the surreal dimension of 
Lacan's thought within a Marxist diagnosis and analysis of the narratives of 
popular culture. 
The centrality of Lacanian psychoanalysis to psychoanalytic film theory 
requires observation of a third distinction, one that separates Freudian psycho­
analysis from Laean, and that is the difference between science and metaphysics. 
Although I would argue that Freud's discovery is better understood as one that 
involves conceptual innovation rather than empirical discovery (see Cioffi 1969; 
Allen 1997b), it has traditionally been construed as an empirical discovery of 
hitherto unrecognized causal processes that govern mental life. Freudian psycho­
analysis is considered to be a science of the mind that uncovers and explains these 
causal processes. The cogency of Freudian psychoanalysis and its application to 
film theory can be judged on the grounds of whether or not the phenomena 
explained through psychoanalysis bear the requisite hallmarks of irrationality, 
and where cinema is ascribed causal effects, the cogency of this ascription may be 
judged by reference to the behavior of actual spectators. However, Lacan recasts 
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Freud's psychological theory of unconscious agency as a philosophical theory 
that describes the essential or constitutive paradox of self-representation. Laea­
nian theory is given an aura of empirical legitimacy by borrowing the language of 
psychological (and linguistic) theory, but because it is a metaphysical theory it is 
actually immune from empirical confirmation or refutation and cannot be used to 
justify or support causal hypotheses. 
Lacan's theory has its roots in the philosophy of Hegel, but its metaphysical 
foundations are perhaps best displayed by comparing Lacanian themes to the 
ideas of Sartre, who was hostile to and repudiated psychoanalytic theory. For 
Sartre, human self-consciousness is defined by a perpetual struggle between 
being-for-itself (pour-soi), expressing absolute freedom, nonfixity, mobility, 
transformation, and change, and being-in-itself (en--soi), expressing fixity, thing­
hood, and stasis. In bad faith, the for-itself defines itself as an entity, but while 
Sartre condemns this as inauthentic, he offers no way out of the dilemma or 
paradox of self-representation. When I represent myself to another being-for­
itself by expressing my desire for them, I necessarily misrepresent myself, for I 
am fixed in the look of the other as a being-in-itself. The perpetual process of 
self-alienation that defines the condition of consciousness and the relationship of 
self to the other is stabilized for Sartre only by the gaze of a third person who 
stands for the social order as whole, bestows an apparent equivalence between self 
and other, and g'ives the illusion of commonality and community (see Sartre 
1958). 
It's not hard to see how Sartrian themes are rehearsed by Lacan (see Samuels 
1993). The dialectic of being-in-itself and being-for-itself is recast by Lacan (via 
Heidegger) in the drama of the subject before the mirror of the other. Self­
consciousness is articulated in the moment that the subject qua no-thing-ness 
(Heidegger's subject) recognizes itself in a mirror or in the gaze of the other. But 
what it recognizes is "an armor of alienating identity" that gives it a form, shape, 
fixity, and thinghood which it is not, albeit, at this stage, one that is provisional 
and unstable. The role of Sartre's being-for-others is transformed by Lacan, who 
identifies the "third term" as the structure of meaning relationships engendered 
by ~anguage and culture (the Other), in which the subject discovers a (wholly) 
fictitious identity at the cost of cementing his self-alienation. For Lacan, there­
fore, the castration of the subject refers not simply to the repressed fantasy of 
penile loss at the hands of the internalized castrating father figure, which, for 
Freud, lay at the core of unconscious mental life. Instead, the fantasy described 
by Freud is a figuration of a quite general, metaphysical "lack in being" that is 
made permanent in the self-understanding achieved by the subject, who begins to 
inhabit language and culture through identifying with the place of the father. 
The appeal of Lacan's theory to Marxist and feminist film theorists was 
undoubtedly as much due to the imaginative way Lacan theorized the role of 
representation in "constructing" subjectivity as to his melancholy metaphysics of 
lack. While the two aspects of the theory are conjoined - it is because the subject 
is metaphysically nothing that the subject is also the necessary fiction that is 
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fabricated in representation - nevertheless film theorists used Lacan's theory of 
subject construction to make quasi-empirical claims about the effects of cinema 
upon the film spectator. (I use the term "quasi-empirical" because film theorists 
employ a distinction between the ideal spectator of theory and actual, empirical 
viewers, but unless the two entities are correlated in some way the theory loses its 
point.) In this way, psychoanalytic film theorists routinely conflated the distinc­
tion between science and metaphysics: they promiscuously melded Freudian and 
Lacanian psychoanalytic concepts that have distinct, indeed incompatible, intel­
lectual pedigrees, and they made sweeping empirical claims on wholly metaphy­
sical grounds. In my view, this conceptual confusion vitiates much of the work 
discussed in these pages. 
2 Psychoanalytic Theories of Cinema 
As I have already outlined, there are two broad kinds of applied psychoanalysis 
according to which aspect of the cinema is being illuminated. The first kind 
focusses upon the visual properties of cinema, the second upon the qualities of 
cinema fiction. This section will be concerned mainly with the first kind of 
psychoanalytic film theory. 
The surrealists and their commentators were the first to celebrate these 
affinities between the visual in film and irrational thought and the capacity of 
cinema to augment human powers of perception, and these ideas received 
persuasive articulation in surrealist practice in the work of filmmakers such as 
Epstein, Dulac, and Bufiuel. As early as 1926 Jean Goudal, in an essay that was 
praised by Breton, argued that the experience of cinema, in conformity with the 
goals of surrealist art, was lodged at the boundary of the conscious and uncon­
scious: "The cinema," he writes, "constitutes a conscious hallucination" (Ham­
mond 1978: 51). As in the theater, the cinema spectator sits in a darkened 
auditorium, but, unlike the theater, what we see is not actually present to us; 
rather, it is presented to us in the form of a "simulacrum of a uniquely visual 
kind." For Goudal, cinema has a kinship to the dream world on account of its 
lack of three-dimensionality, sound, and color. The concreteness of the film, 
together with its temporality, makes cinema an ideal medium for escaping 
the tyranny of reason and staging the associative processes of condensation 
and displacement that, for Freud, characterized unconscious thought. In a 
later essay, Jacques Brunius compares dissolves and fade-outs/ins to transi­
tions in dreams and writes that "the disposition of screen images in time is 
absolutely· analogous with the arrangement thought or the dream can devise. 
Neither chronological order nor relative values of duration are real" (Hammond 
1978: 61). 
Other surrealist writers reflected more upon the impact of cinema on our 
powers of perception. Parker Tyler writes: "In moving with a more pyrotechnic 
virtuosity than the human eye, ... [the camera] has displaced the body of the 
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spectator and rendered it, as a carriage of perception, fluid; the eye itself has 
become a body capable of greater spatial elasticity than the human body, insofar 
as it seems a sort of detachable organ of the human body" (Tyler 1944: 23). It is 
not simply that the camera brings human beings closer in the manner of a 
scientific instrument, but by replacing or displacing the body as the locus of 
perception, the camera seems to challenge the apparent division between inner 
and outer, between mind and world, and hence the coordinates of rational 
understanding itself, transmuting perception into trance or dream: "The camera 
seems to possess the wildness, the compulsiveness, and the interior meaning of 
the most instinctive life, such as that symptomatic in dreams, romantic poetry 
and surrealist art" (35). Perhaps a similar idea is echoed in Benjamin's utopian 
conception "unconscious optics," where the camera-eye released from the con­
straints of the body can reverse the alienating effects of technology and reveal to 
us "the secret life of things" (see Hansen 1999). It was the hidden, or secret, 
aspects of things as they arc revealed by the camera's automatic registration of the 
profilmic event that inspired the surrealists' critical practice of "irrational enlar­
gement" of scenes from otherwise dull American movies. 
Subsequent theoretical elaboration of the analogy between the visual prop­
erties of cinema and unconscious mental states in the writings of Baudry, Metz, 
and Allen continue to be divided between theories that focus on the relationship 
between film and fantasy or dream and theories that focus upon the augmentation 
of perception and its implications for human self-understanding. However, these 
writings contrast with surrealist writings on film by taking on the aspect of a 
psychological theory: that is, cinema is conceived as an apparatus that has certain 
causal effects on the spectator which psychoanalysis can illuminate. Metz and 
Baudry restate Goudal's argument that the cinema provides the spectator with a 
simulacrum of reality that is endowed with illusion of presence. It is for this 
reason that Metz dubs cinema "the Imaginary Significr." Furthermore, Baudry 
and Metz contend that by externalizing the form taken by fantasy, the cinema 
actually serves to mobilize and sustain wish-fulfillment. The cinema, Baudry 
writes, "causes the subject to regress to an early state of development with its own 
forms of satisfaction which may playa determining role in his desire for cinema 
and the pleasure he finds in it" (1986b: 313, my emphasis). In my book Projecting 
Illusion I try to refine the theories ofMetz and Baudry to account for the fact that 
the experience of cinema they describe, which I term "projective illusion," is at 
once a normal rather than a pathological activity and also a contingent rather than 
necessary feature of film spectatorship (1995). 
However, it was psychoanalytic theories of cinematic vision rather than the 
film-dream analogy that came to define the terms of modern psychoanalytic film 
theory. The two kinds of apparatus theory are connected by the idea that the 
cinema stimulatcs or causes archaic regression, but while the first emphasizes the 
"inner" aspect of this process, the retreat of the subject into a boundary undif­
ferentiated state, the latter emphasizes the impact of archaic desire on how and 
what we sec. Since archaic desire characteristically manifests itself in adult life 
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throug'h perversions, psychoanalytic film theorists proposed that the cinema is 
distinctive in mobilizing' a whole range of perverse pleasures. 
Metz argues that the cinema, conceived as an imaginary signifier, is like a 
fetish, and the film spectator is a fetishist (1982). For Freud, the fetish object 
functions as a prop for a fantasy that denies sexual difference - the fundamental 
difference for the child to deny in order to affirm its own sense of imaginary 
wholeness and lack of psychic differentiation from the (m)other. In his imagina­
tion, the fetishist fills in the apparent gap caused by the perceived absence of the 
female phallus with the fetish. He disavows what he knows (rationally) to be the 
case in favor of a primitive belief in sexual undifferentiation that the fetish serves 
to sustain. According to Metz, the cinematic image functions as a fetish because it 
allows us to perceive what is imag'inary as being real and hence to disavow our 
knowledge that what we see is only an image. Metz thereby takes the fetish object 
and the disavowal it sustains out of the domain of fantasy and into the realm of 
visual illusion. Although influential, Metz's assimilation of fetishism to illusion is 
incoherent, as Jacqueline Rose first pointed out, for whereas knowledge of an 
illusion functions rationally to contradict a false belief, knowledg'e of a fetish docs 
not (Rose 1980). 
Metz also argues that the cinema, qua imaginary signifier, promotes scopo­
philia in the form of voyeurism that always, he suggests, includes sadism. 
Scopophilia describes a sexual pleasure derived from looking. Voyeurism can 
be distinguished from scopophilia on the grounds that the pleasure of the voyeur 
is derived from looking at a person who is unaware of the voyeur's presence 
(although this distinction is not always made). Metz argues that the cinema 
installs the spectator in a situation in which his gaze is inoculated from reciprocal 
awareness. Spectatorial voyeurism is further promoted by the keyhole effect of 
the screen which suggests we are looking throug'h an aperture/apparatus upon 
the actors (a feature it shares with the television screen). The salience of the 
keyhole effect to the idea of voyeurism seems to contradict Metz's overall 
argument that bases voyeurism upon the idea of the imaginary signifier, since 
the keyhole effect depends upon recognition of the aperture/apparatus that we 
are looking' through rather than a disavowal of it. However, the fact that the 
keyhole argument survives a critique of the general idea of the imaginary signifier 
may be in its favor. Cinema may not be constitutively voyeuristic, but it does 
seems to be particularly conducive to satisfying voyeuristic desires, as any trip to 
the local video store attests. 
Thus far I have focussed on the Freudian aspect of apparatus theory. I shall 
now turn to the influence of Lacan and the screen--mirror analogy, whose 
formulation by Baudry was explicitly inspired by Althusser (as we shall see) 
but takes on an independence from Marxism in the writings of Metz. Metz 
claimed that the cinema screen was akin to Lacan's idea of mirror-misrecogni­
tion, with the significant difference that one does not see an image of oneself in 
the cinema. Just as the subject in front of the mirror (of the other) is bestowed 
with an illusory sense of identity, cinematic representation engenders in the 
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spectator an illusory sense of herself as someone who "identifies" with the 
position of the camera and therefore authors and owns the visual field of the 
film. However, the visual field the viewer purports to own and the position from 
which she purports to own it are actually the product of the system of represen­
tation. 
While some theorists emphasized the way in which the image constituted the 
subject as the author of their own visual field, others emphasized the effect of the 
cut on spectatorial omnipotence - namely, castration ~ and theorized how 
narrative cinema works to contain or "suture" (like stitches over a wound) the 
potentially catastrophic nature of this cut. For suture theorists the cut in cinema 
represents or enacts the castration that defines the subject's relationship to 
discourse according to Lacanian theory. Narrative cinema consists of alternating 
moments of identification with the plenitude of the image (imaginary wholeness) 
followed by a severance of that imaginary wholeness through the cut, which 
raises the possibility that the spectator may recognize the status of the image and 
discover the relation to lack that defines her position as spectator, and, by 
grandiose extrapolation, as a "subject." Film "constructs" the suhject of self­
misrepresentation, but it also has the power to expose the nature of that con­
struction. Classical cinema avoids this through deploying strategies of reverse­
field cutting, in which the visual field of an image that is lost to the spectator by 
the cut is restored to her vicariously through identification with the look of a 
character whom we see in the next image and who, it transpires, claims owner­
ship of the visual field of the first. 
This theory has been thoroughly discredited for many different reasons and 
from many different intellectual perspectives: 
Analytic film theory focusses on flawed arguments. Apparatus theory 
involves argument by analogy, but the analogy is mistakenly conceived as 
identity (Carroll 1988; Allen 1995). Apparatus theory also misunderstands 
the nature of character identification (Carroll 1988; Smith 1995). 
2	 Cognitive film theorists point out that psychoanalytic theory overlooks the 
pre-conscious and conscious aspects of the spectator's cognitive and emo­
tional engagement with narrative film (Bordwell 1985). 
3	 Narratologists demonstrate that character identification does not depend 
upon point of view in the manner required by the theory (Rothman 1976; 
Browne 1985; Smith 1995). 
4	 Film aestheticians point out that the theory depends on a naive, reductive 
analysis of film style that precludes the fine-grained distinctions the theory 
itself requires (Bordwell 1985). 
5	 Feminists arg'ue that the idea of the spectator as a transcendent, omnipotent 
figure is a patriarchal one (Penley 1989). 
6	 Most importantly in this context, Lacanians point out that film theorists 
misconstrue the nature of Lacanian psychoanalysis and offer a different 
conception of psychoanalytic film theory (Copjec 1982, 19.95). 
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As the failings of apparatus theory became evident, some psychoanalytic film 
theorists began turning away from medium-specific arguments based on the 
visual properties of film toward an exploration of the kinship between the fiction 
film and fantasy. Perhaps it is self-evident that popular narratives are narratives 
of wish-fulfillment offering imaginary and wholly fantastic solutions to the 
complex and messy problems of how to live, how to love, and how to deal with 
death. Tyler writes: "A thousand small wishes arc symbolically satisfied by the 
humblest and worst Hollywood movie, and the excellence or triteness of a movie 
has little to do with satisfying the average customer" (1944: 238). However, film 
theorists have sought a more general explanation of the kinship between fiction 
and fantasy at the level of the way fantasy operates upon the subject rather than 
what it contains. Elizabeth Cowie argues that fictions are congruent in their form 
with the mechanisms that govern fantasy on the grounds that our engagement 
with visual fictions is predicated upon (a) disavowal and (b) wish-fulfillment. 
Cowie's first argument recapitulates Metz's own citation of Octave Manoni, 
now shorn of Metz's visual bias. When 1 consume a fiction, "I know very well 
that this is a story but all the same it is real"; thus my engagement with fiction is 
akin to the way 1 inhabit fantasy. The second argument stresses the way in which 
narrative form engages thc wish to know, where desire is mobilized in relation to 
a lack and the point lies in the process rather than the result: Cowie writes: 
Reading or viewing is a relation of desire, which is, at the very least, the wish to 
know. The corollary of this wish is that the spectator is a subject of lack - we lack 
the knowledge of what will happen in the narrative, and the narration will feed us 
or tease us until it draws us to its already determined conclusion. (1997: 45) 
Of course both arguments depend on a move characteristic of much psycho­
analytic theory which tends to assimilate imagination to fantasy. Make-believe in 
a fictional world surely does not intrinsically involve imagination informed by 
sexualized desire, but merely imagination. Our engagement with narrative pro­
cess, suspense, involves, to be sure, the "desire to know," but is the desire to 
know always or necessarily a sexual desire? These questions are moot only if our 
point of departure is the Lacanian one that the subject as lack is always and 
everywhere the subject that is engaged. And, as 1 have suggested, it is not even 
necessary to adhere to a theory of fiction as fantasy in order to endorse the 
relevance of thinking about films as fantasies; it perhaps only requires some pre­
theoretical reflection. 
Lacanian theorists have shown that apparatus and suture theory involve a 
fundamental misapplication of a Lacanian understanding of the relationship 
between vision and desire. 1 would argue that this confusion derives from the 
fundamental misappropriation of Lacanian psychoanalysis by film theorists as a 
psychological rather than a metaphysical theory. Furthermore, it was a confusion 
that was fostered by the intent of apparatus theorists to develop a causal theory of 
how cinema affects spectators. It is scarcely surprising, then, that what appears to 
Lacanians as bad psychoanalysis looks to cognitive theorists like bad science. In 
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Lacanian theory, looking that is informed by desire is defined by the gaze. The 
gaze is not something that guarantees the subject's self-assurance; on the con­
trary, it renders the subject paranoid, someone who is ensnared by a look that is 
imagined to come from the other but cannot actually be seen. The gaze is that 
which lies outside the field of what is perceived (whether representation or 
physical object), sustaining the fantasy of subjectivity, not by purporting to 
guarantee the subject a mastery of that visual field, but by ceaselessly engaging 
the subject's desire. Such a desire is necessarily mobilized by the world of 
appearances, whether or not those appearances take the form of visual represen­
tations, and whether or not those visual representations are fictional. However, 
visual representations, such as film, do afford the possibility of overtly symboliz­
ing the gaze in the form of a stain or a grimace in the visual field that, so to speak, 
looks back at the observer and challenges their complacency, revealing the kernel 
of disorder and chaos beneath the calm surface of appearances in the fictional 
world. This grimace of the real is a ubiquitous motif in the films of Hitchcock, 
which Zizek terms the "Hitchcockian Blot" (1991, 1992a, 1992b). I shall return 
to this question at the end of the next section. 
3 Marxism, Psychoanalysis, and the Critique of Mass Culture 
In this section I will discuss four main schools of thought that attempt to 
synthesize Marxism and psychoanalysis in the study of cinema: the Frankfurt 
School critique of mass culture (focussing on the work of Adorno), Althusserian­
Lacanian film theory, what might be dubbed the Cahiers du cinema school of 
ideological criticism, and the "new Lacanianism" of Zizek and his followers that I 
have already introduced. The first three schools of thought synthesize Marxism 
and psychoanalysis within the framework of a political modernism that stands 
implacably opposed to mass culture and its products, save in the case of those 
mass cultural texts which show evidence of their own undoing. Psychoanalysis 
becomes a tool for diagnosing the lure of cinema and laying bare the contra­
dictions of dominant ideology. Zizek rejects the opposition between ideological 
illusion / mass culture / pathology and enlightenment / the avant-garde / 
authenticity that defined political modernism. In Zizek's hands psychoanalysis 
reveals the necessity of ideological illusion to which there is no outside. Valuable 
works of fiction, high and low alike, are those that mirror this truth. 
Following Wilhelm Reich, who used Freud to analyze the mass psychology of 
fascism (1946), Theodor Adorno explained the allegiance of the German popula­
tion to Hitler through Freud's analysis of group psychology (Adorno 1991; Freud 
1955). Freud argued that identification with a group is dependent on the relation­
ship the group bears to the leader. In this pattern of identification, the individual 
(partly) relinquishes his identification with a punitive super-ego and reidentifies 
instead with a collective ego-ideal he shares with other members of the group. 
In the classical Freudian model, identification with the super-ego affords 
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individuation and differentiation of the male child from the mother and prepares 
the way for heterosexual object choice. This "straightforward" development is 
denied the female child since the female has little inducement to give up her 
relationship with her father. As a result, the female may form a regressiv~, 
melancholic identification, in her fantasy, with the father, an identification that 
takes the place of heterosexual object choice. This identification eroticizes the 
father in fantasy (it renders him perverse), diminishes individuation, and impedes 
the development of conscience. Of course, a parallel condition may afflict the 
male child who regressively identifies with his mother (one Freudian explanation 
for the etiology of homosexuality). Freud implies that mass psychology is mod­
eled precisely upon the collective investiture ofa regressive "feminine" super-ego 
(see Lebeau 1995), and he compares the capacity of this figure, thus installed, to 
manipulate his or her subjects with the authority of the hypnotist. 
Adorno contends that mass eulture functions as ideology in a manner akin to 
fascist propaganda as a substitute form of socialization to the traditional patri­
archal family. Traditional patriarchal culture under liberal capitalism produced 
an individuated citizenship with the capacity to imagine social change and form a 
genuine collectivity (albeit one that privileged masculinity). Consumer capitalism 
produces a de-individuated citizen whose imagination is colonized by a culture 
industry which functions as a collective feminine super-ego that reduces all its 
citizens to a collectivity of isolated monadic identical subjects. Through a 
combination of administration and hypnosis, the culture industry tutors its 
subjects into believing it is addressing needs that are really manufactured by it: 
"The culture industry not so much adapts to the reactions of its customers as it 
counterfeits them. It drills them in their attitudes by behaving as if it were itself a 
customer" (Adorno 1974: 200-1). The success of the culture industry is achieved 
through the application of the capitalist methods of industrial organization to the 
production of art. The technology of filmic representation is ideally suited to the 
calculation and control of the audience's most primitive pre-ego impulses 
through the "transparency" of the cinematic image and the way in which the 
spectator's imaginative engagement with film is controlled by the temporality 
and rhythm of the work (see Adorno and Horkheimer 1972). 
Adorno's psychoanalysis of cinema did not enter into the mainstream of 
psychoanalytic film theory, but aspects of his work are echoed in the profoundly 
influential theories of French Marxist Louis Althusser. For Althusser, ideology 
describes the process through which society cultivates compliant social subjects 
by appealing to their need to be recognized, to acquire a social identity. Social 
institutions call upon individuals to take up socially recognized positions and 
thereby become "subjects." Individuals enter these positions believing they are 
freely chosen, though in fact they are determined in advance by the system that 
"interpellates" or hails the subject. Althusser compared this "error" of the 
subject to the "error" of the subject before Lacan's mirror who misrecognizes 
herself as an entity within it (collapsing the formation of the social subject with 
Lacan's psychic subject). This comparison allowed film theorists such as Jean­
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Louis Baudry (1986a) to map Althusser's interpellated subject onto an analysis of 
cinematic representation, through an analogy between the film screen and 
Lacan's mirror as illusion-generating apparatuses. The film spectator, Baudry 
argues, is captivated by an "impression" or illusion of reality in the cinema. The 
viewer actually perceives an image but imagines that what she perceives is real, an 
unmediated perception of the world. However, both the world that the spectator 
appears to perceive and the point of view upon that world are created by the 
apparatus. In this way the cinematic apparatus serves to perpetuate the specta­
tor's disavowal of the fact that her perception of reality is determined only 
through representation. "What emerges here," Baudry writes, "is the specific 
function fulfilled by the cinema as support and instrument of ideology. It con­
stitutes the 'subject' by the illusory delimitation of a central location -- whether 
this be that of a god or of an other substitute" (1986a: 295). The task of the film 
theorist is to expose the construction of the subject as an illusion and thereby to 
reveal the truth of ideology from a cognitive standpoint that is outside it. 
As we shall see, Althusserian-influenced apparatus theory seemed to afford a 
detailed analysis of cinematic representation and narration, but it did so at the 
expense of the analysis of content that characterizes Adorno's version of that 
theory. However, Althusser also offered a model for psychoanalytic textual 
criticism, for he pitched his interpretation of the work ofMarx as a "symptomatic 
reading" designed to reveal a meaning that was concealed beneath the surface of 
his writing and yet determined its contours in the way that, in Freud's dream 
analysis, the manifest content of a dream conceals its latent content and yet is 
explained by it. Drawing upon Althusserian literary theorist Pierre Macherey, the 
Cahiers critics undertook a similar ideological diagnosis of Hollywood films that 
soug'ht "to make them say what they have to say within what they leave unsaid, to 
reveal their constituent lacks; these are neither faults in the work, nor a deception 
on the part of the author; they are structuring absences, ... the unsaid included in 
the said and necessary to its constitution" (Cahiers du cinema editors 1976: 496). 
In their famous analysis of John Ford's Young Mr. Lincoln, the Cahiers editors 
purported to reveal how the myth of Lincoln as upholder of the law is established 
in Ford's film only by representing Lincoln as a castrated fig'ure whose authority 
paradoxically derives from the mother. In the Cahiers reading of the film, popular 
narrative is seen to enact a kind of fantasy or utopia of social coherence and 
conflict resolution, whose underlying oedipal logic based on castration and 
repressed desire can be unmasked through a detailed attention to the film's 
formal structure and style that exposes the cracks and fissures in the myth of 
social authority articulated by it. 
Althusserianism therefore bestowed a dual legacy on psychoanalytic film 
theory: apparatus theory and symptomatic criticism. Although a few texts, 
most notably Stephen Heath's (1975) analysis of Touch ofEvil, sought to synthe­
size the analysis of subject construction with textual analysis, such a synthesis was 
difficult to achieve. Subject-construction theory is a quasi-scientific theory which 
explains how spectator response is causally produced by the cinematic apparatus, 
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although it is a theory that rests on metaphysical premises. However, sympto­
matic criticism is an activity of interpretation that requires the imag-inative 
resources of the critic to discover meanings that a film does not appear to 
mandate. The dual legacy of Althusserianism has been overcome in recent 
years through Slavoj Zizek's breathtaking synthesis of Lacanian psychoanalysis 
and ideology critique. Zizek retains the underlying concern ofapparatus theorists 
with the way that cultural representations serve as supports for subjectivity, but 
he rejects the idea that this can be explained in terms of the causal effects of an 
apparatus upon subjects. Instead, the texts of popular culture serve to allegorize 
the drama of lack-in-being that defines the condition of the subject, and, if we are 
attentive critics, these can tutor us in grasping more deeply the ways in which the 
subject's lack-in-being sustains and is sustained by the social order. 
Central to Zizek's voluminous writings is the concept of fantasy and its 
relationship to the real, or that which always exceeds (self-)representation. 
"Ideology," he writes, "is a fantasy construction which serves as a support of 
our 'reality' itself: an 'illusion' which structures our effective, real social relations 
and thereby masks some insupportable, real-impossible kernel" (1994: 50). 
Zizek's analysis of popular culture implicitly rejoins Freud's analysis of the 
ego-ideal in the fantasy of group identification in the context of Adorno's 
extension of this idea to the popular culture, but it is shorn of the normative 
underpinnings of both thinkers -- of an attachment to the masculine super-ego, to 
the distinction between the normal and pathological (however attenuated in 
Adorno's case), and to the hierarchy between art and mass culture - and recast 
in Lacanian terms. For Zizek, the relationship between the consumer and the 
texts of popular culture is a form of super-ego identification that is not degraded 
or pathological, but normative. It is not a question of standing outside ideology 
that exposes its pathology or its fictive character in the manner of apparatus 
theorists, for there is nowhere outside ideology to stand. Instead it is a question of 
exposing the necessity of ideological fictions. Zizek writes: 
It would be wrong to conclude from "non existence of the big Other," i.e. from the 
fact that the big Other is just a retroactive illusion masking the contingency of the 
real, that we can simply suspend this "illusion" and "see things as they really are." 
The crucial point is that this "illusion" structures our social reality itself: its 
disintegration leads to a "loss of reality" - or, as Freud puts it in The Future of 
Illusion, after conceiving religion as an illusion: "Must not the assumptions that 
determine our political regulations be called illusions as well?" (1991: 71) 
Whereas apparatus theorists privileged modernist films that self-reflexively 
exposed the illusory character of representation, Zizek privileges those works of 
popular culture that self-consciously expose the fictive nature of the social order, 
which is nonetheless required to support and to make possible subjectivity. So 
even while Zizek rejects the distinction between false transparency and enligh­
tened self-reflexivity so dear to political modernism, he retains the distinction 
between pathology and enlightenment in attenuated form. There are those who 
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understand how the necessary fiction of subjectivity is sustained by the social 
order to ward off the abyss of the real and those who do not. Equally some texts 
serve as privileged guides: Hitchcock is Zizek's exemplary instance (1991, 1992a, 
1992b). It is as if Hitchcock occupies the place for postmodern theory that 
Godard occupied for political modernists. In his relentless exposure of the 
"real-impossible" kernel that the social order serves to mask, Zizek has crafted 
a fin-de-siecle negative theology whose breathless aphorisms seem to emerge 
from the jaws of authorial extinction. Zizek is Nietzsche reincarnated for the 
millennium, with all the strengths and weaknesses that implies. 
4 Psychoanalysis, Feminism, and Film Theory 
The starting point for modern feminist psychoanalytic film theory is Laura 
Mulvey's essay "Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema" (mentioned above). 
Mulvey's purpose was to diagnose and analyze the structure of gender hierarchy 
and inequality in narrative cinema, and she proposed that psychoanalytic theory 
provides the requisite tools to do it. Mulvey shared with Metz the assumption 
that the "conditions of screening and narrative conventions give the spectator an 
illusion of looking in on a private world" (Mulvey 1989b: 17) and hence that 
cinema was voyeuristic (though she does not assume as forthrightly the idea that 
the spectator identifies with the camera). However, she also asserts what is 
perhaps implicit but not stated by Metz, that this voyeuristic gaze is active, 
sadistic, and male. Why? One answer might be that the voyeuristic gaze is defined 
by Freud as being active, sadistic, and male. A second answer is that the 
voyeuristic male gaze is mobilized through a structure of identification in 
which the male spectator, through identification with the gaze of the male star, 
looks upon the spectacle of the female body. However, as psychoanalysis shows, 
the female body evokes castration threatening the authority of the voyeuristic 
gaze. This threat is neutralized, Mulvey claims, by two characteristic strategies: 
the first is to fetishize the image of woman (as in von Sternberg films), the second 
is to punish the woman (as in certain Hitchcock films). 
In 1969 Raymond Bellour commenced a series of essays on American cinema, 
primarily on the work of Hitchcock, which also identified a gender hierarchy and 
inequality in narrative cinema (see Bellour 1980). However, as Janet Bergstrom 
(1979) pointed out in a detailed presentation of Bellour's analysis of Hitchcock, 
while Bellour identifies a relentless male oedipal logic, in classical Hollywood 
cinema in general and in the films of Hitchcock in particular, that works to 
constrain female desire to become the mirror of male desire, his analysis, unlike 
Mulvey's, is not predicated simply upon the hierarchy seen/being seen, nor does 
it simply deny female characters control of the gaze. For example, in his detailed 
analysis of the Bodega Bay sequence from Hitchcock's film The Birds, Bellour 
demonstrates the way in which a gender hierarchy is created across a series of 
formal contrasts, seen/being seen, close-up/long shot, stasis/movement (1969). 
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Furthermore, it is a hierarchy in which, initially at least, Melanie Daniels (Tippi 
Hedren), the heroine of the film, is in control of the narrative and the gaze, 
brazenly seeking out Mitch Brenner (Rod Taylor) as a potential mate. For 
Bellour, the male oedipal narrative allows space for the autonomous articulation 
of female desire in order for that desire to be contained. If Bellour's analysis had 
become the paradigmatic example of how Hollywood narrative is gender-bound, 
the history of feminist film theory may have been dif1erent, for his analysis is 
predicated upon the structure of visual fictions, not upon the structure of the 
apparatus. While Bellour's male oedipal narrative appears both ubiquitous and 
closed, his reading can, in principle, be challenged on the grounds that not all 
fictions have this structure and that even his interpretation of Hitchcock is only a 
partial one. However, Mulvey's argument turned primarily not on the kind of 
story narrated through the formal strategies of classical editing, but upon the 
putative active, sadistic, masculine, voyeuristic quality of the gaze in cinema, and 
feminist theory became mired in the question ofhow to conceptualize the place of 
the female spectator in a system of looks that seemed to exclude her. Retro­
spectively, it is clear that this was quite simply the wrong question to ask, for it 
was framed by a series of erroneous assumptions. 
There is a fundamental ambiguity in Mulvey's theorization of the look: either 
it is contingent upon the narrative context of a male character gazing at to-be­
looked-at women, or it is intrinsic to the apparatus as such. Making the male gaze 
intrinsic renders it inescapable and hence questionable as a theory. However, if it 
is merely contingent upon context then it cannot implicate the spectator in the 
manner required by the theory, for a character's gaze, represented in the fiction 
as voyeuristic, is not necessarily experienced by the spectator as a voyeuristic 
gaze. In this sense, Mulvey's analysis of Hitchcock's self-conscious presentation 
and critique of male voyeurism in Rear Window contradicts her general theory. 
Kaja Silverman (1988) ofTers an ingenious way to rescue Mulvey's argument. 
The (voyeuristic) look in cinema is not intrinsically male, and it evokes lack 
(through the cut) for all spectators. Mulvey demonstrates the way that, in 
classical cinema, the burden of lack belonging to all becomes a property of the 
female character (and hence the female spectator) in the repetitive scenarios in 
which man is bearer of the look and woman its object. However, Silverman's 
solution has to confront all the criticisms of apparatus theory, which, as we have 
seen, there are good reasons to reject (for criticisms, see Carroll 1996). 
Pace Silverman, who recasts Mulvey's argument as one about specific narrat­
ive scenarios, albeit ones that are ubiquitous, and makes that argument relative to 
a gender-neutral apparatus theory, the response of Mary Ann Doane to this 
ambiguity in Mulvey's argument moves in the opposite direction. For Doane, 
Mulvey's position was interpreted in the light of French Lacanian feminist 
arguments that denied woman access to representation entirely on the grounds 
that the subject constituted in discourse was male: "The man alone has access to 
the privileged specular process of the mirror's identification" (Doane 1987: 16). 
Once the opposition "woman as image / man as bearer of the look" was under­
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stood as a structural feature of representation itself, the problem confronting 
feminist theorists became how to conceptualize the role of the female spectator. 
The options reduced themselves to four (nonexclusive) possibilities. The female 
spectator could (1) assume a transvestite identification with the male gaze at the 
expense of her like (see Mulvey 1989b), or (2) identify masochistically with the 
lack by which she is defined (Doane 1987). Alternatively, the female spectator 
could become a theorist who either (3) imagines a position for women outside any 
representational system that defines her as lack, or (4) exposes the way repre­
sentation ceaselessly structures the subordination of woman (see Hammett 1997). 
However, a number of feminist theorists, including Doane, also pursued a line of 
reasoning that would eventually undermine all the above (Doane 1987; Penley 
1989). For, they argued, not only was representation structured in a manner that 
produced gender asymmetry, but this gender asymmetry was produced by the 
theorist who characterized cinematic representation in patriarchal terms. That 
these two contradictory propositions could be held simultaneously attests to the 
power that the theory of the male gaze held over a whole generation of film 
theorists. Ultimately, though, one horn of the dilemma, "apparatus theory," gave 
way in favor of theories of fiction as fantasy that reconceptualized the relationship 
of gender to psychoanalysis. 
The dilemma of conceptualizing female spectatorship within the framework of 
the Mulvey-Metz paradigm is illustrated by a debate that took place in the pages 
of Cinema Journal over the reponse of the female spectator to the film Stella Dallas 
(1937). At the conclusion of the film, the audience watches Stella, who gazes 
through a window at her daughter's wedding to an upper-class man, excluded 
from the scene, yet triumphant in the knowledge that she has secured her 
daughter's social ascent. Linda Williams concedes that the conclusion of the 
film subordinates the chastened Stella to the position of passive spectator of her 
"properly fetishized" daughter but argues that the film appeals to female readers 
who have a different reading competence from men "that derives from the 
different way women take on their identities under patriarchy and is a direct 
result of the social fact of mothering" (1984a: 8). She refers here to feminist 
object-relations psychology that has emphasized the role of the mother-child 
bond in the development of the girl's identity in contrast to the sharp separation 
from the mother that defines phallic masculinity (Chodorow 1978). In this way 
the female subject identifies with the position of the mother as well as the position 
of the father and may criticize the latter from the standpoint of the former. 
In her reply to Williams, Ann Kaplan responds correctly, if literal-mindedly, 
that women's different socialization has no bearing on how identification in the 
cinema is structured by the patriarchal gaze of film (1985). It is left to Christine 
Gledhill to point out that "a mainstream feature film is not constituted simply by 
a series of looks; it is above all fiction, deploying a range of strategies ... which 
assist in the viewer's construction of a mental!emotional fictional arena" (1986: 
46). The Metz-Mulvey model cannot be undermined by an appeal to female 
spectatorship; the model itself is misconstrued. If object-relations psychology has 
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a bearing upon understanding identification in cinema, it is not because it can 
contribute to understanding the psychology of spectatorship but in the way it can 
illuminate the portrayal of mother-daughter relationships in the cinema and 
hence women's experience in Western culture (see Byars 1991). 
Many revisionist critics contested the universality of the scenario of oedipal 
narrative that enshrined phallic mastery and female to-be-looked-at-ness without 
challanging the underlying assumptions of the model. Steve Neale (1983) and 
others showed the way in which certain genres of classical cinema made a 
spectacle of the male body, though within action stories that allowed the hetero­
sexual male spectator to identify with male narrative agency rather than the 
spectacle of masculinity. Tania Modleski (1988), Patrice Petro (1986), and others 
identified the importance of the female oedipal scenario in popular films in which 
the female protagonist does not relinquish her bonds with her mother. Linda 
Williams (1984b) and Barbara Creed (1993) identified scenarios of female 
empowerment in the horror film in which the threat of castration was not 
contained but acted out in the narrative through the figure of the monstrous 
feminine. Carol Clover (1992) argued that slasher films elicit a "masochistic" 
identification with the suffering female victim on the part of male and female 
spectator alike, preparing the way for the empowerment of the girl as hero in the 
final scenes. Kaja Silverman (1992) analyzed how, under the pressure of history 
(the trauma ofWorld War II), the dominant strategy ofnarrative cinema in which 
male lack is displaced onto the figure of woman breaks down, and male maso­
chism is explicitly staged. 
Gaylyn Studlar (1985, 1988) proposed a fundamental revision of the Metz­
Mulvey paradigm to support her interpretation of the films of von Sternberg. 
Studlar argued that Baudry's comments about the psychic regression of the 
spectator in the cinema, and the analogy between cinema spectatorship and 
dreaming pursued by both Baudry and Metz, point in an altogether alternative 
direction to the idea of spectatorial voyeurism and sadism, and phallic fetishism, 
enshrined in the Metz-Mulvey model. Studlar suggests that the cinema spectator 
is characteristically not a sadistic voyeur but a masochist who swoons before the 
image which overwhelms him or her in its size and proximity. Since the origins of 
masochism lay in the child's fantasies of an all-powerful mother rather than in the 
child's relationship with the father (an argument drawn from Deleuze), the 
perverse pleasures of cinema are undifferentiated according to gender and there­
fore available (after all) for feminists and their antagonists alike. Carol Clover 
(1992) contested (along with other psychoanalytic theorists) the putatively pre­
oedipal character of masochism in Studlar's theory and returned to Metz's 
forgotten formulation of the projective and introjective gaze, as well as Lacan's 
conception of vision bifurcated between the gaze and the look, to argue that 
spectatorial voyeurism cuts both ways: it can be both active and passive, mascu­
line and sadistic by turns. However, thesc revisionist theories, while they offer a 
fundamental challenge to the Metz-Mulvey paradigm, remain locked in the 
implausible assumption that perversion, whether masochistic or sadistic, male 
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or female, is intrinsic to the experience of cinema and they therefore fail to escape 
the shadow cast by apparatus theory (see Gaut 1994). 
As I have already argued, theories of visual fiction as fantasy offered an 
alternative way to understand identification in psychoanalytic terms that seemed 
to avoid the pitfalls of apparatus theory. They also provide a way to divest the 
more localized discoveries of feminist critics from the standard oedipal scenario 
toward a more general theory of audience response. A number of feminist film 
theorists draw on Freud's analysis of typical fantasies in "A Child is Being 
Beaten" to show that a person does not necessarily identify with a person of 
like gender, that active and passive, "sadistic" and "masochistic" forms of 
identification are not gender-bound in the manner presupposed by Mulvey, 
and that popular narratives are not simply patriarchal and oedipal in the manner 
described by Barthes and Bellour (Donald 1989; Rodowick 1992; Cowie 1997). 
Thus Cowie contends that Max Ophuls' film The Reckless Moment (1949) offers 
diverse "positions" of identification - "father, mother, child, lover, wife, hus­
band" -- that involve a wish "both to have and to be the father, and to both have 
and to be the mother" (1997: 162, 163). To be sure, some feminist theorists 
sought to map Freud's analysis of the female role in psychoanalytic theories of 
fantasy onto visual fictions in order to emplot identificatory positions for the 
female spectator that were excluded by the Mulveyan model. However, this kind 
of analysis risks forcing textual interpretation and understanding into yet another 
procrustean theoretical mold (cinema as fantasy apparatus), and it runs contrary 
to idea that the investigation of fantasy reveals the fluid, contingent, even 
performative character of all identities (see chapter 10 on queer theory). Yet 
fantasy theories of (visual) fiction contain their own pitfalls for feminist theory. 
Not only should the general equation between fantasy and fiction be contested (as 
opposed to identifying fantasies in particular fictions or groups of fiction) on the 
grounds that it conflates fantasy with imagination, but it is not immediately clear 
what the theory of fiction as fantasy per se contributes to a feminist politics 
committed to discovering the ways in which patterns of gender inequality are 
perpetuated or subverted in popular narratives. For if all popular narratives offer 
the identificatory positions that subvert normative g'ender roles, then the theory 
seems to lack explanatory power for feminism. To be sure, with sufficient 
ingenuity, all films become available for a feminist reading thus conceived, but 
what then does this really tell us about the meaning of the film itself and, in 
particular, its political significance? 
5 Conclusion: Psychoanalysis and the Ethics of Interpretation 
The history of the application of psychoanalysis to cinema has been driven by two 
main politically motivated goals: theories of how cinema in general effects 
spectators, and symptomatic readings of individual texts. I have tried to show 
the limitations of psychoanalytically informed theories of film and fiction, but I 
141 
Richard Allen 
would now like to address, by way of conclusion, the status of psychoanalytic 
interpretation and its relationship to what I will call the ethics of interpretation. 
Symptomatic readings purport to show the meaning behind the text that is 
concealed by its manifest content, but it is not clear that this is what psycho­
analytic readings of Hollywood cinema achieve. A striking feature of Hollywood 
filmmaking (and American popular culture in general) is the way that psycho­
analytic narratives become a shorthand for emplotting contradictions and conflict 
in the lives and loves of the rational goal-oriented character of Hollywood 
cinema, while avoiding the motivational ambiguities characteristic of art cinema: 
the unconscious motive provides a clear-cut alternative to the conscious one. 
Thus, arguably, far from providing an objective code to unlock the real (hidden) 
meaning of the text, psychoanalytic criticism quite frequently describes what is 
going on at the surface of it: a case in point would be the innumerable psycho­
analytic interpretations of the works of Hitchcock. However, if this is the case, 
the psychoanalytic critic posing as theorist erroneously claims for himself the 
insight that rigohtly belongs to the text itself. Psychoanalytic film theorists often 
proceed as if they were in the position ofan analyst who explains the symptoms of 
the patient. Yet, as Stanley Cavell has suggested, the interpersonal ethics of the 
analytic situation suggest the reverse: the good analyst is one who listens to her 
patient in order to discover something about themselves, to become a wiser 
analyst (Cavell 1996). This suggests that a film theorist who is informed by the 
ethics rather than simply the theory of psychoanalysis will listen to what a film or 
text might say to them, rather than impose their theory upon it. Laura Mulvey 
has learned this lesson well; her analysis of Citizen Kane uncovers the way the 
film itself is formally structured to reveal to the attentive viewer a pattern of 
unconscious motivation that gives the lie to Kane's populism and serves to 
critique American political culture in general. That is, the film itself is under­
stood to be a work of symptomatic criticism (Mulvey 1992; see also Bates and 
Bates 1987 for a similar argument about the film). 
If psychoanalysis is not a privileged code for unlocking the meaning of texts, 
then it surely should be one among many conceptual frameworks to be deployed 
by the critic who is seeking to understand a film or body of films; too often 
psychoanalysis is the sole or dominant tool in the arsenal of the critic who deploys 
it in the belief that he possesses the philosophers' stone. Furthermore, if it is the 
film itself that bestows authority on an interpretation (a claim that obviously 
requires more defense than I can give it here), then one should not assume, prima 
facie, that either Freudian psychology or one singular version of psychoanalytic 
theory is the key to understanding a text: Hitchcock's The Birds may be informed 
by more than just the oedipal trajectory Bellour discovers within it (Allen 1997a); 
David Lynch's work may be most fruitfully understood by self-psychology and 
theories of narcissistic personality that are contemporaneous with it (Layton 
1994); Nicolas Roeg's films might be understood in terms of the Jungian psy­
chology that is their acknowledged source of inspiration (Izod 1992). This kind of 
culturally embedded, interpretative use of psychoanalysis is not likely to per­
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suade Lacanians (who possess the philosophers' stone), but it may persuade the 
rest of us. 
Note 
Thanks to Malcolm Turvey, Alexandra Seibel, and the editors for their suggestions. 
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CHAPTER NINE 
Spectatorship and Subjectivity 
E. Deidre Pribram 
The study of spectatorship is an attempt to understand why we choose to sit in 
the movie theater seat or on the living-room sofa captivated by a screen. What is 
it that makes the experience so pleasurable, desirable, meaningful - given that 
viewing subjects position themselves as filmic or televisual spectators voluntarily, 
in very large numbers, and with frequent repetition? What are the relationships 
between individual and filmic process: how are we linked to screen, narrative, 
character? Who exactly is the subject seated before the screen, involved in an 
activity which has been described as everything from passive absorption to active 
production of the text? 
Concepts of the spectator are inseparable from theories of the human subject. 
That is, notions of spectatorship, while not identical to, change in conjunction 
with, evolving or altering conceptualizations of subjectivity. The three "sub­
jects" discussed here - psychoanalytic, discursive, and social -- are all post­
structuralist in that they are constructed through socio-cultural and ideological 
forces. This is in contrast to the humanist subject of the age of Enlightenment 
through modernism, a unified, coherent being who is able to know "truth." In 
the latter schema, the universe operates according to rules of logic and reason 
which "man" can ascertain. Rationality and science, emanating from the huma­
nist subject, replace the earlier ordering of divine providence. 
Post-structuralism, in contrast, posits a decentered, noncoherent, externally 
constructed rather than internally originating subject. The study of (post-struc­
turalist) spectatorship is the search for what constitutes the person seated in front 
of the movie or television screen, and an exploration of which configurations, out 
of limitless possibilities, constitute viewing subjects so that they see themselves, 
the text, and the world(s) it represents within specific systems of meaning. 
1 The Psychoanalytic Subject 
The psychoanalytic concepts used in film studies are based on the work of
 
French theorist Jacques Lacan, who, in turn, built upon Sigmund Freud's
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pioneering work on the unconscious, sexuality, and subject formation. Freud 
hypothesized that children are introduced into sexuality in the first few, for­
mative years of life. Believing that the myth of Oedipus Rex mirrors the 
desires and events of infant sexuality, Freud based his description on the 
Greek myth in which Oedipus, unwittingly, kills his father and marries his 
mother. In the Oedipus complex, the male infant develops a desire for his 
mother and comes to perceive his father, who is the rival for his mother's 
affection, as the obstacle to the fulfillment of his desire. The outcome is that 
the boy identifies strongly with the father in order that he can take the father's 
place vis-a-vis the mother. In other words, he becomes the father so that he can 
desire the mother, and so, "woman." For female infants, the process is similar 
but the inverse: the object of desire is the father and identification occurs in 
relation to the mother. 
But in either case, the oedipal stage and its resolution enable the child to take 
up its assigned place in terms of gender identification, or "sexual difference." It 
is at this moment that the infant emerges into a world ordered by sexed selfhood, 
that is masculinity and femininity. 
Indebted to Freud, Lacan was also extremely influenced by linguistics and 
structuralism, which attributed culture and consciousness to the acquisition of 
language. Without language, we cannot develop a sense of ourselves as individu­
ated, cognitive beings. Integrating Freudian analysis with contemporary work on 
structural linguistics, Lacan's description of human formative development 
tracks how the infant becomes acculturated, how he or she is brought into 
being as a member of society. The penis of Freudian sexuality (which the girl 
infant is aware she lacks, the boy infant fearing a similar "castration") becomes 
the phallus - the bearer of male identity, that is, of patriarchal power. In this 
scenario the child emerges not only into sexual difference but into a larger 
patriarchal order. To resolve the Oedipus complex in language is to take one's 
place as a member within phallocentric culture. 
In Lacan's analysis, the first stage of this process for the infant is the Imaginary 
- "Imaginary" not only in the sense of illusory, but as a pre-linguistic order 
dominated by images. This is the world of the mother, a world of unity, 
connectedness, fullness, and satisfaction, in which the infant and mother are 
one. The infant has no sense of itself as a separate being but only as part of the 
mother. The second stage is the Mirror Phase, in which the infant recognizes its 
own reflected image, suggesting that it is a separate being. Finally, there is the 
Symbolic. This is the world of the father, the world of language, of meaning 
production, of law in the sense of cultural order, concepts of justice and 
morality, and so on. It is into the Symbolic that the infant steps at the end of 
its early, formative years, at the resolution of the Oedipus complex and at the 
moment of language acquisition. These three stages - the Imaginary, the 
Mirror Phase, and the Symbolic - tog'ether constitute the subject; in Lacan's 
system, the process of moving through these phases establishes the infant as 
subjective being. 
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As the stage of oneness with the mother, the Imaginary is considered illusory 
because such unity does not materially exist and because the phase, of necessity, 
must pass. However, the infant, as she or he grows, is "haunted by the memory of 
this original illusory experience of plenitude when baby and world were one" 
(Gledhill 1984: 30). This is the desire for the mother outlined in the Oedipus 
complex; it is a desire for connectedness and the longing to return to a state of 
fullness which stays with the child as he or she grows up and long after having 
entered the Symbolic. 
The entry into the world of language occurs when the child realizes the 
concept of difference. The illusion of unity with the mother, and therefore 
with the world, is broken, and the infant becomes aware of itself as a separate 
being. The world becomes differentiated into the self or subject versus objects 
and others. The moment of entry into the Symbolic, into culture, is a function of 
realizing the difference between self and Other. The establishment of one's 
subjectivity cannot occur without comparison to an objectified Other. 
While the Imaginary is a world of unity, the Symbolic is a world of separation 
and loss. But the child must accept entry into the Symbolic as the process of 
becoming an adult and taking up one's position as a social being. Simultaneously, 
however, the longing for the Imaginary is never lost, establishing the unconscious 
as the location for these unfulfilled desires. Further, the unity of the Imaginary 
can never be retrieved in its original state of wholeness or plenitude, but only as 
phantasy, in which other objects or representations act as temporary replace­
ments or equivalences. This produces a never-ceasing sense of lack, provoking 
the subject into a constant search for thc replenishment of unity and fullness, the 
achievement of which must always be deferred. 
Film scholars such as Christian Metz have taken Lacan's work and theorized 
that the cinematic experience is one of the locations in which the drives and 
desires of the Imaginary surface and are played out. In The Imaginary Signifier, 
Metz examines cinema's role as "a technique of the imaginary": 
[T]he subterranean persistence of the exclusive relation to the mother, desire as a 
pure eflect of lack and endless pursuit, the initial core of the unconscious.... All 
this is undoubtedly reactivated by the play of that other mirror, the cinema screen, 
in this respect a veritable psychical substitute. (1982: 3-4) 
In this analysis, the viewing experience triggers unconscious desires and phan­
tasies in such a way that the screen-spectator relationship replicates - or sub­
stitutes for - the very operations of the unconscious. Moreover, it is film's 
activation of desires associated with the Imaginary which explains cinematic 
pleasure, the gratifying sensation of which prompts spectators to return to the 
film-viewing experience repeatedly. 
Metz then attempts to account for the mechanisms by which the material base 
of the medium, the images and sounds of the text, reenact or retrieve the 
unconscious. From "The Fiction Film and its Spectator" in The Imaginary 
Sign~fier: 
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[H]ow does the spectator effect the mental leap which alone can lead him [sic] from 
the perceptual donnee, consisting of moving visual and auditory impressions, to the 
constitution of a fictional universe, from an objectively real but denied signifier to 
an imaginary but psychologically real signified? (116) 
Incorporating' such work as Jean-Louis Baudry's "Ideological Effects of the Basic 
Cinematographic Apparatus," Metz describes the "filmic state," the institu­
tional, technological, and psychological conditions in which, or from which, the 
spectator views the film. It is this filmic state which causes the viewer to be lulled 
into a "waking sleep," a semi-regressive or phantasy state which accesses the 
unconscIOus. 
However, the interaction of spectator and screen/film text doesn't simply 
pleasure a fixed, pre-existing subject, but actually produces or constitutes the 
viewer as subject in the process. "[F]ilm-viewing and subject-formation [are] 
reciprocal processes: something about our unconscious identity as subjects is 
reinforced in film viewing, and film viewing is effective because of our uncon­
scious participation.... [T]he cinema 'reinscribes' those very deep and globally 
structuring processes which form the human psyche" (Flitterman-Lewis 1992: 
124). In semiotic and post-structuralist conceptions of subjectivity, the subject is 
continually constructed through signifying or meaning-producing practices such 
as cmema. 
In other words, psychoanalytic film theory is concerned with establishing the 
complex, myriad mechanisms by which the relationship of spectator to screen 
links the human psyche, particularly the unconscious, to the film text. Through 
the circulation of psychoanalytic attributes such as desire, phantasy, and identi­
fication, the spectator-screen process, among other cultural processes, constructs 
the psychoanalytic subject, also variously referred to as the desiring subject, the 
sexual subject, and the screen subject. 
Another important cinematic arena that utilized Lacanian concepts of psycho­
analysis was feminist film theory, investigating and adapting those concepts to fit, 
more appropriately, a political agenda. Combining Freudian/Lacanian psycho­
analysis with studies in ideology, in the work of Louis Althusser and others, 
feminist film theory managed to invert psychoanalytic theories so that the 
theories fundamentally critiqued the phallogocentric structures they previously 
seemed to be simply describing or otherwise naturalizing. 
The appeal of psychoanalytic theories for feminist film studies could be found 
in their description of gender as a culturally acquired series of attributes, rather 
than the effect of biological determinism (anatomy as destiny, women's "natural" 
place, etc.). The concept of cultural acquisition implies the potential for change, 
crucial to a political movement, while deterministic notions foreclose the pursuit 
of altered gender relations. The idea that gender acculturation occurs in the first 
few years of life, prior to the advent of memory, also seemed to account for the 
persistence of male domination over women across diverse cultures and historical 
eras, without proscribing the possibility of altered relations. Further, the 
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contention that sexual difference is such a primary source of self-identity, of 
subjectivity, opened up many possibilities for further feminist analyses. 
The initiatory work ofLaura Mulvey, Pam Cook, and Claire Johnston outlined 
how, within a patriarchal order, the male is constructed as subject while women 
are relegated to object, to the Other, against which male subjectivity is produced. 
In a short article first published in 1973, "Fears, Fantasies and the Male 
Unconscious or 'You Don't Know What Is Happening, Do You, Mr. Jones?'," 
Laura Mulvey writes about sculptor Allen Jones and his "Women as Furniture" 
series, "in which life-size effigies of women, slave-like and sexually provocative, 
double as hat-stands, tables and chairs" (1989a: 6). Mulvey's point is that the 
sculptures, as with dominant forms of representation in general, do not reflect 
"real" women, that is, social beings existing in a material world. Nor do cultu­
rally pervasive representations of women reflect the female unconscious or 
women's phantasies. Rather, images of women mirror the male unconscious 
which produces those representations, and which does so on the basis of deep 
psychic structures of fear and desire. In "Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema" 
(1989b), Mulvey goes on to describe the specific, complex processes, including 
scopophilia, voyeurism, and fetishism, by which the male unconscious is enacted 
or performed upon the image/body of woman in cinema. Such "enactments" on 
women as an objectified Other, in film and other forms of representation, are 
central to the process of male subject formation, the primary controlling, organ­
izing, and signifying presence in patriarchal culture. But women are necessary in 
this process of male subject formation, if only as Other, as sexual difference. In 
psychoanalytic terms, he is aware of his phallus because of her lack. In order to 
know who he is, he needs to have before him who he is not. In Claire Johnston's 
words, feminist film theory and practice "revealed how the economy of the 
classic realist text works towards the unquestioned Imaginary of the patriarchal 
order" (1992: 297). 
In such feminist analyses, the look of the camera, the look of the characters 
within the text, and the position of narrative enunciation are all male. The film 
speaks from, for, and is addressed to the male unconscious, regardless of the 
gender of specific viewers. The cinematic apparatus and the film text position or 
construct an ideal male spectator as the terms in which the screen-spectator 
relationship occurs. 
The contribution of feminist film theory based in psychoanalysis is its attempt 
to explain - with the hopes of dismantling - the exclusion of women from the 
dominant discourses and institutions of socio-culturallife as the function of male 
needs and drives for power. It was able to describe many of the mechanisms of 
phallic oppression (including psychoanalytic theory itself) and certainly opened 
up a wealth of new ways to read films. 
However, psychoanalytically informed feminist film theory, and psychoanaly­
tically based theories of cinema in general, pose significant, perhaps insurmoun­
table, limitations as well. In the first instance, the theories are universalizing or 
totalizing, and so exclusionary, that is, they ignore historical and cultural differ­
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ences. The subject, the individual psyche, appears to be the same, once gender 
differences are established, over time and social categories, despite class, race and 
ethnicity, nationality, sexual preference, and so on. The theory generalizes 
singular subject identities regardless of obvious differences between people, 
cultures, and eras. 
In the second instance, it is difficult to accept the spectator as normatively 
male in the face of large numbers of social subjects - women who repeatedly 
attend the cinematic (and televisual) experience and do so with evident pleasure. 
Rather, one assumes that some manner of divergent signifying process(es) must 
occur for female spectators as well. 
For feminist film theory, the theoretical conceptualizations, not solely the 
surrounding phallic economy, are monolithic and restrictive. Women are 
excluded from any legitimate position from which to view or to speak. As scholars 
such as Teresa de Lauretis have argued, the theory leaves us caught in the orbit of 
the male and not-male, while what is necessary (and desirable) aren't considera­
tions of what it means to be "not-male," but rather what it means to be "women." 
The theories themselves, not just patriarchal culture, limit the ability to explore 
women's own fears and desires, and to give voice to women's psychic lives. 
Feminist scholars originally were drawn to psychoanalytic theories because of 
their capacity to explain gender identity in cultural rather than biolog'ical terms. 
However, psychoanalytic theory led to similarly reductive or absolutist notions in 
which the problem of how to alter the psychoanalytic construction of sexual 
difference, so apparently early and fundamentally formative of identity, seemed 
nearly as insurmountable as arguments based on biological determinism. 
The response of early feminist film theorists to such an apparently exclusion­
ary and detrimental positioning of female spectators by dominant cinematic 
forms was to call for a denial of films which embodied traditional visual and 
narrative pleasures, as the title of Mulvey's article suggests (initiatory feminist 
analyses and critiques were very much aimed at classic realist film and not at the 
concept of cinema in toto). Films of traditional narrative pleasure were to be 
replaced, instead, by avant-garde work which made evident the workings of those 
traditional pleasures or created alternative modes of gratification for viewers. 
While a number of the films that resulted were striking, original, and successful, 
much of the work was textually difficult, tending to create specialized audiences, 
and so, ignoring or excluding wider bands of spectators, including, potentially 
and contradictorily, large numbers of women. 
At the same time, the refusal to participate in forms of dominant culture 
seemed to position the feminist avant-garde as exacerbating or actively particip­
ating in the exclusion of women from the centers of cinematic production and 
reception. As it was unrealistic to assume that mainstream cinema was going to 
cease to be either mainstream or dominant, it made more sense to attempt to 
appropriate such forms in ways that benefited women. This entailed exploring 
other, more productive ways in which popular narrative cinema might provide its 
audiences with pleasures. The development of less restrictive theories and 
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practices was necessary in order that women could be represented in and 
addressed by cinema, as social subjects and as spectators, in alternative, inde­
pendent, and dominant arenas - in other words, wherever and whenever film 
occurs. 
2 The Discursive Subject 
Feminist awareness of the need for reconceptualizing psychoanalytic theories 
coincided with- and helped enable -- important shifts in the concepts of cinema, 
culture, and subjectivity. Evolving notions of subject formation, and therefore 
spectatorship, moved to respond to the two large problematics incurred by 
psychoanalysis. First, in post-structuralist theories beyond Lacan, the universal­
izing "sameness" of subjectivity is superseded by the discursive subject, a much 
more complex, multi-layered understanding of how the self is constituted. 
Second, the posited absence of social beings from the mechanisms and interac­
tions of spectatorship is redressed in the audience studies and reception theories 
of cultural studies, via close examination of the viewing practices of specific social 
subjects (discussed in the following section). 
In discursive theory, individual identity is not a function of singular, solely 
psychic or unaltering processes, but rather, subjectivity is constructed by the 
cultural forces of multiple, overlapping, and sometimes competing discourses. 
Sexual difference or gender, then, is one (or a plurality of) shaping discourse(s) 
among many others in the formation of identity. It is in Michel Foucault's work 
that notions of the discursive subject are most clearly delineated. 
In Foucault's terms, discourses are systems of thought or domains of know­
ledge which form around certain thematics or ideologies, for instance, "justice." 
A discursive practice, in this instance the juridical system, would involve institu­
tions (courts, etc.) and technologies (laws, means of enforcing them). Together, 
the discourses, institutions, and technologies interact as the discursive formation 
of the law. The discursive formation ofheterosexuality would involve institutions 
and technologies such as marriage, and discourses such as romance, love, and so 
on. 
In discursive theory, the (humanistic) subject does not predate, conceive of~ or 
invent the discourse; discourse is not a "phenomenon of expression" by a 
"transcendental subject" (Foucault 1972: 54--5). Rather, and very importantly, 
the subject is constituted by the discourse. So, the law-abiding citizen and the 
criminal are constructs of the discursive practice of the law, husbands and wives 
are the subjective effects of heterosexuality, and so on. In this account, the 
individual is the intersection or collection of discourses which constitute or 
articulate him or her. In other words, the self is the effect of cultural processes. 
Originally influenced by structural linguistics, in Foucault's later work dis­
course came to be inseparable from power. Speaking of the "traditional theme" 
in philosophy that "truth does not belong to the order of power, but shares an 
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original affinity with freedom," Foucault argues that this conceptualization needs 
to be overturned because "truth is not by nature free" but "thoroughly imbued 
with relations of power" (1978: 60). Power is dispersed everywhere throughout 
culture, which is not to say that it is dispersed evenly or equitably, but that 
instances of the exertion of and struggle for power occur continually, at every 
level and in every configuration of culture. 
Instead of the benevolent, forward-progressing, and freeing version of reason 
projected since the Enlightenment, Foucault argues a "reason," that is, regimes 
of knowledge, that are coercive, controlling, and driven by the mechanisms and 
forces of power - although it should also be said that Foucault does not under­
stand power as simply oppressive, but sees it as a much more "productive" force, 
in its capacity for producing cultural relations. 
Theorizing the discursive formation of sexuality, Foucault describes how 
experience - sexuality in this instance - is organized as a regime of knowledge/ 
power in a threefold process. Sexuality is treated as "the correlation of a domain 
of knowledge, a type of normativity and a mode of relation to the self." The 
domain of knowledge is created by the constitution of sexuality as "a field of 
study (with its own concepts, theories, diverse disciplines)." Normativity is 
imposed by "a collection of rules (which differentiate the permissible from the 
forbidden, natural from monstrous, normal from pathological, what is decent 
from what is not, etc.)." And a mode of relation to the self occurs "between the 
individual and himself [sic] (which enables him to recognize himself as a sexual 
subject amid others)" (I984b: 333-4). 
While the thematic of a discourse may remain constant, the meanings pro­
duced over historical eras change. To continue with the instance of sexuality, its 
occurrences in the seventeenth century marked a departure from previous 
experiences of it. "[T]hings were said in a different way; it was different people 
who said them, from different points of view, and in order to obtain different 
results" (Foucault 1978: 27). 
The function of systems of discourse and relations of power is precisely to 
constitute subjectivity, to organize "techniques for 'governing' individuals - that 
is, for 'guiding their conduct' - in domains as different as the school, the army, 
and the workshop" (1984b: 337-8). In the modern era, regimes of knowledge/ 
power are less physically or externally coercive (punishment) than they are 
internalized or self-regulated (control), through the process of normatization. 
The process of normatizing entails a discipline describing its own field of 
operation and creating its own object of study. So, for instance, psychiatry as a 
domain of knowledge was created by emerging discourses on madness. "[M]ental 
illness was constituted by all that was said in all the statements that named it, 
divided it up, described it, explained it, traced its developments, indicated its 
various correlations, judg'ed it, and possibly gave it speech by articulating, in its 
name, discourses that were to be taken as its own" (Foucault 1972: 32). However, 
in the process of constituting the object of study, the object in the sense 
of subject/object is also formulated. The conceptualization of the insane is 
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necessary to the process of normatlzmg acceptable behavior, the criminal 
is necessary to the description of the boundaries and parameters of law and 
order, and so on. By deploying the concept of 'insane,' the identity of the sane 
subject is described, or proscribed. Thus, discourses of what constitutes healthi­
ness must always incorporate the ill, sanity include the mad, law-abiding the 
criminal, 'normal' sexuality the deviant, and so forth. 
In a hypothesis structurally similar to the function of sexual difference in 
psychoanalytic theory, social relations are constructed upon conceptions of 
otherness or alterity. "The history of madness would be the history of the 
Other - of that which, for a given culture, is at once interior and foreign, 
therefore to be excluded (so as to exorcise the interior danger)" (Foucault 
1973: xxiv). By attempting to make the danger of madness entirely "foreign" 
or exterior to the subject and instead locate it as embedded in the object or other ­
of the insane in this instance -- the potential for its interiority or effect on the self 
is denied, and thereby its threat or the anxiety of its threat diminished. 
It is critical in post-structuralist discursive theory to understand subjectivity as 
the invention or articulation of discourse. In the process of naming someone as 
mad, as object of study, or as Other, what is assembled are interpretations or 
judgments, not facts; what is constructed are meanings, not "truths." 
Although extremely influential, Foucaultian discursive theory has not been 
applied to cinema studies in any kind of systematic manner, as was attempted by 
Metz and Mulvey with Lacanian psychoanalytic theory. To date, most efforts 
have been deployed in the study of cultural discourses invoked by a particular 
text or set of texts which cite, group, or contest varying notions of the law, say, or 
sexuality. Those discursive practices specifically considered by Foucault have 
proven most accessible to film and television scholars - in the instance of 
sexuality, in gay and lesbian studies, in studies of the uses of the body, and so on. 
While there are reasons that make it particularly difficult to systematically 
apply post-structuralist discursive theory to cinema studies (the polymorphous 
origins of discourse, its multiply produced effects, and the delineation of a fluid 
rather than a fixed subject), the theory's potential productivity for representa­
tional studies is enormous. Foucault's own preoccupation with the human or 
social sciences precluded specific analyses of forms of representation, but his 
work has certainly contributed to and enriched the way film and television 
studies are pursued, including, pivotally, their conceptions of the subject and 
spectatorship. 
The result has been a broader, more complex notion of representation as a 
reflection of and a site for cultural struggles over meaning formation, that is, as a 
place where meaning production occurs and also where its structures of operation 
can be viewed. This is so because of the ability of representational forms to "stand 
in for" social processes via aesthetic and narrative codes (e.g. characters for social 
subjects), as well as their capacity to invoke or put into circulation wide-ranging 
occurrences of discursive formations or domains of knowledge (what films are 
"about"). At the core of these operations ofmeaning formation is the notion of the 
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subject, and its cinematic version, the spectator, as the convergence, accumula­
tion, and reconfiguration of complementary/competing discourses. It is this 
spectator who has displaced the fixed, meaning-producing spectator of human­
ism/modernism, and the fixed, meaning-effect spectator of psychoanalysis. 
Two examples of studies of representational forms consonant with discursive 
understandings of subjectivity, and so taken up and utilized by film theorists, are 
Stuart Hall's notions of encoding/decoding and Mikhail Bakhtin's concept of 
heteroglossia. Both theories focus on a diversity of subject positions and a 
multiplicity of textual meanings. 
Stuart Hall understands encoding - the production of media texts - and 
decoding - the reception of media texts - as discursive practices. "Before this 
message can have an 'effect' (however defined), satisfy a 'need' or be put to a 
'use,' it must first be appropriated as a meaningful discourse and be meaningfully 
decoded" (1993: 93). The spectator has the potential to interpret, construct, or 
meaningfully produce the text from one of several positions in relation to it. First, 
he or she can make a dominant or preferred reading'. Hall calls such readings 
"preferred" because while they are dominant in having "the institutional!polit­
ical/ideological order imprinted in them and have themselves become institu­
tionalized," they are not singular, fixed, or closed, "not univocal or uncontested" 
(98). 
The viewer can also forge a negotiated reading which is "a mixture of adaptive 
and oppositional elements: it acknowledges the legitimacy of the hegemonic 
definitions to make the grand significations (abstract), while, at a more restricted, 
situational (situated) level, it makes its own ground rules -- it operates with 
exceptions to the rules" (102). Third, the spectator can secure an oppositional 
reading in which the message is decoded in a "globally contrary way. He/she 
detotalizes the message in the preferred code in order to retotalize the message 
with some alternative framework of reference" (103). 
In this formulation, the spectator's own varying relationship to the discourses 
invoked by the text, and the ways they are invoked, allow for a slippage between 
potential reading's or viewing positions in relation to the material of the text. 
However, while the spectator is no longer "sutured" to the text in a particular 
way, preferred, negotiated, and oppositional readings continue to imply judg­
ments of "better or worse" interpretations of the text for that particular viewer 
(depending on the viewer's or the interpreting critic's politics). A hierarchy is 
structured in which one kind of reading is chosen or prioritized over another ­
preferred, negotiated, oppositional - displacing or occurring in place of the 
others. This problematizes a more complex Foucaultian notion of multiple, 
varied, and simultaneous discourses operating on the subject, some of which 
may be complementary to each other, while others are competing. 
Mikhail Bakhtin's concept of heteroglossia, as outlined in The Dialogic 
Imagination, helps redress the limitations of a "pick or choose" or hierarchizing 
concept of readership, while retaining the complexity of Foucault's perspectives 
on discourse and subjectivity. Heteroglossia ia "a notion of competing languages 
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and discourses applying equally to 'text' and 'context.' The role of the 
artistic text, within a Bakhtinian perspective, is not to represent real life 'exist­
ents' but to stage the conflicts, the coincidences and competitions of languages 
and discourses, inherent in heteroglossia" (Starn 1992: 197). As well as the 
simultaneity of complementary/competing discourses, Bakhtin's heteroglossia 
accounts for the simultaneous circulation and interaction of representational 
discourses (the text) and other socio-cultural discourses beyond representation 
(the context). 
The most persistent criticism of Foucault's concept of discursive subjectivity 
is that it eliminates the possibility of "agency," that is, motivated, intentional 
action and reaction on the part of the subject. If the discursive subject is entirely 
the construct of culturally determining forces via discursive institutions and 
systems of knowledge, then the potential for internally driven response is pre­
empted. How are individual or sclf:'willed thoughts and actions possible? How 
can spectators actively select or reject readings if they, themselves, are the 
product or effect of cultural and textual processes? Much post-structuralist 
theory, certainly Foucault's, has been accused of negating the agcncy of the 
subject and therefore eliminating necessary conditions for the possibility of 
political activity and social change. 
Such accusations have been countered by theorists such as Chantal Mouffe 
and Judith Butler. Mouffe finds that a frequent misunderstanding of the anti­
essentialist position "consists in believing that the critique of an essential identity 
must necessarily lead to the rejection of any concept of identity whatsoever" 
(1992: 381). Mouffe contends: 
It is only when we discard the view of the subject as an agent both rational and 
transparent to itself, and discard as well the supposed unity and homogeneity of 
the ensemble of its positions, that we are in the position to theorize the multiplicity 
of relations of subordination.... We have rather to approach it [the social agent] 
as a plurality, dependent on the various subject positions through which it is 
constituted within various discursive formations .... To deny the existence of an 
a priori, necessary link between subject positions does not mean that there are 
not constant efforts to establish between them historical, contingent, and variable 
links. (371--2) 
She calls for the identification and investigation of the multiple and changing 
links between subject positions, within and between subjects, which together 
produce "identity." These are not an impediment to understanding the subject, 
but rather the only means to ascertain the equally mUltiple and changing forms of 
power and subordination. 
In a similar argument, Judith Butler objects to the notion that questioning the 
construction of subjectivity is equated to "doing away with" the subject (1992: 
15). "[1']0 claim that the subject is constituted is not to claim that it is deter­
mined" (12). If the subject is constructed, then agency, too, is a construction, not 
an a priori given. 
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[1]f we agree that politics and power exist already at the level at which the subject 
and its agency are articulated and made possible, then agency can be presumed only 
at the cost of refusing to inquire into its construction.... \Ve need instead to ask, 
what possibilities of mobilization are produced on the basis of existing configura­
tions of discourse and power? Where are the possibilities of reworking that very 
matrix of power by which we are constituted, of reconstituting the legacy of that 
constitution, and of working against each other those processes of regulation that 
can destabilize existing power regimes? (13) 
While both Mouffe and Butler argue that the subject and her or his ag'ency do not 
disappear but, instead, are constituted rclationally, not absolutely, are never fixed 
but always evolving, many questions remain. Indeed, the areas insufficiently 
theorized by Foucault (What precisely causes discourses to alter historically? 
How do various, multiple discourses construct specific subjects and in what 
proportions or relations of impact? What are the mechanisms by which chang'e 
and agency operate?) remain insufficiently understood in terms of their applica­
tion to film studies as well as other disciplines. While the work of Hall, Bakhtin, 
Mouffe, Butler, and many other scholars marks fruitful beginnings, much is yet 
to be done on questions of representation and the discursive subject of film/ 
media/art, and further, on the ways representation conflicts and collaborates 
with other cultural discourses. 
How do viewers operationalize specific readings? That is, how do spectators 
select a specific reading(s) or shift among readings? Do different information 
effects, such as those provided by close readings, political engagement, etc., alter 
earlier, or what mig'ht have otherwise been different, subject positions and 
therefore alter interpretations of a text? What mechanisms are required in 
order to deploy particular readings or deactivate others? 
How does the individual operationalize certain identities at specific moments: 
for instance, what enables a specific female spectator to read a text from the 
position of her gendered subjectivity and simultaneously understand its 
"intended" preferred meaning's? What are the mechanisms which might account 
for that specific female spectator constructing' an oppositional reading from her 
gendered subject position but a dominant reading from her perspective as a 
racialized identity? Among competing or simply differing discourses invoked 
by a text, what allows specific readings to take on greater significance - signific­
ance in both its senses of meaning and importance? Why do some readings 
"matter" to a given spectator more than others? What permits a viewer to change 
his or her "mind" about previously held interpretations? 
Do systems of representation such as film and television form their own 
discursive formation, or are they the confluence of multiple discourses, such as, 
in film, the narrative discourse(s) of the script, the cinematographic discourse(s) 
of the image, and so on? Do genres represent their own discrete discourses within 
a system of representation such as cinema or cut across modes of representations 
(film, TV, novels, poems), encompassing many diverse socio-cultural practices 
and artifacts? Do the romance genres - the "women's weepies" of the 1940s or 
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today's "date movies" -- form part of a discursive formation on romance which 
includes Harlequin romances, Hallmark cards, and Valentine's Day (rendering 
discipline-based analyses insufficient, thus helping to explain the prominence of 
cultural studies)? To what degree and in what ways are the many films (and TV 
shows) that follow the conventions of courtroom dramas, or resolve their dra­
matic dilemmas in courtrooms, part of a representational system of narrative 
conventions or an armature of dominant social discourses surrounding justice and 
the juridical system? While the likely answer is "both" to questions concerning 
the particular (representational) and general (socio-cultura1) discursive forma­
tions invoked by any text, how do we conceptualize and articulate this? How we 
do so is of significance because, as a site where representational and social 
discourses intersect (and perhaps the media's impact can be partially explained 
by their ability to invoke both sorts of discourse rclationally), it marks a promising 
point for agency and political intervention. 
As a series of discursive formations, what kinds of knowledge/power are 
deployed by the representational to construct what kinds of subjectivity? In 
such post-structuralist theoretical configurations, spectatorshiplreadership are 
"technologies of the self," historical and cultural modes of subject formation. 
While Foucault's work does not focus on the relations of representation in detail, 
in an interview he offers a provocative suggestion concerning the need for 
creativity to displace Sartrean (and humanist) notions of authenticity. "I think 
that the only acceptable practical consequence of what Sartre has said is to link 
his theoretical insight to the practice of creativity - and not of authenticity. From 
the idea that the self is not given to us, I think that there is only one practical 
consequence: we have to create ourselves as a work of art" (I984a: 351). While 
Foucault's statement can be interpreted as invoking a romantic and modernist 
conception of art, it can also be understood as extending an alternative cultural 
metaphor or paradigm in which the truth-generating agency of authenticity and 
rational subjectivity are displaced by the meaning-generating agency of the 
creative subject. 
3 The Social Subject
.---­
Althoug'h the discursive subject has not, to date, been formulated specifically in 
terms of spectatorship, it has had significant impact on cultural studies and the 
latter's concern with the social subject and identity formation. 
Cultural studies marks a theoretical return to the "everyday experiences" 
or lived specificities of the material, historical subject. This realignment 
occurs in the face of the seeming "death of the subject" - because an entirely 
cultural construct - predicted by (or, some would argue, predicated on) post­
structuralism. 
Cultural studies' interest in the social subject is not, however, a replication of 
the humanist subject who creates "himself' and controls the surrounding world. 
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Acknowledg'ing that individual subjects are multiply and complexly constructed, 
cultural studies is an attempt to integrate the discursive subject of post-structur­
alism as, on the one hand, the effect of representational and other signifying 
practices, and, on the other hand, an agent of socio-cultural constructs and 
institutions. While a Foucaultian might argue that the distinction between the 
signifying and the social is illusory in that all is signifying practice, cultural 
studies maintains the distinction in order to preserve a recognition of people's 
material existences, which can be made better or worse through political activity. 
"The problem for cultural studies has been to incorporate the significance of 
sliding signifiers and disappearing signifieds without asserting that meaning no 
longer exists, without giving up a politics, without lapsing into a radical moral 
relativism, without abandoning the interventionist commitment which has 
motivated the research of cultural theorists" (Slack and Whitt 1992: 583). 
The concern to maintain a position for political intervention is consonant with 
the Marxist origins of cultural studies, as well as the considerable impact femin­
ism, race and ethnicity studies, gay and lesbian studies, and other identity 
formations have had upon it, in addition to class. Howcver, thc formulation of 
an identity politics, or a politics of difference, seemingly necessitates the exist­
ence of a social subject with some range of conscious agency in order to enact or 
affect a political agenda. 
More specifically, cultural studies works to apply varying notions of the post­
structuralist subject to forms of representation in popular culture. It does so 
while seeking to avoid the totalizing overdctermination of psychoanalytic theory 
and Althusserian-based concepts of ideology, in which the subject is determined 
by dominant ideology as it is embedded in the text, that is, the text instructs the 
viewer how to understand it and so positions the spectator in subjectivity. 
Cultural studies is also a reaction against earlier paradigms of audience research 
that tended to focus on quantitative data such as audience demographics (what 
has been skeptically referred to as the "bums in the seats" approach), and that 
presumed a passive viewership, which surrendered itself to the overpowering 
effects of the media. 
Instead, cultural studies argues that the spectator is the result of various 
discourses put in play by the text, but also the subject of social, economic, and 
political practices beyond the text, which are brought to bear at the moment of 
screen/viewer interaction. While the potentially innumerable configurations of 
such a balance have yet to be sufficiently mapped out, David Morley explains the 
intentions shaping this notion of the audience member / social subject: 
The Althusserian drift of much early cultural studies work ... would reduce [the 
individual subject] to the status of a mere personification of a given structure, 
"spoken" by the discourses which cross the space of his subjectivity. However, it is 
not simply Althusser who is at issue here; much of the psychoanalytic work on the 
theory of ideolog'y generates an equally passive notion of subjectivity, in which the 
subject is precisely "spoken" by the discourses which constitute that person. I 
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want to try to formulate a position from which we can see the person actively 
producing meanings from the restricted range of cultural resources which his or 
her structural position has allowed them access to. (quoted in Turner 1992: 193-4) 
In contrast to approaches in which spectators are "spoken" by the text, cultural 
studies theorists began to ask: What is actually occurring for viewers? How arc 
social subjects using texts specifically, and to what ends? These concerns led to 
the ethnographic methodology associated with cultural studies, and to investiga­
tions of specific subordinate communities or sub-cultures, as exemplified in the 
work ofDavid Morley, Janice Radway, len Ang, Dick Hebdidge, Angela McRob­
bie, and others. 
Their work posited a much more active viewer than had been theorized 
previously in either textual/ideological studies or earlier audience research, a 
viewer capable of resisting dominant cncodings and forging oppositional read­
ings, readers who actively and continuously participate in the formation of their 
own identities. Analyzing the results of her study of elderly viewers of the British 
soap Crossroads, Dorothy Hobson comments: 
Communication is by no means a one-way process and the contribution which the 
audience makes to Crossroads is as important as the messages which the program­
makers put into the program. In this sense, what the Crossroads audience has 
revealed is that there can be as many interpretations of the program as the 
individual viewers bring to it. There is no overall intrinsic message or meaning 
in the work, but it comes alive and communicates when the viewers add their own 
interpretations of a program. (quoted in Turner 1992: 133) 
The emergent spectator of cultural studies, then, contributes two significant 
variations to the notion of spectatorship. First, the text is produced only at the 
moment of interaction with the audience member, bringing the spectator!reader! 
viewer to the forefront of the mediated event (which in cultural studies, to date, 
has been far more extensively television analysis, not film). It becomes impossible 
to speak of the meanings of a text separately from its viewing subject, the two 
becoming indissoluble. Second, the viewing subject is composed of the interaction 
between the effects of discourses invoked by thc text! representation and the 
effects of social and material discourses beyond. Spectatorship is formulated as 
the convergence of textual subjects and social subjects. "[T]he focus of critical 
attention in cultural studies switched from ideology and its effects toward audi­
ences or readerships, since it is at this point that meanings generated in and by 
media discourses actually go live socially, where textual and social power intersect, 
and where the distinction between them is meaningless" (Hartley 1996: 225). 
Further, the spectator is no longer positioned in subjectivity by the text, but, 
under the concept of hegemony, can offer resistance to the ideologies of the text. 
Indeed, cultural studies understands popular culture as the terrain where cultural 
power, relationships, and systems of meaning are negotiated and established ­
and, consequently, can be resisted and!or reestablished otherwise. 
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John Fiske describes one of the projects for cultural studies theorists as the 
discovery of: 
how actual audience groups actively use television as part of their own cultures -­
that is, use it to make meanings that are useful to them in making sense of their own 
social experiences and therefore of themselves.... Exploring the strategies by 
which subordinate subcultures make their own meanings in resistance to the 
dominant is currently one of the most productive strands of cultural studies. 
(1992: 300, 304) 
While this avenue of inquiry has indeed been productive, resulting in the 
identification and analysis of numerous specific communities of social and view­
ing subjects in terms of their uses of representational forms, it has also been 
critiqued for displaying a Utopian or ideal notion of resistance. That is, any sub­
cultural manifestation of distinct identity can be received as a potential form of 
resistance beyond the parameters of dominant ideologies. No means have yet 
been established to determine which sub-cultural configurations of identity 
might prove beneficial or detrimental to that community vis-a-vis the resistance 
to or imposition of dominant discursive practices and institutions. What remains 
for cultural studies is to forge a position that avoids what David Morley has 
referred to as "the improper romanticism of consumer freedoms" while continu­
ing to avert an earlier "paranoid fear of global control" (quoted in Ang 1996: 260). 
Another problematic facing the ongoing endeavor of cultural studies is to 
develop what Janice Radway describes as "a rich and complex understanding of 
the different, multiple, everchanging configurations of subjectivity dialectically 
produced throug'h the negotiation between historically produced individuals and 
material, social and discursive contexts" (1996: 238). Using her own work with 
women readers of romance novels as an example, Radway continues: "To con­
struct her, then, as a 'romance reader' may be to isolate only one small portion of 
her life and to mistake that part for the whole.... The womanhood or femininity 
constructed through romance reading may well be at odds with the femininity 
constructed in the process of doing aerobics, watching Roseanne, or playing soft­
ball" (244-5). Audience (or any subject) analysis, then, is an attempt to contain 
what is the constant stream of subjectivity in order to study it, isolating one or a 
few of its aspects, applicable only for a given moment and specific location. 
This complex stream of interwoven and changing subjectivities is what len 
Ang refers to as "radical contextualism," which she welcomes as an opportunity 
to better understand the "chaotic" empirical landscape of audience experiences 
(1996: 257). Ang argues that the way to approach such a chaotic landscape of 
subjectivity is to work "within the framework of a particular cultural politics," 
which then allows the researcher to "meaningfully decide which contexts we 
wish to foreground as particularly relevant, and which other ones could, for the 
moment, within this particular political conjuncture, be left unexplored" (258). 
While Ang's approach addresses the difficulty of imagining "where to begin and 
where to end the analysis" (253), it raises the question of an a priori politics, and 
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therefore of an a priori social subject. Radway's suggestion is that cultural studies 
embrace the daunting task and "take the fluid process of articulation as its topic, 
that is, the process whereby the historical human subject is constructed through 
the linkage, clash and confluence of many different discourses, practices, and 
activities" (1996: 245). 
In addition to mapping the complex processes of subjectivity, cultural studies 
has yet to delineate the mechanisms between text and society. As John Hartley 
points out: 
If the media exert power and influence over their audiences - that is, socially - how 
is it done textually? And if media texts exert power, what is the place of meaning in 
the analysis of power? ... In spite of Foucaultian, postmodernist, feminist and 
other interventions, or perhaps because of them, it seems as hard as ever to explain 
the link between textual and social power. (1996: 221,224) 
Additionally, cultural studies' emphasis on sub-cultural groups raises ques­
tions about the relationship of the individual to identifying communities, and the 
relationship of both, respectively, to dominant discourses. In what ways and to 
what degree is the individual merely a representative of the group(s) or the 
configuration of a "unique" individual in its accumulation of a multiple but 
specific series of subject positions? 
Angela McRobbie suggests that: "What really is at stake is the nature and form 
of the relationships which bind these differences together and from which they 
accrue their meaning. It is in relation to each other that identity is formed. If 
meaning is relational, so too is identity" (1992: 726). If identity is the relational 
process of the confluence of differences within the individual, between the 
individual and specific communities of identity formation, and between identify­
ing communities, how might this multitude of simultaneous registers of subject 
positions enact or allow slippage, selection, agency, and intervention? 
Spectatorship has been theorized, variously and to date, as the construction of the 
viewing subject through psychic processes, discursive formations, and social and 
historical relations. It seems most productive to consider the spectator as the 
effect of such processes, formations, and relations as they operate concurrently, 
rather than thinking of each dynamic as singular or exclusive of the others. Less 
clear, then, are the complex and simultaneous interconnections between these 
dynamics, which may render the spectator as anything along a barometer of 
viewership from passive imbiber of pre-packaged ideology to active and success­
ful resistent of these same oppressive psychic, discursive, and socio-historical 
forces. Each theorization -- psychoanalytic, discursive, social - has contributed to 
the concept of spectatorship, while not managing to address all the problematics 
summoned up by the other, differing approaches. 
While the social subject of cultural studies regains a political position in that 
the act of viewing and the meanings created are sites of struggle and contestation, 
the theory doesn't yet sufficiently explain the operations by which the viewing 
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subject attains a position of (some) power as the participant in the process of his 
or her own subject formation, able to resist, in however limited a manner, the 
dominance of social and cultural discourses. Similarly, although discursive 
theory offers a more complex way of understanding subjectivity than psycho­
analytic theory, rendering the subject fluid rather than fixed, it has the same 
difficulties as cultural studies in elaborating the mechanisms by which such 
subjectivities might occur. 
Limited and erroneous in its universalizing, unverifiable claims for the uncon­
scious and its lack of participatory (hence political) position in the process of 
"becoming" a subject, psychoanalytic theory did, however, attempt to account 
for reasons why the viewer is "captured" by the text. Addressing the questions of 
what mechanisms operate to "fix" the viewer into an oppressive position in 
seeming opposition to her or his self...interests, and why, once the spectator 
realizes these are the operative mechanisms, she or he can't break free of that 
captivation, psychoanalytic theory's responses were the concepts of pleasure and 
desire, operating alongside social and ideological coercion. 
Cultural studies developed, in part, out of resistance to the notion of the 
spectator/subject as "psychic dupe," determined entirely by the robotic effects 
of his or her own unconscious processes - similar to the criticized concept of the 
public as cultural dupes, simplemindedly affected by the dominant ideologies 
embedded in the popular. Yet, neither the social subject nor the discursive 
subject adequately explains the determinants, the "why" of specific subject or 
spectatorial articulations, remaining open projects for both cultural studies and 
post-structuralism. 
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Laura Mulvey Meets Catherine
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Incongruity in Lesbian, Gay, and
 
Queer Film and Media Criticism
 
Julia Erhart 
What are the specific contributions lesbian, gay, and queer theorists have made to 
the fields of film and media studies? That the answer to this question is the 
subject of a chapter in this film theory companion is a testament to the positive 
growth of an area that, until recently, was characterized largely by censorship and 
absence. In the early 1990s the factor that united lesbian, gay, and queer media 
researchers was the dearth of representation - on-screen, in production, in print, 
and in the classroom. Initially an effect of more than 25 years of institutional 
censorship that forbade even the vaguest references to "sex perversion" (let alone 
depictions of it), pre-I960s, US-produced representations of homosexuality 
fared much the same as homosexuality itself before the gay liberation movements 
- as a closeted and little seen thing. In contrast, the queer pulse of film and media 
studies today is strong and vibrant. It is audible on conference panels, editorial 
boards, and the pages of academic journals: Screen, Wide Angle, and Media 
International Australia have all featured one or more special issues on the topic, 
and Camera Obscura, Cineaste, Jump Cut, and Continuum regularly showcase 
lesbian, gay, and queer research. Lesbian, gay, and queer work is recognized by 
academic publishers, which, during the years 1993-97, produced no fewer than 
nine English-language film or popular culture anthologies with the word "les­
bian," "gay," or "queer" in the title. l And, mentioning only scholarly books and 
journals is to overlook more popular publishing venues where significant queer 
film work has also appeared. 2 
The question I hope to answer is how this increased presence has impacted on 
the theories and methods in film and media studies per se. It is my aim in this 
chapter to show how lesbians, gays, and queers have challenged, altered, inter­
vened in, as well as benefited from film and media studies discussions. By no 
means are scholars in agreement on how to pose such challenges, making for a 
compelling diversity in queer media studies in terms of method, aim, and object. 
Divisions exist as to where to do work, in the New York City Public Library, in 
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the Gay Museums of Berlin or Amsterdam, in the UCLA Film Archives, or in 
the local cineplex. Splits occur over the matter of method, with some wishing to 
identify a gay cinematic language in the tradition of ecriture feminine; some 
wanting to focus exclusively on self-declared and typically avant-garde or inde­
pendent "lesbian" or "gay" films by lesbian, gay, or queer authors; others 
wishing to work concertedly on popular culture, reading hegemonic texts against 
the grain, looking for the queer within the straight. Lesbian, gay, and queer work 
further divides over who or what is the proper subject of research - queers? 
straights? texts? culture? whose texts? whose culture? 
This chapter is a thematic account of the recent major strands of lesbian, gay, 
and queer film and media studies work. Touchstones like Parker Tyler's Screen­
ing the Sexes (published in 1972), the first edited scholarly volume entitled Gays 
and Film (Dyer 1977), Vito Russo's The Celluloid Closet (1981), and the Jump Cut 
Special Section on "Lesbians and Film" (Becker et al. 1981) tell us that there is 
indeed a history to contemporary lesbian, gay, and queer film and media 
research. While I will not be discussing those works in any detail, I will attempt 
to provide, whenever possible, a genealogy of methodological antecedents to 
contemporary trends in hopes of explaining the shape of research at present. 
This chapter does not portray a seamless development of the field but emphasizes 
rather the divergent approaches lesbian, gay, and queer scholars are currently 
choosing. It is divided into three sections, which comprise key threads in con­
temporary lesbian, gay, and queer research. These are: historiography; text­
oriented, psychoanalytic approaches; and queer theory. Now, admittedly, this 
division suggests a discreteness that is organizationally beneficial but in reality 
artificial. For example, several of the historiographies I consider in section I 
employ psychoanalytic modes of analysis, which is the subject of section 2; some 
of the theorists I examine in the third "queer theory" section have been influ­
enced by feminist film theory, which is also discussed in section 2. And some of 
the authors mentioned in sections I and 2 identify as "queer theorists," a term 
that I reserve for work I discuss in the section 3. My intention in creating the 
three groupings is to suggest neither an absolute difference between work of 
different sections nor a fundamental sameness between research within sections, 
but to convey that lesbian, gay, and queer scholars form at least virtual commun­
ities, which in turn produce and sustain different clusters of research. 
1 Queer Stories, Counter-Histories: Reviewing the Past 
How have lesbian and gay representations changed from one era to the next, and 
what can these changes tell us about historical homosexualities? What do films 
from periods prior to our own say about homosexual life during those times? 
How would a queer perspective add to or interrupt histories of media censorship, 
film genres, or national media? What specific concerns must we bring to bear to 
theorize historical images of lesbianism or gayness? These are the questions that 
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both inspire and unravel from lesbian, gay, and queer historiographic film and 
media work, whose most elementary function, in the US at least, is to inform 
present-day viewers of the presencc of gays in cinema before the demise of the 
Censorship Code.3 Lesbian, gay, and queer film and media historiography also 
counters the misapprehension, common in gay studies, that the material of gay 
history is not visual, adding an important component to a field that has demon­
strated a passion for gay history but not, as Tom Waugh notes, in its visual 
dimensions (1996: 5). Finally, lesbian, gay, and queer film and media historio­
graphy makes a significant methodological contribution: given the multi-leveled 
operations of censorship that functioned for decades to circumscribe homosexual 
representation, queer film and media historians know how to circumvent seeming 
dead-ends and to give shape to subjects from frequently scant or unconvincing 
information. 
A recurring challenge to lesbian, gay, and queer film and media historiography 
is that of presentism, or what I would call the anachronistic fallacy. It is well 
known that homosexual identities and the terms that designate them are protean, 
subject to change from one period to the next. The referent of "homosexual" in 
the 1990s is entirely different from its inter-war one; yet should this preclude our 
analogizing between the social positionings of a female-to-male cross-dresser in 
1914 and a contemporary dyke, as R. Bruce Brasell has done? The most convin­
cing lesbian, gay, and queer historiographic film and media work has been 
sensitive to both sides of the matter, refraining from imposing current-day 
language on archival images while permitting productive comparisons between 
representations from different decades. The most effective historiographies, one 
of which continues to be Ruby Rich's 1981 study of the lesbian classic Maedchen 
in Un~timn (Leontine Sagan, 1931), scan films not for images of queerness (an 
entirely recent invention) but for how they represent historical attitudes to 
gender and sexuality, including spinsterhood, independent women, bachelor­
hood, and so forth. Aware of the fact that homosexual identities are not the same 
as contemporary lesbian and gay ones, historiographies like Rich's put their 
readers in the place of the historical viewer, contextualizing images in terms of 
such a viewer's potential perceptions. 
The scarcity of popular pre-1960s representations is a problem facing nearly 
all lesbian, gay, and queer film and media historiographers. What images do exist 
are recognized as being predominantly straight-authored and as having little to 
do with historical gayness due to the operations of the notoriously strenuous 
Code. This is expressly the problem Chon Noriega grapples with in his 1990 
survey of changing attitudes toward homosexuality during the Code years. 
Knowing that depictions within films, from These Three (1936) through Advise 
and Consent (1962), yield little reliable information about gayness, Noriega shifts 
the focus to the paratextual material of the films' reviews in search of what had 
not been permitted to be represented on-screen. For Noriega, the question is not 
"whether certain films have - in retrospect - gay and lesbian characters, subtexts, 
stars, or directors as an anodyne to censorship, but how homosexuality was 'put 
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into discourse,' and the role censorship played during the Code era" (1990: 21). 
Showing how to look beyond or around distorted screen representations, the 
essay provides a counter-discursive response to the deformations caused by the 
Code. 
Noriega's essay continues to be one of the most successful examples of the use 
of paratextual elements to delineate historically specific practices of film con­
sumption. Taking account of marketing and publicity strategies, Rhona Beren­
stein's Attack ofthe Leading Ladies (1996) also makes use of paratextual data and 
is a good example of a topic that remains important in contemporary lesbian, gay, 
and queer historiographic research, which is genre analysis. Attcuk ofthe Leading 
Ladies is one of two relatively recent academic press publications on the horror 
genre, which has long attracted lesbian, gay, and queer film and media interest 
(Zimmerman 1981; Weiss 1993). Published within a year of each other, Beren­
stein's book and Harry Benshoffs Monsters in the Closet (1997) could not be more 
different in method and focus; for these reasons they are useful illustrations of 
some of the choices facing lesbian, gay, and queer researchers in this area. Not 
focussed on "queerness" per se, Berenstein's book takes as its subject matter a 
specific series of films (Hollywood horror movies made between 1931 and 1936) 
to consider how they demonstrate the precarious nature of normative white 
reproductive sexuality under threat from homosexual men, lesbians, people of 
color, and women. Benshoffs book, in contrast, surveys images ofmonstrousness 
in English-language horror films from the classical Hollywood era to the present, 
primarily insofar as they serve as a vehicle for homosexuality. Whereas Beren­
stein's book is a synchronic study of a discrete set of films in terms of the cultural 
anxieties they represent, Benshoffs presents a transhistoric view of the concur­
rent development of two cultural tropes, "monster" and "queer." 
The discrepancy in Berenstein's and Benshoffs research in method and object 
of labor is typical of most lesbian, gay, and queer genre work. Many researchers 
strive to delineate the queer significance of media previously considered primar­
ily interesting to straight viewers, as Benshoff docs, fi'equently by drawing 
attention to the prevalence of stock lesbian or gay characters within a genre 
and/or the artificiality of heterosexual coupling; others name homosexuality as 
but one of several contexts helpful to understanding a genre, as Juan A. Suarez's 
(1996) book on the American avant-garde docs. Some research celebrates the 
sheer fact of bringing previously unseen work to print, as Tom Waugh's elegant 
historical study of pornography succeeds in doing. Almost all lesbian, gay, and 
queer genre analyses seek to recognize a gay presence within texts, forms, and 
genres that previously had gone unrecognized.4 
Highlighting the gay-relevance of subjects previously considered to be straight 
is also the aim of work that is organized around a single director or artist. Some of 
this, like Mark Gatiss's 1995 book on James Whale, is more or less straightfor­
wardly biographical in scope; in contrast, a 1996 anthology on Warhol (Doyle et 
al.) seeks a broader discussion of the audiences and contexts that produce the 
artist. Still other research, like the dossier on Hitchcock included in the Out in 
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Culture anthology (Creekmur and Doty 1995), attempts to explore how a single 
director's films can challenge normative ideas about sexuality in spite of the fact 
that the director did not identify as gay. Most of these studies foreground, or at 
least problematize, the individual's (homo)sexuality as an important authorial 
component which deserves to be reclaimed by contemporary queers. This is true 
even of the work on Hitchcock, whose membership in this category may strike 
some as precarious, but which editor Doty defends on the basis that" 'being' 
queer (homosexual, gay, bisexual, or lesbian) [may be] a case not only of naming 
yourself but of being named by your pleasures, desires, and even your anxieties" 
(183). Writing with a comparable intention, the editors of the Warhol anthology 
state that their aim is to counter the "degaying" that occurs in high-art assess­
ments of Warhol's work. Demanding recognition of Warhol's sexuality, they go 
on to say: "to ignore Warhol's queerness is to miss what is most valuable, 
interesting, sexy, and political about his work" (Doyle et al. 1996: 2). 
As the Warhol editors do, most biographical writing touches upon experiences 
of marginalization and self-censorship; it thus has the potential to expose the 
social circumstances of a particular period, as Judith Mayne's (1994) book on 
Arzner does. Not a traditional biography, Mayne's book is an examination that 
names the director's sexuality as the key but not the sole salient epistemological 
frame through which to consider her films. Less interested in plotting every 
aspect of the director's life than in delineating a broad context for her work, 
Mayne both works within and against conventional auteur studies. Interestingly, 
one of the by-products of Mayne's biographical work has been a resuscitation of 
the organizational trope of the author. Due in part to Mayne's and, notably, 
Richard Dyer's interest, the topic has enjoyed something of a revival. Both 
Mayne and Dyer have named the author's death premature arguing that a 
director's sexuality, along with his or her gender, race, and class background, 
are indeed salient factors (Mayne 1991; Dyer 1991). For lesbians and gay men, 
the sexed, raced, classed, and gendered body of the director is not an outmoded 
modernist critical concept, but an idea that should never have been abandoned to 
begin with. Proof of this are the number of author-oriented studies that have 
appeared in the past few years of potential interest to lesbian, gay, and queer 
students, which inelude the aforementioned Warhol anthology and dossier on 
Hitchcock as well as a book on Laurel and Hardy (Sanders 1995).5 
In sum, interest in lesbian, gay, and queer film and media historiography is 
strong, as is positive concern for the historical presence of lesbians, gays, and 
queers on-screen during prior decades (which is related but not precisely equiva­
lent to the former). This latter interest is particularly visible in the domain of 
nonacademic publishing, where an outpouring of multi-national guides and 
reference works, whose focus is contemporary as well as historical images of 
gayness, indicates a burgeoning, extra-academic epistemophilia for this aspect of 
the gay past. To date, I count at least eight English-language anthologies that 
catalogue in one way or another past representations of gayness in film, on 
television, and on the radio, in the US, the UK, and Australia. 6 The popularizing 
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of this strand of queer film history is in many ways very exciting, suggesting a 
concern for queer-film matters outside the realm of the university. 
Before concluding this section on "queer-storiography," there is a cautionary 
note to add. In her bibliographic essay on queer theory and cinema, Fabienne 
Worth (1993) notes the tendency for lesbian and gay cinema research to split up 
according to sex, with gay men conducting historiographic archival work and 
lesbians carrying out text-based, psychological analyses of, more often than not, 
contemporary films. While there is certainly sufficient gay male interest in non­
historiographic textual analysis, and though the above discussion testifies to the 
presence of some lesbian historiographic work, overall I agree with Worth that 
there is a paucity oflesbian historiography, which isn't the case for feminist film 
historiography more generally. Antonia Lant's 1991 research on women in 
wartime Britain and Shelley Stamp Lindsey's 1996 analysis of US women view­
ers in the 1910s are but two testaments to the vigor and vitality of feminist 
historiography, as is Lea Jacobs's 1991 study of the negotiations between direc­
tors and censors over the "sensitive" subjects of adultery and prostitution. 
However, what I find curious is that none of these admirable historical projects 
has been a "lesbian" project per se.7 My point here is not why lesbians have been 
"excluded" from the above-mentioned analyses; rather, it is why they have not 
conducted more of their own. The early andmid-1980s witnessed the publication 
of two ethnographies (Whitaker 1981; Ellsworth 1986), but since the last was 
published, nothing more has emerged in this area. While one could well imagine 
a range of compelling lesbian historiography, including more ethnographic work 
as well as archival projects that would scrutinize censorship files for conversa­
tions about "sex perversion," such studies have not been quick to materialize. 
2 Laura Mulvey Meets Catherine Tramell: Paradigm Shifts 
In contrast to the relative paucity of lesbian historiography, there has been an 
abundance of lesbian as well as g'ay research in the area of contemporary 
spectatorship. In overall method and aim, lesbian and gay spectatorship work 
takes as its point of departure heterosexual feminist film theory of the 1970s and 
early 1980s. Initially, this theory aimed to qualify from a feminist point of view 
many of the concepts delineated by the "apparatus theorists," as Jean-Louis 
Baudry, Stephen Heath, and Christian Metz were called. Research by, among 
others, Pam Cook, Claire Johnston, and in particular an early essay by Laura 
Mulvey established several basic premises: first, that there exists a relationship 
between power, objectification, and looking that neatly divides up along sexual 
lines, with men being the agent of the look and women the object viewed; second, 
that the mechanisms of cinema foster such relationships; third, that psycho­
analysis helps delineate and indeed undo such mechanisms; and fourth, that the 
mode of analysis needed to bring about chang'e must engage at the level of the 
signifier, i.e. the text. 
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Whereas Mulvey had limited herself to the concerns of male viewers, others, 
such as Nlary Ann Doane and Tania Modleski, worked to outline the vicissitudes 
of viewing for the female spectator. Given shape by the language of psycho­
analysis, this spectator was not a product of empirical or ethnographic research 
but an idealized subject divorced from cultural or historical context, whose class, 
racial, national, and sexual orientation generally went unnamed - at least in the 
ten years immediately following "Visual Pleasure." Simply, this first phase of 
post-Mulvey theory could not envision exceptions to structures of looking which 
positioned men as agents and women as objects, let alone a gay or lesbian 
spectator. Though not articulated from an explicitly gay or lesbian point of 
view, two essays carved out a space for such spectators, Dyer's 1982 essay on 
the male pin-up (see Dyer 1992), and de Lauretis's 1984 chapter, in /Llice Doesn't, 
entitled "Desire and Narrative." Without challenging Mulvey's findings, both 
Dyer and de Lauretis extended their analyses to areas not covered by Mulvey. 
Dyer examined the consequences of objectifying men (rather than women), 
detailing the configuration of the look in the case of the male "pin-up." De 
Lauretis, in turn, added to Mulvey's observation of the sexedness of narrative, 
the idea that narrative was heterosexed, detailing how narrative nearly always 
involves the movement of a male hero through female-gendered space. Though 
homosexuality was not a matter of concern at this point to either critic, both 
essays made room for speculations about the difference lesbianism or gayness 
might make to Mulvey's paradigm, signaling that spectating need not conform to 
a sexist or heterosexist paradigm. 
Following these initial formulations, lesbian and gay theorists began to qualify 
how feminist film theory's notions of looking, desire, and identification would 
manifest themselves in lesbian or gay contexts. While earlier feminist elabora­
tions of such processes were useful to lesbians and gays, many took feminist film 
theory to task for failing to question the sexuality of the viewer and for theorizing 
a system of viewership that, without exception, associated men with vision, 
desire, and agency, and women with passivity and desiredness. The list of 
grievances was long and sustained; critics noted that what had been termed a 
sexual division of labor was in fact a heterosexuill division of labor and sub­
sequently castigated feminist film theory for not recognizing that desire and 
identification need not be patterned after the model of heterosexuality (Becker et 
al., 1981; Stacey 1987; Straayer 1996; de Lauretis 1991; Mayne 1991; Roof 1991; 
White 1991). 
In spite of these negative appraisals, gays' and lesbians' debt to feminist film 
theory is certain. Nowhere is it more clear than in work that invokes feminist 
psychoanalytic theory directly. Lizzie Thynne's (1995) essay on the Canadian 
Anne Trister (Lea Pool, 1986) and Patricia White's (1995) reading of the British 
film Nocturne aoy Chamberlain, 1991) both rehearse heterosexual feminist read­
ings of the mother-daughter relation for their understanding of lesbian specta­
torship, as other work does (Holmlund 1989). However, an important forerunner 
to those articles, Teresa de Lauretis's 1991 essay "Film and the Visible," on She 
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Ailust Be Seeing Things, circumvents feminist versions of psychoanalysis alto­
gether to return to an earlier pre-feminist model. Significantly invested in 
Laplanche and Pontalis's notion of primal fantasy as a setting of desire, de 
Lauretis is concerned with Sheila McLaughlin's 1987 film because of how it 
articulates such a scene -- and especially because it does so with female characters. 
Delineating how the film is addressed to a lesbian subject, in terms that 
Laplanche and Pontalis outline, the essay shows how concepts such as "primal 
fantasy" are relevant for lesbians, as well as the significance, for psychoanalysis, 
of a lesbian film such as McLaughlin's. 
De Lauretis's essay is one of several which functioned to update the psycho­
analytic vocabulary from a lesbian, gay, or queer perspective. Work also emerged 
claiming the importance for lesbians, gays, and queers of classical scenarios or 
mechanisms such as fetishism (Knapp 1993), the primal scene (Miller 1991), 
castration (ibid.), paranoia (White 1991; Barton 1995), and identification (Stacey 
1987; Vermeule 1991; de Lauretis 1991), as well as the psychoanalytic dimension 
of cultural processes like homophobia and lesbophobia. Mulvey's description of 
the nonequivalence of cinematic identification and desire - the resolute differ­
ence between the character that the viewer identifies with and the one she or he 
desires - has been a matter of particularly heated debate. While de Lauretis has 
insisted on the theoretical validity of Mulvey's distinction, Jackie Stacey has 
argued that representations that show the two mechanisms to be co-present, in 
films like All About Eve, provide models lesbians would do well to embrace. 
Stacey's point has been taken up to some extent by Blakey Vermeule (1991), 
which has in turn generated further commentary from de Lauretis (1994). 
At the very least, the critical activity that I am detailing indicates the dramatic 
amplification of the psychoanalytic vocabulary with the materialization of lesbian 
and gay work. Simply, lesbian and gay research brought new life to the field at the 
very moment when some heterosexual feminists were beginning to express 
frustrations about the limitations offeminist film theory, as I have said elsewhere 
(Erhart 1997).8 
Further shifts followed the amplification of the psychoanalytic vocabulary. 
Whereas the focus of Mulvey's address had been the central male protagonist, 
lesbian and gay theorists scanned the entire frame, looking well beyond the 
activities of the leading heterosexual couple to consider relationships between a 
range of minor characters. Renee Hoogland's (1997) essay on Basic Instinct is one 
of several that demonstrate this. Hoogland's thesis is that the lesbian is a 
paradoxical figure made invisible by culture yet simultaneously endowed with 
privileged powers of sight. To substantiate this, she examines the film's treat­
ment of the infamous, ice-pick-wielding Catherine Tramell and her lesbian lover, 
Roxy, in light of cultural narratives oflesbianism, specifically looking at the scene 
in which Catherine and the male hero are in bed as Roxy watches from a distance. 
From this scene, Hoogland deduces that the banishment of Roxy to the margins 
of the frame recycles an earlier narrative of sexual subject constitution - that of 
the little boy looking on during the primal scene, with the result of reducing the 
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lesbian to what she calls an "aspiring male" (35). Hoogland's analysis is import­
ant because it considers the positions and points of view of all the characters, 
apart from those of the male lead, to determine how the film recycles dominant 
myths of sexual subject constitution. Like other work I have discussed, the essay 
significantly corrects, updates, and expands feminist film theory, the psycho­
analytic models it employs, and the textual material it considers, augmenting 
both the theoretical paradigms and our knowledge of lesbian subjectivity. 
While lesbian and gay spectatorship work has undoubtedly gone beyond 
feminist film theory, it has preserved an essential component, which is the belief 
in the primacy of sexual difference in the constitution of human subjects. For 
each of the theorists I have discussed, gender has remained just as key as it did for 
Mulvey, even as new factors were added. In contrast, a considerable number of 
lesbian, gay, and queer film and media researchers have bypassed the debates 
with feminist film theory and have articulated modes of sexuality beyond and 
apart from debates about sexual difference. Three key things must be said about 
such research. First, it sees sexual difference as, to quote Chris Straayer, a 
"forced system [which] produces false conclusions" (1996: 7); second, it is 
critical of feminist film theory's understanding of the visual text as the sole 
determinant of the viewing experience; and third, it identifies with the word 
"queer" in terms of its practice and subject of research. 
3 Everyone Has Ttleir "Queer Moments":9 Reception and ttle Bisexed 
Bod~ 
Appropriated in the late 1980s by the North American activist group Queer 
Nation and the special "Queer Theory" issue of d~Uerences more or less simulta­
neously, the term "queer" was fast adopted by activists and academics through­
out the anglophone First World as both more "in your face" and more inclusive 
than earlier terms had been. To begin with, "queer" was intended as a product­
ively disruptive alternative to what was seen as the assimilationist and conservat­
ive aims of post-liberation movement majority gay culture. If liberal gay rights 
advocates located homosexuality within the separate-but-equal discourse of 
difference, "queer" was impatiently oppositional in its stance, celebrating and 
drawing attention to rather than minimizing its difference from the hegemonic 
(hetero)sexual norm. Second, "queer" emerged as a more inclusive alternative to 
terms such as "lesbian" and particularly "gay," which tended to refer to specific 
sub-sets of the gay communities while excluding others. Third, "queer" was seen 
as a more economical alternative to cumbersome taxonomical listings like "les­
bian, gay, bisexual, transgender ..." which themselves had evolved when the 
universality of "gay" was called into question. In its very lack of specificity, 
"queer" promoted itself as a term "beyond labels," as a term that included 
lesbians, queers of color, bisexuals, cross-dressers, transg'endered people, and 
sexual others of all stripes, in addition to gay white men. Whereas lesbian or gay 
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politics could be attacked on account of their unrepresentativeness, "queer" 
claimed to represent everyone. By avoiding prioritizing any single identity 
group, "queer" aimed to include all groups, mitigating the divisions that sepa­
rated communities. "Q!.Ieer" thus contained a strong Utopian element, to which 
this passage attests: 
queer ... includes people who might also self-identify as gay and/or lesbian, 
bisexual, transsexual, transvestite, drag queen, leather daddy, lipstick lesbian, 
pansy, fairy, dyke, butch, femme, feminist, asexual, and so on - any people not 
explicitly defining themselves in "traditional" heterosexual terms. (Benshoff 
1997: 5) 
Utopian, indeed. Almost immediately after the term appeared, objections were 
raised as to whether "queer" really could represent such strands of diversity or 
whether it was merely a spruced up and more contemporary version of the 
earlier, recognizedly problematic word, "gay." If "gay" had come to seem too 
male- and white-specific, what made the word "queer" any different?lO 
At the same time as criticisms began to be voiced, in specifically academic 
realms "queer" was welcomed as an alternative to the constraints of identity­
politics-driven appellations of the 1970s and '80s. What was deemed particularly 
useful about the term was the way it defied easy definition in terms of both the 
subject(s) to which it referred and the practices that it comprised. Throwing into 
question traditional or accepted understandings of sexuality but also, more 
broadly, gender, maleness, femaleness, love, sex, and desire, "queer" provoked 
a reevaluation of the object of the critical enterprise itself. This was particularly 
true in the area of film and media studies, where the notion stimulated discus­
sions about aesthetics, marginality, and the relationship between art and audi­
ence, in addition to conversations about the difference between "queer" and the 
terms "gay" and "lesbian" (Smyth 1994). Critics identifying with the word went 
so far as to ask: What is the object of criticism? What determines the relationship 
between viewers and texts? Are our disciplinary models adequate to describe it? 
What makes a film or a television show queer to begin with? 
In the area of film and media studies, a good deal of effort initially went into 
determining what the term "queer" referred to, as critics attempted to decide 
what exactly a queer image or narrative looked like. Typically "queer" was 
defined oppositionally, that is, as representation that possessed qualities of 
being non-, contra-, or anti-straight (Doty 1993; Benshoff 1997; Evans and 
Gamman 1995; Burston and Richardson 1995; Robertson 1996). "Queer" was 
representation that "makes heterosexuality strange" (Nataf 1995: 59). "Queer" 
continued to signify images that were deemed homosexual, but stood also for 
non-homosexual imagery that fell outside of hegemonic representation, such as 
representations of slm sexuality, intergenerational sex, or interspecies sex. 
Whereas the earlier categories "lesbian" and "g'ay" were suited to analyzing 
discrete lesbian and gay images from (respectively) lesbian and gay films like 
Desert Hearts and Boys in the Band, a queer approach helped analyze images that 
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appealed to both lesbians and gay men (not to mention bisexuals and transgen­
dered people). For example, images meriting a queer reading included Katherine 
Hepburn dressed as a young man in Sylvia Scarlett as well as the relationship 
between Russell, Monroe, and the male athletes in Gentlemen Prefer Blondes 
(Doty 1993). 
In addition to trying to figure queer content, queer researchers initially 
attempted to clarify where exactly queerness (as the status of being queer was 
designated) could be found. Three relatively uncontroversial areas emerged: first, 
queerness could appear in scripts by lesbian, gay, or queer authors; second, it 
could be conveyed to a scene via a lesbian, gay, or queer director; or third, it 
could be seen in performances of actors who were lesbian, gay, or queer (Benshoff 
1997: 13-16). Alexander Doty additionally proposed that queerness could arise 
from the viewing situation as a response of a certain audience to specific imagery. 
A product of contextual relationships, queerness could result from the reception 
position adopted by self-identified lesbian, gay, or queer audiences to queer as 
well as non-queer texts, or by straight-identified viewers to lesbian, gay, or queer 
images. In this formulation, queerness was not an essential attribute inhering 
within either the text or the viewer, but arose from their co-configuration. 
The consequence of Doty's definition of queerness was a radical reevaluation 
of the previously impermeable border between "gay" and "straight." If queer­
ness could emerge from particular practices and moments regardless of the 
identities or experiences of viewers, it could just as easily be apprehended ­
maybe even performed - by "heterosexuals" as by "homosexuals." Queerness 
could materialize regardless of the self-termed identity of a viewer or the socially 
recognized gayness of the object viewed. Queerness was no longer experienced 
solely by self-declared queers watching "out" texts, but was produced within and 
circulated by so-called "straig-ht" culture too. 
What should be noted about the intervention I have just described is its 
fundamental anti-essentialism; this is visible in Doty's reluctance to name, as 
immutable, homosexual and heterosexual identities_ The mutability of identity 
is key to contemporary queer film and media theory, a good part of which has 
rejected, as I have said, established categories of gayness, preferring to think of 
sexuality as a performance. Influenced by the writing ofEve Sedgwick and Judith 
Butler (themselves influenced by Joan Riviere, Monique Wittig, and J. L. Austin, 
among others) as well as by work going on in science studies, queer media 
theorists have noted the insufficiency ofbinarily opposed and mutually exclusive 
terms such as "man" and "woman." Chris Straayer, for example, has posited the 
arbitrariness of biology's two-sex system, suggesting that the notion of an 
"embraced incongruity" of maleness and femaleness may be more appropriate 
(1996: 88). 
According to Straayer, both popular-culture forms such as music video and 
modernist genres like video art already suggest the existence of such an incon­
gruity. Figures that manifest traits of both sexes not only destabilize the opposi­
tion between masculinity and femininity but are culturally empowered by this 
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fact, rather than castrated, as psychoanalysis would have it. In her writing on the 
"bisexed" figure that she calls the She-man, Straayer shows how signifiers of 
femaleness such as certain kinds ofclothing (in music video) magnify the power of 
a biologically male performer; she compares this to the way in which women's 
donning of male clothing sometimes results in masculine privilege (82). In both 
cases, the co-presence of seemingly mutually exclusive body parts and accoutre­
ments (male bodies decked out in women's clothing, female bodies adorned with 
mustaches or dildos) undermines normative understandings of two-sexedness and 
renders powerful the respective performers. Intersexuals, hermaphrodites, dildo­
wearing women, and others not fitting easily into either "male" or "female" 
categories are the beneficiaries in this new (but, Straayer says, already existing) 
system that privileges instability and contradictoriness over seamlessness. 
What should be said about Straayer's work on the She-man is how far it has 
traveled from the concerns outlined in my second section, on lesbian and gay 
revisions to psychoanalytic feminist film theory.l1 For Straayer, queerness has 
more to do with performance and the figuration of the body than with the matter 
of object choice, that is, with what I would call sexual presentation rather than 
sexual orientation. Second, the queerness (to continue with that term) of the 
material Straayer discusses lies less in a spectator's against-the-grain response 
than within the texts themselves. For these reasons, it is not surprising that the 
matter of the spectator is not especially high on Straayer's list of concerns. Does 
it make a difference whether the She-man is viewed by a lesbian, a straight 
woman, a queer man, or a straight man? That this question is in many ways 
beside the point is a welcome exception to a body of theory that is more at ease 
discussing Hollywood than self-produced lesbian, gay, and queer work. 
4 Conclusion 
The presence of lesbian, gay, and queer work in film and media studies has been 
steadily on the rise, at the same time as it is consistently under revision. To 
discuss this work solely in the context of film and media studies, however, is to 
skew the reality of its origins and influences. In addition to film and media 
studies, gay, gender, and women's studies have all aided the field's development, 
providing inspiration and reading material to researchers who were perhaps not 
finding them in film and media departments. Lesbian, gay, and queer film and 
media researchers, in turn, have injected new life into the areas of gay, lesbian, 
and women's studies, contributing significantly at international queer and 
women's studies conferences, to anthologies, to journals, and in interdisciplinary 
teaching situations. 
How queers fare in the world of production is a closely related matter. Though 
statistics on both behind-the-camera and on-screen participation in mainstream 
cinemas are lacking, the 1990s saw a flowering in lesbian and gay film and video 
festivals world-wide, 69 active ones being listed by Jackson and Tapp (1997). 
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While the majority of these happen in the US, indicating the bias that charac­
terizes production as well as research, festivals currently take place in locations as 
widespread as Riga, Budapest, Hong Kong, Reykjavik, Leningrad, Jerusalem, 
Cork, Cape Town, and Turku. How much of the work seen at such festivals 
makes it back to the classroom, on to public television, or through other means to 
audiences unable to reach the metropolis is not entirely clear; but the increase in 
queer film (which has been produced in practically all of Latin America in 
addition to Cuba, Egypt, Thailand, Singapore, India, and Kazakhstan, as well 
as in Europe and North America) leaves me hopeful. However, the midnight­
hour ban on the first Seoul Queer Film and Video Festival that occurred in 
September 1997, and on Wong Kar-Wai's gay-themed film Happy Together 
which occurred at the same time, reminds us that the internationalization of 
queer film and video is still partial. 
Nonetheless, the range and breadth of lesbian, gay, and queer work has been 
impressive, as I have tried to show. Lesbians, gays, and queers have brought a 
visual dimension to gay history, have archived images and figures from the past, 
have delineated the lesbian and gay relevance of methods such as psychoanalysis, 
and have redefined the borders between previously discrete subjects like "gay" 
and "straight," image and audience, and male and female. How lesbians, gays, 
and queers keep on negotiating the thorny terrain of popular culture - especially 
film, which is irresistible and everywhere, stunningly affirmative and furiously 
homophobic, engaging a legion of desires, anxieties, and fantasies, sometimes all 
at once - is a matter which none of us can afford to ignore. 
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the need for divergent interests and methodologies, the editorial is characterized by 
a receptiveness to other methods and perspectives that had not often been seen 
before this moment. 
9 This quote is from Burston and Richardson 1995 (6), paraphrasing Evans and 
Gamman. 
10 For a recent critique of the term's masculinism, see Smyth 1994; Graham 1995. For 
a critique of its whiteness, sec Dhairyam 1994. 
11	 While Straayer uses the terms "lesbian," "gay," and "queer" with equal ease, there 
are moments when she grants special privilege to the latter, as when she opposes 
"queer" lesbianism to "assimilationist" lesbianism (1996: 276). It is for this reason 
that I consider her a "queer theorist." 
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CHAPTER ELEVEN
 
Is There Class in this Text?: The
 
Repression of Class in Film and
 
Cultural Studies1
 
David James 
1 Academic Identity Politics 
During the last quarter-century, questions about social class have been pushed to 
the margins of the academic study of cinema and related cultural phenomena. 
Feminism and other forms of sexuality studies, and projects mobilized by and on 
behalf of people of color, have transformed the humanities; but in the remarkable 
extension of the limits of discourse that has resulted, the topic of class has become 
all but unspeakable, and so the possibility that socialism might shape a common 
struggle for women, blacks, and in fact oppressed groups ofall kinds now has less 
of a command on either the popular or the intellectual imagination than at any 
time in the twentieth century. The devasting global assault on the working class 
itself, which these academic trends both reflect and assist, merits. some initial
2 .
reference. 
The toppling of the Berlin Wall on November 9, 1989, and the rapid collapse 
of Soviet-sponsored governments in Eastern Europe were everywhere touted as 
marking, not simply the West's victory in the Cold War, but the final, world­
historical victory of capitalism tout court. Coming little more than a year after the 
events in Tienanmen Square had ended any remaining illusions about the 
Chinese Communist Party (which had in any case already abandoned socialism 
in its embrace of a market economy and a social order premised on class division 
and the future widening of it), these events signaled the complete integration of 
Second- and Third-World economics into the global market that had been 
accelerating over the previous two decades. Now only racial superstition and 
religious fanaticism interrupted a triumphant new world order dominated, if no 
longer controlled, by US capital. 
The previous decade had brought parallel traumas to the working people of the 
anglophone West. Begun in the late 1960s in the United States, the radical 
reconstruction of the right matured in the 1980s' "Revolt of the .Haves": the 
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termination of the New Deal, the pseudo-populism of Reaganomics, and other 
attacks on the working class of a ferocity unprecedented in the twentieth century. 
In President Reagan's first administration, welfare cutbacks and regressive tax 
policies (for example, the top rate on unearned income was reduced from 70 to 50 
percent) cost low-income families $23 billion, while high-income families gained 
more than $35 billion.3 Families with annual incomes over $200,000 profited by 
$60,000, while those receiving below $10,000 lost an average of $1,100. Com­
bined with the 1970s' transformations within the domestic economy and in its 
position in the global economy, Reaganomics widened income disparities and 
produced a substantially new social stratification. Figured as the "Brazilianiza­
tion" of the economy or as the reshaping of the American income pyramid into an 
hourglass, the reproduction of global core-periphery relations within the First­
World working class split the workforce into a small, more skilled sector and a 
very much larger, less skilled sector. Stably employed and sustained by corpor­
ate-subsidized welf:lre, the former gravitated toward and identified its interests 
with the capitalists and top business managers, while the latter declined into 
irregular employment or even permanent unemployment and, dependent on 
defunded state welfare, disintegrated in an overall immiseration of barbaric 
proportions. 
The crucial site of this sustained offensive against working people was the 
attacks on those welfare programs most identified with the underclass (cuts in 
food stamps, child nutrition, aid to families with dependent children, and low­
income housing, but not, for example, tax deductions on home mortgages) and 
especially on trade unions. Newly elected President Reagan's destruction of the 
Professional Air Traffic Controllers' Organization (ironically, the only union to 
have supported his candidacy) escalated the offensive that had been developing 
since the 1970s: the relocation of manufacturing to union-free Sunbelt regions, 
the closing of unionized shops and their reopening as open shops, and the use of 
wage differentials between unionized and nonunionized labor to divide the 
working class. Eviscerated by its failure to embrace the black, women's, and 
Third World solidarity movements after the 1960s and shackled by its cooperat­
ive ties to management, organized labor lost two million members during the 
1980s, and at the end of the decade union membership was half what it had been 
at its high point after World War II. Fleeing a sinking ship, the Democrats (like 
the British Labour Party) abandoned their traditional constituencies - and work­
ing people abandoned the ballot box. 
Nationally and in fact internationally coordinated, this objective reduction of 
the life opportunities of all working-class people cut across the New Social 
movements that had replaced class in post-1960s identity politics. While these 
movements had scored impressive gains for those members of them capable of 
entering the newly opened avenues for success in bourgeois society, far greater 
numbers of working-class women and blacks walked with the rest of the working 
class down the road to poverty and hopelessness. The same era that saw gender 
and ethnic identity politics make their momentous ideological advances also saw 
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the "feminization of poverty" (continued increases in female-headed households 
beyond the 1980 figure, when women comprised 66 percent of all adults officially 
classified as poor); the flight of the new black middle class and the further decline 
of living standards in urban African-American communities (by 1984, while a 
quarter of all children lived in poverty, twice that proportion of black children 
did); and the increase of sweatshop exploitation of both illegal and legal immi­
grants. Far from demonstrating the obsolescence of class divisions, bourgeois 
identity politics in fact concealed and so facilitated increased class polarizations. 
Taken together, these developments mark the fading of the vision of a rational, 
nonalienated, nonexploitative, and fully participatory democracy that had been 
the great imaginative achievement of Marxism, itself one of the great intellectual 
achievements of modernity. 
Although the repression of consideration of class in cultural studies reflects 
these global developments, it was most immediately determined by the functions 
of the academy itself, where the emergence of discourses around sexual and 
ethnic identity simultaneously ensured the silencing of class theory. The social 
movements of the 1960s and then the mutually incommensurate micropolitics 
that split the left thrived in the university largely to the extent that they 
negotiated the personalization of the political into academic practices. Thus, in 
the case of feminism, the struggle for women's rights generally, the struggle to 
increase the presence of women in higher education, and the struggle to empower 
women as cultural producers all played their part in the struggle to develop 
feminist hermeneutics and historiography in the university, and were all under­
stood as interdependent components of a broadly unified cultural initiative. Both 
the trace and the medium of the interdependence of these projects was a new, 
postmodernist discourse, a mixed autobiographical and critical mode based, to 
use Lyotard's (1984) terms, on narrative rather than science, whose immense 
rhetorical and analytic force was supplied by the heritage of shared subjectivity 
discovered in consciousness-raising. 
Subsequent identity groups aspired to their own similarly united fronts, in 
which advances in academic theory, disseminated throug'h para-academic insti­
tutions, would both nourish and be nourished by advances in the relevant 
constituencies in society at large. But though, in the academy and on its slopes, 
these interdependencies made possible great gains in the theoretical considera­
tion of ethnic and sexual identity, the practice of constructing academic programs 
around the political interests of academics themselves in fact inhibited the 
emergence of parallel discourses around class. First, the crucial social agency 
that might have created an equivalent identity group was not present; the work­
ing class is not generally admitted into higher education, certainly not to elite 
research universities where theoretical work is done, in sufficient numbers to 
create the critical mass of working-class-identified subjects that could develop 
such a theoretical offensive in class terms.4 Second, where affirmative action 
programs did fortuitously occasion the enrollment of working-class women or 
working-class people of color to these institutions, they were admitted (and 
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interpellated), not as working class, but under the designation of their sexual or 
ethnic identities, identities that were subsequently invoked and affirmed by a 
panoply of methodologies, courses, journals, and other apparatuses, while their 
class background was ignored and any residual class consciousness and class 
loyalties they might have had were systematically inhibited. 
And so, third, while all other identities have been eminently assimilable to the 
bourgeois academy, allowing female, black, and queer people to live privileg'ed 
lives as female, black, and queer academics, such a richly rewarded career as the 
voice and image of a social identity is not even theoretically possible for a 
working-class person. Of course, the corporatization of higher education increas­
ingly depends on the exploitation of graduate students and peripatetic adjuncts; 
but for those who attain it, a tenured life of college teaching and research is hardly 
alienated labor. Whatever its anxieties, it provides more of the rewards and 
satisfactions of bourgeois life than the exigencies and perils of the proletarian's. 5 
In this respect, the best that a person fi'om the working class can hope for is 
precisely that, to be from the working class, and in this displacement to be 
deprived of the possibility of speaking either as or for the working class, or 
even as or for her- or himself. 6 The back of a working-class identity must be 
broken across the abyss of a class migration to a station where feelings of pride 
and success will always be gnawed by those of estrangement and betrayal.7 
Such institutional repression of working-class consciousness is not accidental. 
As Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis (1976) have shown, reforms in the US 
educational system have historically entailed the extension of privileges. But the 
schooling of the previously excluded has always been determined by the require­
ments of their roles in the structural transformations of capital: in the early 
nineteenth century, when public day schools replaced the family to complement 
the developing factory system; in the Progressive Era, when the expansion of 
high schools saw the common curriculum sacrificed to the ideology of vocation­
alism, with special tracking for working-class children that broke the control of 
trade unions in skill training; and since World War II, where acceptance of 
demands for expanded access to higher education by minorities and women has 
simultaneously satisfied corporate and state needs for technical, clerical, and 
other service skills - the creation of a reserve army of underemployed white­
collar labor.8 There is no reason not to suppose that contemporary curricular 
reforms and admissions programs are part of a similar historical process. How­
ever humanly necessary and objectively good they currently seem to be, and 
however they empower those few, selected members of minority groups that they 
incorporate, they are similarly instrumental in displacing class consciousness and 
otherwise legitimating and reproducing the class structure of a diversified post­
modern economy. And indeed, despite pockets of resistance, multi-culturalism 
has itself long been a major corporate priority. 
The point here is not to propose an academic identity politics based on class. 
The university already -- sometimes loudly, sometimes silently - sustains a 
bourgeois identity politics, and a working-class identity politics within it will 
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be structurally infeasible as long as the university maintains its present functions, 
that is to say, as long' as the present social order and its systemic dependence on 
exploitation lasts. And in any case, whatever impossible identity working-class 
intellectuals sustain is fundamentally different from all others; rather than seek­
ing to create a society in which its own interests are paramount, it looks forward 
to its own supersession, either in the terms of Marx's own proposal that "a real 
possibility of emancipation" demands the formation of "a class which is the 
dissolution of all classes," or in the now century-old commitment made by the 
Social Democrats who met at Erfurt in 1891 to struggle "ag'ainst not only 
the exploitation and oppression of wage workers, but also every form of exploita­
tion and oppression, be it directed against a class, a party, a sex, or a race.,,9 
Where they are not simply unimaginable, such conceptions are now so ubiqui­
tously denigrated that any approach to the role of culture in class society is 
obliged to begin from the recognition of two absences: first, the absence of a 
generally accepted theory of class and of its articulation with other forms of 
structural social division, and hence second, the absence of any single systematic 
or comprehensive theory of the way class could inform the study of cinema. As a 
preliminary to remedying these absences, a synopsis of some of the overall issues 
involved in the concept of class and a review of the processes by which class came 
to be excluded from film studies may have its uses. lO 
2 Classical Marxism 
Marx himself never systematically developed a theory of class, and in fact he died 
leaving the manuscript of volume 3 of Capital unfinished a few lines after he had 
asked the crucial question, "What constitutes a social class?" (Tucker 1978: 441). 
Nevertheless, in his work and in the traditions ofMarxism, class is one of the key 
theoretical formulations. Fundamentally, it designates a position in the economic 
structure of society. As each historical era finds its own way of organizing 
material production, around the raw materials, tools, factories, and so on from 
which goods are produced (the means ofproduction), it generates specific social 
divisions. These social divisions are classes; the relation between them is the 
hidden foundation of the social formation, and their conflictual interaction has 
driven history through a series of stages, or modes ofproduction. If the latest of 
these, capitalism, were ever to exist in a pure form, it would allow two social 
positions in relation to the means of production: that of the few capitalists, who 
own them, and that of the many workers, who own nothing but their ability to 
work, which they are obliged to sell in order to live and from which the capitalists 
extract and appropriate more value than the labor power itself costs to reproduce. 
Capitalist society consists, in essence, then, of two classes, bourgeois and prole­
tarian. Marx expected nineteenth-century capitalism to continue to develop the 
conflict between these until the proletariat would communally seize control of the 
means of production for themselves, eventually to create a society without a 
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division between exploiter and exploited, "the abolition oj' all classes and ... a 
classless socie~y" (220). Beyond this premise of the historically specific, adversarial 
relation between capitalists and workers, almost everything in Marx about class is 
debatable. A number of issues, however, are both primary and recurrent: the 
apparent existence of classes or class factions other than those of capitalist and 
worker; the relation between the objective and subjective components of a class 
position; and the modes of activity in spheres outside the economic that follow 
from a given position in production. 
The period in which Marx wrote was not one of pure capitalism, but rather 
one in which capitalism was in the process of replacing the previous mode of 
production, feudalism, with its class division between landowners and peasants, 
while signs of a future socialism were already perceptible. Class positions remain­
ing from a previous era, as well as those harbingers of the next, thus complicated 
the social polarization. In the early 1880s, when he was writing the last page of 
Capital, Marx observed that whereas "middle and intermediate strata even here 
obliterate lines of demarcation," nevertheless "three gTeat social classes" existed: 
"wage-labourers, capitalists and landlords" (441-2). But because the last of 
these, vestigial of feudalism, were progressively assimilating to capital, the situa­
tion as a whole fundamentally ratified the polarization thesis announced more 
than 30 years before in The Communist Man~(esto: "Society as a whole is more and 
more splitting up into two great hostile camps, into two great classes directly 
facing each other: Bourgeoisie and Proletariat" (474). 
Marx's prediction of the inevitability of class polarization was challenged as 
early as the 1890s, when, largely as a result of gains made by the labor movement, 
class conflict appeared to be diminishing in Western Europe, and economic crises 
and the immiseration of the proletariat seemed, if anything, to be becoming less 
likely. Revisionism, initially theorized by Eduard Bernstein, proposed that class 
fractions between capitalist and proletariat would not disappear but would 
continue to expand. The expansion of these middle classes indicated a reconcilia­
tion of the class conflicts of early capital and the progressive amelioration of 
workers' conditions through electoral politics of the kind that produced the 
traditions of social democracy. In the longer perspective, the proliferation of 
such fractions and other social reforms, together with the failure of the working 
class to emerge as the agent of revolutionary change in the Western democracies, 
has continued to challenge Marx's teleology, while simultaneously authorizing 
social movements premised on reconciliation between classes, or on structural 
division along lines other than class. 
Marxism itself has provided several responses to these challenges. While in the 
West recent deindustrialization and the expansion of service and high technology 
sectors have allowed a small number ofblue-collar workers to rise economically, a 
much greater number ofpreviously skilled and unionized workers have slid down 
into unskilled service jobs and even unemployment, creating a new social polar­
ization with a new and highly fragmented working class that traditional forms of 
working-class organization find difficult to access. And in any case, Marx's 
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expectation of increasing class polarization was predicated on capitalism's assim­
ilation of the entire global economy, and while he may not have theorized this 
fully, others did, most notably Lenin, in Imperialism, the Highest Stage ~l 
Capitalism, where he diagnosed the shift from the industrial to the financial 
form of capital as the vehicle of its expansion. Today, as the relocation of heavy 
manufacturing industries from the West to East Asia reconfigures the global 
division of labor and as the capitalist world market has come to control even the 
vestigial instances of pre-capitalist production, the "new world economy" and 
similar umbrellas for the unregulated internationalization of capital may tem­
porarily obscure class polarization in the First World, but only as the exploitation 
of First-World proletariat is refracted in core-periphery relations and the spatial 
extension of capitalism generally. Thus, employing a simple, objective definition 
of class (the bourgeois are those who receive surplus value and are in a position to 
reinvest it, while all others are proletarian), Immanuel Wallerstein has argued 
that world-wide the process of increasing dependence on wage labor has 
continued, so that polarization remains "a historically correct hypothesis, not a 
false one ... provided we use as the unit of calculation ... the capitalist world­
economy" (Balibar and Wallerstein 1991: 128). 
The other, entirely different response to the apparent plurality of classes is to 
make a distinction between an objective position in relation to production (like 
Wallerstein's above, for example) and one that includes other factors, such as the 
notion that in the actual historical organization of classes, economic relations 
interact with political and ideological processes, especially the consciousness of 
specific historical subjects. ll Marx himself proposed the basis for this latter 
response in a distinction between class an sich and class fur sieh, first adumbrated 
in 1847 in The Poverty of Philosophy: industrialization, he argued, has in fact 
"transformed the mass of the people of the country into workers. The combina­
tion of capital has created for this mass a common situation, common interests. 
This mass is thus already a class as against capital, but not yet for itself' (Tucker 
1978: 218). But neither the specific point at which a social aggTegate constituted 
around production actually forms a class nor the role played by ideological self­
consciousness in the process was fully explained. Thus, in a parallel discussion of 
small peasants in mid-century France in The Eighteenth Brumaire ofLouis Bona­
parte, Marx implied the need for quite extensive activity outside the realm of the 
purely economic for a class formation properly to congeal. The peasants were, he 
argued, "a vast mass ... which live in similar conditions"; but they were never­
theless so isolated from each other in the process of their work that they remained 
politically inchoate, "much as potatoes in a sack form a sackful of potatoes": 
In so far as millions of families live under economic conditions of existence that 
divide their mode of life, their interests and their culture from those of other 
classes, and put them in hostile contrast to the latter, they form aclass. In so far as 
there is merely a local interconnection among these small peasants, and the identity 
of their interests begets no unity, no national union and no political org'anization, 
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they do not form a class. They are consequently incapable of enforcing their class 
interest in their own name. (608) 
In his commentaries on the revolutions in nineteenth-century France, parti­
cularly The Eighteenth Brumaire (1852) and The Civil War in France (written in 
1871), Marx explored the process by which class as an economic category is re­
created in the more complex forms of class as a political category and function. 
The process includes the overlapping of modes of production to produce mul­
tiple class fractions (the aristocracy of finance, the industrial bourgeoisie, the 
middle class, the petite bourgeoisie, the army, the lumpenproletariat, the intel­
lectuallights, the clergy, the rural population, as well as the proletariat proper of 
France in 1848, for example), the shifting alliances among these as they form 
"ruling blocs," the consolidation of such blocs in the formation of the state, and 
the subsequent degree of the state's autonomy and/or its implementation of 
specific class interests, either overtly or through some form of masquerade. 
The question of class consciousness that runs through all these considerations 
is framed by the issues of ideology and ideological determination generally. 
Again, key formulations are not a little ambiguous. In The German Ideology 
(written 1845-6), Marx proposed a schema according to which the class that 
controls material production is also able to control mental production, with the 
result that the "ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas .... 
The ruling' ideas are nothing more than the ideal expression of the dominant 
material relationships" (172). Elsewhere, most clearly in the summary statement 
of the general principles of historical materialism in A Contribution to the Critique 
of Political Economy (1859), he strongly implied that difTerent classes possess 
different ideologies: if "it is not the consciousness of men that determines their 
being, but, on the contrary, their social being that determines their conscious­
ness" (4), then because different classes have different social beings, their 
different consciousnesses must follow. 
Because intentional social reorganization would seem to require some degree of 
conscious opposition to the received status quo, the Marxist tradition has pro­
duced a number of positions about the consciousness of the agents of such 
historical change, especially about working-class self-consciousness. One tradi­
tion emphasizes its importance. Rosa Luxembourg, for example, believed that 
the working class could generate its own class consciousness through its own 
mass political action; and Georg Lukacs argued, in History and Class-Conscious­
ness, that although the working class is the only class capable of true self-know­
ledge, practically speaking the conditions of working-class people's lives inhibit 
its emergence, necessitating its construction from outside by the party, a position 
fully developed by Lenin. On the other hand, the need for or possibility of such a 
self-consciousness posited in this "Hegelian" tradition has been denied by 
"structural" Marxists, notably Louis Althusser and Nicos Poulantzas. Referen­
cing the anti-humanism oflate Marx, instanced in his claim in Capital that he was 
dealing with individuals "only in so far as they are the personifications of 
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economic categories, embodiments [or bearers, Trager] of economic categories, 
embodiments of particular class-relations and class-interests" (297), Althusser 
theorized classes as objective social structures, whose nature and development are 
independent of any immanent subjectivity, even in the members of the working 
class themselves. 
Multiplied by the details of subsequent political history as well as by trans­
formations in the nature of capital, these indeterminacies in Marx have generated 
the body of Marxist class theory. This is beyond even the meagerest summary 
here, but three issues do merit mention: the main non-Marxist theories of class; 
debates about class in contemporary sociology; and "post-Marxist" attacks on the 
primacy of the working class in left politics. 
3 Other Theories of Class 
Besides Marx, the main contributor to classical sociological theories of class was 
Max Weber (1864--1920), who conceived of class somewhat more loosely as a 
specification of "life chances," defined by a position not in productive relations 
but in market relations, determined by ownership of property and possession of 
skills and education. He subsumed the resulting plurality of market situations 
into four "social classes": the working class; the petite bourgeoisie; technicians, 
specialists and lower-level management; and those who were privileg'ed through 
property and education. In addition to rejecting Marx's notion of necessary 
structural conflict among these groups, he also rejected any distinction between 
conscious and unconscious positioning and hence the possibility of economistic 
historical development. The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, his 
analysis of the origins of modern society, thus emphasized the role of ideology, 
specifically Calvinism, as producing rather than reflecting economic transforma­
tion. The importance of economic class for Weber is further qualified in its 
relation to an alternative formulation, that of the "status group," according to 
which individuals derive social identity from common cultural patterns, includ­
ing consumption and other lifestyle priorities. 
Much post-war sociolog'y effected various forms of Marx--Weber synthesis in 
functionalist theories of the relation between (objective) class formation and 
(subjective) class action. The most prominent neo-Weberian, John Goldthorpe, 
for example, devised a class scheme closely resembling those used by market 
researchers and census bureaux, which combined market and work situations to 
differentiate seven levels aggregated into three categories: service, working, and 
intermediate classes. On the basis of this analysis, he then explored the degree to 
which these positions have produced actual demographic identities capable of 
social action and also tracked social mobility across class positions (Crompton 
1993: 57--60, 63-9).12 
Erik Olin Wright, on the other hand, retained the Marxist principle of class 
positions generated in production; his work has attempted to demonstrate that 
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the plurality of new middle classes may actually be reduced back to primary 
economic relations, so as to sustain the polarization thesis. To the bourgeoisie, 
proletariat, and petite bourgeoisie - the three basic positions developed in 
orthodox Marxism in respect of ownership or nonownership of the means of 
production- he added three contradictory class locations: managers and super­
visors; small employers; and semi-autonomous wage earners. Occupants of these 
locations are contradictorily determined: managers, for instance, do not own the 
means of production yet they do control both means of production and labor 
power, whereas semi-autonomous wage earners do not own or control the 
material means of production, but nor do they sell their labor power (Wright 
1985: 19-57). In subsequent work, as he shifted his emphasis from forms of 
domination to processes of exploitation, Wright (1989) was forced to double the 
number of classes in the occupational scheme, as well as to develop increasingly 
sophisticated theoretical and statistical procedures to map synchronic positions 
and mobility among' them. Although he has not been able to produce a model that 
can satisfactorily account for multiple intermediary classes, neither has he aban­
doned either the general project or its Marxist foundations. 
Given the economic emphasis of these Weberian and neo-Marxist traditions, it 
is not surprising that their reverberation in cultural studies has been slight; but 
other Marxist~Weberian sociologies oriented toward consumption, particular!y 
symbolic consumption, have been heard, most notably the work of Pierre Bour­
dieuY His Distinrtion: A Social Critique ofthe Judgement of Taste (1984), a self­
designated "ethnography of France," synthesized a Marxist understanding of 
class as an objective structural position in relation to production with an extens­
ive system of stratification based on subjective values - a broadly Weberian 
attention to symbolic practices, including lifestyles and consumption prefer­
ences. Occupation categories supply the major social strata (working, middle, 
and upper classes) and the internal divisions within them, but positions in these­
and the operations of power generally -- are seen as sustained through other social 
and cultural factors, which Bourdieu defines as educational and cultural "cap­
ital." An individual's or social group's possession of social and cultural capital 
produces a characteristic system of dispositions, which Bourdieu calls the habitus 
-- "the internalized form of class condition and of the conditioning it entails" 
(101). Together, the economic, social, and cultural conditions constitute class: 
"Social class is not defined solely by a position in the relation of production, but 
by the class habitus which is 'normally' (i.e. with a high statistical probability) 
associated with that position" (372). 
Generally, Bourdieu argues, the hierarchies of occupation and taste are homo­
log'ous; higher social class reproduces itself with better education, which pro­
duces more cultural capital, leading to superior social standing and power, 
including a greater capacity to process works of "legitimate" culture. But there 
are significant variations within the three major class divisions that reflect not 
only the different overall volume of a given capital, but also its different "com­
position," that is, the relative proportion of the economic, social, and cultural 
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forms. These variations engender the different tastes and consumption habits of 
the various groups within each stratum. Within the dominant class, for example, 
the economic capital of industrial employers dominates their cultural capital, 
whereas the opposite is the case for intellectuals (115); for recreation, then, the 
former prefer golf "with its aristocratic etiquette, its English vocabulary and its 
great exclusive spaces, together with extrinsic profits, such as the accumulation of 
social capital," while the latter get high ascetically, in mountaineering for exam­
ple, which "offers for minimum economic costs the maximum distinction, 
distance, and spiritual elevation" (219). 
Distinction was based on surveys taken in France, some as long ago as 1963. In 
anglophone countries 30 years later, neither the occupational class patterns, 
which are its basis, nor the codes of cultural differentiation are nearly as clear; 
a working-class taste for La Traviata against an haute bourgeois taste for Well­
Tempered Clavier will not register in a leveled cultural milieu where both works 
are denigrated as "high" culture. Bourdieu's understanding of cultural prefer­
ences is, moreover, strongly deterministic, and although it allows for extremely 
fine gradings of class location and is extraordinarily responsive to cultural factors 
that internally stratify occupational categories, it makes no place for individual or 
sub-cultural resistance to them or movement through them. Nevertheless, his 
demonstration of how class situation not only permeates and controls all forms of 
subjectivity, but in fact comprises it ~ in Bourdieu's words, how a class "condi­
tion" in fact "impos[es] conditionings" (101) - remains a powerful challenge to 
the end-of-class ideologies that now dominate the academic study of culture. Of 
these, Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe's use of post-structural theory to 
authorize the replacement of class by other forms of identity in radical politics 
became widely fashionable. 
In their Hegemony and Socialist Strategy (1985), Laclau and Mouffe developed 
a "post-Marxism" in which the proletariat's inability to hegemonize over the 
"New Social movements" has caused the disintegration of the historical role 
proposed for it in Marxism: 
What is now in crisis is a whole conception of socialism which rests upon the 
ontological centrality of the working class, upon the role of Revolution, with a 
capital "r," as the founding moment in the transition from one type of society to 
another, and upon the illusory prospect of a perfectly unitary and homogenous 
collective will that will render pointless the moment of politics. The plural and 
multifiuious character of contemporary social struggles has finally dissolved the 
last foundation for that political imag·inary. (2) 
Their revisionism is distinguished by a highly sophisticated repertoire of dis­
course theory drawn especially from Saussure, Wittgenstein, Foucault, and 
Derrida ~ a theoretical apparatus that they use to read the classic Marxist texts 
from Bernstein to Althusser deconstructively. Their reading, they claim, dis­
closes the persistence of a fundamental economic determinism that has caused all 
Marxists to give an ontological priority to the working class, even in social 
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analyses that propose forms of class alliance; although a plurality of social actors 
are recognized, the search for a "true working-class subject" forces their reduc­
tion back into class politics. Ag'ainst such an essentialism and against an undiffer­
entiated pluralism, they argue the need for new forms of "social logics 
which ... acquire their meaning in precise conjunctural and relational contexts 
where they will always be limited by other- frequently contradictory - logics; 
but none of them has absolute validity, in the sense of defining a space or 
structural moment which could not in its turn be subverted" (142-3). 
Laclau and Mouffe have encountered some resistance from the left. 14 Their 
historical rereading of the Marxist tradition has been criticized as reductionist, a 
straw-man caricature that conceals the actual complexity of the relations between 
the economic and political developed in it, and the argument that economic 
production does generate social relations and hence classes prior to their dis­
cursive articulation has been reasserted. The political programs their conclusions 
project have likewise been dismissed as merely a new pluralism or as so abstract 
and vague as to be virtually useless. But since some version of the crisis in 
Marxist theory they describe is all but axiomatic in the entire New Left tradition 
(articulated in its essentials 30 years earlier by C. Wright Mills) as well as in many 
post-war Ivfarxisms (Eurocommunism, for example), by and large the academy 
has received their work with relief and gntitude. Their argument that class need 
no longer be considered the hegemonic formation of political alterity in a model of 
"radical democracy" that still necessarily included a socialist dimension, "the 
abolition of capitalist relations of production" (192), has slipped into justification 
for the abandonment of class as even one among other categories of resistance - a 
specifically anti-working-class politics that their subsequent writings have 
endorsed. Here we cannot explore that process in the realm of political thought, 
but a virtually identical itinerary may be traced in the displacement of class from 
two of the bodies of cultural theory engendered by the New Left: 1970s film 
theory and 1980s cultural studies. 
4 The Displacement of Class from Film Theory and Cultural Studies 
Especially after the Comintern adopted Popular Front Policies, in the late 1930s 
many forms of populist film culture in which class politics were paramount 
flourished across Western Europe and the United States; but in the renewal of 
radical politics after the 1950s the importance of class was radically diminished, 
especially in the US. IS The reasons for this are complex, though beyond what­
ever plausibility remained to arguments for "American exceptionalism," clearly 
the revelations about Stalin, followed by the Cold War and McCarthyism, had 
virtually destroyed any popular currency Marxism might still have had. With the 
notable exceptions of the Black Panthers and certain sectors of the Vietnam War 
resistance, the main social movements of the 1960s such as Civil Rig'hts and 
Women's Liberation - the immediate sources of contemporary ethnic and sexual 
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identity politics - developed more in opposition to Marxism than in articulation 
with it. But in France, following the success of the union of students and workers 
in the May events and the challenge to Gaullism, the vocabulary of cultural 
criticism was not only self-consciously Marxist, but its Marxism was to some 
deg-ree class-oriented. So, initially, were both radical film and radical film theory 
in the period immediately after 1968. The subsequent evaporation of class from 
this Marxism and then the general failure of French Marxism reverberated 
through the ang'1ophone adoption of French film theory, particularly around 
the heritage of Louis Althusser. 
Of Althusser's various interventions - the proposal of the autonomy of the 
economic, political, and ideological practices; the theory of the epistemological 
break between the conceptual frameworks of the early and the late Marx; the 
replacement of a Hegelian, humanist conception of the subject by one deter­
mined by the lived social structures - the most fateful for film studies was his 
theory of ideology. Given his strictures on Marx's early Hegelian writing's, it is 
ironic that Althusser should have taken up the general model of ideology 
proposed in The German Ideology, that is, as pandemic and consistent in the 
social formation as a whole rather than class-specific. As early as 1967, he 
recognized the limitations that resulted; he was "not equipped for an adequate 
treatment of certain questions," and so he "did not examine ... the 'fusion' of 
Marxist theory and the workers' movement . .. did not examine the concrete forms of 
existence of this 'fusion' (org'anization of the class struggle - trade unions, parties 
- the means and methods of direction of the class struggle by these organiza­
tions)" (1977: 15). But he never redressed the deficiency, and with the sole 
exception of the autonomy allowed to certain intellectual activity designated as 
science (or "theoretical practice"), all the other social, material, and ideological 
apparatuses that call the subject into being were understood as promoting each 
other uniformly, and were lived so completely across all social classes as to 
amount to a g'eneral conditioning that structured even the unconscious. Devel­
oped through Lacanian psychoanalysis, this theory of ideology was appropriated 
by film studies with a similar essentialism; the ideological effects of cinema were 
seen as socially uniform because they were intrinsic to its apparatus, to the 
historical conditions of its invention, and to all cases of its use apart from 
deliberate avant-gardist ruptures of its fundamental and enabling mechanism, 
primary identification. 
Since the British importation of French theory took place in the mid-1970s at 
exactly the time when its psychoanalytic component was being most forcefully 
developed, the early 1970s' concern with the rediscovery of early Soviet cinema 
(also imitated from French journals) was hardly in place before a psychoanalytic 
theory of the subject was dropped like a cuckoo's egg into the nest of historical 
materialism. Thus, to take one example, in the 1974 special issue of Screen 
devoted to a reconsideration of Brecht as exemplary for a contemporary revolu­
tionary cinema, his use of techniques of formal rupture and negation as a means 
to critical distanciation were re-presented via a Freudian rather than a Marxian 
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theory of fetishism (Heath 1974). The combination of semiology and psycho­
analysis that comprised Screen's "Marxism," especially as it moved to disentan­
gle a purely Lacanian concern with subject formation from its previous 
Althusserian concern with ideology, was challenged in both Britain and the 
United States - in the first case, from a position which sought to sustain concern 
with working-class cultural values (e.g. Buscombe et al. 1975: 129-30), and in the 
second, where Jump Cut was beginning to nurture a populist radical film criti­
cism that did include elements of class consciousness, from a working-class 
feminist position (e.g. Lesage 1974). But with the fading of the suspicion of 
Freud common in US feminism in the early 1970s, Lacanian psychoanalysis 
came to dominate US film theory almost entirely. As it did so, the only social 
difference that film theory could thenceforth register was the specificity that 
psychoanalysis itself could theorize, that is sexual difference. After this point, 
given that even the historically specific family structure was not admissible as a 
mediating agency in the structuration of the unconscious and of language around 
the phallus or its lack, the main currents of cinema studies had no theoretical 
means of addressing issues of class. That they have also had no desire to do so has 
been confirmed in the generally parallel itinerary followed by the other New Left 
tradition of cultural criticism, cultural studies. 
The founders of British cultural studies - Richard Hoggart, Raymond Wil­
liams, and E. P. Thompson -- were committed to working-class politics, and the 
first two were themselves of working-class origin. Their early critical and histor­
iographical writing was informed by their political commitments as well as by 
their address to specific constituencies, especially as they found them through 
their participation in adult education programs for working-class people. In 
this, their project paralleled later feminist practices, even though (in the case of 
Williams and Hoggart) its autobiographical component was displaced into novels 
and autobiography, rather than being combined with criticism to form the mixed 
objective/subjective mode that made early feminist writing so powerful. Initially, 
their project entailed not the repression of class content from Marxism so much 
as the gradual discovery that European Marxism could in some cases supply a 
vocabulary for the analysis of working-class culture. With the conspicuous 
exception of Thompson's (1978) attack on Althusserianism and "theory" in 
general and his own correlative subjectivist (and empiricist) theory of class as 
something that "happens when some men, as a result of common experiences 
(inherited or shared), feel and articulate the identity of their interests as between 
themselves, and as against other men" (1963: 9), British cultural studies profited 
from the translation into English of the texts of Western Marxism: Lukacs, the 
Frankfurt School, and, especially, Gramsci. By the early 1970s, "a decisive second 
... break into a complex Marxism" (Hall 1980a: 25) allowed researchers at the 
Birmingham Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies to jettison Anglo-Amer­
ican structural-functionalist sociology, and so to produce the mid-1970s projects 
of reading working-class life for its "lived meanings," and the initial studies of 
deviant sub-cultures, schooling, and workplace relations, as well as sophisticated 
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metatheoretical considerations (e.g. Clarke et al. 1979). These were thoroughly 
informed by Althusser, but structural Marxism's inability to pose the concept of 
class from within a general theory of ideology and its lack of a theoretical means 
of conceptualizing ideological resistance made it less and less useful, especially as 
text-based, semiological studies were increasingly linked to sociological studies of 
actual audiences. The consequent "turn to Gramsci" - a turn away from the 
concept of monolithic, virtually irresistible ideological determination toward that 
of a dialectical relation among the interests of several classes under the hegemony 
of one of them - was incompatible with the Screen problematic. 
Birmingham's implicit challenge to Althusserianism and "Screen theory" was 
taken up by Rosalind Coward. Admitting (more than charitably) that "in Screen 
itself, there has been little work which deals explicitly with the problems of class 
analysis," she nevertheless argued that its Lacanian theories of subject formation 
invalidated the Birmingham Centre's papers, in which "the ideological and 
political are finally reduced to being an expression of a class interest or position" 
(1977: 75--6). Denying reductionism, Birmingham retorted that Screen's view of 
the autonomy of discursive practices and the refusal of any "determinacy in, 
articulation with or pertinent specific effects for other levels of the social forma­
tion" (Chambers at al. 1977: 116) discredited any theory of ideology it might 
otherwise propose, certainly any Marxist one. Presumably spurred by this inter­
change, the Media Group at Birmingham spent the next year (1977-8) studying 
Screen theory and reevaluating its own premises, but without finding anything to 
make them amend their position. Stuart Hall's summary response (1980b) again 
attacked Screen's exclusive concern with the psychoanalytic construction of the 
subject as an essentialism that excluded any other determination that the social 
formation, in its historically specific forms, might exert and made any concept of 
ideological struggle impossible. In advancing Birmingham's alternative, David 
Morley (1992) did invoke Michel Pecheux's concept of an interdiscourse, by 
which the differential effects of specific discursive practices are seen as inflecting 
the uniformity of primary subject positioning; but, practically, his work was still 
based on Hall's "decoding" model, published some seven years earlier. Indeed 
his empirical studies of the reception of British television news programs (made 
with Charlotte Brunsdon) presupposed precisely the self-identical, humanist 
subject which Screen had worked so hard to dispose of. 
The progress of this and of Morley's independent work was not, however, 
immune to the prevailing currents. The early study of the audience for the 
television program Nationwide was overtly concerned with class and had demon­
strated very clear, if direct, correlations between class position and patterns of 
decoding. 16 But Morley's discontent with the imprecision of the model of the 
class structure used, which might well have prompted him to develop a more 
sophisticated model, instead caused him to abandon class for an exclusive con­
cern with gender. His subsequent studies of the contexts of television reception 
still focussed on working-class families, but since they were all working class, 
class was a constant; it thus became invisible in all the analyses, which in any case 
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made no attempt to explore the class specificity of the gender relations discovered 
or to compare them with gender relations in more privileged families. Though 
Morley eventually recognized that "gender analysis was prioritized more ex­
clusively than had originally been intended, and the effectivity of this particular 
factor was isolated from that of others - such as class and age" (1992: 160), he did 
not return to class. 
Otherwise, in attempting to combine a historically and socially specific semiot­
ics with a nonreductionist sociology, and in walking a thin line between recogni­
tion of the ways people actively and creatively make over industrial culture to 
their own uses and acknowledgment of the constraints that surround such 
interventions, Morley's work was representative of the best of 1980s media 
studies. In general, however, what became the main current of cultural studies 
in the United States abandoned not only Birmingham's concern with the working 
class, but also the Marxist and feminist critical components of the early 
projects. What Morley himself designated as "the 'don't worry, be happy' school 
of (principally American) cultural studies" (11) became essentially accomm­
odationist, preoccupied with affirmative models of the consumption of industrial 
culture as itself a form ofempowerment, the site of resistance. Where the ethereal 
heat of Screen theory had boiled off Althusser's Marxism, so, amid the political 
defeats and defeatism of the Reagan/Thatcher and then the Clinton eras, the 
lowlier ambitions of cultural studies drained the Marxism out of Gramsci. 17 
Notes 
I	 This essay includes material previously published in James 1996a and 1996b. 
2	 There are, of course, exceptions: some work in labor history; less in literary criticism, 
with Barbara Foley's (1993) study of proletarian fiction being especially noteworthy; 
and some essays in cinema studies, such as Auster and Q!1art 1978; Biskind and 
Ehrenreich 1980; Hansen 1983; Jameson 1990; Kleinhans 1974; Mayne 1982; Nichols 
1972; Ross 1991; Ryan and Kellner 1988; Sklar 1975; Stead 1989; Traube 1992; and 
several essays in Sklar and Musser 1990. Hansen and Philipson (1990) have 
assembled essential articles on socialist-feminism. 
3	 Figures here and below are variously from American Social History Project 1992; 
Chafe 1995; Davis 1986; and Ferguson and Rogers 1986. 
4	 See Bowles and Gintis 1976, especially pp. 209--13, for a survey of statistics on the 
stratification of higher education by family income. Bourdieu notes that only 6.7 
percent of French professors come from working-class f~lmilies (1988: 44). 
5	 Erik Olin Wright (1979) surveyed various models of the class position of intellectuals 
-- that they are workers, that they belong to several different classes, that they are part 
of the petite bourgeoisie, and that they are part of a professional~managerial class ­
concluding that they occupy contradictory locations. 
6	 Bourdieu points out that the intellectual who attempts to put himself or herself in the 
place of the worker can actually experience neither the conditionings that position 
imposes nor, especially, the necessity that informs those conditionings; but he also 
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points out that migration out of the working class makes "true" representations of 
working-class experience similarly unavailable for people who "originate from these 
classes" (1984: 372-4, 587 nn. I, 2). His whole section on the determination of 
working-class culture by the experience of domination is very important. 
7	 Strangers in Paradise: Academicsfrom the Working Class (Ryan and Sackrey 1984) is a 
collection of autobiographical essays typically illustrating the fact that "to grow up 
working class, then to take on the full trappings of the life of the college professor, 
internalizes the conflicts in the hierarchy of the class system within the individual, 
upward~)I mobile person" (5). This principle of the "hidden injuries of class" is 
adopted from the book of that title (Sennett and Cobb 1973), an account of the 
experience of working-class people in Boston. 
8	 Bowles and Gintis's (1976) "reproduction theory" of capitalist education, with its 
general principle that any "adequate explanation" of "the evidently critical relation­
ship between education and the capitalist economy ... must begin with the fact that 
schools produce workers" (10), recognizes that the "authoritarian classroom does 
produce productive workers, but it also produces misfits and rebels" (12), but it 
does not develop the alternative function. Bowles and Gintis's work is usefully 
supplemented by an important text from a quite different tradition, Paul Willis's 
Learning to Labor: How Working Class Kids Get Working Class Jobs (1981), an 
ethnography of the forms of cultural resistance mobilized by working-class youth, 
which nevertheless assures their reproduction as working class. In its contrast with 
Bowles and Gintis's functionalism -- which can find hope only in "a socialist 
movement [and] the creation of working-class consciousness" to replace "the 
divisive and fragmented consciousness of US working people" (285) - Willis's 
recognition of the "deep disjunctions and desperate tensions within social and 
cultural reproduction" that allows for "challenging and subversive and ... threaten­
ing" sub-cultural contestation (175) was a major contribution to the Gramscian 
phase of British cultural studies. 
9	 The first quote here is from Contribution to the Critique ofHegel 's Philosophy ofRight 
in Tucker 1978 (64); all subsequent references to Marx's writings are to this edition. 
The entire statement of principles adopted at Erfurt is reprinted in Laidler 1968 
(233-6). 
10	 Johnson (1979) provides a useful overview of Marxist theories of class, especially as 
they affect issues of culture. Other useful introductions may be found in Bottomore 
1983 (74-8) and Crompton 1993 (23-9). 
11	 Przeworski (1977) provides an especially useful survey of the history of this position 
in Marxist thought. 
12	 Crompton (1993) has made an excellent - and user-friendly - overview of the 
history and present state of debates about class in sociology. In addition to the 
theoretical class schemes deriving from the traditions of Marx and Weber, she 
considers other categories of class indexes, such as "commonsense" hierarchies 
based on occupation and subjective scales of social status. 
13	 Brubaker (1985) usefully surveys Bourdieu's work, though he underestimates the 
importance of social position in relation to production in Bourdieu's model of class 
identity. 
14	 Of these, Wood (1986) is especially useful in placing Laclau and Mouffe's disart­
iculation of the political from the economic in the "retreat from class" of 1970s 
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anglophonc post-Althusserianism generally, especially in the work of Barry Hindess 
and Paul Hirst. 
IS	 A notable exception here is the school of radical historians fostered by William 
Appleman Williams at the University of Wisconsin, who in 1959 founded the 
seminal journal Studies on the Left. For an overview of this left historiography, see 
Wiener 1991. The relevance of this school's corporate liberalism thesis - that 
corporate capital's appropriation of popular protest movements within the ideology 
of liberalism prevents their challenging capitalism itself on specifically socialist 
grounds .. continues to increase. 
16	 The conclusion was "that patterns of decoding should not be seen as being simply 
determined by class position, but by the way in which social position articulates with 
the individual's position in different discursive formations" (Morley 1992: 116). So 
whereas there were great differences in the decodings made by people of different 
classes, there were also differences within classes. Within working-class reception of 
Nationwide, for example, he found a "profound difference in decodings between 
those groups which are nonunion, or are simply 'members' of unions, and those 
groups with an active involvement in the discourses of trade unionism - although 
the two categories of groups have the same working-class background ... union 
officials tend to produce forms of negotiated decoding; the shop stewards produce 
a fully oppositional form of decoding ... and simply inactive union members 
... tend to reproduce dominant decodings" (116). But Morley's conclusions here, 
which strikingly resemble Bourdieu's general model described above, were read in 
the United States as if they demonstrated that there were no correlations between 
decoding and class. See Morley 1992 (12-13) for his complaints about these mis­
readings and his attempts to clarify. 
17	 For overviews of the erasure of the critical component in 1980s Gramscianism, see 
Budd et al. 1990 and Harris 1992. Morley 1992 (1-41) reviews some of the same 
Issues. 
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CHAPTER TWELVE
 
Culture Industries 
Douglas Kellner 
In capitalist societies, film production has been by and large a form of commercial 
entertainment controlled by media corporations. Thus, the Frankfurt School 
coined the term "culture industries" to call attention to the industrialization and 
commercialization of culture under capitalist relations of production. This situa­
tion was most marked in the United States, which has had little state support of 
the film industry. Consequently, the concept of culture industries in film studies 
finds its paradigm in analysis of Hollywood as a distinctive mode of cinematic 
production, originating in the United States in a specific time and place, but 
spreading throughout the world as film became a global business and major form 
of commercialized culture. 
Accordingly, I first discuss the development of the concept of the culture 
industries in the Frankfurt School and then delineate some conceptions of 
Hollywood film as ways of understanding how the culture industries shape the 
commercial mode of film production, resulting in a specific sort of cinema with 
distinctive effects. 
1 The Frankfurt School, the Culture Industries, and Regimes of Capital 
To a large extent, the Frankfurt School inaugurated critical studies of mass 
communication and culture and produced the first critical theory of the cultural 
industries (see Kellner 1982, 1989, 1995, 1997). During the 1930s, the Frankfurt 
School developed a critical and transdisciplinary approach to cultural and com­
munications studies, combining critique of political economy of the media, 
analysis of texts, and audience reception studies of the social and ideological 
effects of mass culture and communications. 1 They coined the term "culture 
industries" to signify the process of the industrialization of mass-produced 
culture and the commercial imperatives that drove the system. The critical 
theorists analyzed all mass-mediated cultural artifacts within the context of 
industrial production, in which the commodities of the culture industries exhib­
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ited the same features as other products of mass production: commodification, 
standardization, and massification. The culture industries had the specific func­
tion, however, of providing ideological legitimation of the existing 
capitalist societies and of integrating individuals into the framework of its social 
formation. 
Adorno's analyses of popular music (1978 [1932], 1941, 1982, 1989), Low­
enthal's studies of popular literature and magazines (1961), Herzog's studies of 
radio soap operas (1941), and the perspectives and critiques of mass culture 
developed in Horkheimer and Adorno's famous study of the culture industries 
(1972; and Adorno 1991), which contain many, albeit unsystematic, references to 
Hollywood film, provide significant examples of the value of the Frankfurt 
School approach. Moreover, in their theories of the culture industries and 
critiques of mass culture, they were the first to systematically analyze and 
criticize mass-mediated culture and communications within critical social theory. 
They were the first social theorists to see the importance of what they called the 
culture industries in the reproduction of contemporary societies, in which so­
called mass culture and communications stand in the center ofleisure activity, are 
important agents of socialization and mediators of political reality, and should 
thus be seen as major institutions of contemporary societies with a variety of 
economic, political, cultural, and social effects. 2 
Furthermore, they investigated the cultural industries in a political context as a 
form of the integration of the working class into capitalist societies. The Frank­
furt School were one of the first neo-Marxian groups to examine the effects of 
mass culture and the rise of the consumer society on the working classes, which 
were to be the instrument of revolution in the classical Marxian scenario. They 
also analyzed the ways that the culture industries and consumer society were 
stabilizing contemporary capitalism and accordingly sought new strategies for 
political change, agencies of social transformation, and models for political 
emancipation that could serve as norms of social critique and goals for political 
struggle. This project required rethinking the Marxian project and produced 
many important contributions - as well as some problematical positions. 
The Frankfurt School focussed intently on technology and culture, indicating 
how technology was becoming both a major force of production and a formative 
factor of social organization and control. In a 1941 article, "Some Social Implica­
tions of Modern Technology," Herbert Marcuse argued that technology in the 
contemporary era constitutes an entire "mode of organizing and perpetuating (or 
changing) social relationships, a manifestation of prevalent thought and behavior 
patterns, an instrument for control and domination" (414). In the realm of 
culture, technology produced mass culture that habituated individuals to con­
form to the dominant patterns of thought and behavior, and thus provided 
powerful instruments of social control and domination. 
Victims of European fascism, the Frankfurt School experienced first hand the 
ways that the Nazis used the instruments of mass culture to produce submission 
to fascist culture and society. While in exile in the United States, the members of 
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the Frankfurt School came to believe that American "popular culture" was also 
highly ideological and worked to promote the interests of capitalism. Controlled 
by giant corporations, the culture industries were organized according to the 
strictures of mass production, churning out products that generated a highly 
commercial system of culture, which in turn sold the values, lifestyles, and 
institutions of American capitalism. 
In retrospect, one can see the Frankfurt School work as articulation of a theory 
of the stage of state and monopoly capitalism that became dominant during the 
1930s.3 This was an era of large organizations, theorized in 1910 by Hilferding as 
"organized capitalism" (1981), in which the state and giant corporations mana­
ged the economy and in which individuals submitted to state and corporate 
control. This period is often described as "Fordism" to designate the system of 
mass production and the homogenizing regime of capital that wanted to produce 
uniform desires, tastes, and behavior. It was thus an era of mass production and 
consumption characterized by uniformity and homogeneity of needs, thought, 
and behavior, producing a "mass society" and what the Frankfurt School 
described as "the end of the individual." No longer was individual thought and 
action the motor of social and cultural progress; instead giant organizations and 
institutions overpowered individuals. The era corresponds to the staid, ascetic, 
conformist, and conservative world of corporate capitalism that was dominant in 
the 1950s with its organization of men and women, its mass consumption, and its 
mass culture. 
During this period, mass culture and communication were instrumental in 
generating the modes of thought and behavior appropriate to a highly organized 
and conformist social order. Thus, the Frankfurt School theory of the culture 
industries articulates a major historical shift to an era in which mass consumption 
and culture were indispensable in producing a consumer society based on 
homogeneous needs and desires for mass-produced goods and a mass society 
based on social organization and homogeneity. It is culturally the era of highly 
controlled network radio and television, insipid top-forty pop music, glossy 
Hollywood films, national magazines, and other mass-produced cultural artifacts. 
Of course, media culture was never as massified and homogeneous as in the 
Frankfurt School model, and one could argue that the model was flawed even 
during' its time of origin and influence. One could also argue that other models 
were preferable (such as those of Walter Benjamin, Siegfried Kracauer, Ernst 
Bloch and others of the Weimar generation, and, later, British cultural studies). 
Yet the original Frankfurt School model of the culture industries did articulate 
the important social roles of media culture during a specific regime of capital and 
provided a model, still of use, of a highly commercial and technolog'ically 
advanced culture that serves the needs of dominant corporate interests and 
plays a major role in ideological reproduction and in enculturating individuals 
into the dominant system of needs, thought, and behavior. 
The form of culture industry in the mode of film production that became 
hegemonic in the United States and eventually became the dominant form of 
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world cinema is usually designated "Hollywood film," referring to a highly 
industrialized and rationalized mode of commercial cinematic production driven 
by the logic of commodification and capital realization. Accordingly, in the next 
section I interrogate the form of Hollywood film as culture industry. 
2 Hollywood, Film, and the Culture Industries 
Film emerged as one of the first mass-produced cultural forms of the twentieth 
century. Based on new technologies of mcchanical reproduction that made 
possible simulations of the rcal and the production of fantasy worlds, film 
provided a new mode of culture that changed patterns of leisure activity and 
played an important role in social life. From the beginning, film in the United 
States was a mode of commercial activity controlled by entertainment industries 
that attempted to attract audiences to its products. Film production was accord­
ingly organized on an industrial model with a mass-produced output aimed at 
capturing a secure audience share and thus realizing a substantial profit. As a 
commercial enterprise, American film developed as an entertainment industry, 
rather than as an educational instrument or art form. 
Early films were the inventions of technicians and entrepreneurs like the 
Lumiere Brothers and Melies in France and the Edison Corporation in the 
United States. The first films ranged from the documentaries and quasi-docu­
mentary realist fictions produced by the Lumieres and Edison to the fantasy 
fictions of Melies. The genres that would characterize Hollywood film began to 
appear during the first decades of the century with westerns like The Great Train 
Robbery (1903), the melodramatic social dramas of D. W. Griffith, costume and 
historical dramas like Ben Hur (the first of several versions appeared in 1899), 
horror films, and comedies by Mack Sennett, Charlie Chaplin, Buster Keaton, 
and others. 
Hollywood soon emerged as the capital of the film industry in the United 
States. Benefiting from Californian weather, which provided good light and a lot 
of sunshine, and a varied environment that opened onto the sea, desert, moun­
tains, small towns, and a bustling urbanscape, a film colony soon emerged which 
became the locus of the American and eventually world film industry. The 
demand for film was great, and the early film studios began repeating and 
reproducing the formulas and types of film that were most popular. Con­
sequently, Hollywood films were divided into the most popular types of genres, 
like the western, melodrama, crime drama, costume film, horror film, and, with 
the coming of sound, the musical (Schatz 1981). 
Film soon became the most popular and influential form of media culture in 
the United States (Sklar 1975; Jowett 1976). Indeed, for the first half of the 
twentieth century - from 1896 to the 1950s - movies were a central focus of 
leisure activity and deeply influenced how people talked, looked, and acted, 
becoming a major force of enculturation. The number of theaters grew from 
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about 10,000 storefront nickelodeons with daily attendance offour to five million 
in 1910 to around 28,000 movie theaters by 1928 (May 1983). In the 1920s the 
average audience was between 25 and 30 million customers a week, while by the 
1930s from 85 to 110 million people paid to go to the movies each week (Dieterle 
1941). Consequently, films were a central form of entertainment and an extre­
mely popular leisure activity. 
Moreover, films became a major force of socialization, providing role models 
and instruction in dress and fashion, in courtship and love, and in marriage and 
career. Early films were produced largely for working-class, immigrant, and 
urban audiences, and some critics of the movies thought that they had negative 
or subversive effects aowett 1976). For exampie, the comedies of Charlie 
Chaplin made fun of authority figures, romantic dramas were attacked by the 
Legion of Decency for promoting promiscuity, and crime dramas were fre­
quently attacked for fostering juvenile delinquency and crime. On the other 
hand, films were believed to help "Americanize" immigrants, to teach their 
audiences how to be good Americans, and to provide escape from the cares of 
everyday life (Ewen and Ewen 1982). 
Whereas some films from the silent and early sound era presented poverty and 
social struggle from progressive perspectives sympathetic to the poor and 
oppressed, many films focussed on the rich and celebrated wealth and power, 
serving as advertisements for the consumer society and the ruling elites. Cecil B. 
de Mille's comedies and dramas of modern marriage, for example, can be seen as 
marriage and fashion models, and the romantic films of the 1920s can be read as 
"manuals of desire, wishes, dreams" for those wanting to assimilate themselves to 
mainstream America (Ewen and Ewen 1982: 102). Consequently, films played an 
important socializing role by mobilizing desires into certain models. In particular, 
they helped socialize immigrant and working-class cultures into the emerging 
forms of the consumer society, teaching them how to behave properly and 
consume with style and abandon. 
From the beginning, popular movie stars played an important role in Holly­
wood cinema and became fantasy figures for idealized romance and desire (Dyer 
1979). Female stars like Clara Bow, Gloria Swanson, and Colleen Moore repres­
ented the glamour and vivacity associated with the 1920s, while Mary Pickford 
and Lillian Gish projected idealized fantasies of pure American women. Roman­
tic male idols were represented by Rudolf Valentino, Douglas Fairbanks, John 
Gilbert, and Clark Gable. Becoming a Hollywood star became the fantasy of 
countless young men and women who flocked to the film capital in search of fame 
and fortune, and some of these aspirants indeed succeeded in becoming the stars 
of the Hollywood firmament. 
Although films for the most part reflected mainstream American values, they 
represented modern and urban social values in particular, and so conservatives 
began attacking their alleged "immorality" and "subversiveness". Due to pres­
sure from civic groups and the threat of government regulation, a set of censor­
ship boards was established with the cooperation of the film industry, which 
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produced a Production Code that was adopted by the industry by the mid-1930s. 
Explicit limits were set on the allowable length of kisses and no open-mouth 
kisses could be shown. No nudity or explicit sexuality was allowed, such things as 
prostitution and drugs could not be portrayed, criminals had to be punished, and 
religion and the church could not be criticized (the Code is reproduced and 
discussed in Jowett 1976). The Production Code held sway until the 1960s 
(although it was challenged in the 1950s) and set firm ideological and social 
parameters to Hollywood films. 
But the crucial determinants of the ideological functions of Hollywood film 
had to do with control of film production by major studios and the emergence 
and subsequent dominance of the studio systems from around 1917 into the 
1960s (Bordwell et a!. 1985; Schatz 1988). Hollywood film production became 
dominated early on by big studios, which monopolized the patents necessary for 
film production and projection and which primarily produced films for profit. 
Since films must attract large audiences, they needed to resonate to audiences' 
dreams, fears, and social concerns, and thus inevitably reflected social mores, 
conflicts, and ideologies. Consequently, some of the first critical analyses of 
Hollywood film argued that films reflected American society, providing mirror 
images of its dreams, fears, and mode of life. 
3 Hollywood Film and US Society 
Since the culture industries sought masses audiences, Hollywood cinematic 
production attempted to resonate to audience tastes, desires, and fantasies, and 
so there was a close connection between Hollywood film and contemporary social 
life in the United States. Sociological and psychological studies of Hollywood 
film proliferated in the post-World War II era and developed a wide range of 
critiques of myth, ideology, and meaning in the American cinema. Parker Tyler's 
The Hol(Yl1Jood Hallucination (1944) and Myth and Magic of the Movies (1947) 
applied Freudian and myth-symbol criticism to show how Walt Disney cartoons, 
romantic melodramas, and other popular films provided insights into social 
psychology and context, while producing myths suitable for contemporary audi­
ences. In Movies: A P\:ychological Study (1950), Martha Wolfenstein and Nathan 
Leites applied psychoanalytical methods to film, decoding fears, dreams, and 
aspirations beneath the surface of 1940s Hollywood movies, arguing that: "The 
common day dreams of a culture are in part the sources, in part the products of its 
popular myths, stories, plays and films" (13). In her sociological study of Hol(y­
l1Jood: The Dream Factory (1950), Hortense Powdermaker studied an industry 
that manufactured dreams and fantasies, while Robert Warshow (1970) related 
classical Hollywood genres like the western and the gangster film to the social 
history and ideological problematics of US society. 
Building on these traditions, Barbara Deming demonstrated in Running A,vay 
from M:yse{f(1969) how 1940s Hollywood films provided insights into the social 
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psychology and reality of the period. Deming argued that: "It is not as mirrors 
reflect us but, rather, as our dreams do that movies most truly reveal the times" 
(1). She claimed that 1940s Hollywood films provided a collective dream portrait 
of its era and proposed deciphering "the dream that all of us have been buying at 
the box office, to cut through to the real nature of the identification we have 
experienced there" (5-6). Her work anticipates more sophisticated and univer­
sity-based film criticism of the post-1960s era by showing how films both 
reproduce dominant ideologies and contain proto-deconstructive elements that 
cut across the grain of the ideology that the films promote. She also undertook a 
sort of gender reading of Hollywood film that would eventually become a key 
part of Hollywood film criticism. 
Another tradition of film scholarship and criticism in the United States 
attempted to situate films historically and to describe the interactions between 
film and society in more overtly political terms. This tradition includes Lewis 
Jacobs' pioneering history of Hollywood film (1939), John Howard Lawson's 
theoretical and critical works (1953, 1964), Ian Jarvie's sociological inquiries into 
the relation between film and society (1970, 1978), D. M. White and Richard 
Averson's studies of the relation between film, history, and social comment in 
film (1972), and the social histories written by Robert Sklar (1975), Garth Jowett 
(1976), Will Wright (1977), Peter Biskind (1983), and Thomas Schatz (1988). 
While this tradition produced useful insights into the relationships between 
Hollywood film and US society in specific historical eras, it tended to 
neglect the construction of film form, the ways that specific films or genres 
work to construct meaning, and the ways that audiences themselves interact with 
film. 
More theoretical approaches to the production of the works of the Hollywood 
culture industry began emerging in the 1960s, including the ideological analyses 
of Cahiers du cinema and the extremely influential work associated with Screen 
which translated many key Cahiers and other works of French film theory, 
including Roland Barthes, Christian Metz, and others who generated much 
more sophisticated formal approaches to film (see Metz 1974; Heath 1981). 
The Cahiers group moved from seeing film as the product of creative auteurs, 
or authors (their politique des auteurs of the 1950s, taken up by Sarris [1968] 
and others) to focus on the ideological and political content of film and how 
it transcoded dominant ideologies. At the same time, French film theory and 
Screen focussed on the specific cinematic mechanisms that helped produce 
meanmg. 
During the same period of intense ferment in the field of film studies during 
the 1960s and 1970s, members of the Birmingham Centre for Contemporary 
Cultural Studies were discovering that gender, race, and sub-culture were also 
important elements in analyzing the relationships between culture, ideology, and 
society. Pushed by feminism to recognize the centrality of gender, it was argued 
that the construction of dominant ideologies of masculinity and femininity was a 
central aspect of Hollywood film (Kuhn 1982; Kaplan 1983). Studies of the ways 
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that Hollywood films constructed race, ethnicity, and sexuality also became a key 
aspect of film studies, and various post-structur~list-influenced theories studied 
the role of film and media culture in the social construction of ideologies and 
identities. 
Studies also began appearing in the 1970s of the business of film, dissecting' the 
political economy of the Hollywood studio system (see Balio 1976, 1985; Wasko 
1994). Combining these historical, socio-economic, and theoretical perspectives, 
Bordwell, Staiger, and Thompson (1985) provided a comprehensive and sys­
tematic approach to analyzing the "classic Hollywood film system" with specific 
studies of the production process, Hollywood style, and cinematic technolog·y. 
They argued that Hollywood cinema is a highly distinctive economic and artistic 
phenomenon which blends a unique system of production, film style, and cine­
matic technology to produce a clearly recognizable product. Offering the concept 
of "a mode of film practice," they situated Hollywood film in its historically 
specific context and analyzed the system of production, style, and typical 
products. 
There are now a multiplicity of approaches competing to theorize the relations 
between Hollywood film and US society. The theory wars of the 1980s and '90s 
have proliferated a tremendous amount of new theories that have in turn been 
applied to film. Consequently, structuralism and post-structuralism, psycho­
analysis, deconstruction, feminism, postmodernism, and a wealth of other 
theoretical frameworks have generated an often bewildering diversity of 
approaches to theorizing film, which join and complicate previous film theory 
methods such as the genre theory, auteur theory, and historical-sociological 
approaches. My own take on the cacophony of contemporary approaches to 
film is that it is not a question of either/or which forces the theorist to adopt 
one option, but rather a variety of approaches can be deployed to engage the 
relations of film to society (see Kellner 1995 for elaboration of my multi­
perspectival model). 
Consequently, the following section will discuss the genre approach to analyz­
ing the intersection of film and society in the Hollywood culture industry, while 
in the concluding section, I note developments in contemporary Hollywood film 
that legitimate the use of auteur criticism and socio-ideological approaches to 
film. These approaches can be combined, I would argue, with the newer theoret­
ical approaches to provide fuller and richer thematizations of the relation of 
Hollywood film to US society. 
4 Hollywood Genres: The Coin of the Culture Industries 
Although much of the best European art film can be interpreted as a result of the 
creative vision and talent of individual directors, Hollywood film from the 
beginning was deeply influenced by the dominant genres in its studio system. 
Hollywood culture industry film production was thoroughly industrialized and 
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rationalized, its films delineated into specific types with their familiar codes, 
conventions, iconography, and themes. Genres like the western or crime drama 
were a preferred type of film for the Hollywood studio system since they were 
popular, conventional, and easy to reproduce. The studios were set up like 
factories with big barns, rows of barracks, stock sets, and so forth, in a production 
process that thrives on formulas and conventions. Thus, following the economic 
imperatives of the capitalist system to produce products as quickly and cheaply as 
possible to maximize production and profits, the Hollywood cinema became a 
genre cmema. 
The major Hollywood studios controlled not only film production, but also 
distribution, ensuring a guaranteed exhibition site for Hollywood product. This 
system first emerged in the 1910s, took its distinctive shape in the 1920s, reached 
maturity in the 1940s, and began to disintegrate in the 1950s due to anti-trust 
legislation, which caused the studios to divest themselves of their distribution 
and exhibition channels, and to competition from other entertainment media 
such as television (Schatz 1988). 
The various Hollywood studios had their own distinctive style and favorite 
genres. Warner Brothers was known for a gritty 1930s-era realism, featuring 
tough gangster films, hard-edged domestic melodrama, crusading biopics, and 
energetic musicals; Universal was renowned for its atmospheric horror films, 
MGM for its colorful musicals and spectaculars, and David Selznick was asso­
ciated with big-budget quality pictures, both when he worked for other studios 
and after he formed Selznick International Pictures in 1935 (Schatz] 988). Since 
the main Hollywood studios repeatedly reproduced the types of film that they 
thought were the most popular, Hollywood cinema became primarily a genre 
cinema, in which popular formulas are repeated in cycles of genres that in turn 
deal with central societal conflicts, problems, and concerns of its audiences. The 
western, for example, deals with conflicts between civilization and threats to 
civilization from disruptive forces, whereas the gangster film deals with threats to 
law, order, and social stability within an already established urban society. 
Melodramas, social comedies, and musicals deal with conflicts and problems 
within domestic arenas like the family and romance, whereas war films and 
adventure genres generally deal with conflicts in the public sphere outside of 
the private realm. 
Genres become established when visual, stylistic, and thematic concerns 
become formalized into an immediately recognizable system of conventions. 
Genre films were thus the appropriate form of production for a culture industry 
geared toward commercial success. For the most popular genres become familiar 
artifacts that create certain expectations which, if fulfilled, bring audiences back 
again and again for their particular satisfactions. Thus, genre films combine 
narrative formula, audience expectation, and the industrial practice of a culture 
industry aiming at commercial success. 
For instance, the cultural form of the western developed into a generic 
construct featuring conflicts between cowboy heroes and villains in the familiar 
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setting of the US West. The plot contains standard conventions of 
gunfights, chase scenes, and the eventual defeat of forces of disorder; the visual 
imagery alternates small town or homestead scenes, with chase or action scenes in 
the desert and the mountain regions of the West. In this setting, the western pits 
sets of "bad" guys against the "good" townspeople, homesteaders, and 
cowboy hero in an epic struggle between "good" and "evil." This form in turn 
generated ideologies of racism and imperialism whereby the "enemies" of civil­
ization (Indians, Mexicans, villains) were portrayed negatively, thus 
legitimating the "settlement" of the West by (white male-dominated) forces of 
"civilization." In addition, women were stereotyped as either whores or sub­
missive representatives of the domestic order, thus reproducing patriarchical 
ideologies. 
In order to resonate to audience fears, fantasies, and experiences, the Holly­
wood genres had to deal with the central conflicts and problems in US society 
and offer soothing resolutions, assuring its audiences that all problems could be 
solved within existing institutions. Western films, for example, assured their 
audiences that "civilization" could be maintained in the face of threats from 
criminals, outsiders, and villains of various sorts, and celebrated individualism, 
white male authority figures, and violence as a legitimate way of resolving 
conflicts. The western's mythologized vision of American history glossed over 
the fact that the "villains" were often the land's original inhabitants who had had 
their property stolen by the white settlers, presented as being forces of civiliza­
tion. 
Gangster films appealed to people's fear of crime and fascination with crim­
inals; the classical Hollywood gangster films inculcated the message that "crime 
does not pay" and showed the police and legal system able to contain crime and to 
deal with criminals. But gangster films also explored cultural conflicts and 
contradictions central to American capitalism. Gangsters are, in fact, prototypical 
capitalists who will do anything to make a buck and thus are allegorical stand-ins 
for capitalist energy and will. Gangster films explore the tensions within Amer­
ican life between making money and morality, between self-interest and legality, 
and between private and public interests. The gangsters are fantasy characters 
who act out secret audience desires to get ahead no matter what, although it is still 
not clear if their repeated punishment (mandated by the Production Code) 
actually helped prevent crime or whether the films promoted crime by making 
the gangsters - often played by popular figures like James Cagney or Humphrey 
Bogart - extremely dynamic, attractive, and vital figures. 
Melodramas, social comedies, and musicals in turn legitimated male-domin­
ated romance, marriage, family, and moral rectitude as the proper road to 
happiness and well-being. Musicals followed formulas of boy meets girl, boy 
loses girl, and boy gets girl to celebrate the desirability of male-dominated 
romance. Melodramas dramatized what would happen to wayward women or 
willful men who failed to conform to dominant gender roles. They celebrated 
hardworking mothers who sacrificed their own happiness for their children, thus 
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projecting the proper role for women (for example, Imitation of Life, Stella 
Dallas, Mildred Pierte, and others), and intimated that life's greatest happiness 
derived from marriage and family. And social comedies, too, celebrated marriage 
and family as the proper goals for men and women (Cavell 1982). Indeed, David 
Bordwell claims that in his random selection of 100 typical Hollywood movies, 95 
made romance at least one important plot line while in 85 heterosexual romantic 
love was the major focus (Bordwell et al. 1985: 16). 
Hollywood genre films thus tended to promote the American dream and 
dominant American myths and ideologies. They taught that money and success 
were important values; that heterosexual romance, marriage, and family were the 
proper social forms; that the state, police, and legal system were legitimate 
sources of power and authority; that violence was justified to destroy any threats 
to the system; and that American values and institutions were basically sound, 
benevolent, and beneficial to society as a whole. In this way, Hollywood film, 
supported by other forms of media culture, helped establish a certain hegemony, 
or cultural dominance of existing institutions and values to the exclusion of 
others. As Raymond Williams argued: 
I would say that in any society, in any particular period, there is a central system of 
practices, meanings and values, which we can properly call dominant and efTcctive 
... what I have in mind is the central, effective and dominant system of meanings 
and values, which are not merely abstract but which are organized and lived. That 
is why hegemony is not to be understood at the level of mere opinion or mere 
manipulation. It is a whole body of practices and expectations; our assignments of 
energy, our ordinary understanding of the nature ofman and of his world. It is a set 
of meanings and values which as they are experienced as practices appear as 
reciprocally confirming. (1983: 8-9) 
Hollywood film is thus implicitly "political" in the way it tends to support 
dominant American values and institutions. The more explicitly political func­
tions of Hollywood cinema generally emerg'e in times of social crisis. During both 
World Wars, war films and other genres advocated patriotism and presented the 
"enemy" in stereotypical terms. During the Cold War anti-communist period, 
Hollywood produced a genre cycle of anti-communist films that depicted the 
threat to democracy and the "American way of life" by the "communist con­
spiracy." Whereas during World War II Russians were presented positively as 
US allies against fascism, fi'om the late 1940s on through Rambo communists are 
generally presented as the incarnation of evil. 
Yet the Hollywood system was flexible enough to allow individual cinematic 
statements and social critique within the genre system. Hollywood films prized 
difference and variation within accepted boundaries and allowed a limited range 
open for artistic expression and social commentary. Filmmakers like John 
Ford, Frank Capra, Sam Fuller, and Alfred Hitchcock used the genre system 
to articulate their own specific artistic concerns and visions, finding in the 
genre and studio system a congenial framework to produce their work. Other 
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artistically inclined directors like Erich von Stroheim and Orson Welles con­
stantly clashed with their production bosses and found their work edited against 
their will, eventually leaving the system and giving up filmmaking altogether, as 
von Stroheim did, or seeking alternative funding with mixed success, as in the 
case of Welles. 
Indeed, it is not certain that the genre films always resolved the social contra­
dictions portrayed and served as ideological advertisements for existing social 
institutions, discourses, and practices. As noted, the crime dramas often made the 
criminals' transgressions of societal norms more appealing and attractive than 
their punishment, and likewise women's transgressions of bourgeois norms in the 
melodrama often put in question established patriarchal institutions. The wes­
tern could also be used to portray the victims of the frontier conquest sympathet­
ically and to attack the crimes and barbarism of the "civilizing" forces. Genre 
films could thus be used to contest ideological norms as well as reproduce them, 
and thus to provide ideology critique as well as legitimation. 
During the 1950s, the studio system that had produced g'enre cycles as the 
mode of production of Hollywood film broke up, and the genre system was 
challenged, opening the ways to new types of film. As we shall see in the next 
section, although the Hollywood system initially opened up, a new regime of 
production came to support the equivalent of genre cinema, and the desire for 
megaprofits continued to drive the system. 
5 Hollywood Today, and into the Future 
The break-up of the studio system in the 1950s forced film directors to find new 
sources of film-financing. The result was a very fertile period of production in 
the 1960s with film becoming more varied, diverse, and socially critical. The rise 
of new directors like Stanley Kubrick, Arthur Penn, and Robert Altman, who 
had distinctive artistic visions and style, seemed to give credence to the notion of 
a "New Hollywood" and provided a boost to auteur criticism that focussed on 
the cinematic style and form of key directors and films, while critics like Andrew 
Sarris insisted that the classical Hollywood directors also exhibited disti~ctive 
aesthetic styles which he canonized in his artistic pantheons (1968). 
In retrospect, all one-sided approaches to theorizing Hollywood film are 
problematical. Although some "authors" had created distinctive and impressive 
bodies of work, they were often created within the constraints of a specific genre 
and studio system. So to fully understand Hollywood film, one needs insight into 
the production system, its codes and formulas, and the complex interaction of 
film and society, with film articulating social discourses, embedded in social 
struggles, and saturated with social meanings (Kellner and Ryan 1988). Thus, 
analyzing the connection between Hollywood film and US society requires a 
multi-dimensional film criticism that situates its object within the context of the 
social milieu within which it is produced and received. 
213 
Douglas Kellner 
It was widely perceived in the 1960s that youth constituted a major audience 
for Hollywood film, and so more youth-oriented films and directors emerged, 
creating new cycles of films which cinematically inscribed the discourses of the 
New Left student movements, as well as the feminist, black power, sexual 
liberationist, and counter-cultural movements, producing a new type of socially 
critical Hollywood film. These films transcoded (i.e. translated) representations, 
discourses, and myths of 1960s eulture into specifically cinematic terms, as when 
Easy Rider transcodes the images, practices, and discourses of the 1960s counter­
culture into a cinematic text. Popular films intervened in the political struggles of 
the day, as when 1960s films advanced the agenda of the New Left and the 
counter-culture. Films of the "New Hollywood," however, such as Bonnie and 
Clyde, Medium Cool, Ea.~)1 Rider, and so on, were contested by a resurgence of 
right-wing films during the same era (e.g. Dir()I Hany, The French Connection, 
and any number ofJohn Wayne films), leading many to conclude that Hollywood 
film, like US society, should be seen as a contested terrain and that films could be 
interpreted as a struggle of representation over how to construct a social world 
and everyday life. 
Throughout the 1970s, intense battles between liberals and conservatives were 
evident in Hollywood film, with more radical voices - of the sort that occasionally 
were heard in the late 1960s and early 1970s - becoming increasingly margin­
alized. The tremendous success of more generic films, like Love Story, Airport 
and other disaster films, The Godfather films, and The Exorcist and other horror 
films, led the Hollywood culture industry to search for the blockbuster film, 
leading to a return to genre cinema. But it was probably the huge success of]an)s 
(1975) that set the pattern for the blockbuster syndrome. Released in the summer 
of 1975, the film was introduced to an unprecedented ballyhoo of advertising and 
opened in a then-record "wide release" of 464 theaters. An all-time high of 25 
million tickets were sold in the film's first 38 days of release, and it had soon 
earned a record $102 million in rentals. Henceforth, "high concept" films that 
could be clearly described and marketed became a major focus of the Hollywood 
film industry (Wyatt 1994), which sought "bloekbuster" hits that would turn 
over a high profit. 
In the 1970s, new technologies and cultural forces emerged that changed the 
nature of film culture and production. In August 1975, Home Box Office (HBO), 
a new nationwide movie channel, began disseminating an array of films by 
satellite transmission and cable systems to individual homes. Other movie chan­
nels followed, and a mushrooming ofcable and satellite channels made available a 
cornucopia of films for home consumption. In addition, the Sony Betamax home 
video recorder appeared in 1975, followed by the more successful VHS format, 
and a proliferation of video-rental stores and businesses made it possible to see 
the history of film within one's own home. Henceforth, film eulture became part 
of everyday life, and the most popular films could be seen via theater, television, 
or home video systems. 
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During this period as well, the culture wars that had raged since the 1960s 
were reproduced in Hollywood films. As the 1970s progressed, conservative films 
were becoming more popular (e.g. Rocky, Star Wars, Close Encounters a/the Third 
Kind, Superman), indicating that conservative sentiments were growing in the 
public and that Hollywood was nurturing these political currents. Indeed, even 
liberal films ultimately helped advance the conservative cause. A cycle of liberal 
political conspiracy films (e.g. The Parallax View, All the President's Men, The 
Domino Principle, Winter Kills) vilified the state and thus played into the con­
servative/Reaganite argument that government was the source of much existing 
evil. Films that took a perspective sympathetic to the working class and critical of 
business (Blue Collar, F.l.S. T., and many others) blamed corrupt unions for the 
working class's problems, while liberal films dealing' with race (Claudine, A Piece 
oIthe Action, and the like) attacked welfare institutions and celebrated individual 
initiative and self-help -- precisely the Reaganite position. And even the most 
socially critical films (such as the Jane Fonda films, Network, and other Sidney 
Lumet films) posited individual solutions to social problems, thus also reinfor­
cing the conservative appeal to individualism and attack on statism. Con­
sequently, reading Hollywood films of the decade politically allowed one to 
anticipate the coming of Reagan and the New Right to power by demonstrating 
that conservative yearnings were ever more popular within the culture and that 
film and popular culture were helping to form an ideological matrix more 
hospitable to Reagan and conservatives than to embattled liberals (Kellner and 
Ryan 1988). 
On the other hand, even seemingly conservative film genres such as the horror 
film, or seemingly anti-gay films like Cruising, contain critical moments, 
problematizing hegemonic ideologies and putting in question dominant ideolo­
gies like the family (Wood 1986). Robin Wood argues that the "incoherent text" 
is a dominant cinematic mode of the 1970s, full of ideological contradictions and 
conflicts that reproduce existing social confusion and turmoil. Thus, film, like 
society, was very much a contested terrain, with the future of society and culture 
up for grabs. 
With the election of Reagan in 1980, the conservative wave of films continued 
throughout the decade, though they were contested, as was Reaganism itself, by 
liberal and radical films like Missing, Reds, Salvador, Platoon and other Oliver 
Stone films, as well as a wealth of films by independent filmmakers like John 
Sayles. The blockbuster syndrome, however, continued to be the dominant 
trend, and with the teaming up of Steven Spielberg and George Lucas for the 
Indiana Jones series and the continued success of Lucas's Star Wars films and 
Spielberg's blockbusters, Hollywood went big-time for high-tech spectaculars in 
which the special effects often overwhelmed story and character. 
Gender struggles were particularly intense, with a return to the "hard-body" 
masculine hero of an earlier era, replacing the more feminized male heroes of the 
late 1960s and early 1970s Ueffords 1994). As part of the backlash against 
feminism, there was also a cycle of films that villainized independent women, 
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showing single career women without families being driven into pathological 
behavior (Fatal Attraction, Basic Instinct, The Hand that Rocks the Cradle, etc.). 
On the other hand, there was also a cycle of gay and lesbian films that expanded 
the representations of sexuality, and many films written, directed, or produced 
by women or men wishing more complex, varied, and progTessive representations 
of gender and gender relations. 
Moreover, althoug'h there was a return to big'-budget films, there was also a 
wave of successes by independent filmmakers like John Sayles, Susan Seidelman, 
Spike Lee, and Robert Rodriguez, who turned over respectable profits on low­
budget films, and so Hollywood itself began financing' some off-beat films and 
allowed a new generation of filmmakers to enter the mainstream. Many of these 
were women, people of color, or more socially critical types; hence more diverse 
representations of gender, race, and class were produced and circulated. At this 
time, a multi-cultural-focussed cultural studies developed as a major approach 
to film and cultural criticism, and a proliferation of new critical strategies 
emerg·ed. There was an especially intense focus on audience research, on how 
audiences produced meanings, on how films mobilized pleasure and influenced 
audiences, and how audiences decoded and used the materials of media 
culture. Consequently, a wide rang'e of positions appeared on the relationship 
between film, media culture, and its audiences (see the discussion in Staig'er 
1991). 
During the 1990s, globalization has made Hollywood film an ever more 
familiar and popular artifact throughout the world. Whereas Hollywood films 
have dominated the world market for decades, it is even more the case today with 
American global corporations playing an important role in distributing its prod­
ucts throughout the world. Hollywood films are the most capital-intensive and 
thus have the most spectacular special effects; they are effectively marketed 
throughout the world and are popular everywhere. In Canada, for instance, 
about 95 per cent of films in movie theaters are American; US 
television dominates Canadian television; seven American firms control distribu­
tion of sound recordings in Canada; and 80 per cent of the magazines on 
newsstands are non-Canadian (The Washington Post National Weekly 
Edition, September 11-17, 1995: 18). In Europe, Hollywood films comprise 
75-80 per cent of the box office, and the explosion of new TV channels has 
produced a boom in US television exports, bringing' in revenues of more than 
one billion dollars a year (Time, February 27, 1995: 36, 40). In Latin 
America, Asia, and other parts of the world, the situation is similar, with 
American media culture, commodities, fast food, and malls creating' a new global 
culture. 
To some extent globalization = Americanization, and Hollywood film is an 
effective culture industry which serves to sell the "American way of life" (on 
globalization and cultural identity, sec Cvctovich and Kellner 1996). Thus, there 
are debates throug'hout the world about limiting Hollywood film and other 
artifacts of US culture to a specific quota and providing' g'ovcrnment 
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support for national film cultures. The market ideology which has been dominant 
since the Thatcher/Reagan era, however, has militated against government 
regulation and quotas; hence Hollywood films continue to dominate the world 
market. 
Consequently, the products of the Hollywood culture industry and their 
relationships to US society, and indeed the entire world, are quite complex and 
require a multi-perspectival approach that dissects the political economy of the 
film industry and the production of film, provides critical and analytical readings 
of cinematic texts, and studies how audiences appropriate and use film and other 
cultural artifacts (see Kellner 1995 for elaboration of this model). Of course, in 
specific case studies, one might want to focus intensely on a single topic or 
dimension, but to grasp the full range of meanings and effects of Hollywood film 
one needs more complex and multi-dimensional approaches. 
Finally, we are currently undergoing one of the most dramatic technological 
revolutions of recorded history with new entertainment and information techno­
logies emerging, accompanied by unprecedented mergers ofthe entertainment and 
information industries (see Wasko 1994). These new syntheses are producing novel 
forms of visual and multi-media culture, in which it is anticipated that film will 
appear in seductive new virtual and interactive forms, accessible throug'h com­
puter, satellite, and other new technologies. There is feverish speculation that the 
Internet and its assorted technologies will create a new entertainment and 
information environment, and currently the major corporations and players are 
envisaging what sort of product and delivery system will be most viable and 
profitable for films and other entertainment of the future. Thus, one imagines 
that the culture industries producing and distributing film and other forms of 
media culture will continue to be highly significant as we approach a new century 
and perhaps a new era that will supply novel forms offilm and new types ofculture 
industry. 
l\Jotes 
On the Frankfurt School theory of the cultural industries, sec Horkheimer and 
Adorno 1972; Adorno 1991; the anthology edited by Rosenberg and White 1957; 
the readers edited by Arata and Gebhardt 1982 and Bronner and Kellner 1989; the 
discussions of the history of the Frankfurt School in Jay 1973 and Wiggershaus 1994; 
and the discussion of the Frankfurt School combination of social theory and cultural 
criticism in Kellner 1989, 1997. 
2 I've analyzed some of these effects from a reconstructed critical-theory perspective in 
studies of Hollywood film with Michael Ryan (1988), two books on American 
television (Kellner 1990, 1992), and a series of media cultural studies (Kellner 
1995; Best and Kellner, forthcoming). 
3 Sec Kellner 1989 and the texts in Bronner and Kellner 1989. 
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CHAPTER THIRTEEN
 
The Political Economy of Film 
Janet Wasko 
In the late 1970s, Thomas Guback wrote an essay entitled "Are We Looking at 
the Rig'ht Things in Film?" (1978), in which he argued that the study of cinema 
focussed overwhelmingly on criticism and theory, with a dash of atheoretical 
history. Guback's main point was that film studies typically neglected the 
analysis of cinema as an economic institution and as a medium ofcommunication. 
In his paper, Guback described an "institutional approach" to film, which 
looked very much like a political economic approach to the study of communica­
tion. While this approach has been distinctly identified in communication schol­
arship, it seems to be much less common within film studies. And while there 
may be more attention to the economics of film by cinema scholars these days, it 
might be argued that some of Guback's concerns are still quite valid. 
This chapter is based on the assumption that film is a form of mediated 
communication, and is thus appropriate for many of the approaches used in 
studying other forms of media. The chapter begins with a brief discussion of the 
political economy of communication and then focusses more specifically on 
the political economy of film, pointing to the significance of the approach, as 
well as identifying questions raised and methods used in this type of analysis. 
1 Defining the Tradition: Classical Political Economy 
Many of the descriptions of political economy of communication or media begin 
with a discussion of the general study of political economy, drawing on eight­
eenth-century Scottish enlightenment thinking and its critique in the nineteenth 
century. For Adam Smith, David Ricardo, and others, the study of economic 
issues was called political economy and was grounded in social theory. Smith 
defined political economy as the study of "wealth" (material goods) or the 
allocation of resources, and was concerned with "how mankind arranges to 
allocate scarce resources with a view toward satisfying certain needs and 
not others" (1776). Further, political economy focussed on the production, 
221 
Janet Wasko 
distribution, exchange, and consumption of wealth and the consequences for the 
welfare of individuals and society. More specifically, these economists studied 
one arrangement for the allocation of resources- capitalism, as a system of social 
production. 
Classical political economy evolved as capitalism evolved, adding Marx and 
Engels' historical materialism and class analysis in the nineteenth century, and 
emphasizing a radical critique of the evolving capitalist system through a moral 
stance in opposition to the unjust and inequitable characteristics of that system. 
During the second half of the nineteenth century, however, there was a 
fundamental shift in the study of economic issues. As the focus changed from 
macro- to microanalysis, emphasis was placed on individual rather than societal 
concerns, and the methods used came from the social sciences rather than from 
moral philosophy. These changes were represented in the basic shift in the name 
of the discipline -- from political economy to economics. 
The person responsible for the name change, William Jevons, suggested that 
economics was the study of "the mechanics of utility and self interest ... to satisfy 
our wants to the utmost with the least effort ... to maximize pleasure is the 
problem of economics" (1970). As a more recent economist has explained, the 
"nco-classical economists made a sharper distinction than their predecessors had 
done between the explanation of What Is in an economic system and the 
consideration of What Oug'ht To Be" (R. D. Collison Black, quoted in Jevons 
1970). 
Although neoclassical economics prevails today, political economy has sur­
vived in different forms. In communication studies, radical, critical, or Marxian 
political economy has been applied to the study of communication and has been 
recognized as a distinct tradition. In The Political Economy of Communication 
(1996), Vincent Mosco has defined this version of political economy as "the 
study of the social relations, particularly power relations, that mutually constitute 
the production, distribution and consumption of resources" (25). He explains 
that political economy is about survival and control, or how societies are organ­
ized to produce what is necessary to survive and how order is maintained to meet 
societal goals. Mosco further delineates four central characteristics of critical 
political economy, which are helpful in understanding' this approach: 
1 Social change and history. Political economy continues the tradition of 
classic theorists, uncovering the dynamics of capitalism - its cyclical nature, 
the growth of monopoly capital, the state apparatus, etc. 
2 Social totality. Political economy is a holistic approach or, in concrete 
terms, studies the relationship among commodities, institutions, social rela­
tions, and hegemony, exploring the determination among these clements, 
although some clements are stressed more than others. 
3 Moral philosophy. Critical political economy also follows the classical the­
orists' emphasis on moral philosophy, including not only analysis of the 
economic system, but discussion of the policy problems and moral issues 
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which arise from it. For some contemporary scholars, this is the distinguish­
ing' characteristic of political economy. 
4 Praxis. Finally, political economists attempt to transcend the distinction 
between research and policy, orienting their work toward actual social change 
and practice, or, as Marx pointed out, "Philosophers have sought to under­
stand the system, the point is to chang'e it." 
Mosco's model draws strongly on the work of British political economists 
Peter Golding and Graham Murdock, who distinguished critical political eco­
nomy from mainstream economics: it is holistic, historical, centrally concerned 
with the balance between capitalist enterprise and public intervention, and "g'oes 
beyond technical issues of efficiency to engage with basic moral questions of 
justice, equity and the public good" (Golding and Murdock 1991). 
These explanations set the stage or provide the grounding for applying' 
political economy to the study of communication. 
2 Political Economy Applied to Communication 
The academic study of communication has not always embraced economic 
analysis, much less a political-economic approach. During the 1940s and 1950s, 
communication scholars focussed primarily on individual effects and psycholo­
gically oriented research, with little concern for the economic context in which 
media is produced, distributed, and consumed. 
In the 1950s and early 1960s, former Federal Communication Commission 
economist and University of Illinois professor Dallas Smythe urged scholars to 
consider communication as an important component of the economy and to 
understand it as an economic entity. In 1960, he presented one of the first 
applications of political economy to communication, defining the approach as 
the study of political policies and economic processes, their interrelations and 
their mutual influence on social institutions (1960). He argued that the central 
purpose of applying political economy to communication was to evaluate the 
effects of communication agencies in terms of the policies by which they are 
organized and operated, or to study the structure and policies of communication 
institutions in their social settings. Smythe further delineated research questions 
emanating from policies of production, allocation or distribution, and capital, 
organization and control, concluding that the studies that might evolve from 
these areas were practically endless. 
In the 1970s, Murdock and Golding defined political economy of communica­
tion as fundamentally interested in studying communication and media as com­
modities produced by capitalist industries (1974). The article represented "a 
ground-breaking exercise ... a conceptual map for a political economic analysis of 
the media where none existed in British literature" (Mosco 1996: 102). A later 
work placed political economy within the broader framework of critical and 
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Marxist theory, with links to the Frankfurt School, as well as to other critical 
theorists (Murdock and Golding 1979). Nicholas Garnham further outlined the 
approach, noting that the political economy of communication involves analyzing 
"the modes of cultural production and consumption developed within capitalist 
societies" (1979: 125). 
Political economy draws upon several disciplines - specifically history, eco­
nomics, sociology, and political science. And while some may question whether 
or not a specific methodology is involved, the study of political economy draws 
on a wide range of techniques and methods, including' not only Marxist econo­
mics, but methods used in history and sociolog'y, especially power-structure 
research and institutional analysis. 
Because historical analysis is mandatory, the approach is able to provide 
important insight into social change and movement. Political economy becomes 
crucial in order to document communication in total social context. Interrelation­
ships between media and communication industries and sites of power in 
society are necessary for the complete analysis of communications and help to 
dispel some common myths about our economic and political system, especially 
the notions of pluralism, free enterprise, competition, etc. Through study of 
ownership and control, political economists analyze relations of power and 
confirm a class system and structural inequalities. In that the position includes 
economic and political analysis, it is therefore necessary grounding for ideological 
readings and cultural analysis. And through identification of contradictions, 
political-economic analysis provides strategies for intervention, resistance, and 
change. 
While the approach does not claim to explain everything, political economists 
have examined a wide range of communication and media practices, including 
the traditional mass media and, more recently, computers and information 
technologies and users. As it is nearly impossible to briefly trace the rich history 
and wide rang'e ofcommunication theory and scholarship that draws on a political 
economic tradition, only a few examples will be mentioned here. (See Mosco 
1996 for a detailed overview.) 
Political economy has been especially relevant in analyzing international com­
munication. For instance, Herbert Schiller's extensive work (beginning with 
Schiller 1969) has been important in critiquing the US communication system, 
its government and military ties, and its international extension. In Latin Amer­
ican and Europe, Armand Mattelart's various studies of international commun­
ication have made important contributions to the discussion of cultural 
imperialism (see Mattelart and Siegalaub 1979). Another good example is Gerald 
Sussman's work, especially on Southeast Asia, which has emphasized Third­
World issues (for instance, Sussman 1984). 
The analysis of media concentration and the implications for media content 
and democratic ideals have been the focus of many studies, including Edward 
Herman and Noam Chomsky's Manufacturing Consent (1988) and Ben Bagdi­
kian's The Media Monopoly (1997). 
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New technologies have been examined in a number of political economic 
studies, such as Mosco's The Pay-Per Soeie~y (1989), Dan Schiller's Telematies 
and Government (1986), and a more recent collection edited by McChesney et al., 
Capitalism and the Information Age (1998). 
Despite the broad definitions discussed previously, the study of the political 
economy of communication is still often considered narrow and deterministic, 
accused of focussing primarily on the economic or on the production side of the 
communication process, and neglecting texts, audiences, and consumption. 
Another common misconception is that political economists are concerned only 
with ownership and control questions. 
Over the years, political economists have defended their theoretical positions 
and research from extreme and inaccurate accusations, but also have attempted to 
respond to reasonable criticism of the approach (compare Murdock and Golding 
1974 and 1996). Some of this discussion has taken place in the flurries of 
theoretical debates between political economy and cultural studies (for instance, 
Garnham 1995; Grossberg 1995). 
In addition, a few political economists have directed attention to the process of 
"rethinking" political economy (Meehan et al. 1994). Mosco's volume on the 
political economy of communication (1996) is subtitled "Rethinking and 
Renewal", with an attempt to redefine political economy in the broad terms of 
commodification, spatialization, and structuration, as well as examining political 
economy's relation to cultural studies and policy studies. Others have specifically 
combined political economy with other approaches, such as textual analysis, 
audience studies, or ethnographies (Pendakur 1993). 
Thus, the tradition is actually much more complex than some critics claim. It 
is important to remember that the study of political economy encompasses 
political as well as economic analysis. Indeed, the political cannot be separated 
from the economic. Understanding interrelationships between communication 
industries, the state, other economic sectors, and key power bases is crucial for a 
complete analysis of the communication process, and thus involves research 
issues that are not always related directly to texts, audiences, or consumption. 
Though studies of ownership patterns and the dynamics of control are essential, 
political economic analysis is much more extensive than merely identifying and 
then condemning those who control media and communication resources. 
3 Political Economy and Media Economics 
It may be helpful to discuss another approach to studying economic issues in 
communication, that is, media economics. As mentioned previously, more specific 
attention to economics has been evident in the field of communication and media 
studies since the late 1980s, with scholars identifying media economics as a 
distinct focus of research activity. Examples include texts by Robert Picard 
(1989), Alan Albarron (1996), and Allison Alexander et al. (1993), as well as 
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The Journal ofMedia Economics, which was introduced in 1988. The goal of the 
journal is "to broaden understanding and discussion of the impact of economic 
and financial activities on media operations and managerial decisions." Gener­
ally, these media economics texts and the journal echo the concerns of main­
stream (neoclassical) economics. As the journal's first editor explains: 
Media economics is concerned with how media operators meet the informational 
and entertainment wants and needs of audiences, advertisers and society with 
available resources. It deals with the factors influencing production of media 
goods and services and the allocation of those products for consumption. (Picard 
1989: 7) 
For the most part, the emphasis of media economics is on microeconomic 
issues rather than macroanalysis, and primarily on producers and consumers in 
media markets. Typically, the concern is how media industries and companies 
can succeed, prosper, or move forward. While competition may be assessed, little 
emphasis is placed on questions of ownership or the implications of concentrated 
ownership and control. These approaches avoid the kind of moral grounding 
adopted by political economists, as most studies emphasize description (or "what 
is") rather than critique (or "what ought to be"). A common approach is the 
industrial organization model, as described by Douglas Gomery: 
The industrial organization model of structure, conduct, and performance pro­
vides a powerful and useful analytical framework for economic analysis. Using it, 
the analyst seeks to define the size and scope of the structure of an industry and 
then go on to examine its economic behavior. Both of these steps require analyzing' 
the status and operations of the industry, not as the analyst wishes it were. 
Evaluation of its performance is the final step, a careful weighing of "what is" 
versus "what ought to be." (1989: 58) 
In addition, communication scholars have contributed organizational studies, 
which call attention to economic characteristics of media and communication 
industries, as well as emphasizing policy and regulatory developments (see 
Turow 1984; Tunstall and Palmer 1991). 
4 The Study of the Economics of Film 
It is clear that much more economic analysis has been done in film studies since 
Guback's critique in the 1970s. Generally, economic approaches to film can still 
be characterized as Allen and Gomery did in their discussion of economic film 
history in 1985. Allen and Gomery describe, and obviously favor, an institutional 
or industrial organizational model, following Gomery's description of media 
economics above. Examples of an industrial analysis include Gomery's early 
work on the introduction of sound, followed by studies of exhibition, etc. More 
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recently, Justin Wyatt's analysis of "high concept" as a dominant force in 
contemporary Hollywood draws directly on industrial organization economics 
(Wyatt 1994: 65--6). Much of the work in edited collections on the film industry 
more or less explicitly follow an industrial model (see Balio 1976; Kindem 1982). 
Allen and Gomery also describe a Marxist critique in economic film history, 
singling out Thomas Guback's work as an example. While Guback draws on 
Marxist theory, one might argue that his work could better be described as 
political economy of film, as described below. Allen and Gomery note that a 
Marxist economic critique typically has been linked to the analysis of a particular 
film or set of films, which has not necessarily been the goal of Guback's research. 
More appropriate is Janet Staiger's work (Bordwell et al. 1985), in which she 
outlines a "Hollywood mode of production" obviously drawing on Marxist 
concepts, but primarily interested in film style. Interestingly, Staiger's work is 
described on the University of Texas website as "the economic history and the 
dynamics of the industry and its technology." 
5 Political Economy of Film 
I would argue that political economy represents a distinctly different approach to 
the study of film, yet has not received as much recognition within cinema studies. 
The political economy of film must incorporate those characteristics that define 
political economy generally, as discussed previously: i.e. social change and 
history, social totality, moral grounding, and praxis. 
Fundamentally, the political economy of film must understand motion 
pictures as commodities produced and distributed within a capitalist industrial 
structure. As Pendakur notes, film as a commodity must be seen as a "tangible 
product and intangible service" (1990: 39-40). Similar to industrial analysts, the 
approach is most definitely interested in questions pertaining to market structure 
and performance, but a political economist analyzing these issues more often 
would challenge the myths of competition, independence, globalization, etc., and 
view the film industry as part of the larger communication and media industry, 
and society as a whole. For instance, the US film industry is not only important 
because its films are popular worldwide. Indeed, that is only the tip of the iceberg. 
Rather than celebrate Hollywood's success, political economists are interested in 
how US films came to dominate international film markets, what mechanisms are 
in place to sustain such market dominance, how the state becomes involved, how 
the export of film is related to marketing of other media products, what the 
implications are for indigenous film industries in other countries, and what 
political!cultural implications may stem from the situation. 
Most importantly, the political and ideological implications of these economic 
arrangements are relevant, as film must also be placed within an entire social, 
economic, and political context and critiqued in terms of the contribution to 
maintaining and reproducing structures of power. 
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Indeed, the focus on one medium or industry, such as film, may be seen as 
antithetical to political economy's attempt to go beyond merely describing the 
economic organization of the media industries. The political-economic study of 
film must incorporate not only a description of the state of the industry, but, as 
Mosco explains, "a theoretical understanding of these developments, situating' 
them within a wider capitalist totality encompassing class and other social rela­
tions [offering a] sustained critique from a moral evaluative position" (1996: 115). 
Some of the key distinctions between political economy and other models are 
the recognition and critique of the uneven distribution of power and wealth 
represented by the industry, the attention paid to labor issues and alternatives to 
commercial film, and the attempts to challenge the industry rather than accepting 
the status quo. 
5.1 Examples o.lstudies representing political economy o.ffilm 
While perhaps not as recognized as other approaches, the political economy of 
film is represented in a wide rang'e of research. Some classic economic studies fit 
much of the above description, but were not explicitly identified as political 
economy. For instance, Klingender and Legg's Money Behind the Screen (1937) 
examined finance capital in the film industry in 1937, tracing studio owners and 
their capitalist backers, while Mae Huettig's study of the film industry in the 
1930s documented the power inherent in the various sectors of the industry 
(Huettig 1944). 
More recently, Guback's work, especially those studies focussing on interna­
tional film markets, represents an ideal example of political economy of film. The 
International Film Industry (1969) presented primary documentation about how 
the US domination of European film industries intensified after 1945, with the 
direct assistance of the US government. Guback followed this classic study with 
several articles documenting the international extension of US film companies in 
the 1970s and '80s, especially emphasizing the role of the state in these activities 
(in Balio 1976). In another article, Guback defended a nation's right to resist 
Hollywood's domination and develop its own film industry based on economic 
and cultural factors (1989). Guback's in-depth outline of the US film industry in 
Who Owns the Media." (Compaine 1982) represents a strong critique ofHollywood 
structure and practices, as opposed to the other industrially oriented articles in 
the volume. 
Pendakur's study of the Canadian film industry employs a radical political 
economy of film, but also incorporates industrial org'anization theory to examine 
the market structure of Canadian film. "Marxian political economy's concern 
with power in class societies and its emphasis on a dialectical view of history help 
explain how the battle to create an indigenous film industry has been fought in 
Canada, in whose interests, and with what outcome" (1990: 39). 
Pendakur (1998) and Wasko (1998) have also examined labor issues in film, 
adding to the growing literature documenting the history of labor organizations 
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and workers in the US film industry. Wasko's other contributions include Movies 
and Mont:y (1982), which presented the historical development of relationships 
between Hollywood and financial institutions, and Hol(vwood in the InfOrmation 
Age (1994), which examined continuity and change in the US film industry 
relating to the introduction of new technologies during the 1980s and early 
1990s. In addition, Wasko, Phillips, and Purdie (1993) examined the ongoing 
commercialization of film, by focussing on growth of product placement, tie-ins, 
and merchandising activities in film marketing. 
Meanwhile, many other scholars have taken a political-economic approach in 
looking at various aspects of film. Nicholas Garnham incorporated an analysis of 
the "Economics of the US Motion Picture Industry" to exemplify the produc­
tion of culture in his collection Capitalism and Communication (1990). Aksoy and 
Robins's "Hollywood for the 21st Century" (1992) is also a good example of a 
study that focusses on issues of concentration and globalization and draws 
fundamentally on political economy. Another example is Prindle's Risky Busi­
ness: The Political Economy ofHol(ywood (1993). 
Despite these various studies, it still might be argued that political economy is 
much less common in film studies than in communication research. If so, then 
why? It is possible that Guback's explanations in the 1978 essay mentioned at the 
beginning of this chapter are still relevant. He argued that one of the reasons that 
there is so much textual film analysis is the relatively easy access to film texts. In 
other words, scholars depend on the material that is available for study, whether 
it be film texts or industry-supplied information. Even though more popular 
media attention now centers on the film or entertainment industry through 
stories and programs (such as Entertainment Tonight), including stories that 
explore film production and box office numbers, it is mostly coverage generated 
by the industry itself and hardly critical. 
Indeed, it is sometimes still a challenge to find reliable and relevant data about 
the film industry on which to base a critical analysis. For instance, where can one 
find accurate production figures beyond the rumour mill, as reported in Varie~y 
or other trade publications? The recent attention to the box oHice receipts from 
Titanic again draws attention to the mystical accounting methods used by Holly­
wood to determine profit and loss for specific films. Other areas also remain 
mired in mystery: for instance, where is it possible to find accurate or meaningful 
figures on stock ownership of film companies or the corporations that own them? 
The type of information that is available tends to lend itself especially well to 
congratulatory coverage of the industry's triumphs. But it also might be argued 
that much scholarly writing on the industry is not critical anyway, resisting any 
criticism of the status quo and basically supportive of the way things are. Even 
when information is available, the commercial and profit-motivated goals of the 
industry are assumed, and rarely questioned. 
On the other hand, one might also wonder why film is less often included in 
much of the work in political economy of communication? While film appears in 
general overviews of communication or media industries, it seems to receive less 
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careful analysis than other forms of media or communication Gowett and Linton 
1980). One obvious reason may be the academic fragmentation that still some­
times separates film studies from media and communication studies in university 
organizational charts, professional organizations, and scholarly journals. Of 
course, one explanation is that film studies typically has been based in the 
humanities, while communication and media studies tend to draw more on the 
social sciences. Beyond this frag'mentation, thoug'h, there also may be different 
perceptions of film's importance for communication scholars. Film still often 
represents "only entertainment," thus not as worthy of scholarly attention as 
news and information programming', or computer and information technologies. 
These oversights need to be addressed if we are to understand film in its social 
context. These days, film must be considered as part of the larger communica­
tions and media industry. More than ever before, distribution outlets such as 
cable and satellite services link news, information, and entertainment programs; 
and sometime in the future it seems likely that there will be further links via new 
dig'ital and multi-media forms. It is no longer novel to observe that news is 
looking more like entertainment, with new forms evolving, such as infotainment, 
docudramas, etc. 
But importantly, these activities are, more than ever, under the same corporate 
ownership. Films are produced by the same companies that are involved with 
other media and communications activities, and it is no secret that fewer and 
fewer giant corporations control these activities. These multi-national corpora­
tions have diversified into all areas of the media, sometimes attempting to 
maximize profitability by building synergy between their corporate divisions. 
For some of these companies, film plays a key role in these synergistic efforts, as 
corporations such as the Walt Disney Company build product lines which begin 
with a film but continue through television, cable, publishing, theme parks, 
merchandising', etc. These days, companies like Disney not only distribute 
products to these outlets, but own the outlets. 
In addition, it may be useful for communication scholars to look more closely 
at the international expansion of the US film industry to better understand the 
historical evolution of current globalization trends. While the expansion of global 
markets may be relatively new for some media, the US film industry developed 
global marketing techniques as early as the 1920s and continues its dominant 
position in international media markets today. 
S.2 What is to be done? 
In addition to the cross-media analysis that is called for above, there are other 
links that political economists need to make, responding to the critiques of the 
approach discussed earlier. It is apparent to many political economists that 
cultural studies, whether centered on film or other areas, offers important 
insights that are crucial to understanding the reception of media products and 
their ideological significance. As critical cultural analysts come to an awareness of 
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the significance of political-economic grounding, productive links might be made 
to integrate research, policy efforts, and other practical activities. 
Political economists have been accused of ignoring the audience or the con­
sumption side of the production equation, an issue dealt with by Wasko and 
Hagen (1999) in a volume that includes both reception analysts and political 
economists discussing issues relating to audiences and consumption. 
Other linkages need to be forged with researchers who share similar political 
commitments. For instance, political economy has neglected many of the issues 
posed by feminist theorists. A forthcoming collection by Eileen Meehan and 
Ellen Riordan specifically addresses this blind spot and promises to make an 
important contribution to forging these links. 
Another area that needs more attention is the application of political-economic 
analysis to practice, or actually challenging the industries that we are critiquing. 
Many scholars contribute a great deal through teaching and "enlightening" 
students, who may ultimately go on to work for media companies. "However, 
developing strategies to affect the policies and activities of the communication 
and entertainment industries is still a real challenge for critical researchers. 
One indication that some of the issues raised in this chapter have been 
recognized within film studies is the theme for the 1999 Society for Cinema 
Studies conference: Media Industries: Past, Present and Future. It indicates how 
media beyond film have been integrated into previously exclusive cinema studies, 
but also concretely acknowledges the importance of economic and industry 
issues. The conference description reads: 
Topics for panels and papers might include media industry issues concerning 
production, distribution and exhibition, regulatory parameters, the relationship 
between technological change and industrial structure, international industry 
comparisons, institutional/industrial issues concerning independent, and alterna­
tive media and studies in political economy ofthe mass media. (from SCS website, my 
emphasis) 
As the industry and its wealth become ever more concentrated, it will be 
increasingly difficult to avoid the issues and analysis that a political economy of 
film offers; thus one might expect the approach to become even stronger in the 
future. 
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Digital Transformation
 
Henry Jenkins 
Don't you wish that somebody, in 1895, 1897 or at least in 1903, had realized thc 
fundamental significance of the cinema's emergence and produced a comprehensive record 
of a new medium's emergence? Interviews with the audiences; a systematic account of the 
narrative strategies, scenography and camera positions as they developed year by year; an 
analysis of the connections between the emerging language of cinema and different forms of 
popular entertainment which co-existed with it, would have been invaluable.... In contrast 
to a hundred years ago, when cinema was coming into being, we are fully aware of the 
significance of this new media revolution. And yet I am afraid that future theorists and 
historians of computer media will be left with not much more than the equivalents of 
newspaper reviews and random bits of evidence similar to cinema's first decade.... They 
will find that analytical texts from our era arc fully aware of the significance of the 
computer's takeover of culture yet, by and large, they mostly contain speculations about 
the future rather than a record and a theory of the present. 
Lev Manovich, "Cinema as a Cultural Interface" 
In his essay "Cinema as a Cultural Interface," Lev Manovich laments the failure 
of contemporary media scholars to record "the moment when the icons and the 
buttons of multimedia interfaces were like wet paint on a just completed painting, 
before they became a universal convention and slipped into invisibility." Histor­
ians of early cinema can return to the prints of early films preserved in archival 
collections around the world to trace the process of stylistic experimentation and 
discovery. Many significant early films no longer exist - but enough exist to make 
the reconsideration of early films a central focus of cinema studies today. A 
historian of the Web, even one writing today, would face much greater difficul­
ties. The early websites, made less than a decade ago, no longer exist, swamped 
by rapid growth, quickly scuttled and replaced, leaving no archival records. 
Writing the history of digital media will be much more like writing the history 
of a transitory medium, like early radio or vaudeville, than like documenting the 
evolution of a textual medium, like the printing press or the cinema. Rapid 
technological transformation may prevent future generations from accessing 
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and reading many survIvmg texts and artifacts (computer games, software, 
hypertext narratives). We can still project old films, but they won't have the 
operating systems to play old video games, which are more like the wax phono­
graph cylinders than like books or films. Media scholars are therefore obligated to 
record our observations, to document technological and aesthetic change, and to 
preserve evidence of new media's impact. 
Manovich also correctly captures - and to some degTee manifests - the 
temporal flux characteristic of contemporary digital theory, looking to the past 
(for antecedents) and to the future (for the fulfillment of utopian promises) but 
rarely at the present (for crude prototypes for what is to come). Yet Manovich's 
discussion, which distinguishes between "newspaper reports, diaries of cinema's 
inventors, programs offilm showings and other bits and pieces" on the one hand 
and academic theory on the other, preserves distinctions that are breaking down 
as the function and status of theory responds to the digital revolution. From a 
contemporary perspective, one wonders why Moving Picture World's Epes Win­
thrope Sargent, who articulated the core principles of the emerging classical 
Hollywood cinema, isn't as much an early film theorist as Serg'ei Eisenstein, who 
used theory to explain his own filmmaking practices. Many digital theorists have 
more in common with Sargent or Eisenstein than with Foucault or Derrida. 
If academic writers cast their eyes on the future, journalists (Rheingold 1993; 
Katz 1997a; Dibble 1994; Brand 1988; Herz 1996) and media activists (Horn 
1998; Dyson 1998; Cherny and Weise 1996) have provided accounts of the early 
days of the Internet, the evolution of the video game, women's hostile reception 
on-line, and MUD (Multiple User Domain) debates about democracy and virtual 
communities. Thomas McLaughlin (1996) has offered the term "vernacular 
theory" to refer to theorizing outside the academy, offering compelling case 
studies of the different modes of theory formation among school teachers, 
advertising executives, fans, media activists, or New Age visionaries, and verna­
cular theory abounds in the digital realm. We are often told that the Internet is a 
"world without gatekeepers," which opens public debates beyond the confines of 
elite universities. Amy Bruckman (1996) describes this new participatory culture: 
"Cyberspace is not Disneyland. It's not a polished, perfect place built by 
professional designers for the public to obediently wait on line to passively 
experience it. It's more like a finger-painting party. Everyone is making things, 
there's paint everywhere, and most work only a parent would love." Do-it­
yourself theory-making is sloppy business which doesn't accept academic theo­
ry's rules or standards. 
What counts as theory and what theory does are questions that rarely get asked 
in summary essays like this one. Theory will be understood here as any attempt to 
make meaningful generalizations for interpreting or evaluating local experiences 
and practices. When we make claims about what e-mail is, what it does, how it 
changes how we relate to people, its potentials for reshaping traditional practices 
and institutions, or how it differs from letter-writing or phone calls, we are 
theorizing digital media. Academic and vernacular theory carry different degrees 
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of prestige, speak different languages, ask different questions, and address 
different audiences, though the line between them is rapidly breaking down. 
For example, when someone like Nicholas Negroponte, the head ofMIT's Media 
Lab, writes a regular column in Wired, does he write as an academic or a 
vernacular theorist? Is his status fundamentally different from the provocative 
political journalist John Heilman, who has also published in Wired but has no 
university affiliation? Even some early works of digital theory, such as Vannever 
Bush's influential "As We May Think," first published in Atlantic Month6! in 
1945, appeared not in scholarly journals but in mass-market magazines. Alluc­
quere Rosanne Stone (1995) has used the term "code switching" to refer to her 
shifts in tone, language, and address as she goes from chat groups to academic 
conferences, from corporate trade shows to avant-garde arts exhibitions. Mar­
shall McLuhan's "global village" surfaces as the name of a corporate knowledg'e­
management program, alongside quotations from Understanding Media (McLu­
han and Lapham 1994). Theory has become central to how businesses operate, 
how politicians plan their campaigns, and how consumers make choices. 
What counts as digital media may also be up for grabs. Digital theory may 
address anything from the role of CGI (Computer Graphics Interface) special 
effects in Hollywood blockbusters to new systems of communication (the Inter­
net), new genres of entertainment (the computer game), new styles of music 
(techno), or new systems of representation (digital photography or virtual real­
ity). All of these different things reflect a shift from the computer as a tool, 
primarily understood in terms of information storage and numerical calculation, 
to the computer as a medium of communication, education, and entertainment. 
Each attracts their own cadre of theorists asking different questions: e-mail poses 
questions about virtual community; digital photography about the authenticity 
and reliability of visual documentation; virtual reality about embodiment and its 
epistemological functions; hypertext about readership and authorial authority; 
computer games about spatial narrative; MUDs about identity formation; web­
cams about voyeurism and exhibitionism; and so forth. The multiplicity of digital 
media makes writing' a totalizing account impossible. The same might be true of a 
theory of print culture or of the cinema. However, theorists working on those 
earlier media privilege one form or function over others. Literature becomes the 
study of novels, short stories, and philosophical essays, not, at least until recently, 
of manners books, instructional manuals, travel narratives, or reference works. 
Cinema studies focusses primarily on commercial feature-film production and 
not home movies, instructional films, corporate promotional videos, or exercise 
tapes. Cyberspace is not one place or one thing. Digital theory struggles with its 
multiplicity, hybridity, and fluidity. 
In a period of prolonged change, digital theory is more than an academic 
exercise. Digital media impacts all aspects of Western society, from education to 
politics, from business to the arts. Journalists, science-fiction writers, ideologues, 
entrepreneurs, activists, classroom teachers, rock stars, Supreme Court judges, 
and government regulators are both consumers and producers of digital theory. 
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For many, theorizing restores predictability and stability to a world rocked by 
radical change, while for others, theory fuels change, directing the energies 
unleashed by the digital revolution toward altering the nature of political life or 
personal identity. Our fantasies and fears about change shape our theories 
(including supposedly disinterested academic theories) as much as our 
theories help master those fears and fulfill those fantasies. Theories often reflect 
our points of entry into digital culture, the difference between a generation that 
initially encountered digital media as technologies of the workplace (word­
processing) and those for whom digital media are technologies of recreation 
(computer games) or personal communication (chat rooms). For one group, 
digital media will be likely understood as technologies counterposed to the fleshy 
and spiritual aspects of human life. For the other, digital media are understood in 
terms of the social relations they facilitate and thus as integral to how we live 
within families, make love, express intimate thoughts, and have fun in the late 
twentieth century. 
Because digital media are changing rapidly, the state of digital theory is also 
evolving at a dramatic pace. One book editor who had sought to analyze and 
evaluate the CD-ROM disk as a new medium discovered that CD-ROM was 
surpassed by DVD in the time it took him to get his contract, solicit and edit 
contributions, and get the book published and into the stores (Smith 1999). An 
important study on the impact of race on access to the Internet (Hoffman and 
Novak 1998) was deemed out of date upon publication, well before we could 
process and respond to its challenges for cyberdemocracy. For those reasons, this 
chapter can, at best, represent a day in the life of digital theory, not an exhaustive 
map of an established field. 
1 Bridging the Two Cultures: The Artist and the Engineer 
This book is intended as an attempt to think about the object-world of technology as though 
it belonged to the world of culture, or as though these two worlds were united. For the truth 
is, they have been united all along. Was the original cave painter an artist or an engineer? 
She was both, of course, like most artists and engineers since. But we have a habit - long 
cultivated -- of imag'ining them as separate, the two great tributaries rolling steadily to the 
sea of modernity, and dividing everyone in their path into two camps: those that dwell on 
the shores of technology and those that dwell on the shores of culture. 
Steven Johnson, Interface Culture 
In the early 1990s, a group of graduate students and junior faculty members met 
regularly in the basement of the MIT Media Lab to read and discuss cultural 
theory. Reflecting their interests in the intersection between narrativelreader­
response theory and artificial intelligence, they called themselves the Narrative/ 
Intelligence Reading Group. Some of what the group read was predictable - the 
hypertext theories of Ted Nelson (1981), Roger Schank (1995) on storytelling 
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machines, Donna Haraway's "Cyborg Manifesto" (1985). Other selections were 
more idiosyncratic- Aristotle's Rhetoric, Clifford Geertz's "Thick Descrip­
tions" (1977), Andre Bazin's "Myth of Total Cinema" (1971a), or The Mem01:V 
Palace ofMatteo Ricci (Spence 1994). Occasionally, a visitor to the Media Lab, 
such as Samuel R. Delaney, joined the ongoing dialogue, yet the group never 
received official recognition or funds from the Media Lab and the students 
received no academic credit. As group members graduated, they continued to 
follow the Narrative/Intelligence electronic mailing and, in some cases, con­
ducted their own sessions with local research groups. As a founding member, I 
was often struck by how fluidly discussions moved from abstract principles to 
designing filtering systems, holograms, virtual reality programs, or interactive 
cinema projects. They looked upon theory not simply as a vocabulary for study­
ing things but as a tool for making things. Their Media Lab projects were always 
grounded in theories, sometimes simple-minded, sometimes sophisticated. Pro­
ject directors make assumptions not only about programming language or deliv­
ery systems but also about the nature of the society or the kinds of user their 
innovations would foster. For example, intelligent agents, digital entities that 
seek recommendations from like-minded users on the Web, depend upon the 
assumption that taste is systematic. If we share one set of preferences with 
someone else, we likely make other common judgments. These assumptions 
come very close to Pierre Bourdieu's theory of "habitus", the field of cultural 
choices (1984). And when some group members working on agents first looked at 
Bourdieu's cryptic maps and charts, they immediately saw them as interfaces to 
be operationalized, tested, and refined. 
These conversations were not fundamentally different from those at univer­
sities and corporations around the world. The early International Conferences on 
Cyberspace have been often described in languag'e approaching "alien encoun­
ters," as humanists and technologists saw each other as beings from other worlds, 
speaking unfamiliar languages, and asking out-in-orbit questions. Consider the 
titles of two representative essays from Michael Benedict's Cyberspace: First Steps 
(1994): "The Erotic Ontology of Cyberspace" (Heim 1994) and "Collaborative 
Engines for Multiparticipant Cyberspaces" (Tollander 1994). More recent gath­
erings, such as Harvard's Internet and Society conferences, find academic the­
orists, entrepreneurs, and computer scientists addressing a divergent yet shared 
body of concerns. Through such conversations, we are starting to find ways 
beyond the division, which C. P. Snow (1992) described, between the "two 
cultures," the utilitarian realm of science and engineering and the expressive 
realm of the humanities and the arts. 
This new fusion of the humanities and engineering reflects the shifting 
nature of the technologies themselves, what Bruce Sterling (1988) describes as 
the change from the "steam-snorting wonders" and massive dam projects of 
the early twentieth century to "technologies that stick to the skin" and 
become intimate parts of everyday life. As Michael Menser and Stanley 
Aronowitz argue: 
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The technological is not so easily distinguished from the "human," since it is 
within (medical technologies, processed foods), beside (telephones) and outside 
(satellites). Sometimes we inhabit it (the climate-controlled office space), or it 
inhabits us (a pacemaker). Sometimes it seems to be an appendage or prosthetic (a 
pair of eyeglasses); at other times, human beings appear to serve as the appendages 
(as in an assembly line). (1996: 9) 
Sherry Turklc documents the diverse ways that people are interacting with and 
conceptualizing computers, mapping sub-cultural responses (hackers, gamers), 
naive encounters (children), and gendered computing styles through sociological 
observation and psychological analysis. Her movement from The Second Sell 
(1984) to L~le on Screen (1997) maps the shift from personal computers to a 
world-wide network. The computer, she argues, is a "second self," an extension 
of our perceptions of our own identity, a vehicle for rethinking our relations with 
the world, and a metaphor for thinking about human intelligence. 
Cultural critics often act as if their importance lay in dethroning the scientific 
community's entrenched power. Yet the best digital theory emerges when the 
lines between the scientist/engineer and humanist/ artist are less clearly demar­
cated, when engineers integrate cultural theory into their design principles, when 
humanists learn how to program, and when digital artists theorize their own 
creative processes. Much important work on interactive fiction, for example, has 
come from people like Stuart Moulthrop (1990), Michael Joyce (1996), and 
Shelley Jackson (1997), who are also key hypertext authors. Eastgate Systems 
(http://www.eastgate.com) not only markets such pioneering works but also 
shapes their reception context, distributing theoretical and critical works, hosting 
conferences and seminars, publishing bibliographies. Marsha Kinder (1998) has 
translated her ideas about the needs to "deconstruct" race, sex, and gender into a 
computer game, Runaways. Digital composer Tod Makover has created and 
performed a musical work, Brain Opera (http://brainop.media.mit.edu), based 
on Marvin Minsky's Society ofMind (1988). Brenda Laurel (1990,1993, forth­
coming) works in Silicon Valley, not only theorizing the gendering of computer 
technology but creating new games for girls which put her ideas into practice. 
Digital theory often comes from humanists at technical institutes; its theorists list 
themselves as CEOs of start-up companies. 
Such projects necessarily challenge the "critical distance" which has domin­
ated much recent academic theory, though this ideal of "distance" has already 
undergone serious questions across many different disciplines.! Nothing would 
be served, either within the academy or in the business sector, by theorists' 
refusal to engage in designing digital technologies and critiquing practical devel­
opments. Often such conversations reveal strange and unexpected common 
interests, as in the discussions surrounding the development of "girls' games," 
where feminist academics interested in ensuring girls' early access to the tech­
nology and female entrepreneurs interested in broadening the software market 
found they might work together (Cassell and Jenkins 1998). The state of the 
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technology at that time reflected the unexamined goals of male game designers, 
who developed products that reflected their own tastes and interests, and, as a 
result, game systems required faster reaction time for fighting games but not the 
memory and processing necessary to establish more complex character relation­
ships. Both groups wanted to rethink what a computer game might look like and 
what kinds of pleasure it might incorporate, and they drew on similar intellectual 
perspectives to address those shared questions. The female game executives were 
themselves versed in feminist theory, often had liberal arts backgrounds, and did 
quantitative and qualitative research mapping girls' preferences and playing 
styles. Academic feminists, who sought more precise understandings of the 
gendering of game genres, sometimes found themselves consulting' with the 
games companies. 
One of my contributions to the discussions of the Narrative/Intelligence 
Group was the introduction of David Bordwell's work on the institutional and 
cultural contexts of early Soviet film theory, which closely parallels the activities 
of our contemporary humanities computing centers (1994). Early Soviet film­
makers, such as Sergei Eisenstein and Dziga Vertov, had professional training in 
engineering, architecture, and graphic design. They were recruited into filmmak­
ing in the wake of the Bolshevik revolution, seeking a fusion of arts and 
engineering at a time when technologization was seen as key in transforming 
Russia from a feudal state into a worker's utopia. They framed their theories in a 
language derived from those more technical backgrounds, with Vertov celebrat­
ing the "man with the movie camera" as part artist and part engineer, with 
Kuleshov speaking of his early works as "experiments," with Eisenstein writing 
about montage-editing in terms from Pavlovian reflexology. Their essays were 
written to justify their work to the Bolshevik Party leaders (a form of grant­
proposal-writing) or to explain to each other the lessons they had learned from 
specific projects (a form of lab-reporting). Any theoretical understanding was 
immediately converted into practical applications. Many digital theorists work in 
this same techne tradition, merging theory and practice. 
This fusion between theory and practice shapes not only the content of media 
theory but also the forms theory takes and the contexts within which it circulates. 
Digital theorists, such as William Mitchell (1996) and Seymour Papert (Papert 
and Negroponte 1996), have translated their books into interactive websites 
which allow readers to follow links relevant to their discussions and which 
support additional annotation, linkage, and electronic discussion from their 
readers. Digital ethnographer Ricki Goldman-Segall's website (1997) enables 
users to directly access video footage from her fieldwork and to form their own 
conclusions and interpretations. The most important developments in digital 
theory are often first introduced on-line and only belatedly appear in print. 
Stuart Moulthrop's Technocultures mailing list, for example, has facilitated an 
ongoing international conversation about core issues in the theory of hypertext 
and interactive cinema, substantially influencing its participants' theoretical 
writings. Phil Agre's The NetlJJork Observer (http://weber.ucsd.edu/~pagre/ 
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tno.html), a monthly electronic newsletter, is a vehicle for computer profes­
sionals to debate the social and political implications of their work. Bruce 
Sterling's Dead Media Project (http://griffin.multimedia.edu/~deadmedia) 
focusses on media inventions that failed or died out so that we gain a more 
skeptical attitude toward computer entrepreneurs' sweeping claims. A special 
issue of Postmodern Culture (http://calliope.jhu.edu/journals/postmodern_cul­
tureltoc/pmcv008.html#v008.2), edited by Robert Kolker, focussed on the 
potential application of digital media for traditional film studies and allowed 
contributors to develop a range of different models for writing cyberessays on 
subjects as diverse as Prospero's Books, Dziga Vertov, Casablanca, Singin' in the 
Rain, and The Killing. Some essays link in clips; others digitally map narrative 
space or even produce fly-by quicktime diagrams. Often, digital media enables 
theorists to enlarge their potential audience, as in the case of Berkeley's Bad 
Subjects (http://english-www.hss.cmu.edu/bs), whose monthly webzine of cul­
tural criticism and political theory attracts 20,000 connections a week. The 
Birmingham tradition of cultural studies originated in a context of open uni­
versities, which shaped not only its focus on the practices of everyday life, but 
also the tone and style of its early writing. Similarly, Bad Subjects' attempts to 
broaden the dialog'ue of cultural studies to a larger public is generating a more 
accessible, pragmatic, and forward-looking version of cultural theory. In general, 
the need to create theory one can use, the merger of humanities and engineering 
approaches, is producing a different style of scholarship from the more abstract 
theories that have dominated media studies in recent decades. 
2 Inventing the Future: Digital Theory and the Utopian Imagination 
If we don't invent the future, AT&T will. 
David Rodowick, "Audiovisual Culture and Interdisciplinary Knowledge" 
In "The Theory of the Virtual Class," Arthur Kroker and Michael A. Weinstein 
(1994) speak of" the growth of cyber-authoritarianism," which excludes from the 
debates about digital media all voices that are not "stridently pro-technotopia," 
bestowing an air of "inevitability" on the digital revolution. At the heart of this 
vision of a "wired shut" culture is their conception of the "virtual class," which 
theorizes, develops, and regulates cyberspace according to its own "radically 
diminished vision of human experience." Displaying the radical pessimism that 
has characterized critical theory since Adorno, "virtual life" gives Kroker and 
Weinstein a new way to speak about "false consciousness." Their depiction of the 
"virtual class" borders on conspiracy theory, seeing the "dig'erati" as totally 
calculating, totally coherent, totally in control. 
A fundamental technophobia runs through not only traditional humanism but 
the theories and critical practices of the old Left. Technology is understood as 
inhuman or anti-human, as destroying more organic pre-technological cultures. 
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Technology is viewed as the instrumentation of surveillance, power, and social 
control, rather than as a toolkit for social and political transformation. These 
writers fit digital media into a longstanding Left "alienation" from "the 
machine," critiquing the Internet's original support from the military as displa­
cing the old "military industrial complex" with the new "military-entertainment 
complex" (Herz 1997). Herbert Schiller writes: 
What the evidence here demonstrates is the strong, if not determining, influence of 
the social purpose that initially fostered the development of new technologies. The 
social uses to which this technology is put, more times than not, follow their 
originating purposes. When military or commercial advantage are the motivating 
forces, it is to be expected that the laboratories will produce findings conducive to 
these objectives. (1994: 45) 
Despite some of its limitations, critical pessimism serves important functions. 
It questions the more fanciful and zealous claims made for digital media (such 
as John Perry Barlow's proclamation that the nations of the world have no 
sovereignty over the citizens of cyberspace [1996]).2 They ask whether our 
hopes for democracy, social justice, political transformation, and free expression 
are getting coopted into the sales pitch for new software and hardware. In 
practice, Robert Adrian (1995) argues: "Increased bandwidth allows telephone 
space to be appropriated for commercial propaganda; occupied by infotainment 
commodities; turned into a shopping mall." We need to be vitally concerned 
with who controls our technological and economic base, recognizing that there is 
a significant overlap between those countries which have the greatest access to 
the Internet and those countries which consume the bulk of the world's 
resources. As in earlier industrial or technological revolutions, computers may 
displace workers from their jobs or bring employees under tighter supervision 
and control by their bosses. While we are busy celebrating a participatory 
medium without gatekeepers, most other sectors of the entertainment and 
information industries have increasingly fallen into the hands of a smaller and 
smaller number of media conglomerates. Critical pessimism stresses the dangers 
of information overload; too much information can be as disempowering as too 
little. 
As Lev Manovich (1996b) has noted, there is something distinctly American 
about the dominant currents of digital theory: 
For the West, interactivity is a perfect vehicle for the ideas of democracy and 
equality. For the East, it is another form of manipulation, in which the artist uses 
advanced technology to impose his/her totalitarian will on the people .... A 
western artist sees the Internet as a perfect tool to break down all hierarchies and 
bring the art to the people .... In contrast, as a post-communist subject, I cannot 
but see the Internet as a communal apartment of the Stalin era: no privacy, 
everybody spies on everybody else, always present line for common areas such as 
the toilet or the kitchen. 
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The dominant language in cyberspace remains English, the dominant ideology a 
characteristically American mixture of rugged individualism and civic libertar­
ianism. Not surprisingly, many foreign governments have built firewalls blocking 
their citizens from Internet access, much as they jam the Radio Free Europe 
signals coming over their borders. As some social critics note, the digital revolu­
tion may simply be another phase in the process of American cultural imperial­
ism, though others suggest it is a more complex version, since it does allow some 
channels for messages to be shipped back to the United States and impact its 
development (Stratton 1997). 
However, the old paradigms of critical pessimism ultimately lead to political 
paralysis and fatalism, another way of seeing technological expansion as inevit­
able and irreversible. Critical pessimism offers us few models of viable change, 
focussing only on the strength of entrenched power and the failure of all 
strategies of resistance. At its most reductive, critical pessimism scapegoats the 
media for all the faults of the current social order, rather than recognizing that 
digital media might offer new technical potentials for responding to the frag­
mentation of contemporary social life or the domestic isolation of children, 
housewives, and the elderly. Digital theory matters politically because of its 
ability to envision alternatives, to imagine a better future. Cyberspace provides 
a place to experiment with alternative structures of government, new forms of 
social relations, which may, at least on the most grassroots of levels, allow us to 
temporarily escape, if not fully transform, unacceptable social conditions in our 
everyday lives. 
Feminist critics, such as Brenda Laurel (forthcoming) and Allucquere 
Rosanne Stone (1995), have embraced the Amerindian myth of Coyote, the 
shapeshifter, to characterize digital media as enabling a breakdown of fixed sexual 
and social identities and a transformation of stable alignments of power. Donna 
Haraway (1985) has promoted the "cyborg," which exists at the interface 
between human and machine, not as a figure of dehumanization but as one that 
"denatures" gender and sexuality (Gray et a1. 1996). Summarizing this line of 
feminist argument, Anne Balsamo writes: "Cyborg identity is predicated on 
transgressed boundaries. They fascinate us because they are not like us and yet 
are just like us" (1996: 33). The metaphor of the cyborg' as a hybrid identity helps 
us to recognize that our gender identities are, at least, partially culturally 
manufactured, and, as such, gender may be reinvented, retooled, or repro­
grammed. Some argue, for example, that going on-line enables a radical recon­
ceptualization of the relationship between our selves and our bodies, potentially 
liberating us from a long legacy of biological determinism. Others would insist, 
however, that cyborg identities still require a physical transformation, a recon­
ceptualization of what it means to live within our bodies and that cyborg femin­
ism pulls us back to the material world. 
This prospect of "shapeshifting" or "cyborg" identities is being realized by 
gay and lesbian teens who go on-line to find a community where homophobia 
does not dominate, where the risks of "coming out" can be lowered, and where 
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they can experiment with more f1uid conceptions of their sexuality. The digital 
realm allows them room to find out who they are and what they want outside of 
the constant pressures at home or at school. For those teens, cyberspace is not a 
"virtual life" but rather a temporary alternative to their rather dystopian real­
world experiences at a time when gay and lesbian teens are three times more 
likely than their straight counterparts to commit suicide. However, many filter­
ing technologies block access to websites and discussion groups on the basis of the 
use of such words as "gay" and "lesbian," regardless of whether the sites include 
sexually explicit content. Such filters threaten to render that realm of alternative 
social interactions invisible and thus inaccessible to many who need it most 
(http://www.glaad.org/glaad/access_denied/exec-sum.html). 
Even the most utopian digital theory often contains some degree of skepticism 
about the future and criticisms of the present -- even if it remains only implicit. 
Michael Heim has framed the term "virtual realism" to describe the position 
taken by many digital theorists: "Virtual realism walks a tight rope. The delicate 
balancing act sways between the idealism of unstoppable Progress and the 
Luddite resistance to virtual life .... Virtual realism is an existential process of 
criticism, practice, and conscious communication" (1998: 43-4). As computer 
scientist Langdon Winner (1995) explains: 
Right now it's anyone's guess what sorts of personalities, styles of discourse, and 
social norms will ultimately flourish in these new settings... . We can predict, 
though, that American society will continue to exclude ordinary citizens from key 
choices about the design and development of new technologies, including' informa­
tion systems. Industrial leaders present as fait accomplis what otherwise might 
have been choices open for diverse public imaginings, investigations and 
debates .... People doing research on computing and the future could have a 
positive influence in these matters. If we're asking people to change their lives to 
adapt to new information systems, it seems responsible to solicit broad participa­
tion in deliberation, planning, decision making, prototyping, testing, evaluation 
and the like. 
Winner's essay poses two different conceptions of the utopian imagination - one 
in which the process of change is presented as inevitable and another in which 
alternative visions for the future are proposed and debated. The utopian imagin­
ation performs important political work. The entertainment industries, as 
Fredric Jameson (1979) notes, can only attract popular interest by acknowledging 
real-world fears and aspirations. In Jameson's model, those tensions are redir­
ected toward consumer capitalism's preferred solutions, utopian fantasies that 
can be satisfied through consumption. Alienation equals bad breath; mouthwash 
is the solution. Richard Dyer's account of utopianism in queer politics (1992), on 
the other hand, suggests that the utopian imagination can provide the basis for 
social critique. No meaningful change can occur until we can imagine a world 
different from our own: the queer teens' on-line experience of "what utopia feels 
like" may lead them to fight for it in their real lives. In that sense, the utopian 
244 
The Age of Digital Transformation 
imag'ination is not a refusal to face problems but rather a rhetorical strategy which 
allows us to move from a preoccupation with problems toward a new conceptua­
lization of solutions. 
Digital theory is closely related to a much older strain of technological utopian 
discourse in American culture, one which originated as middle-class reformers 
and political radicals proposed alternatives to the problems surrounding the 
industrial revolution (Segel 1984; Ross 1991). Writers like Edward Bellamy felt 
that improvements in technologies of communication and transportation might 
overcome conditions of alienation, improvements in mass production might 
overcome problems of scarcity, and a greater mastery over nature might cleanse 
soot-filled environments. However, they also called for profound shifts in the 
social structures and economic base of industrial society, linking technological 
change with political change. This technological utopianism arose at the moment 
when Frederic Jackson Turner was declaring the closing of the American 
frontier. Social alternatives to undesirable social conditions needed to be mapped 
onto the future rather than projected onto unsettled real estate. Technological 
utopianism was also the founding myth of the American science-fiction tradition, 
which took shape under the g'uidance of pulp-magazine editor Hugo Gernsbeck. 
Gernsbeck saw "scientifiction" as a means of democratizing access to knowledge 
about science and as an extension of his own vision of a more democratic and 
participatory culture broug'ht about through amateur radio. By mid-century, 
however, the discourse of technological utopianism had been coopted into a 
discourse about consumerism, one fully embraced by the nation's business 
leaders and promoted through advertising. The "world of tomorrow" envisioned 
by the 1939 New York World's Fair had more to do with creating a sense of 
inevitability that foreclosed popular debates about where we are going than with 
the earlier technological utopian movements' attempts to challenge current 
conditions. Both modes of the utopian imagination shape digital theory - both 
the bland boosterism, which sees the development of digital media as leading 
irreversibly toward a better way of life (Wired's linkage of democratic ideals and 
high-price consumer items), and the more cautious utopianism, which uses the 
future to question troubling aspects of contemporary life (coupling the promo­
tion of virtual communities with close scrutiny of issues of privacy, ownership, 
surveillance, and access). 
Philip Hayward (1993) notes that digital media have been situated in relation 
to the counter-culture, introduced to the popular imagination in terms borrowed 
from science fiction (such as "cyberspace," which was coined by William Gib­
son), the drug culture (such as Timothy Leary's promotion of VR's mind­
altering potential), and rock music (such as Grateful Dead stalwart John Perry 
Barlow's promotion of digital media). There is a surprisingly comfortable fit 
between cyberpunk's representations of the hacker sub-culture battling multi­
national media conglomerates and contemporary cultural studies' accounts of 
"poaching" and "resistance.,,3 Cyberpunk representations differ profoundly 
from the prevailing images of computer scientists as nerds with pocket protectors 
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or the "virginal" astronauts in earlier science fiction (Sobchack 1990). Cybercul­
ture was understood as a "revolutionary force" destroying the old media, such as 
television, which George Gilder (1994) describes as the "technology of tyrants." 
This same rhetoric of decentralization appealed to the libertarian impulses of 
both the Left and the Right, leaving unresolved whosc side was going to win the 
"digital revolution." 
As with earlier counter-cultures, therc is a danger that culture jammers (Dery 
1993), hackers (Sterling 1994), and netizens (Katz 1997a) will confuse the 
romance of existing on the fringes with the hard work of promoting social and 
political change. Gibson has noted, for example, that the more critical or dysto­
pian clements of Neuromancer (1994) have been ignored amid thc giddy excite­
mcnt that compels computer scientists to try to build the cyberspace he 
imagined. Gibson wrote his fiction less as a celebration of the transformative 
power of digital media than as a warning about the dangers of divorcing human 
intelligence from the body, of isolating the self from real-life experience, and of 
transforming human culture into data that can be controlled by global corpora­
tions. It is as if someone read Frankenstein and decided that it would be a good 
idea to assemble and mass-market human beings from parts of dead bodies. This 
failure to preserve both the critical and the utopian dimensions of Gibson's 
"cyberspace" does not bode well for the digital counter-culture's chances of 
achieving radical change. 
Almost as "revolutionary" on their own terms, hypertext theorists, such as 
Stuart Moulthrop (1991), Richard A. Lanham (1993), Robert Coover (1992, 
1993), George P. Landow (1991, 1994), and Espen J. Aarseth (1997), build 
upon post-structuralist literary theory to imagine digital media as reconfiguring 
the relations between readers, writers, and texts. Moulthrop (1989) writes: 
Hypertext is not a definable artifact like a bound volume, it is a dynamic, expan­
sible collection ofwritings whose contents will change from moment to moment. It 
is nothing at all like a book, only a bit like a library, and much more like the 
university itself in that it is shaped both by inherited resources and current 
contributions. Though part of the system will probably need to be permanent, it 
is probably better not to depend too heavily on a framework of canonical text or 
definitive discourse .... Every hypertext project should support writing as well as 
reading. The function of the hypertext is not simply to disseminate information 
but to create better conditions in which people can exchange, develop, and evaluate 
ideas. 
Moulthrop's conception of hypertext seeks to dismantle all that was rigid, 
hierarchical, and unidirectional in print culture. Sugg'esting that defenders of 
the book act as if "defending the wrapper would protect what was in the box," 
Richard Lanham (1993) characterizes hypertext as the literary fulfillment of the 
computer's promise of "radical dcmocratization." Hypertext will result in an 
education system where "you simply cannot be a critic without being in turn a 
creator." 
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At the heart of hypertext theory remains a constructivist epistemology, the 
belief that the best forms of learning require active participation and free 
exploration, a hands-on process of testing and manipulating one's surroundings. 
Hypertext theorists imagine new forms of literature or theoretical argument 
which enable the reader's more active participation and which open themselves 
to a much broader range of interpretations. As Aarseth explains: 
A reader, however strongly engaged in the unfolding of a narrative, is powerless. 
Like a spectator at a soccer game, he may speculate, conjecture, extrapolate, even 
shout abuse, but he is not a player .... The eybertext puts its would-be reader at 
risk: the risk of rejection. The effort and energy demanded by the cybertext of its 
reader raise the stakes of interpretation to those of intervention. (1997: 4) 
Early hypertext advocates, such as Ted Nelson (1981), imagined a world in which 
all human knowledge was available in digital form, open to access, annotation, 
and manipulation by all. His ideal is realized in a much more modest (and 
corporately sponsored) fashion in the World Wide Web. Other writers, such as 
Moulthrop (1995), acknowledge the dangers of getting lost in hypertext and the 
need to "steer between the extremes of informational anarchy and despotism." 
Paul Duguid has challeng'ed the rhetoric of "liberation" which surrounds 
hypertext: "The desire for a technology to liberate information from technology 
is not far from the search for a weapon to end all weapons or the war to end all 
wars.... As with so much optimistic futurology, it woos us to jump by high­
lighting the frying pan and hiding the fire" (1996: 76). Technology always 
emerges within a social and cultural context that constrains or facilitates its 
designer's goals. Hypertext theory envisions new forms of learning, knowledge, 
and expression; it does not always address the institutional and social changes 
needed to prepare us to participate in such a culture. At present, teachers who 
have always taught from county-approved textbooks and prescribed syllabi (such 
as in the US), are understandably intimidated by the promise that the Internet is 
a world without gatekeepers, uncertain how to evaluate the information they 
receive, and frightened of losing what little control they maintain over their 
classrooms. Others question whether part of the pleasure of reading a novel or 
watching a film might lie in surrendering control and allowing expert storytellers 
to manipulate our emotions. 
Formalist writers are also eager to use digital media as a vehicle for transform­
ing culture. Janet Murray's Hamlet on the Holodeck (1997) sees contemporary 
manifestations of digital media as the crude predecessors of a much more robust 
art form. Imagining the future storyteller as "half hacker, half bard," Murray 
"see[s] glimmers of a medium that is capacious and broadly expressive, a medium 
capable of capturing both the hairbreadth movements of individual human 
consciousness and the colossal crosscurrents of human society" (9). Murray's 
"cyberbard" represents at once a dramatic break with print culture and the 
continuation of literary creation into a strange and unfamiliar future. Feed 
magazine editor Steven Johnson's Interface Culture (1997) similarly imagines 
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computer interfaces developing ways of charting information and social structure 
in a highly mediated society, much as nineteenth-century authors turned to the 
novel to map what Charles Dickens called the "links of association" between 
different social classes. Murray and Johnson embrace change as a dynamic 
quality, which will generate new forms of human expression; both see digital 
media as offering new models for understanding psychological and social rela­
tions, for making coherence and order out of the information flow. 
Digital theory is not predictive, any more than science fiction is. Theorists and 
science-fiction writers don't foretell the future; they comment on the present. 
Few digital theorists claim to know for sure what directions digital media will 
take or what impact they are likely to have upon our social, political, and 
economic life. Digital theory is, in Allucquere Rosanne Stone's terms, "thor­
oughly experimental and subject to recall for factory modification at any time" 
(1995). In the end, Murray or Moulthrop may have less to tell us about the 
potentials of digital media than about the perceived limitations of existing media 
or the constraints of contemporary education. Rather, the future-orientation of 
digital theory represents an attempt to participate in the process of inventing the 
future. Calling on humanists to be inventors rather than custodians of their 
culture, James J. O'Donnell writes: "The genuine spirit of our culture is not 
expressed in applying small pieces of cellotape to hold together the structure we 
have received, but in pitching in joyously to its ongoing reconstruction" (1998: 
91). The most important thing digital theory can do is to refuse to accept the 
rhetoric of the sales prospectus and to continue to push the digital media to grow 
in new directions. Academic theorists have historically responded to static, if not 
moribund, media. Printed texts existed for centuries before there was an aca­
demic discipline focussed on the study of literature. Film studies arose only at the 
moment when the Hollywood cinema's influence as a central cultural institution 
was giving way to television. Television studies gained academic respectability at 
the moment when the dominance ofnetwork broadcasting was challenged by new 
delivery technologies such as cable or videotape. As Marshall McLuhan has 
noted, "media are often put out before they are thought out" (McLuhan and 
Lapham 1994), and the lag time can be enormous. Digital theory is responding to 
the process of change, describing and analyzing a medium (or cluster of media) 
still being born. 
Digital theorists identify and focus attention on sites of experimentation and 
innovation that hold promise for future developments, even when those sites 
counter the prevailing commercial logic of the marketplace. The danger, of 
course, is that they will reconstruct old cultural hierarchies, elevating avant­
garde digital works (afternoon, Patchwork Girl, ViCt01:Y Garden) at the expense of 
recog'nizing the cultural impact and artistic innovation of commercial products 
(.N(yst, Chop Suey). Already, these new works are being treated in separate 
anthologies, some of which deal with "digital cinema" as a new high art form, 
while others deal with games and CD-ROMs as popular culture. The best work 
on digital aesthetics, such as Murray's Hamlet on the Holodeck, bridges that gap, 
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imagining new forms of storytelling as both culturally meaningful and formally 
challenging, broadly accessible and innovative. . 
3 Mapping Change: Digital Theory and Historical Analysis 
The computer as hypertext, as symbol manipulator, is a writing technology in the tradition 
of the papyrus roll, the codex, and the printed book. The compnter as virtual reality, as 
graphics engine, as perceptual manipulator, belongs to and extends the tradition of televi­
sion, film, photography and even representational painting. 
David Jay Bolter, "Degrees of Freedom" 
Describing digital theory in terms of its focus on a developing technology and its 
future capacities may be misleading, since it is also vitally concerned with 
framing a historical account of media in transition,4 explaining changes and 
continuities between digital and earlier forms of media. Most of the participants 
at a 1994 conference on "The Future of the Book" (Nunberg 1996) found that 
they could not address the topic without also discussing how the culture of the 
book came into being. Our changing media environment has foregrounded the 
codex book's status as material practice sparking recent moves from the study of 
literature (which is often abstracted as "text") to renewed interest in the history 
of the book, theatrical performance, orality, and the printing press. Literary 
studies has become a branch of media studies. Recognizing that the book is a 
medium docs not necessarily imply that its material form fully determines its 
function or status. The medium is not always the message. Carla Hesse writes: 
The historical record makes unquestionably clear that the most distinctive features 
of what we have come to refer to as "print culture" ~ that is, the stabilization of 
written culture into a canon of authored texts, the notion of the author as creator, 
the books as property and the reader as an elective public ~ were not inevitable 
historical consequences of the invention of printing during the Renaissance, but, 
rather, the cumulative result of particular social and political choices made by given 
societies at given moments. (1996: 21) 
Similarly, the democratic and participatory ideals associated with "interactive 
technologies" are not the product of the technologies but of our social and 
cultural interactions with them. Recognizing this distinction reminds us of the 
need to struggle to define technology's future directions through social and 
political actions, not simply through our design principles. 
Contemporary discussions of technological conversion - that is, the integra­
tion of existing communications technologies into a single megasystem - need to 
be framed in relation to what I call cultural convergence. Cultural convergence 
refers to the process by which people in their everyday life use media in relation 
to each other, form evaluations about which media best serve specific purposes, 
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assemble information across multiple channels of communication, and embrace 
artworks that depend upon appropriation and remixing of cultural materials or 
upon the archiving and recirculating of previous media texts. Some of these 
changes reflect our initial encounters with digital media, but these shifts are being 
felt across the full range of contemporary popular culture, and some of them 
prepare for, rather than respond to, the increased penetration of the Internet, the 
World Wide Web, and the PC into our everyday lives. The popularity of the 
VCR had to do with its time-shift capability which, at a time when Americans 
were working longer hours and were moving toward a 24-hour work cycle, 
enabled people to keep in touch with the popular television programs which 
had become a central part of contemporary cultural literacy. The wide-spread 
embrace of e-mail reflects the mobility of a culture where one American in three 
moves in any given year; the Internet allows us to maintain contact with those 
we've left behind or to build new friendships and join new communities, despite 
the unmooring of our ties to geographically local communities. Similarly, proper­
ties of one medium may train us in the perceptual and cognitive skills we will 
need to embrace future media. As Lev Manovich (1996a) writes: 
Gradually cinema taught us to accept the manipulation of time and space, the 
arbitrary coding of the visible, the mechanization of vision, and the reduction of 
reality to a moving image as a given. As a result, today the conceptual shock of the 
digital revolution is not experienced as a real shock .- because we were ready for it 
for a long time. 
Such arguments require a move away from digital theory toward what might bc 
described as comparative media studies, an approach that reads the emerging 
digital technologies against the backdrop of a much broader range of media, both 
historical and contemporary_ Because digital media potentially incorporate all 
previous media, it no long-er makes sense to think in medium-specific terms. The 
renewed interest in Marshall McLuhan (McLuhan and Lapham 1994) has more 
to do with his willingness to talk about what a range of different media have in 
common and how each of them defines a particular series of relations to time and 
space than with his sometimes wacky insights into specific media. Harold Innis 
(1991), James Carey (1988), and Ithiel De Sola Pool (1984), among others, offer 
alternative models for thinking across media. All of a society's media interact 
with and influence each other, requiring research to be conducted in a systemic 
or ecological way rather than a fragmentary fashion. David Rodowick (1994) has 
suggested the term "audiovisual" rather than "digital" to refer to the complex 
interplay of representational technologies which constitute our contemporary 
sensory environs. Marsha Kinder (1991) discusses the "entertainment super­
system," the complex intertextual relations between the manifestations of pop­
ular narratives, such as Batman, The Teenage Mutant N£/?ja Turtles, Star Trek, or 
The X Files, as they move across film, television, comic books, and digital media. 
Such migrations are a logical consequence of the horiiontal integration of 
modern media conglomerates (Meehan 1991). 
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Some adaptations from filmic to digital media prove more engaging than 
others. Digital manifestations of Star Trek (Murray and Jenkins 1999), for 
example, stress only those aspects of the series that fit comfortably into pre­
existing game genres: the result is an emphasis on combat, exploration, and 
technology rather than on character relations, cultural diversity, or negotiation. 
Digital Star Trek narrows the range of fannish activities and interests facilitated 
by the original television series. Despite digital media's "encyclopedic" promise, 
the contemporary CD-ROM disk contains far less information than a videotape 
library of series episodes. Moreover, talk about digital interactivity often ignores 
the interaction and participation ethnographers and reader-response critics have 
long discussed in relation to traditional literary, television, or cinematic narra­
tives. Digital media structure into the text certain opportunities for interactions, 
providing the resources for engaging with richer, more vivid representations of 
the story world, but also foreclose other interactions that might arise from a less 
impoverished narrative universe. By contrast, Greg Smith (1999) argues that 
CD-ROM adaptations of Monty Python's comedy preserve its improvisational 
and fragmented style, its anarchic comedy of interruptions and destabilizations, 
its search for unpredictable juxtapositions of material, and its parodic self-­
consciousness about its own medium. More than simply a recycling of previously 
produced materials, Monty Python is rethought for CD-ROM and, in the 
process, helps us to rethink digital technology. One set of instructions in the 
game, for example, states: "to waste more time, please click here again." The 
game's comic focus on delay, technical breakdown, and repetition pokes fun at 
the complex attitudes toward temporality surrounding CD-ROM games: playing 
games may be a good way to .\pend time, and yet players are impatient with any 
delays which maste their time. 
Our initial encounters with any new medium focus attention on its breaks 
with predecessor media and, as a consequence, help to defamiliarize pro­
perties that were once taken for granted. In the case of literature, the computer 
reopened questions about the bound and linear qualities of books, resulting 
in hypertext theory. For cinema, the introduction of digital media poses 
questions about the screen and our relationship to cinematic space. According 
to Manovich (1994), the cinema reworks "the classical screen" (Renaissance 
perspective's attempts to represent three-dimensional space on a flat surface), 
creating "the dynamic screen" where the displayed image changes over time. 
In watching a film, we focus our full attention on the representation on 
screen and disreg'ard the physical space outside it. This concentration is possible 
because the image fills the whole screen. The screen "functions to filter, to screen 
out, to take over, rendering non-existent whatever is outside its frame." The 
introduction of the computer screen, however, reveals the "stability" of the 
dynamic screen, creating, in the case of the Windows desktop, a world where 
multiple screens compete for our attention or, in the case of virtual reality, a 
world where "the screen disappears altogether" facilitating more immediate 
. . 51l1teractlOn. 
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David Jay Bolter and Richard Grusin describe this process in somewhat 
different terms in Remediations (1998), suggesting that the history of media 
might be charted through competing impulses toward immediacy, which 
depends on the ability to look through the screen as if it were a window, and 
hypermediacy, which forces us to look at the screen as a graphical surface. 
Examples of immediacy include "a painting by Canaletto, a photograph by 
Edward Weston, a 'live' television broadcast from the Olympics, and the com­
puter system for virtual reality," while earlier examples of hypermediacy include 
"medieval illuminated manuscripts, Renaissance decorated altarpieces, Dutch 
painting, Baroque cabinets, and modernist collage and photomontage." Digital 
media reflects both the push toward immediacy - to create transparent interfaces 
- and the push toward hypermediacy - to bring multiple forms of media together 
on the same page. Yet both impulses reflect a process of remediation - that is, the 
attempt to define the new media in relation to the old. Hypermediacy makes 
explicit the process of quotation or appropriation from earlier media, yet imme­
diacy often depends upon an unconscious comparison to earlier media. Compu­
ters that promise photorealism aren't promising us reality; they are promising 
computer graphics that look like photographs. 
The new medium may usurp some of the cultural functions or status once held 
by the earlier media. Andre Bazin (1971 b) argued, for example, that the intro­
duction of photography as a mechanism for more perfectly reproducing the 
material world "freed" painters to explore abstraction. Television's usurpation 
of radio's storytelling role forced radio to expand the centrality of music to its 
broadcast content. The introduction of digital media, for example, has had an 
enormous impact upon the contemporary cinema, not simply in obvious ways, 
such as the use of computer animation in Toy Story or of CGI special effects in 
Jurassic Park. The morph introduces a fundamental new structure to the rhetoric 
of cinema, one which, as Vivian Sobchack (1997) notes, depends upon the 
suggestion of similarity across previously perceived differences rather than on 
montage's graphic collisions. Michael Jackson's Black or White music video uses 
the morph to erase racial differences and construct an image of humanity united 
through the pleasure of music and dancing; Terminator 2 uses the morph to 
transform humans into inanimate objects and back again; political advertisements 
used the morph to sugg'est that democratic candidates could not easily separate 
themselves from the faults of Bill Clinton. 
More profoundly, these devices subtly yet dramatically undermine the onto­
logical status of the photographic image, which Andre Bazin argued was the 
fundamental basis of cinema. Contemporary film theory insists that cinematic 
images are not indexical, but rather complex cultural signs constructed for the 
screen. These critiques of the realist tradition always ran against our culture's 
core faith in the authenticity of the image. As Manovich (1996c) writes: 
During cinema's history, a whole repertoire of techniques (lighting, art direction, 
the use of different film stocks and lens, etc.) was developed to modify the basic 
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record obtained by a film apparatus. And yet behind even the most stylized 
cinematic images we can discern the bluntness, the sterility, the banality of early 
nineteenth century photographs. No matter how complex its stylistic innovations, 
the cinema has found its base in these deposits of reality. 
Yet, as writers like William Mitchell (1994) note, digital photographers can 
construct vivid, compelling, absolutely convincing photographs of architectural 
spaces or historic encounters (Abraham Lincoln and Marilyn Monroe) 
which never existed. Hollywood could make Fred Astaire dance on the 
ceiling (through elaborate manipulations of his physical environment), but dig'ital 
artists could make the dead star dance with a Dustbuster for a contemporary 
television commercial. In such a world, seeing' is no longer believing. The 
computer ignores photography's indexical relation to reality, translating 
images into pixels which can be transformed, reworked, and redesigned like 
text in a word-processing program. The line blurs between animation (which 
involves creating images where none existed previously) and editing (which 
involves recutting or rearranging fragments of events which occurred before 
the camera). 
Theories of spectatorship that assume a relationship between optical point of 
view and narrative identification must be revised in light of the intense identi­
fication and participation experienced by players of Seg'a or Nintendo video 
games, which almost always depend upon third-person camera. Even more 
sophisticated accounts of character identification, such as Murray Smith's Enga­
ging Characters (1995), may be unable to fully describe the difference it makes 
when we become an active participant controlling the fictional character as a 
cursor which we navigate through narrative space or when we choose which 
camera position will be employed. When I feel the acceleration of speed, spinning' 
real fast and clearing the screen as the Tasmanian Devil, my pleasure has less to 
do with my moral alignment with those characters than with my ability to control 
them. Even given my ample facial hair and my sometimes anarchic sense of 
humor, I am not, in the end, terribly much like Taz. Yet, I often speak of the 
game-playing experience as if "I" died, "I" flew off a cliff, "I" beat my 
opponent, suggesting a fairly direct identification with the often simplistically 
rendered figure on the screen. 
Film theory often stresses temporality at the expense of spatiality, while most 
recent accounts of digital media stress its status as a new form of "spatial story" 
(DeCerteau 1988), one that provides complex and compelling visual environ­
ments rather than complexly structured plots or rounded characters. Margaret 
Morse (1994) notes, for example, that what compels the development of virtual 
reality technologies is a consumer desire for "another world" outside everyday 
life's limitations and frustrations. Mary Fuller and I (1995) compare the struc­
tures of contemporary video games and earlier forms of travel narratives. 'vVe 
argue that video games create "spaces for exploration, colonization, and exploita­
tion, returning to a mythic time when there were worlds without limits and 
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resources beyond imagining." In the process, they rewrite the history of the 
founding of America to absolve us for our postcolonial guilt, restaging them in 
worlds which had no prior human inhabitants. These games partially compensate 
f<lr increased restrictions upon children's access to the physical spaces of their 
environment, offering a "virtual playscape" through which they can experience 
the illusion of "complete freedom of movement" Oenkins 1998). Other games, 
such as Simcity, give us a god-like vantage point for redesigning the world 
(Friedman 1995).6 
Many have drawn meaningful parallels between the current transformation of 
digital media and cinema's own emergence from scientific experimentation and 
arcade attraction to become a central cultural institution, but this hardly exhausts 
the range of meaningful analogies. "Multi-media" works, which may combine 
audio, still photographs, moving images, digital animation, and text, pose ques­
tions about the interplay between different media forms, inviting comparison to 
collage, Life Magazine photoessays, comic strips, comic books, or the sound-and­
slideshow extravaganzas of the 1960s pop underground. Brenda Laurel (1993) 
and Thyrza Goodeve Nichols (1997) have called for a reconsideration of the 
relevance of theatre history to an understanding of digital media, Laurel focuss­
ing on the relationship of interactivity to theatrical improvisation, Goodeve 
exploring the relationship between on-line personas and vaudeville performance 
styles that required performers to exaggerate their own ethnic identities. The 
immersive quality of virtual reality has invited comparison with the amusement­
park rides of turn-of-the-century Coney Island and with the nineteenth-century 
tradition of cycloramas and panoramas. The grassroots many-to-many dimen­
sions of digital communication closely parallel earlier attempts to create more 
broad-based participatory media, such as the amateur radio movement of the 
1910s and 1920s, which envisioned a world where there would be as many 
transmitters as receivers. Examining the CD-ROM game Phantasmagoria, 
Angela Ndalianis (1999) relates it to a much longer tradition of employing 
emergent communications technologies as the basis for magic or horror perform­
ances. Understanding the circulation of e-mail involves a reconsideration of 
earlier attempts to construct communications networks, such as the postal 
service, the telegraph, and the telephone, leading to new research into earlier 
styles of "sociability," such as the telephone "party line." Another tradition, 
represented by the work of Lisa Cartwright (1995; Cartwright et a1. 1998), 
has sought to link contemporary digital media with a much larger history of 
medical and scientific imaging technologies, such as the X-ray or the sonogram. 
Early television, as Pam Wilson (1996) reminds us, showcased its ability to 
form links between remote geographic locations to show us, for example, both 
the east and west coasts on screen at once, much as journalists often describe 
"web-surfing" as a form of "virtual tourism." Scott Bukatman (1994) arg'ues that 
we should trace the historic links between the typewriter and the computer 
keyboard to learn how mechanical writing systems have altered the way we 
work and think. Some of these comparisons are more forced than others, 
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yet most reveal something significant about dig'ital media and their historical 
predecessors. 
What, then, is the work of theory in the age of digital transformation? Digital 
theory offers us explanations, interpretations, and predictions that enable us to 
manage the process of technological change and its impact upon our social, 
cultural, economic, political, and personal lives. Digital theory provides a point 
of intersection between the languages and practices of science and engineering on 
the one hand and the arts and humanities on the other. Digital theory embraces 
the utopian imagination, not as a way of predicting the future but as a way of 
envisioning meaningful change and keeping alive the fluidity that digital media 
have introduced into many aspects of our social and personal lives. Digital theory 
identifies historical antecedents for contemporary media developments and, at 
the same time, defamiliarizes older media and opens them to reexamination. 
What is striking about the present moment is not simply that academic theorists 
have responded quickly to a changing media environment - itself a phenomenon 
virtually without precedent - but that theory production has been embraced by 
the larger society. Theorists are interviewed as media celebrities in the pages of 
mass-market magazines like Wired. Vernacular theory surfaces and is debated on 
almost every on-line discussion list and newsgroup as everyday citizens hope to 
better understand the nature of the transformations occurring around them. 
Theoretical arguments are forming the basis for the early court decisions that 
determine what model of regulation, intellectual property rights, or anti-trust 
litigation is most appropriate for cyberspace. The impact of digital communica­
tions on all aspects of modern life has made the process of mediation remarkably 
visible and has created a new demand to answer questions that once would have 
seemed the arcane interest of media scholars. 
l\Jotes 
For further discussion of this shift in theory's relations to subjective experience, see 
Jenkins et aI. Forthcoming. 
2 As one wag asked, if the citizens of cyberspace have escaped their bodies, how come 
so many of them suffer from carpal tunnel syndrome? 
3	 For more background on the relationship between cyberpunk and cultural studies, 
see Henry Jenkins, "Cyberpunk," Media in Trallsition website, http://media­
in-transition.mit.edu. For other work on the cyberpunk movement, see Balsamo 
1996, Bukatman 1993, Hayles 1997, McCaffrey 1996, Ross 1991, and Spring'er 1996. 
4 The theme of "Media in Transition" has been the focus of a two-year-10ng series of 
conferences and events at MIT, organized by David Thorburn and l-Ienry Jenkins, 
which will result in a series of books for MIT Press. For more information, see 
http://media-in-transition.mit.edu. 
5 For another take on the evolution of the screen, see Sobehack 1994. 
6 For other examples of work which focusses on the spatiality of dig'ital media, see 
Tashiro 1998 and Strain forthcoming. 
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CHAPTER FIFTEEI\J
 
Cultural Exchange 
Tom O'Regan 
A film ... circulates in a sphere which can be described as transnational with none of the 
specificity so desired by nationalists. It docs so because its mode of communication doesn't 
rely exclusively on the local or the national for success. 
Ron Burnett, "The National Question in Quebec" 
It almost goes without saying that what distinguishes the cinema from a good 
proportion of broadcasting and book publishing is that it is from inception 
international (McQ!.1ail 1994: 16-20). In most cinema markets and those parts 
of the television schedule dedicated to movies, including pay-TV movie chan­
nels, international productions dominate. Films circulate across national, lan­
guage, and community boundaries reaching deep into social space. Audiences, 
critics, and filmmakers appropriate, negotiate, and transform this international 
cinema in various ways. It is in cinema's nature to cross cultural borders within 
and between nations, to circulate across heterogeneous linguistic and social 
formations. This is an internationalism in production and in reception, in the 
making of films and in their consumption. And if we agree that an internation­
alism is intrinsic to the cinema th,en what must underwrite this are systems of 
cultural exchange. We can say then that cultural exchange is fundamental to 
cinema at every level. 
Cultural exchange is intrinsic to the cinema's production, circulation, and 
uptake. A normal - even unexceptionable - feature of the film milieu, cultural 
exchange can be found in filmmaking and film criticism, film reception, and film 
marketing. Processes of cultural exchange are intrinsic to the circulation of 
filmmaking across national and cultural borders - among and within states. 
They facilitate the lending and redisposition of cultural materials from one 
filmmaking and cultural tradition to another. A powerful force for innovation 
in filmmaking and the development of international understanding and misun­
derstanding alike, cultural exchange is a critical component of wider processes of 
cultural identity formation and cultural development. Cultural exchange matters 
to processes of cultural definition, loss, reconstruction, and renewal. It is 
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constitutive of the cinema and of culture and identity more generally. As such, it 
is both unexceptionable and controversial. In this chapter I establish and evaluate 
the ways filmmaking and film studies alike have conceptualized and ordered the 
compelling' evidence for cultural exchange. 
By cultural exchange we mean the circulation - the g'iving, receiving, and 
redisposition - of cultural materials among differentiated socio-cultural 
formations. The component parts of the cultural exchange process - from the 
distribution mechanisms to the materials circulated and the formations that send 
and receive -- are immensely varied in incidence, form, and purpose. 
The central disputes within film studies about cultural exchange turn on how 
we identify its nature and how we evaluate its standing and direction. At issue 
here is not whether such exchange either does or should take place, as everyone 
agrees that it is a structural given at some level and is indeed committed to at least 
some forms of international, intercultural, or intercommunal cultural exchange. 
How we describe and judge cultural exchange is tied up with our very notions of 
culture, identity, and exchangc itself Our theoretical and normative positions on 
these concepts determine not only the range of cultural-exchang'e practices and 
processes in the cinema that are selected for investigation and discussion, but also 
the kind of position on cultural exchange that we adopt. 
A vocabulary has built up within film studies to attempt to capture the various 
modalities of this handling of exchange. We speak of film, filmmakers, and 
audiences alike indigenizing, adapting, appropriating, poaching, resisting, coopt­
ing, and remaking films, filmmaking styles, practices, and technologies drawn 
from other filmmaking traditions - national and otherwise. We speak of film­
makers entering into a dialogue with the dominant international cinema and 
other cinema traditions. We speak of the cross-cultural reception of film and 
television. We speak of too little and too much cultural exchange, of unequal and 
reciprocal exchanges. 
To discuss these matters we need to grasp the sheer dimensions of cultural 
exchange in terms of the materials that are exchanged, the peculiar standing of 
cultural exchange in the cinema in its broader contexts, the cultural communities 
involved in that exchange, and the economics of cultural exchange. 
1 The Materials of Cultural Exchange 
The cultural materials involved in this exchange can be diverse. They can be 
films like Titanic Games Cameron, 1997), circulating almost wherever films are 
screened commercially in theaters around the world. They can be concepts for 
films, as when the French film Trois hommes et un cot~ffin (Coline Serreau, 1985) 
was remade in Hollywood as Three Men and a flaky (Leonard Nimoy, 1987). 
Filmmakers rOlltinely draw on stories from other cultural traditions: how many 
times have Shakespeare's plays been remade or used as concepts for stories in 
various cultural traditions from the Russian to the Japanese to the American? 
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They can be the adjustments made to films with the explicit purpose of facil­
itating international circulation: this impinges on the selection of content (is it too 
parochial?), of actors and directors (are they known in other territories?), and 
even of accents and dialogue (will they be comprehensible?). The original Mad 
Max (George Miller, 1979) was dubbed from Australian into American English 
to facilitate its circulation; and the children's film Babe (Chris Noonan, 1995) 
strove for accents that would be acceptable to North American school children. 
Such factoring in of international circulation and therefore a film's potential for 
cultural exchange is a consistent consideration for investors, producers, directors, 
and scriptwriters. 
The cultural materials can be filmmaking practices. Italian neorealist aesthetics 
and production practices of the late 1940s - particularly the enthusiasm for 
location shooting and the use of nonprofessional actors - evident in films such 
as Roma: Citta apnta (Roberto Rossellini, 1945, Rome: Open City) and Ladri di 
biciclette (Vittorio de Sica, 1951, Bi~ycle Thieves) were diffused among a variety of 
other national cinemas over the late 1940s and 1950s. These aesthetics created 
critical expectations as to what the cinema (generally) should look like. 
The materials can be the reception of films and filming, which in turn inform 
those who produced the films in the first place. Provocatively, Thomas Elsaesser 
claims that the New German Cinema of Rainer Fassbinder, Wim Wenders, 
Werner Herzog, Volker SchlOndorff et a1. was "discovered and even invented 
abroad, and had to be reimported to be recognised as such" within Germany 
(1989: 300). Such refashioning is part of the general circulation of any national 
cinema as it "travels" outside its domestic context and enters new contexts. 
Elsaesser writes of how: 
European films intended for one kind of (national) audience or made within a 
particular kind of aesthetic framework or ideology, for instance, undergo a sea 
change as they cross the Atlantic and on coming back find themselves bearing the 
stamp of yet another cultural currency. (l994a: 25) 
Audiences routinely take up and reshape films made in other places, from other 
times, and yoke them to their purposes. They can create "imaginary Americas," 
turning film's purposes in alternate directions, creating aberrant interpretations 
and the like. Non-American audiences, John Caughie writes, routinely "play at 
being American" in their consumption ofHollywood movies. There is, he claims, 
a curious game of identification and nonidentification being played by audiences, 
such that the non-American "plays at being American" with all the "tactics of 
empowerment" and "games of subordination" that this implies (1990: 45). As 
Alison Butler observes: 
the refunctionalization of texts is not just a manifestation of occasional resistances, 
but the very condition of possibility of such border crossing·s .. Productive - and 
indeed unproductive -- misreading is perhaps the paradigmatic operation which 
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governs the reception of films outside- and sometimes inside - their original 
national contexts. (1992: 419) 
Identifying much the same processes, Henry Jenkins writes of fans raiding "mass 
culture, claiming its materials for their own use, reworking them as the basis for 
their own cultural creations and social interactions" (1992: 18). Fans like Caugh­
ie's non-American are situated "outside" but reconstruct this status so as to 
inscribe themselves within that creative process. 
The cultural materials can also include our ways of conceiving cinema itself. 
These consist of ideas about what cinema is, what it can be, how it can be 
important, in what ways its study should be approached. Andre Bazin (1967, 
1971) and his colleag'ues at Cahiers du cinema in the 1950s and 1960s developed 
ideas about the cinema of great international sig·nificance. Their ideas arguably 
underwent something of a sea-change also, as they were refashioned into the 
auteurist criticism of Andrew Sarris in North America and in that circulation 
helped found contemporary Anglo-American film studies. 
People can be cultural materials too, as skills honed and developed in one 
cultural milieu are redisposed in another. Film directors often contribute to a 
number of national cinemas. Luis Buouel made Spanish, Mexican, US, and 
French films. For his part Joseph Losey, "compelled to leave America at the time 
of Senator McCarthy ... had to digest the mores of a new environment and 
struggle to obtain work" in the UK (Thomson 1980: 358). There he made 
classics of British cinema such as The Servant (1963) and The Go-Between 
(1971). The peripatetic Hungarian, Emeric Pressburger, worked in the film 
industry in Germany, then France, before settling in England, becoming one 
half of British cinema's most creative partnership, "Powell & Pressburg'er" (see 
MacDonald 1994). And it was he more than his collaborator who was responsible 
for the extraordinary wartime propaganda film The 49th Parallel (1941), aimed at 
shoring up wavering American publicopinion for involvement in World War II. 
Pressburger's contributions did not end with his British involvements. In the 
1960s he wrote the script from England for an Australian film, They 're a Weird 
Mob (Powell, 1966). 
Such freewheeling internationalism for actors, cinematographers, and direct­
ors is now an ordinary, even customary, way of inhabiting a film milieu. This 
experience of crossing borders is often driven by the needs of the receiving 
culture. Australian director Fred Schepisi is on record as saying that the 
Americans "want you [meaning' non-Americans like him] to be original within 
formula frameworks" (Koval 1992: 43). They want "your originality but not for 
original films, they want it applied to their kind of films" (42) - in his case the 
results include Russia House (1990), Roxanne (1987), and Six Degrees ofSepara·­
tion (1993). 
The cultural materials exchanged include particular technolog'ies of exhibition, 
production, and marketing. Film festivals, for example, provide a machinery for 
films of various local cinemas to, in Bill Nichols's words, "circulate globally, 
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within a specific system of institutional assumptions, priorities and constraints" 
(1994: 68). Screened at film festivals, these films are "never only or purely local"; 
instead they "circulate, in large part, with a cachet of locally inscribed difference 
and globally ascribed commonality." Film festivals as a distribution mechanism 
allow for the recognition of "the uniqueness of different cultures and specific 
filmmakers," while at the same time affirming "the underlying qualities of an 
'international cinema.' " 
Another example of cultural materials in circulation is provided by the adop­
tion of different cinema exhibition venues. Take the example of the multiplex -­
the phenomenon of multi-screen theatrical exhibition spaces. It begins in Canada 
in the late 1950s, is extended to the US over the 1960s, and from there becomes 
dispersed around the world. Or take the siting of exhibition venues in giant 
shopping malls in the US and their slow spread throughout the global system 
since the late 1970s and into the twenty-first century. Here developments in real 
estate, site management, and city-planning are part of the difTusion of cinema 
developments internationally. 
Exchangeable cultural materials are also of a more generalized character -- such 
as the ideas, practices, and conceptions of everything from modernity to the role 
and functions of the state - and flow across cultural borders impacting upon film 
form, content, and the very organization of the cinema. John Orr, for example, 
identifies a "neo-modern moment" which "has its origin in the national cinemas 
of Western Europe and the United States where it engages with Western 
capitalist modernity" and has been extended to other cinematic traditions 
(1993: 6). John Tomlinson argues that a feature of the contemporary period is 
one where the "the simultaneous advantages and demerits of 'modernity' are 
being extended to powerful and impoverished nations alike" (1992: 175; see also 
Downing 1996: 223). In this context the cinema is, as Hamid Naficy has pointed 
out, one of those institutions of modernization, as "Third World" filmmakers, 
"wooed to cinema by Western films," trained in many cases in Europe, the US, 
and to a lesser extent the USSR, upon return made "films that critiqued the West 
and attempted to create a national identity in contradistinction to it" (1996: 4). 
Another instance of such general exchanges is in policy models, where the 
ideas, the phrases, the arguments are borrowed and redisposed. Not long after 
the publication of the South African Film White Paper in 1996 (see Tomaselli 
and Shepperson 1996), Zimbabwe released its own film "white paper" which 
bore a remarkable resemblance to the South African document. The South 
Africans involved in the original white paper were surprised by these similarities. 
Although the Zimbabweans seem to have had no other agenda than to use an 
available African-based policy, one consequence of this kind of ad hoc borrowing 
is that it aligns, mirrors, and therefore helps integrate various regional film 
industries. Such policy-learning is important internationally. And it happens 
everywhere. Canadian film policy-making of the late 1960s and early 1970s 
directly impacted on Australian film policy development in the same period, 
with Canadian officials advising their Australian counterparts. The prevalence of 
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the overseas "fact-finding mission" is a more general instance of this on most 
government horizons. It is replicated by the obligatory visit of previously domes­
tic filmmakers to international festivals, not only to learn the festival system but 
to assimilate the prevailing international standards of everything from imaging 
standards to deal-making. 
Such cultural materials provide the glue holding together the more-or-Iess 
integrated international film system of production, circulation, distribution, and 
exchange. 
2 The Communities for Cultural Exchange 
Alongside the various cultural materials that can be exchanged and the mixed 
standing of this exchange we also need to recognize the various partners involved 
- the community terrain on which cultural exchange takes place. The cultural 
formations involved are as varied as are the cultural materials of the exchange and 
generate distinctive cultural-exchange dynamics. 
They can be smaller and larger, richer and poorer nations. They can be 
groupings of nations, as in Europe, Africa, Latin America, as in the North and 
the South, as in the developed and the underdeveloped world, as in the Occident 
and the Orient. They can be communities of language-speakers of varying size 
and collective wealth - francophones, Zulu-speakers, Japanese-speakers, and 
anglophones. They can be religious communities embracing groups of nations, 
as in the so-called Islamic and Catholic countries. Such faith communities, like 
their language-community counterparts, can exist within and across a number of 
nations. The nation states involved in cultural exchange can be of various types. 
There are the "new world," neo-European nations of the Americas and Austra­
lasia defined by settler invasions and the dispossession of indigenous populations; 
there are the "old world" nations ofEurope with their predominantly indigenous 
populations; and there are the postcolonial nations of Africa and South-East Asia. 
The cultural formations involved in exchange also include smaller and larger 
sub-groupings within nation states. They might be the various "national com­
munities," such as the Quebeckers and the Inuit "first nation" in Canada. They 
include the various minorities defined by ethnicity, region, sub-culture, sexual 
orientation, and gender. And they include the various cultural communities 
within national borders and those -- such as various diasporic communities ­
who persist across national borders. 
The cultural communities can be at greater or lesser cultural distance from 
each other. Some can be partly derived from each other and share a common 
language, such as the US, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa, 
which are all fonner British colonies. Unsurprisingly, Hollywood has some of its 
best markets in English-speaking territories, leading' to the perennial complaint 
of Britons, Australians, and English Canadians that they are cursed with sharing 
the English language with the dominant international cinema and wearing the 
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consequences of this cultural proximity. Some national communities, like the 
Scandinavian and Benelux countries, are particularly open to cultural exchange. 
As small countries these nations look to a variety of import sources for television 
and cinema as a means of maintaining a sense of a distinctive identity, whereas 
bigger countries like Britain, France, and Germany look principally to their own 
local productions to secure these same objectives (Sepstrup 1990: passim). 
Smaller countries tend to regard imports in a different way from big countries, 
seeing in them advantages as much as disadvantages and often putting effort into 
diversifying the sources of film and program imports. Other national 
communities are remarkably closed, with international productions making up 
a negligible amount of the US box office and television schedules (but this 
negligible amount is enough to make the US Britain's best television and cinema 
export market). 
The communities involved in cultural exchange can operate at a large cultural 
distance from each other - think of the gap between, say, a small Pacific Island 
nation such as Vanuatu and the People's Republic of China. And this large gap 
may be replicated within a nation, as when we compare traditional Aboriginal 
communities in central Australia with their "mainstream" European and increas­
ingly Asian equivalents. Underwriting the complexity of cultural exchange are 
systems of mutual attraction and repulsion. We might assume that culturally 
contiguous communities would be more likely to be involved as partners in 
cultural exchange than communities at some distance from each other. But this 
does not always hold. In situations of conflict or histories of invasion, such 
communities may prefer, as a matter of policy, more culturally distant materials. 
Croatians prefer German and Hollywood filmmaking to that of their 
Serbian neighbours; Pakistan prefers Western programming over that of its 
neighbour India. Sometimes, among diasporic refugee communities, the 
films and television-programming of a proximate community are preferred to 
the local cultural materials of a homeland still under a despised political dis­
pensation. 
Sometimes this cultural exchange can be equal: French and German cultural 
trade is roughly balanced and both have larger populations. Mostly, however, 
cultural exchange is unequal. Some countries -like the US, Japan (in television 
at least), and India - are cultural producers, others cultural importers. Studies of 
the flow of cinema and television have quantified this cultural exchange, indicat­
ing the largely one-way cultural flows from the richer to the poorer, from the 
developed to the underdeveloped, from the North to the South, from the English 
language to other languages, from the larger language groups to the smaller ones, 
from the US to the rest of the world (Varis 1988). Such studies have also 
indicated the substantial role in cultural exports of highly populated countries 
in Europe (France, Germany, and Italy), Latin America (Mexico and Brazil), the 
Middle East (Egypt), and Asia (India, Japan, and Hong Kong/China) and the 
minor but significant role played by more sparsely populated countries such as 
Australia and Canada (see Sinclair et al. 1996). 
268 
Cultural Exchange 
This unequal character of cultural exchange is longstanding. In 1946 Gordon 
Mirams concluded his study of New Zealand filmgoing with the observation that 
"if there is any such thing as 'a New Zealand culture,' it is to a large extent the 
creation of Hollywood" (cited in Lealand 1988: 83). The Moving Picture World 
Gan 7) of 1922 observed: "The American control of foreign market with respect 
to motion pictures is approximately the following: South America, 95%; Aus­
tralian 90%; continental Europe, 85°/<); Britain, 85%; Far East, 8%" (quoted in 
de Usabel 1982: xv). Even in the world's second largest economy, Japan, inter­
national productions make up half the cinema box office (though negligible 
amounts on television). 
Such unequal cultural-exchange dynamics have their origins in the structural 
dynamics of the cinema - its system of scale production with mass distribution 
and exhibition - requiring expensive technology, specialized screening venues, 
continuously improving standards of image-making and large-scale administra­
tive coordination (Tunstall 1977). The international film industry is, unsurpris­
ingly, dominated by a handful of major transnational corporations. Such multi­
nationals conduct a largely unequal relationship with weaker domestic producers, 
exhibitors, and policy-makers. This industry is geographically concentrated in a 
handful of wealthy film centers, and its international scale shapes the production 
possibilities and contexts of peripheral film industries, nations, peoples, and 
centers (Guback 1969; Thompson 1985). The international industry is both 
dominant and predatory. It is predatory in that it is naturally expansive. It 
seeks new markets, new personnel for its productions (many national cinemas ­
British, Australian, Canadian, Dutch, and New Zealand - have their most 
talented directors for only so long), new commercial opportunities (in theme 
parks, product tie-ins, new media). And it seeks to extract the maximum benefit 
from its productions by, for example, forcing cinema-, video-, and television­
buyers to take a package of products, whether sight unseen to get continuous 
access to valued products or in order to purchase that handful of productions that 
are most desired. As Janet Wasko notes, "it seems undeniable that the media 
business has increasingly become even more concentrated and unified" with 
"corporate mergers and diversification activities" intensifying this trend (1994: 
18). 
Yet this same Hollywood cinema, along with the other dominant international 
cinemas, plays an important role in cinema capacity-building globally, providing 
the incentive to invest in building or renovating exhibition infrastructures. For 
these reasons, much national cinema policy-making, while wanting to do much 
more to redress the imbalance, ends up leaving substantially intact the exhibition, 
distribution, and production nexus which aids the dominant international cine­
mas. Typically there is some fiddling at the edges through various national 
cinema supplements - based sometimes on minor imposts on the distribution 
and exhibition sectors, but mostly on various government-funded production 
support mechanisms. The commercial order of the cinema is one where unequal 
exchanges, dominance, hierarchies, the size and length of the multi-national and 
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national exhibition and distribution networks rule. It is onto this basic structure 
that various governments and local industries graft their local filmmaking activ­
ities. 
The partners to cultural exchange in the cinema come to that exchange on an 
undeniably and permanently unequal basis with disparities of language, wealth, 
size, resources, infrastructures, and culture. Few film relations are based on free 
and open exchange. There are many one-way cultural flows and little reciprocity. 
There are two broad ways in which community agents and film critics have 
understood the economic domination of cinema exchange by the larger players 
and in particular Hollywood. In the first, they see it as evidence of fundamental 
and structural inequality in the international system amounting to discriminatory 
economic dynamics (Schiller 1969; Mattelart et al. 1984). In the second, it is a 
pragmatic and improvised economic response to a set of given cultural conditions 
(Wildman and Siwek 1988). In one, Hollywood's dominance represents the 
distortion of markets, and in the other, a response to market conditions. 
What the concentration on audiovisual flows and distribution dynamics tends 
to neglect is the use made by communities of the cultural materials that are 
exchanged. Clearly the producers and viewers in this international cultural 
exchange system only weakly share cultural resources. Both are required to 
negotiate cultural cleavages to create meanings. Eric Michaels suggests that this 
circumstance has had important textual consequenccs: it has encouraged Holly­
wood producers to adopt a "highly complex rhetorical stance which makes it 
quite difficult to say what the intended meaning of many programs might be" 
(1990: 19). In other words, the "conversation" between producers and audiences 
is designed to minimize obstacles to local and international participation alike on 
the part of potential audiences. But this strategy of incorporation is achieved 
through a communicative inefficiency (which is exploited most efficiently): as 
propositional contents are bent further, opportunities for partial misunderstand­
ing are increased and even encouraged. And this is not a problem. For Holly­
wood, it does not particularly matter that wildly divergent or astonishingly 
convergent interpretations are routinely accomplished by audiences through 
Hollywood's global circulation so long as tickets are sold and videos rented. 
But equally, as Michaels elsewhere contends: 
It would seem difficult to see in the introduction of imported video and television 
programs the destruction of Aboriginal culture. Such a claim can only be made in 
ignorance of the strong traditions and preferences in graphics, the selectivity of 
media and contents, and the strength of interpretation of the Warlpiri. (1994: 95) 
Heterogeneous cultural communities of region, race, and ethnicity make for 
various kinds of internal cultural exchange dynamics which can be profoundly 
unequal, dysfunctional, and to the disadvantage of the weaker party to the 
exchange. Taking the USA as an example, the cultural communities involved 
in this exchange include the "mountain" communities that are the subject of 
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J. W. Williamson's study Hillbil~yland (1995), which has as its subtitle What the 
Movies Did to the Mountains and what the Mountains Did to the Movies. In this 
exchange, the mountains, with their associations of inbreeding, mental degenera­
tion, and quaintness, become ciphers for a metropolitan imagination exercising 
its cultural power. 
Similar unequal dynamics sustain many representational politics. Film scho­
larship speaks to the systematic and questionable representational dynamic 
involving African-American, Amerindian, and other minority populations in 
the content and practices of mainstream cinema, in its institutions, and among 
its mainstream white audiences (see Bogle 1973; Bataille and Silet 1980). Cultural 
exchange is routinely condemned here for the distorted lens it provides, leading 
to calls for the taking over of the representation of minorities to the mainstream 
by the minorities themselves so as to fashion a more inclusive image. Such 
internal cultural diversity is itself a leitmotif in much cultural studies and 
contemporary screen scholarship. It shifts attention to contingent processes of 
integration, differentiation, and assimilation of the cultural materials of the host 
and minority culture by minorities themselves, displacing the mainstream from 
its assumed center stage. So we find Hamid Naficy's Iranian immigrant viewers 
of film and television in California adapting aspects of their Persian heritag'e and 
taking on elements of American culture to construct composite, hybrid identities 
in symbolic cultural practices which simultaneously disavow and recognize their 
difference (1993: 86). Homi Bhabha's immigrant and marginal diasporic com­
munities further make a claim for the centrality of their experience to the 
constitution of the nation itself: "the Western metropole must confront its 
postcolonial history, told by its influx of postwar migrants and refugees, as an 
indigenous or native narrative internal to its national identity" (1994: 6). For 
their part, gay and lesbian communities interacting with a filmmaking largely 
premissed on heterosexual orientations produce not only their own resistances 
but proactive readings and filmmaking, including notions of a queer nation 
internal to the nation itself (see Brasell 1995). Equally important is the conco­
mitant stress placed on the imaginative consequences of cultural diversity upon 
majority groups. In this context Kobena Mercer poses the question: "what is 
going on when whites assimilate and introject the degraded and devalued sig­
nifier of racial otherness into the cultural construction of their own identity?" 
(1992: 21). Julian Stringer, answering this question, argues that white appropria­
tions of blackness and Chineseness are qualitatively different: "the racial eco­
nomy in the white imagination of True Romance (dir. Tony Scott, writer Quentin 
Tarantino) is clear: you can have the Chineseness; but you can be black" (199617: 
60). Stringer asks: "what is it that makes him [Tarantino] want to be black but 
not really Chinese?" 
Cultural exchange mechanisms can, as these examples demonstrate, be located 
at macro and micro levels alike, suggesting that cultural exchange is both a 
constitutive component of culture itself and involves matters of cultural and 
economic power. As Michael Schudson observes: 
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The interrwinings of local, regional, national, and global cultures are now complex 
beyond reckoning. Cultures flow in, out, around, and through state borders; within 
states, centres radiate to peripheries but peripheries influence centres, too; in the 
world system the same phenomenon is repeated and culture flows in many 
directions. (1994: 42) 
In such circumstances the critical issue is the handling and standing of such 
cultural exchange by agents in various cultural formations. In this both the 
senders and receivers, the exporters and the importers, the foreign and the host 
cultures are implicated. At issue is how cultural exchange mechanisms enter into 
and shape cultural milieux, including identities and the culture itself. 
3 The Standing of Cultural Exchange 
A mixed standing to cultural exchange in the film milieu and beyond is an 
inevitable consequence ofboth this sheer diversity and scope ofcultural materials 
exchanged and the variety of levels at which such cultural exchange operates -­
from policy to ideas, from the circulation of pcople to thc cxtension of practices, 
from reception contexts to industry development. Cultural exchange is part of 
the very furniture of the film milieu, a taken-for-granted given. And it is some­
thing very much in the foreground of consideration as some aspects of cultural 
exchange are made into substantive political, critical, and ethical issues by film 
critics, filmmakers, activists, and governments. 
Our film politics, our film policy-making, our film appreciation, and our film 
criticism are deeply ambivalent about cultural exchange. We take it for granted, 
embrace it, and repel it in cqual measure. We simultaneously see cultural 
exchange as an ordinary and integral part of the very constitution of the cinema, 
and as something so extraordinary as to require urgent critical and policy remedy. 
On the one hand we appreciate it and evolve strategies for more of it, and on the 
other we formulate policies designed to ensure less of it, including campaigns to 
diminish or enhance its standing. This ambivalence about cultural exchange is a 
consequence of how we encounter - remark upon or simply take for granted - the 
standing of cultural exchange. 
Cultural exchange can have standing as simply an unexceptionable process in 
the film milieu, as when Kristin Thompson writes ofhow national cinemas are, as 
a mattcr of course, shaped by the "influences film-makers and audiences picked 
up from the presence of American films" (1985: ix). Describing and judging this 
sort of cultural exchange cuts across every facet of film study. The study of film 
auteurs needs to assess, for example, thc influence of the British creative duo 
Michael Powell and Emeric Pressburger on the work of Martin Scorsese. Lesley 
Stern, for example, writes that "Raging Bull (Scorsese, 1980) bears an imprint, 
can be read in terms of The Red Shoes (Powell & Pressburger, 1948); it is as 
though The Red Shoes has bled subliminally into Raging Bull" (1995: 11). A 
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strand of national cinema analysis embeds the national cinema in question into a 
larger international cinema, such that comparing one's own national cinema to 
others becomes a way to understand it. Darrell William Davis notes how one 
strand in the discussion of Japanese cinema "emphasises its similarities and 
differences to other works, usually from Western cinema" (1996: 19). The result 
aimed for is that of "an intertextual conversation of allusion and influence that 
conveys the dialectic of artistic process" within Japanese cinema (19). Cultural 
exchang'e functions here as a catalyst for understanding' and reinvig'orating' local 
traditions. 
Cultural exchange can be of such a character that it is not even noticed as a 
form of exchange. GeoffLealand notes the naturalizing of the Hollywood screen 
presence on the cultural horizons of ordinary New Zealanders: 
The stories ofHollywood that persist have been long naturalised into New Zealand 
popular culture, so that E. T. seems no more alien to New Zealanders than to 
Americans. The images we [New Zealanders] have embraced, as well as having 
been naturalised, have also been "neutralised"; no longer perceived as threats to 
the cultural integrity of New Zealand. They are deemed as something else ­
"entertainment", "escapism", "fantasy", universal stories with universal appeal. 
(1988: 90) 
Here cultural exchange is part of the wallpaper - a cause for neither celebration 
nor denigration, it is simply something we are to attend to if we want to under­
stand the cinema before us and the everyday transnational conversations of which 
it seems a part. Its standing is literally that of any other naturalized part of the 
film milieu. Cultural exchange seems here to be part of us, who we are, what we 
think. We can no more disaggregate and disentangle it than catch the air. 
Something of the mundane character of this cultural exchange can be seen in 
the gestation and critical uptake of Alex Proyas's recent feature film Dark City 
(1998). Proyas, whose previous feature was the cult classic The Croll' (1994) 
featuring the late Brandon Lee, made Dark City in his native Australia in a 
studio part-owned by the Fox Corporation - a major Hollywood studio and 
multi-national film distributor. In keeping with the emerging logic of global film 
production that Toby Miller has explored (1996, 1998a, 1998b), Dark City is 
simultaneously a Hollywood film made in Australia, an Australian film (the 
studio in question was developed in conjunction with support from federal and 
state [provincial] governments), a film with an international cast and crew, and a 
film whose story coordinates are claimed by its director in French comics, sci-fi 
literature and the German Expressionist cinema of the 1920s (Barber and Sacchi 
1998; Helms 1998). 
For their part, film critics typically made sense of this film through an orgy of 
comparison. It was judged to be a commentary on and an extension of classic 
films as diverse as No~feratu, eine Symphonie des Grauens (1922), Metropolis 
(1926), La Bete humaine (1938), The Wiz,ard of Oz (1939), Zardoz (1973), 
Phenomena (1984), Hellraiser (1987), Delicatessen (1991), The Hudsucker Proxy 
273 
Tom O'Regan 
(1994), The Crow (1994), and La Cite des enfants perclus (1995).1 The reviews on 
the Internet proliferated resemblances. Some critics declaimed its derivativeness. 
Paul Tatara (1998) claimed a "dead lift" from Brazil (1985): "Think of a loud, 
unimaginably confused (visually as well as narratively) Brazil with absolutely no 
sense of humor." Others found in its cinematic references a rich intertextual 
space. Roger Ebert (1998) noted that: "Its villains, in their homburgs and 
flapping overcoats, look like a nightmare inspired by the thugs in M, but their 
pale faces would look more at home in The Cabinet olDr. Caligari (1919)." 
The filmmakers and audiences (insofar as critics are indicative of the audience) 
alike saw the film adapting, appropriating, poaching, and remaking films, film­
making styles, practices, and technologies drawn from various filmmaking tradi­
tions. Proyas's film was clearly entering into a dialogue with the cinema - past 
and present, the dominant international cinema, art cinema, and traditions of 
comics. 
The film has no discernible Australian precedent, nor can any influence be 
claimed from previous Australian films, and yet it is likely to significantly impact 
on Australian production (Venkatasawmy and O'Regan 1998). It is a film with 
decidedly international precedents. While not an Australasian art film along the 
lines of Jane Campion's The Piano (1993), it takes up aspects of art cinema 
hitherto unexplored in its imagining of other possible worlds, its plays with the 
logic of representation, and its studio-based rather than location-based film 
practice. 
With Dark Ci~y cultural exchange is fundamental to its very constitution in 
production, circulation, and significance. The debating point is the quality of this 
exchange. Few doubt whether it should exist (they might want less of it but could 
not imagine none of it) or if this is the right kind of cultural exchange (to do so 
would query a line of filmmaking that begins with Fritz Lang's Metropolis). The 
issue is rather if it is any good at what it does in its own terms and in terms of the 
sci-fi, expressionist, and film-noir traditions on which it draws. Is it parasitic on 
them? Does it adequately contribute to them? At issue is its cinema, not its 
cultural authenticity or the appropriateness of an Australian creating an Amer­
ican noir city in a Sydney backlot. This film and this filmmaker are not making a 
statement about Australia or his Greek-Australian identity. They are participat­
ing in the cinema, and this film is produced, circulated, and criticized in a 
transnational space. 
Cultural exchange is often publicly embraced as a good thing in circumstances 
where the line between self and other - the domestic national cinema and the 
international cinema - is clearer. The public championing of cultural exchange is 
often tied up with how generations (of audiences, filmmakers, and critics) step in 
the face of their predecessors by actively seeking and lionizing certain kinds of 
cultural exchange as a matter of active policy. Such a searching out of available 
international models of film and living was part of a purposive rejection of a local 
film and socio-political situation by the emerging filmmakers of the New German 
Cinema from the 1960s. Anton Kaes contends that a "unifying force of New 
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German Cinema since the 1960s has been the 'uncompromising rejection of the 
[fascist] National Socialist film tradition'" (1989: 8). He cites directors such as 
Wim Wenders looking to American directors such as John Ford "for stylistic 
inspiration"; Volker SchlOndorff going to France "to learn filmmaking," and 
Herzog identifying himself with "the tradition of German Expressionism of the 
1920s." 
The local situation need not be as drastic as a fascist past; typically many a 
national filmmaker will publicly reject his or her own domestic production 
traditions in favor of the seemingly more expansive, even liberating, horizons 
and models available in the international cinema. Devaluing the national cinema 
and admitting to the value of Hollywood is part of how filmmakers - like 
Australia's Baz Luhrmann (Strict(y Ballroom, 1992) - declare their "newness," 
"relevance," and "importance" in the local milieu. Hollywood enacts what the 
national cinema holds out, at least potentially, as its preserve - namely a natural 
and direct relation with the local audience. As Kim Schroder and Michael 
Skovmond celebrate it, "by breaking away from traditional, class-based notions 
of good taste, [it] could be absorbed by the actual tastes and desires of large 
numbers of working-class people" (1992: 7). 
Governments the world over promote the educational and cultural value of 
international understanding in their cultural policies. They inaugurate programs 
for intercultural dialogue, which include the support of film festivals and the 
encouragement of coproductions. Indeed one of the functions of national public 
broadcasters in the latter part of the twentieth century - particularly in their 
niche and minoritarian variants- was to provide expanded opportunities for 
seeing and appreciating more of the world's cinema and television programming 
than they would otherwise have had available to them through the commercial 
dynamics of free-to-air broadcasting. So it is, for example, that Australia's 
national public broadcaster, SBS-TV, broadcasts 50 per cent of its programming 
in languages other than English drawn from around the world and maintains a 
"world movies" pay-TV channel. In a similar fashion the UK's Channel 4 has 
been an important screening venue and production catalyst for feature films, 
documentaries, and series television exploring local and international cultural 
diversity and including a variety of international production partnerships. 
Sometimes moments of cultural exchange become defining moments for a film 
community and enable cultural communities to reorient their appreciation, 
criticism, and sense of the purposes and possibilities of filmmaking, as happened 
in France in the 1950s and early 1960s. Like so many of his generation, Henri 
Agel encountered as a revelation the American cinema largely denied him under 
German occupation after World War II: 
It was in the course of these nights, glistening with all the fires of the music hall, 
through swarming carnivals worthy of the early Rouault, in smoke-filled halls 
oozing with all the effluvia of Pigaile, that for some an American enchantment was 
born. A magic, doubtless impure and at times closer to a junkie's high, a magic too 
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tied up with tinsel and vulgarity of the Boulevard not to be ambiguous. And even 
so, in the trip from the icy Palace to the last metro for Etoile, everything began to 
decant, to regroup along certain lines of force that in the course of those weeks 
etched a more precise and more dense image of Hollywood, no longer the one that 
our professors pronounced with their lips pursed, but a crucible perpetually on the 
boil in which was blended fear and laughter and eroticism and violence and 
tenderness. Surely we were mixing thus the best and the worst. (1963: 12-13; 
quoted in Routt 1992: 61) 
This cinema became a vehicle for both a cinephilia -- a love of and commitment to 
the cinema -- and a highly particular French "romance Americaine." In Agel's 
case this desire and love for a specifically American cinema is simultaneously 
embedded with unambiguously French landmarks and cultural references. 
Love and desire are as indiscriminate here as elsewhere. The desire may just as 
likely be for an art cinema, a political cinema, an experimental cinema seemingly 
unavailable in one's own local cinema as for a popular vernacular cinema like 
Hollywood. (Indeed in English-speaking countries this desire for cultural 
exchange is more likely to manifest itself publicly in a desire for something 
other than Hollywood vernacular and the Anglo-American quality film, includ­
ing its Australasian and Canadian variants.) 
Just as cultural exchange can be so appreciated, loved, and desired, cultural 
exchange can be repulsed, actively and trenchantly resisted. Indeed desire and 
repulsion are part of the very public provenance of cultural exchange, as we see in 
the Agel quote. One person's (foreign or simply Other) love object is another's 
hate object. Agel's love for Hollywood and the cinema is matched by his 
professors' disdain for American cinema and "the movies_" Often desire and 
repulsion for the same cinematic phenomena are to be found among the same 
people. The Cahiers du cinhna film critics who espoused American cinema in the 
1950s and early 1960s had adopted a far less sympathetic tone toward Hollywood 
by the mid-1960s as directors facing American competition. 
Resisting cultural exchange has long been a very public matter and has its 
origins in the profoundly unequal cultural flows of the international audiovisual 
system mentioned above. As these unequal cultural exchanges flow from cap­
italist dynamics which have concentrated the "power over communications" into 
a handful of multi-nationals, resistance to them becomes a public matter. Fran­
yois Mitterrand, as French President, railed against this nexus in 1982: 
The distribution of information developed and controlled by a few dominant 
countries could mean for others the loss of their history or even their sovereignty, 
thus calling into question their freedom to think and decide. (cited in Mattelart et 
al. 1988: 19) 
Various cultural, educational and religious elites make apolitical issue of too 
much distributed cultural e:rchange. The desire for cultural exchange readily turns 
to repulsion when it rubs up against, and is seen to compromise through sheer 
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scale, cultural transmission and routines of identity formation. Many a Briton, 
Frenchman or woman, and Australian has worried publicly about the conse­
quences for cultural maintenance, transmission of heritage, and allegiance even to 
the nation and community of a youth brought up on other people's pictures, 
knowing more of the 4th of July and apple pie than 1066, the storming of the 
Bastille, or Gallipoli. These worries are often registered in a public anti-Amer­
icanism, anti-market, or anti-transnational-corporation position on the part of 
various elites and popular movements, g'iven Hollywood's role as the primary 
international cinema and the US role as the world's leading economy. 
Cultural exchange with the US is actively resisted for the threats it poses to the 
transmission of local cultures from generation to generation. In film criticism we 
speak of films and filmmaking traditions being swamped by other cultural 
traditions. In the case of Australian and Canadian audiences and filmmakers, 
they not only "feel second best ... forced to second guess what their authentic 
indigenous culture should be" but they produce a "neo-colonial 'second cinema' 
that consciously and unconsciously strives to reproduce the Hollywood models of 
production and circulation, counterfeiting the local sense of historical reality" 
(Dermody and Jacka 1988: 20, 23). Hollywood's effects are experienced not only 
in the perverted complexion of markets and investment but in the perversion of 
the national subject itself- the value and identity of a nation's citizens. America's 
offense is psychical: they are the privileged group, globally enforcing' their world­
view. People the world over respond by becoming identified with this American 
point of view, and in the process their identity, history, and culture are devalued. 
Agents locate an abjection among audiences and filmmakers to explain why a 
positive relation between the local audience and their national cinema is so 
difficult to achieve. Under such conditions of distorted cultural exchange film­
making milieux can seem to become predominantly neocolonial (Dermody and 
Jacka 1988: 23). Repulsion is integrally tied up with matters of national pride and 
sour grapes: too much cultural exchange becomes a measure of national failure 
for the local product not only to own its domestic market but to count inter­
nationally. 
There are powerful political reactions on the part of political and cultural elites 
to the unequal cultural exchange implicit in the international audiovisual system. 
Perceiving' too much of one kind of cultural exchange, such as largely one­
directional cultural flows, these reactions acquire a modular form. Film critics 
in English-speaking countries routinely lament too much American influence on 
local filmmakers and call for a greater openness on their part to to other cultural 
influences like Asian or European cinema (see, for example, Berry 1992: 48). 
Film agents - from eritics to lobbyists - around the world call for and attempt to 
implement protectionist measures, including the expulsion of "foreign bodies" to 
recover a being, a space before "contamination": in 1975 an Australian govern­
ment report claimed its legitimate business as protecting local locations from 
exploitation by predatory international filmmakers (Interim Board of the Aus­
tralian Film Commission 1975: 36). Mainland and Taiwanese critics routinely 
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lambast Hong Kong cinema for being "un-minzu" - for being un-Chinese in its 
adoption of "Western" modes of filmic expression. Domestic film-industry 
spokespersons routinely regard the loss of their domestic audience to Hollywood 
(or another dominant international cinema) as a consequence of predatory and 
colonizing behaviors. Sometimes resistance to cultural exchange has been ex­
hibited in political disturbances, including acts of arson and threats accompany­
ing the opening of the South Korean market to Hollywood films and American 
distributors. 
Repulsion need not be founded on the schoolmaster's elitism with its implicit 
assumptions of low versus high culture, elite versus popular art, Europe versus 
America. It may instead be founded on resolutely populist and even tribalist 
positions. Indigenous community leaders (see Michaels 1994: 20-46) are con­
cerned at the cultural impact of a readily available cinema, television, and video 
on traditional life - rituals, mores, observances, and practices - and the respect 
for cultural authority. But even here indig'enous people are typically not against 
cultural exchange per se. They are more often concerned to guard against its 
excesses and to attempt to turn it toward community-building and cultural 
enhancement. Classification and censorship regimes "protect citizens" from 
materials that would give cultural or religious offense. 
Whether this is a genuinely felt cultural need, an informed response to 
objective conditions of concentration and control over transmission, or simply 
opportunist industry posturing to secure its own advantages, such reactions 
license both policy programs designed to foster a local filmmaking ecology and 
political rhetorics aimed at reclaiming symbolicly a tradition in danger of extinc­
tion. On grounds of the cultural threat and cultural erosion following fi'om 
exchange, a panoply of measures have developed internationally to inhibit, 
limit, and channel it. These inhibitions include a variety of governmental instru­
ments from public policy to film-censorship regimes, from film-importing prac­
tices to curricula adjustment. 
Nations around the world and jurisdictions such as the Canadian province of 
Quebec "use the law as a vehicle for the protection of [their] identity" (Burnett 
1996: 250). So we have had long histories of regulated box office quotas and levies 
on films, introduced and sustained over the 1930s stretching through to the 1980s 
as a means of ensuring a viable local supplement alongside a vigorous interna­
tional cinema. Quebec legislators, as part of their efforts to encourage the public 
use of French and protect a distinctive identity, have mandated not only street 
signage in French but also that English-language films can only "play for 
between eight and twelve weeks before a French dubbed version must appear 
in the theatres" (Burnett 1996: 257). 
Various content regimes, first in the cinema and later in television, mandate 
amounts oflocal cinema and television product or specify upper limits on foreign 
content. Such content regimes are designed to encourage particular kinds of 
cultural exchange and production sources for the people's cinema enjoyment. In 
1928 the New Zealand government mandated that 20 per cent of films imported 
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into New Zealand should be British, justifying this measure on the grounds that 
it would "give our people, particularly the younger ones, a clearer idea of British 
history, of British countries and British customs and ideals" (cited in Lealand 
1988: 91). Lest the colonial dominion relation evident here be seen as something 
of the past, just substitute for British "European" and you have the basis for 
much of the same supra-nation-state discourse of the contemporary European 
Community. For his part, the French cultural minister of the 1980s, Jack Lang, 
denounced multi-national and, by implication, American dominance of the 
international cultural exchange system in remarks that occasioned diplomatic 
exchanges with the Americans (cited in Mattelart et al. 1988: 19-20). Against this 
cultural imperialism he was concerned to construct counter-measures in a Latin 
audiovisual space (see Mattelart et al. 1984: passim). 
The reactions to too much exchange of a certain kind reach into general 
societal reactions to perennial issues such as screen (cinema and TV) violence 
and classification issues. Because these controversies were associated in Australia, 
from the late 1950s to the mid-1970s, with imported product, the importing of 
that product became a political issue, whereas in the US the issue was one of 
influencing Hollywood's generation of product. Controversies over the same 
programs and films in Australia carried an additional weight in that Australian 
children were not just being affected by violence, thcy wcre also being "Amer­
icanized." Social and educational elites in Australia found themselves supporting 
Australian production as a quality alternative. Quality film and television meant 
non-US television and screen drama. This is quite typical. Moral crusaders the 
world over transpose US concerns about the effects of movie and television 
violence on civic, social, and family life into similar concerns couched in terms 
of the circulation of specifically American cinema and programming. Sometimes 
these reactions can become populist movements dedicated to purging the foreign 
presence and identifying the movies and entertainment more generally as a 
primary target, as in Iran under Khomeini. The standing of cultural-exchange 
dynamics is obviously implicated in systems and relations of power within the 
cinema and society more generally. And this power is not only exercised by the 
stronger cultural producer against the weaker cultural receivers and producers, 
but also by the power of domestic elites to co-determine with international 
distributors the shape, form, and trajectory of the cultural exchange that does 
take place. 
This mixed standing of cultural exchange when coupled with the diversity of 
materials for cultural exehange has encouraged film and cultural studies alike to 
seek to classify it - to distinguish types and kinds of cultural exchange, and to 
disclose the effects of the operation of these various types of cultural exchange on 
different film milieux, filmmakers, and film-reception contexts. And in classify­
ing cultural exchange, film and cultural studies have been concerned to make 
judgments about it. We have been concerned with "what ought to be the case" 
and we have therefore expressed preferences for and aligned ourselves with some 
rather than other forms of cultural exchange, assiduously seeking to praise and 
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locate the best and most appropriate. We have lauded those who resisted the 
power dynamics of the international cinema, articulating a "third cinema" - "a 
cinema of research and experimentation, equidistant from both mainstream and 
auteurist cinema" (Stam 1993: 242). And conversely we have been vitally con­
cerned to search out and warn of the worst excesses of cultural exchange ­
circulation and imitation that is destructive, whether of indigenous traditions 
or simply of sensibility itself. Consequently critics, like their filmmaker and 
policy-maker counterparts, routinely find some kinds of cultural exchange 
g'ood, and others bad. We use our identification of whether cultural exchange is 
good or bad to figure out the standing and therefore the value of films, filmmak­
ing traditions, and film-production entities like particular companies and indeed 
whole countries. Cultural exchange is consequently alternately valued and criti­
cized, embraced and combatted. Film studies' attempts to classify and evaluate 
cultural exchang'e are irrevocably shaped not only by the communities concerned 
and the standing of that exchange but by the very notions of culture, identity, and 
exchange deployed. It is to these notions we must now turn. 
4 Cultural Exchange and Cultural Identity 
Our deliberations above inevitably lead us to the conclusion that cultural­
exchange processes are simultaneously a blessing and a curse; they enable cultural 
development and identity formation and they disable the same. They help define 
one's own pictures and are integral to substituting other people's pictures 
for one's own. Cultural exchange is double-faced. It is part and parcel of the 
mechanisms that establish a sense of collective identity; and, equally importantly, 
it is part of disestablishing the same. It is inextricably tied to our notions of 
cultural identity, national identity, diasporic identity - for peoples and for the 
cinema in, for example, a national cinema. Cultural exchang'e is an intrinsic part 
of the self-same process that makes our cultural and political identities so 
provisional. 
Insofar as identity involves notions of cultural integrity and autonomy, ideals 
of cultural becoming and cultural wholeness including a sense of destiny as a 
people, cultural exchange mechanisms diminish these. The integrity and auton­
omy of a culture and an identity formed in auto-identificatory fashion (construct­
ing an identity in relation to itself rather than in relation to another) seem 
compromised by processes which, by definition, must question, even corrode, 
the bounded, coherent, and placed character of a cultural formation (adopted 
from Morley and Robins 1995: 122). Such cultural-exchange processes empha­
size the interrelatedness and hybridity of cultural formations producing cultural 
fragmentation under the impact of imports as the audience for the local cultural 
product is fractured and seemingly "lost" to other cultures. 
Such processes are often held to contribute to a perceived failure to achieve an 
identity. This is the classic anxiety over the incompleteness of various national 
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and sub-national identities. We can worry whether we are sufficiently other (or 
even have an identity or separate culture). We are concerned about unrealized or 
weak identities whose very weakness is a product of the encounter with other, 
hegemonic cultural traditions. A leitmotif in these discussions is the recognition 
that the domestic cinema, the culture, and the identity under conditions of 
cultural exchange are decentered, unbounded, incoherent, and placeless. So it 
is that Susan Dermody and Elizabeth Jacka talk of how: 
Second-world countries like Canada and Australia are riddled with post-colonial 
ambiguity and anxieties.... Our identity becomes both clamorous and per­
manently obscure.... For where do "we" end and the "other" begin? Who is 
the other by which we define our difference, ensuring "us"? Britain? America? 
How are "they" to be satisfactorily disentangled from what we have internalized 
and hybridized from them? (1988: 20) 
Sometimes film critics see this as a self-inflicted national failure - a product of 
cultural and social dysfunction, immaturity, and underdevelopment of cinema 
and other institutions. More commonly however, this failure is located elsewhere 
in colonial histories and neocolonial power relations embodied in critical con­
ceptions of cultural imperialism and varieties of oppression and incapacity. These 
circumstances make one susceptible to other people's pictures and projections 
that are not one's own, and even lead to pathological and dysfunctional identities 
for a culture and its cinema. In the field of cultural power, we routinely speak of 
overpowering and vulnerable identities as some cultural identities are more 
powerful than others. But this is not the whole story. 
Cultural-exchange processes also pose an alternative mechanism for founding 
a cultural identity - one that is based on the recognition of the relational and 
hybrid character of identity and culture. As Edward Said maintains, a culture, a 
self, a national identity is always produced in relation to its "others": 
the development and maintenance of every culture requires the existence of 
another different and competing alter ego. The construction of identity ... whether 
of Orient or Occident, France or Britain ... involves establishing opposites and 
"others" whose actuality is always subject to the continuous interpretation and 
reinterpretation of their differences from "us". (1995: 332) 
Cultural-exchange processes clearly contribute to identity and culture forma­
tion at fundamental and basic levels. Identity is also intrinsically relational and 
cultures are themselves hybrid mixes. Such processes enter into the very story­
telling of the vulnerable party. Olle Sjogren observes that, as a "small country," 
Sweden in its films and TV programs: 
is forced to transform its culturally weak position into a comedic national virtue. 
Comedy becomes a funny mirror for reflecting upon one's cultural weakness. It 
allows one to admit that one longs for a more exciting life without threatening the 
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life one is leading. Through parodies one can indulge one's fascination with 
another, more exciting culture, while simultaneously dismissing the indulgence 
as a joke. (1992: 157) 
Cultural-exchange processes show us how "we" are different from "them"; 
they let us know who we are through showing us who we are not. Such processes 
also illuminate and clear spaces for identities other than "ourselves." As Philip 
Schlesinger observes: 
How we define the other and how the other simultaneously defines us are part of 
the unavoidable game of identity politics. We are defined, in part at least, by being 
different from how they are. (1994: 27) 
For Schlesing'er this process ofhetero-identification is part of all identity politics, 
whether it is staged at international, national, or sub-national level. Cultural 
exchanges are the ordinary stuff of cultures and identities. The Canadian and 
Australian condition is not then special but an ordinary condition of identity 
formation. The difference is more one of inflection: these cultural formations 
routinely problematize their identities, often as a matter of civic and ethical 
principle (Hutchinson 1994: 164-97). 
Ron Burnett details some of the issues at stake when discussing the case of 
Quebeckers Celine Dion and Denys Arcand, the director of Jesus de Montreal 
(1989), both of whom have been "closely identified with the nationalist wing of 
Quebec culture" yet want, in the case of Dion, to be successful musically in the 
American market and, in the case of Arcand, to become known as "an interna­
tional filmmaker": 
Celine Dion and Arcand have understood that specificity as such can best be 
identified from the outside and that the distinctions which we so arbitrarily use 
to maintain our sense of identity rarely survive without being affirmed by observers 
from other cultures. (1996: 260) 
Cultural exchange is critical to any meaningful identity. It also carries the risk 
of substituting local culture with that of another. International contamination 
becomes a necessary risk, and identity a balancing act. It's not unusual for 
national cultural formations to oscillate between periods where public discourse 
emphasizes the line between self and other and other periods where it embraces a 
deliberate mixing, blurring, and preparedness to confuse itself with the world. 
Ross Gibson, for example, acknowledges that "the audience for Australian cinema 
... is now perhaps more interested in the world rather than the boundaries that 
could theoretically separate the nation from the remainder of the international 
community" which it was so preoccupied with in the 1970s (1992: 81). 
Burnett seems to be suggesting continuous processes of cultural interpenetra­
tion and exchange which precede the advent of the cinema and are subsequent to 
it. In this scenario attention is shifted to cultural-transfer processes and the 
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relation between them. Its premise is that there is, in Davis's words, "an 
international consciousness inseminating the film industries of all countries 
from the moment of their inception" making the cinema "an institution that is 
profoundly, inescapably international" (1996: 19). In such circumstances there is 
no original or authentic local culture or national cinema - every national cinema 
is consequently "'always already' touched by other cultures" (20). National 
cinemas become, in Elsaesser's words, "relations": "'National cinema' makes 
sense only as a relation, not as an essence, being dependent on other kinds of 
filmmaking, to which it supplies the other side of the coin" (1994a: 25-6). 
When Richard Collins notes the "productivity ofUS cultural influences ... on 
the Nouvelle Vague, the New German Cinema, or on Italian filmmakers like 
Sergio Leone or ... Gianni Amelio" (1990: 157), he is finding Hollywood posit­
ively in the constitution of the national cinema product. This not only questions 
the idea of contamination; it suggests an informed dialogue with Hollywood. To 
be sure this is an asymmetrical dialogue, but a dialogue nonetheless. 
But the cinema disposing the Other to produce a sense of Self raises the 
question as to whether the Other is displayed for him or herself or simply as a 
cipher to establish ourselves. Such dynamics hardly matter if the Other is a 
culturally stronger First-World Other, as when people of a European descent 
(usually Americans and Britons) and African-Americans are depicted as villains 
in Hong Kong cinema (such representation was aided by Hong Kong censorship 
under British control, which was more concerned to police representations of the 
mainland for fear of giving offense to a capricious People's Republic of China 
than to police the representation of themselves and the West). Where those 
Others are weaker, racially, religiously, and ethnically different, and comparat­
ively voiceless, film critics worry about the representation of these Others 
functioning as "metaphors for ... [a] sense of collective identity" (Berry 1994: 
33). Obviously and throughout history preceding and subsequent to the cinema, 
such forms of hetero-identification have been typically discriminatory and pre­
judiced. A blackness helps define a whiteness; the Africans and Asians help 
define the European; women help define men, and so on. 
But with the contemporary critical attention currently paid to diasporas, 
migrants, intercultural exchange, exile, and marginal, minority communities 
defined either by ethnicity and race or by sexual preference (it is now common 
to talk of the "queer" nation [Berlant and Freeman 1992]), a literature on hetero­
identification has developed which has moved from denouncing an in-principle 
opposition to forms of hetero-identification to distinguishing between negative 
and positive self!other dynamics. On the one hand there is the attcntion paid to 
colonialist representational logics (Young 1990) and accompanying notions of 
Eurocentrism (Shohat/Stam 1994); on the other hand this has been accompanied 
by a deal of attention to locating and celebrating good, productive, life-and 
identity-affirming practices. Here hybridity and intersubjective encounters are 
celebrated and endorsed. So it is that Chris Berry, in writing of Denis O'Rourke's 
fiction documentary The Good Woman ofBangkok (1992), talks of a "postcolonial 
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encounter" at the Rose Hotel between the prostitute Aoi and the filmmaker, 
which has also become an "intersubjective space": 
What is enacted in the intersubjective exchanges in the Rose Hotel, on the other 
hand, is the encounter of two very different entities, each internal!y incoherent and 
split in its own way, each caught in larger patterns. Furthermore, these entities are 
caught up in the unequal relationships that the hybrid, syncretic space of their own 
interaction creates; in the Rose Hotel they create a space that is far from utopian 
but is different from what went before. And what is the nature of this particular 
intersubjective exchange, this particular deal in Bangkok? Symbolized in the form 
of her rice farm, Aoi gets to exert agency, and symbolized in the haunting form of 
his film O'Rourke gets to be in Asia and gets Asia in him. (1994: 55) 
Exemplary filmmaker theorist figures such as Trinh T. Minh-ha (1992) exem­
plify what ought to be in such exchanges. Theirs is a hybridity of form and 
function in filmmaking and film criticism. They perform an avowedly indeter­
minate identity -- refusing' any fixed identity as American or Vietnamese, for 
example. They insist on process rather than outcome, a becoming rather than an 
arriving. They occupy a space that, in being neither one thing nor another, is a 
liminal "in between" space appropriate to the crossing of territorial and other 
borders in their work and its reception. They are seen to be both "outsider-in" 
and "insider-out." 
Culture under a dispensation that takes both national societies as its unit and 
various communities within and across it is routinely and inevitably a hybrid 
phenomenon made of past and present cultural exchanges. It cannot be an ideal 
purity corrupted through inappropriate cultural exchange or an ideal purity to be 
achieved at some point in the future. Cultures under conditions of cultural 
exchange are made from nonoriginary, nonorganic characteristics. They arc 
hybrid, they are contingent, they are in process. The faultlines within film 
studies arc centered on how we describe this international contamination and 
the standpoints we take on cultural exchange, and most particularly where we 
draw the line as to its desirable and undesirable components. 
Our very ways of discussing' cultural exchange and identity here make it 
tempting to find two models of culture: an older organic model rooted in 
tradition and heritage and auto-identification, and another contemporary version 
for our globalizing times based on hetero-identification and hybridity. But if we 
go back to some of the founding analyses of culture and national cultures by 
Herder (1993), for instance, we find the same sense of culture being formed by 
interactions with others - through invasions, cultural transfers, migrations, and 
so on, alongside the more organic nativist constructions. The issue is not then a 
matter of choosing between one or the other but the relation between the two ­
the interpenetration of auto-identificatory processes with hetero-identificatory 
ones. The t:mltlines within film studies over cultural exchange emerge over the 
weighting given to each and therefore the angle of incidence taken on these 
processes. 
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Embedded in this discussion is a way of understanding the double­
edged character of culture itself, cultural exchange and its relation to cultural 
identity. Such exchange is critical to defining and transforming the self, to 
defining the culture and redefining it; it is also critical to processes of cultural 
denaturing, of eroding the culture and the sense of self, of compromising it, of 
ruining it, reducing it to a form of sameness. This simultaneous character of 
cultural exchange - both as a means for us to determine who and what we are and a 
powerful corrosion of who and what we are - is fundamental to cultural exchange 
in the cinema and bedevils film studies and the wider film milieu. 
An emerging perspective in film studies has it that we need a change from 
normative approaches to cultural exchange toward normalizing the cultural-trans­
fer processes intrinsic to such cultural exchanges. Film studies, at least in part, is 
moving from principled objections to unequal cultural exchang'e to a careful 
attention to the variety, shape, and interrelatedness of the various cultural­
exchange processes. This attention focusses on the negotiation of cultural trans­
fers by the receiving culture. 
5 Negotiation of Cultural Transfers 
Regardless of these various asymmetries, the international film and television 
milieu is configured by flows and transfers (of concepts, genres, styles, texts, 
fashions, etc.) which shape filmmaking, criticism, and consumption in a variety 
of ways. Soviet semiotician Iouri Lotman (1990) has made cultural 
transfers central to his understanding of national cultural formations. 
Elsewhere I have applied this model to thinking about Australian national 
cinema and cultural-transfer/exchange processes more generally (see O'Reg'an 
1996). 
For Lotman cultural transfers play a significant role in the formation of 
cultures. They are central to culture and cultural development g·enerally. A 
culture cannot turn itself into a sending culture without being at some point 
a receiving culture. He distinguishes processes of cultural transfer and provides a 
way oflinking these as the successive stages involved in the unfolding story ofany 
culture's development. These are: a first stage where imported texts "keep their 
strang'eness" and are valued more than those of the home culture; a second stage 
where "the imported text and the home culture ... restructure each other" (so, 
for example, Rolf de Heer's Bad Boy Bubky [1994] indigenizes the Eastern 
European art film in an Australian context); a third stage where "a higher content 
is found in the imported world-view which can be separated from the national 
culture of the imported texts" and attached to the local product (so local films 
become better films than their original Hollywood exemplars); a fourth stage 
where "imported texts are entirely dissolved in the receiving culture" (as with 
Italian neorealism or the Nouvelle Vag'ue); and a fifth stage where "the receiving 
culture ... chang'es into a transmitting culture directing its product to other, 
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peripheral areas of the semiosphere" (so British films such as Mike Newell's 
Four Weddings and a Funeral [1994] and Hug'h Hudson's Chariots of Fire 
[1981] circulate the length and breadth of the international system) (Lotman 
1990: 146). 
For Lotman, national cultures need to pass through these five stages. Cultures 
cannot become transmitting cultures without passing through the earlier stag·es. 
As a professional historian and semiotician of culture, it makes no sense to 
Lotman to oppose these stages to one another, as they are part of a general and 
larger process. Both the abject home culture of stage one and the confident 
producing culture of stag'e four are not only part of a continuum of cultural 
exchange but are organically interconnected. Such natural semiotic processes are 
not to be criticized as such but are rather to be identified for what they are - part 
of the general condition of any culture and not just antipodal ones. It is also the 
case that these stag'es are co-present at anyone time. 
In the first stage identified by Lotman, "[t]he texts coming in £i'om the outside 
keep their 'strangTness' " such that they are "read in the foreign language (both 
in the sense of natural language and in the semiotic sense)." Also, "[t]hey hold a 
high position in the scale of values, and are considered to be true, beautiful, of 
divine origin" (1990: 146). If Australians routinely hold Hollywood filmmaking, 
British cinema and television, and the European and now Asian cinema in higher 
esteem than the local product, they are matched by those in France like Henri 
Agel or Naficy's "third world audiences" wooed to the cinema by Hollywood. 
Industry people- distributors, filmmakers, and exhibitors - regularly report that 
audiences, from their perspective, are unwarrantedly resistant to quality local 
product, so inured are they by the almost divinized imported product. For the 
cinephile, American, not one's own national cinema, is "the cinephile's heaven" 
(Martin 1988: 92). Theirs is a loving regard for modes of filmmaking often not 
their own. Filmmakers can often insist upon the cultural appropriateness in other 
contexts of the Hollywood imaginary, berating those who would accentuate what 
is different about local speech and life styles and ignoring what is imaginatively 
held in common. For Lotman: 
Knowledge of the foreign language is a sign of belonging to "culture," to the elite, 
to the best. Already existing texts in "one's own" language, and that language 
itself, are correspondingly valued lowly, being classed as untrue, "coarse," "uncul­
tured." (1990: 146) 
Variously, the Hollywood cinema, American independents, European and 
Asian art films, the avant-garde, exploitation, political, multi-cultural, or femin­
ist cinema can show up the limits and inadequacies of the local product. The film 
critic calls on this international repertoire to introduce to the local cinema some 
film-performance style, genre, or social problematization. Audiences are often 
animated by similar concerns, as when John Baxter reported how viewing local 
films left him 
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disturbed rather than glowing with national pride - rather like a Catholic hearing 
mass said for the first time in English rather than Latin. There was only one proper 
place for making films and that was America: I didn't care to see fantasies enacted 
right on my doorstep. It was a common reaction. (1986: 22) 
During this stage, Lotman sug'gests there is a "dominant psychological impul­
se ... to break with the past, to idealize the 'new,' i.e. the imported world-view, 
and to break with tradition, while the 'new' is experienced as something salvific" 
(1990: 146). Instances of this stage abound in criticism, filmmaking, and film­
policy development. The need for a new start is undergirded by a recognition of 
the worthless character of the National Socialist tradition in Germany or the 
cinema of papa for the French New Wave. The devaluation of British-produced 
culture and elevation of Hollywood and the continental international art cinema 
is a natural part of the British experience of the cinema and culture more 
generally. I-Ience the common conception of British cinema as a kind of cardigan 
(Medhurst 1995: 16). 
Sometimes this first stage is referred to retrospectively and disparag'ingly as 
the "cultural cringe," where anything imported is valued, come what may. The 
standpoint of later stages reconstructs this stage as a false consciousness to rail 
against. But Lotman's first stage is essential to the introduction of new formats, 
critical paradigms, and combinations of filmmaking. Without it there can be no 
system regeneration, no second stage of indigenizing the imported culture 
from which to begin. It also/encourages a healthy disrespect for the local 
product and enables people to dream of an outside from which to reposition 
the local. 
The second stage, where the "imported texts and the home culture restructure 
each other," is evident in the many film-concept remakes. It is present in 
criticism when critics take the different theories developed for other cultural 
formations and sometimes apply them with only minor changes to their own 
context. And it is an important component in documentary cinema traditions 
where the substantially local character of much documentary circulation makes 
the original neither as publicly available nor as valued as the local copy, thus 
permitting often rudimentary concept remakes. 
Typically, feature-filmmakers and television-drama producers operate in the 
more advanced stage of a full-blown adaptation - as the Hollywood, British, and 
European originals already have a market presence. In this second stage, Lotman 
insists, "translations, imitations and adaptations multiply" and "the codes 
imported along with the texts become part of the metalingual structure." This 
second stag'e gives rise to a relatively strict division of labor: the local is the 
content, the flavor, the accent, and the social text, while the international 
provides the underlying form, values, narrative resolutions, etc. The products 
of this second stage are subject to Mattclart et al.'s criticism that in them 
"cultural identity [is] reduced to a national label stuck on what is essentially a 
transnational copy" (1988: 22). 
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This stage also includes "a predominant tendency to restore the links with the_ 
past, to look for roots" (Lotman 1990: 147). The new is now interpreted as "an 
organic continuation of the old, which is thus rehabilitated." Peter Weir's Picnic 
at Hanging Rock (1975) makes sense not just as a lush and quirky European art 
film or a classy horror film but in its connections with longstanding Australian 
storytellings, based as it is upon a screen adaptation of Joan Lindsay's novel. It 
was connected with nativist ideas about the threatening bush and tall stories and 
ghost stories about child disappearance and horror met with in the bush. Lotman 
notes that ideas of organic development come to the fore at this stage. Films can 
become part of a larger narrative of a culture undergoing development and 
flowering maturity. 
Lotman's third stage stresses: 
a tendency ... to find within the imported world-view a higher content which can 
be separated from the actual national culture of the imported texts. The idea takes 
hold that "over there" these ideas were realized in an "untrue," confused or 
distorted form and that "here," in the heart of the receiving culture they 
will find their true, "natural" heartland. The culture which first relayed these 
tcxts falls out of favour and the national characteristics of the texts will be stressed. 
(146) 
The third stage crucially involves perceptions. It reevaluates the home culture's 
product in a situation of assumed international comparison. The establishment of 
a film's international credentials, like success and awards at Cannes and Berlin 
film festivals, establishes its domestic credentials as an exemplary local product of 
international standard. Lotman's third stage opens out onto the heartfelt pride 
many producers and film workers feel about the quality and innovation of their 
product in an international frame. It is evident in the appreciation of films such as 
Luc Besson's La Femme (1990). This film reveals the complete mastery of the 
thriller genre. It is appreciated for its technical virtuosity and its ag'gressive and 
exuberant vitality, and its standing is confirmed by its concept remake in Holly­
wood. 
The fourth stage assimilates the imported matrices, making them entirely its 
own: "the imported texts are entirely dissolved in the receiving culture." For 
Lotman: 
During this stage ... the culture itself changes to a state of activity and begins 
rapidly to produce new texts; these new texts are based on cultural codes which in 
the distant past wcre stimulated by invasions from outside, but which now have 
been wholly transformed through the many asymmetrical transformations into a 
new and original structural model. (1990: 146) 
Whether it be the Japanese cinema of the 1950s and early 1960s, the French New 
Wave, Italian neorealism of the 1950s and the cinema of the 1960s, German 
Expressionism of the 1920s, or the New German Cinema from the 1960s, this 
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cinema is related to but not beholden to its distant "debts." There are limits to 
participation at this fourth stage. For some film-producing countries it happens 
regularly, as with the largcr countries of Europe. For the vast bulk of countries, 
which are small- or medium-sized in population tcrms or are comparatively 
impoverished in terms of film-production funding and circulation, we can be 
looking at "onc-person" film industries. There is not the level of production 
activity to sustain it, nor is there the dominance oflocal "symbolic" culture at the 
box office and on the television schedule. 
In the fifth stage: 
The receiving culture, which now becomes the general centre of the semiosphere, 
changes into a transmitting culture and issues forth a flood of texts directed to 
other, peripheral areas of the semiosphere.... As with any dialogue, a situation of 
mutual attraction must precede the actual contact. (Lotman 1990: 146) 
Of course the prospect of any but the largcr countries being at the center of the 
international audiovisual scmiosphere is largely chimerical. Although individual 
films from countries other than the US do rcgularly bccome "dominant enter­
tainment forces" (this is particularly so if they arc produced in the English 
language or can be dubbed into English effectively, as with Bruce Lee's Kung 
Fu films of the early 1970s), these tend to be the exception, not the rule. 
Nonetheless thcrc is an ambition within just about every reach of cinema and 
criticism not only to be particular and local but also to be universal and to speak 
to the world. The trajectory of many actors, cinematographers and directors to 
Hollywood, to Hong Kong, and to the larger film industries of Europe - France 
for francophone Africa, for example - makes sense in this context. The move to 
Hollywood completes the cycle: think of how many filmmakers continued to 
make "their" films in Hollywood. There is, obviously, a good casc to be made 
that Alfi'cd Hitchcock continued to make British films throughout his Hollywood 
career. For Elsaesser, Hitchcock's cinema revealed "the peculiar complexion of 
the British dandy" (1994b: 21), while for Ken Mogg, Hitchcock rcmained till the 
end "a British filmmaker" (1995: 21). 
6 Conclusion 
Lotman's schema provides support for a widely held position within film theory 
to put more flexible and open-ended conceptions of cultural exchange at the 
heart of its study. These conccptions are predicated on conceptions of culture 
that see it as always already hybrid - products of bordcr-crossings and other 
features. Lotman would agree with Davis that "an international consciousness" 
inseminatcs "thc film industries of all countries from the moment of their 
inception" (1996: 19). I-Ic, too, would see not only the cinema as "an institution 
that is profoundly, inescapably international" but that every national cinema, 
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every national or marginal cultural community is "'always already' touched by 
other cultures." And he would add that this is not new but the very historical 
condition ofculture. Clearly the normalization, divinization, and demonization of 
cultural exchang'e noted above are themselves naturally occurring features of the 
cultural-exchange cycle. 
By normalizing' cultural transfers we can shift our attention from moments of 
cultural exchange to its broader dynamics. In so doing analysis moves from 
valorizing one type of cultural exchange over others to understanding the larger 
cultural-exchange processes that link these moments. Lotman's own emphasis 
upon the cyclical character of cultural exchange makes him sanguine about it. For 
this historian of culture we should not take sides too quickly or take up the 
teleolog'ical invitation of seeing five sequential stages in which the latter stag'es are 
superior. We can afford to give each stage its due, particularly if we want system 
regeneration to occur and if we want to create the conditions for the cultural 
exchanges we prefer to occur (Lotman shows we need those other aspects of 
cultural exchange we might sometimes abhor). Filmmaking methods, 
ideas, concepts are also transformed in the encounter with local traditions. 
In this way cultural exchange facilitates the adaptation and reinvigoration of 
tradition. 
Such a position not only has practical consequences for how we might secure 
"cultural futures," in Michaels' happy phrase (1994: 99), but also has ethical and 
normative consequences for our practice as policy-makers and critics alike. 
Burnett warns us of the dangers inherent in our very conduct of cultural 
exchange: 
The necessity of the other ... makes policy necessary for culture but only if policy 
itself is seen as a cultural product and thus as open to change and reevaluation as 
any cultural production might be. Any transformation of policy into law in this 
regard closes off the very channels of discourse and exchange which have made the 
creation of culture possible in the first place. (1996: 260) 
For Burnett, as for Lotman, our policies, our plans of action, our very 
critical vocabulary need to remain flexible and open lest they inhibit and deny 
the very cultural adaptations so critical to cultural maintenance and growth. 
Working out the contours of this practice is a central issue facing 
contemporary film studies, whether it focusses on cultural exchange between 
or within societies. 
Note 
These titles are listed as links with other titles in the Internet Movie Database pages 
on the film. See http://us.imdb.com/TitleWark+CiZv+(l998) . Accessed August 11, 
1998. 
290 
Cultural Exchange 
References 
Agel, Henri. 1963. Romance americaine, 7th edn, art 35. Paris: Les Editions du Cerf. 
Barber, Lynden, and Marco Sacchi. 1998. "Shadow Player." The Australian Magazine 
Supplement, Weekend Australian (May 16-17): 32--4. 
Bataille, Gretchen, and Charles Si1et, eds. 1980. The Pretend Indians. Ames: Iowa State 
University Press. 
Baxter, John. 1970. Australian Cinema. Sydney: Pacific Books. 
---. 1986. Films/ruck: Aus/ralia at the Movies. Sydney: Australian Broadcasting Cor­
poration. 
Bazin, Andre. 1967, 1971. What Is Cinema? Vols I (5 2. Essays selected and trans. Hugh 
Gray. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Bell, Philip, and Roger Bell. 1993. Implicated: The United States in Australia. Melbourne: 
Oxford University Press. 
Berlant, Lauren, and Elizabeth Freeman. 1992. "Queer Nationality." boundary 2, 19 
(spring): 149-80. 
Berry, Chris. 1992. "Heterogeneity as Identity." Metro 91 (spring): 48-51. 
-----. 1994. A Bit on the Side: East--West Topographies ofDesire. Sydney: EM Press. 
Bhabha, Homi. 1994. The Location ofCulture. London: Routledge. 
Bogle, Donald. 1973. Toms, Coons, Mulattoes, Mammies and Bucks. New York: Viking 
Press. 
Brasell, R. Bruce. 1995. "Queer Nationalism and the Musical Fag Bashing of John 
Greyson's The Making of'Monstors.'" Wide Angle 16,3: 26--36. 
Burnett, Ron. 1996. "The National Q~.Iestion in Quebec and Its Impact on Canadian 
Cultural Policy." In Film Policy: International, National and Regional Perspectives. Ed. 
Albert Moran. London: Routledge. 249-61. 
Butler, Alison. 1992. "New Film Histories and the Politics of Location." Screen 33, 4 
(winter): 413-26. 
Caughie, John. 1990. "Playing at Being American: Games and Tactics." In Logics of 
Television. Ed. Patricia Mellencamp. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. ++-58. 
Collins, Richard. 1990. Television: Culture and Policy. London and Cambridge: Unwin 
Hyman. 
Davis, Darrell William. 1996. Pieturing Japaneseness. New York: Columbia University 
Press. 
Dermody, Susan, and Elizabeth Jacka. 1988. The Screening ofAustralia Vol. 2: Anatomy 
ola National Cinema. Sydney: Currency Press. 
De Usabel, Gaizka S. 1982. The High Noon of American Films in Latin Amerim. Ann 
Arbor: UMI Research Press. 
Downing, John. 1996. Internationalizing Media Theory. London: Sage. 
Ebert, Roger. 1998. "Dark City." Chicago 5)'un Times (March 11). <http:/ / www.suntimes 
.com/ebert/ebertJeviews/ 1998/02/022704.html > Accessed Aug. 14, 1998. 
Elsaesser, Thomas. 1989. New German Cinema: A History. London: BFI/Macmillan. 
---. 1994a. "Putting on a Show: The European Art Movie." Sight and Sound 4 (April): 
22-7. 
--. 1994b. "The Dandy in Hitchcock." Maguj/in 14: 15-23. 
"Foreign Market." 1922. The Moving Picture World (Jan. 7): 30. 
291 
Tom O'Regan 
Gibson, Ross. 1992. South i!t'the West. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University 
Press. 
Guback, Thomas. 1969. The International Film Industry. Bloomington: Indiana Univers­
ity Press. 
Helms, Michael. 1998. "Dark City" Interview with Andrew Mason and Alex Proyas. 
Cinema Papers 124 (May): 18---21,45. 
Herder, Johann. 1993. Against Pure Reason: Writings on Religion, Language, and History. 
Trans. and cd. Marcia Bunge. Minneapolis: Fortress Press. 
Hutchinson, John. 1994. Modern Nationalism. London: Fontana Press. 
Interim Board of the Australian Film Commission. 1975. Report of the Interim Board of 
the Australian Film Commission. Canberra (February). 
Jenkins, Henry. 1992. Textual Poachers. London: Routledge. 
Kaes, Anton. 1989. From Hitler to Heimat: The Return i!t' Histor.v as Film. Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press. 
Koval, Ramona. 1992. One to One. Sydney: ABC Books. 
Lea1and, Geoff. 1988. A Foreign r.gg in Our Nest? American Popular Culture in New 
Zealand. Wellington: Victoria University Press. 
Lotman, Iouri M. 1990. The Universe ofthe Mind: A Semiotic Theory ofCulture. Trans. 
Ann Shukman. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press. 
MacDonald, Kevin. 1994. Emeric Pressburger: The Life and Death i~t' a Screenwriter. 
London: Faber and Faber. 
McQuai1, Denis. 1994. Mass Communication Theor.V: An Introduction, 3rd edn. London: 
Sage Publications. 
Martin, Adrian. 1988. "Nurturing the Next Wave: What Is Cinema?" In Back ot'Beyond: 
Discovering Australian Film and Television. Ed. Peter Broderick. Sydney: Australian 
Film Commission. 90-101. 
Matte1art, Armand, Xavier Delcourt, and Michele Mattelart. 1984. International Image 
Markets: In Search of an Alternative Perspective. Trans. David Buxton. London: 
Comedia Publishing Group in association with Marion Boyars. 
---. 1988. "International Image Markets." In Global Television. Ed. Cynthia Schneider 
and Brian Wallis. New York: Wedge Press. 13--34. 
Medhurst, Andy. 1995. "Inside the British Wardrobe." Sight and Sound (March): 16-17. 
Mercer, Kobena. 1992. "Skin Head Sex Thing: Racial Difference and Homoerotic 
Imaginary." New Formations 16 (spring): 1-23. 
Michaels, Eric. 1990. "A Model of Teleported Texts (With Reference to Aboriginal 
Television)." Continuum: The Australian Journal ot'Media and Culture, 3, 2: 8-31. 
---. 1994. Bad Aboriginal Art: Tradition, Media and Technological Horizons. Sydney: 
Allen and Unwin; Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 
Miller, Toby. 1996. "The Crime of Monsieur Lang: GATT, the Screen and the New 
International Division of Culture Labour." In Film Policy. Ed. Albert Moran. Lon­
don: Routledge. 72---84. 
--. 1998a. "Hollywood and the World." In The Oxford Guide to Film Studies. Ed. John 
Hill and Pamela Church Gibson. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
----. 1998b. Technologies of Truth: Cultural Citi.zenship and the Popular Media. Min­
neapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 
Mogg, Ken. 1995. "'How about I Pump Hitler?': Hitchcock's FOYCl~~-n Correspondent 
(1940) and Its Sources." MagujJin 16: 11-26. 
292
 
Cultural Exchange 
Morley, David, and Kevin Robins. 1995. Spares of Identity: Global Media, Electronic 
Landscapes and Cultural Boundaries. London: Routledge. 
Naficy, Hamid. 1993. "Exile Discourse and Televisual Fetishization." In Otherness and 
the Media: The Ethnography of the Imagined and the Imaged. Ed. Hamid Naficy and 
Teshome H. Gabriel. Longhorne: Harwood Academic Publishers. 
---. 1996. "Theorizing 'Third World' Film Spectatorship." Wide Angle 18,4: 3-26. 
Nichols, Bill. 1994. "Global Image Consumption in Late Capitalism." East-West Film 
Journal 8, 1: 68-85. 
O'Regan, Tom. 1996. Australian National Cinema. London: Routledge. 
Orr, John. 1993. Cinema and Moderni~y. Cambridge and Oxford: Polity Press. 
Routt, William D. 1992. "L'Evidence." Continuum: The Australian Journal o/lviedia and 
Culture 3, 2: 40-67. 
Said, Edward. 1995. Orientalism. Ringwood, Melbourne: Penguin Books. 
Schiller, Herbert. 1969. Alass Communications and American Empire. New York: Augus­
tus M. Kelley. 
Schlesinger, Philip R. 1994. "Europe's Contradictory Communicative Space." Daedalus 
123, 2: 25-52. 
Schroder, Kim Christian, and Michael Skovmond. 1992. "Introduction." Media Cul­
tures: Appraising Transnational Media. Ed. K. C. Schroder and M. Skovmond (Lon­
don and New York: Routledge). 
Schudson, Michael. 1994. "Culture and the Integration of National Societies." In The 
Sociology ofCulture. Ed. Diane Crane. Cambridge and Oxford: Blackwell. 
Sepstrup, Preben. 1990. Transnationalization ot" Television in Western Europe. Academic 
Research Monograph 5. London: John Libbey. 
Shohat, Ella/Robert Starn. 1994. Unthinking Eurorentrism: Multiculturalism and the 
Media. London and New York: Routledge. 
Sinclair, John, Elizabeth Jacka, and Stuart Cunningham, eds. 1996. Nem Patterns in 
Global Television. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press. 
Sjog'ren, Olle. 1992. "The Swedish Star-Spangled Banner: An Essay on Blended Images 
in Film." In NetllJorks ofAmericanization. Ed. R. Lurden and E. Asard. Abstract by 
Richard Holm, pp. 156-60. Uppsala and Stockholm: Almqvist and Wiksel Inter­
national. 
Starn, Robert. 1993. "Review Essay: Eurocentrism, Afrocentrism, Polycentrism: The­
ories of Third Cinema." In Otherness and the Media: The Ethnography ot"the Imagined 
and the Imaged. Ed. Hamid Naficy and Teshome H. Gabriel. Langhorne: Harwood 
Academic Publishers. 233-54. 
Stern, Lesley. 1995. The Scorsese Connection. London and Bloomington: BFI/Indiana 
University Press. 
Stringer, Julian. 1996/7. "Problems with the Treatment of Hong Kong Cinema as 
Camp." Asian Cinema 8, 2: 44--65. 
Tatara, Paul. 1998. "Someone in Dark Cit)! Needs to Lighten up." CNN Interactive (10 
March). <http://cnn.com/SHOWBIZ/98031l0/dark.city.review/ > Accessed Aug. 
14,1998. 
Thompson, Kristin. 1985. Exporting Entertainment: America in the World Film Market 
1907-1934. London: BFI. 
Thomson, David. 1980. A Biographiwl Dictionary of the Cinema. London: Secker and 
Warburg. 
293 
Tom O'Regan 
Tomaselli, Keyan, and Arnold Shepperson. 1996. "Misreading' Theory, Sloganising 
Analysis: The Development of South African Media and Film Policy." South African 
Theatre Journal 10, 2: 161-75. 
Tomlinson, John. 1992. Cultural Imperialism. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 
Press. 
Trinh T. Minh-ha. 1992. Framer Framed. London and New York: Routledg·e. 
Tunstall, Jeremy. 1977. The Media Are American: Anglo-American Media in the World. 
London: Constable. 
Varis, Tapio. 1988. "Trends in International Television Flow." In Global Television. Ed. 
Cynthia Schneider and Brian Wallis. New York: Wedg'e Press. 95-108. 
Venkatasawmy, Rama, and Tom O'Regan. 1998. "Only One Day at the Beach: Dark City 
and Australian Filmmaking." Metro 117 (November). 
Wasko, Janet. 1994. Hollywood in the Information Age. Cambridg'e: Polity Press. 
Wildman, Steven, and Stephen Siwek. 1988. International Trade in Films lind Television 
Programs. Cambridge: Balling'er Publishing. 
Willemen, Paul. 1994. Looks and Frictions: Essays in Cultural Studies and Film TheO/y. 
London and Bloomington: BFI/Indiana University Press. 
Williamson,J. W. 1995. Hillbillyland: What the Movies Did to the Mountains and What the 
Mountains Did to the Movies. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 
Young, Robert. 1990. White Mythologies. London: Routledge. 
294
 
CHAPTE R SIXTE EI\J
 
Shooting Back: From Ethnographic
 
Film to Indigenous Production/
 
Ethnography of Media
 
Faye Ginsburg 
We live in a world in which, increasingly, people learn of their own and other 
cultures and histories through a range ofvisual media -- film, television, and video 
- that have emerged as powerful cultural forces in the late twentieth century. The 
development of low-format inexpensive video equipment, as well as cable and 
satellite technologies, has placed the capacities for image-making, once mono­
polized by media industries, in the hands of people almost everywhere on the 
planet. The transnational and intercultural spread of these new communication 
forms has stirred many twentieth-century intellectuals to consider their 
transformative impact on social life. Their arguments about the effects of mass 
media have ranged from the dystopic - suggesting the hegemonic reach of state 
and corporate powers into everyday lives - to the utopian ~- heralding the 
potential of new technologies to create electronic democracies and global 
villages. Only recently have these assumptions been measured against the lived 
realities of the production, circulation, and reception of visual media re­
presentations in different societies. New discussions are emerging, in and outside 
of academia, concerning the multiple ways that culture is encoded in film, 
TV, and video - whether dominant or alternative - and how these representa­
tions are interpreted as they mediate across disjunctures of time, culture, and 
prejudice. 
This chapter is a response to the transformative impact of these developments 
on the field of visual anthropology, as media (including ethnographic film) are no 
longer simply vehicles for documentation but are now objects of social and 
cultural analyses. Without an expanded intellectual and empirical base, visual 
anthropology and the practice of ethnographic film are in danger of becoming 
atavistic and myopic, especially as images of other cultures are interpellated 
increasingly into the spectacles of cinema and the seamless flows of television. 
To resituate ethnographic film as part of a continuum of representational pra­
ctices aligns our project with a more general revision of a number of fields ­
anthropology, cultural and media studies, cinema studies - that are concerned 
with the contested and complex nature of cultural production. This shift to 
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expand our range, then, is one that can effectively address contemporary cri­
tiques of ethnographic film and revive its contemporary purpose. 
The distinguished theorist and filmmaker David MacDougall suggests the 
term "intertextual cinema" (1997) to draw attention to the multiple positions of 
those engaged in the creation and consumption of screen representations of 
culture. Now anthropologists are expanding on that model in order to understand 
media in the context of broader social relations that are constituted and reima­
gined in film and video works explicitly engaged in representing culture. This in 
no way dismisses the value of the text itself, which often embodies in its own 
internal structure and meaning the forms and values of the social relations they 
mediate, making text and context interdependent. If we recognize the cinematic 
or video text as a mediating object - as we might look at a ritual or a commodity­
then its formal qualities cannot be considered apart from the complex contexts of 
production and interpretation that shape its construction. 
The expanded framework I propose might provisionally be termed the anthro­
pology of culture and media, a denomination I see as invoking two often 
neglected legacies in visual anthropology. The first legacy can be traced to Jean 
Rouch (1975) and his ideas of shared anthropology, ethno-fiction, and regards 
compares. These were early important efforts to juxtapose cultural commentaries 
of Europeans and Africans, accommodating not only diverse views but also 
multiple formal strategies, including fictional, parodic, and avant-garde techni­
ques. Following Rouch's legacy, it is easy to see how his early efforts connect 
with contemporary ones by Third-World and indigenous mediamakers, people 
who are particularly engaged in the repositioning of cultural authority and 
experience by using satire, humor, and performance to provide multi-layered 
commentaries on their own identities and on the dominant society. 
The second legacy I want to invoke is the work of anthropologists (and others) 
who took media as a serious aspect of scholarly inquiry, beginning in the 1930s 
with Bateson and Mead's film and photography projects in Bali and New Guinea 
(1942). Later, during World War II, they and other American anthropologists 
studied Japanese and German cinema as ethnographic documents to help them 
understand differences in national cultures in order to assist the allies (Bateson 
1943).1 Hortense Powdermaker's 1950 ethnographic study of Hollywood was a 
prescient effort that left no legacy. In the 1960s, new possibilities opened up with 
the work of Sol Worth at the Annenberg School of Communications, University 
of Pennsylvania, and Jay Ruby and Richard Chalfen who established the first 
visual anthropology program in America at Temple University in 1974. 
Together, they argued that if anthropology was going to pay serious attention 
to filmmaking (as was occurring' in the 1960s with the ethnographic film work of 
Tim Asch, Robert Gardner, John Marshall, and later David and Judith 
MacDougall), then anthropologists needed to attend to the cultural and 
social dynamics of the media systems they were engaging with, what Worth called 
the "shift from visual anthropology to the anthropology ofvisual communication" 
(1976).2 It took nearly two decades for that transformation to take place. 
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1 Modes of Imagining 
In 1993, in a comprehensive review essay, Debra Spitulnik invoked the insights 
of Stuart Ha1l3 and other sociologically grounded media scholars to call for more 
engagement by anthropologists with "mass media as vehicles of culture, as modes 
of imagining and imaging communities" (1993: 295). Five years later, a fertile 
domain of study - the anthropology of mass media - had emerged, along with a 
general reconceptualization of anthropology that addresses our changing rela­
tionship with informants as our cultural worlds grow ever closer; as the social 
domains we need to track to understand contemporary lives increasingly are 
shaped by processes of late capitalism, requiring multi-sited research strategies 
(Marcus 1995); and as we imagine what our work can contribute to changes that 
affect people around the globe who are living "in the present" (Fox 1991). For 
many years mass media were seen as almost a taboo topic for anthropology, too 
redolent of Western modernity and cultural imperialism for a field identified 
with tradition, the non-Western, and the vitality of the local. As media are 
becoming more ubiquitous even in remote locales, an increasing number of 
anthropologists have recognized the necessity of attending not only to their 
presence, but also to the significance of film, television, video, and radio as part 
of the everyday lives of people throughout the world as well as visual culture, 
broadly conceived (Pinney 1998; Poole 1997; Ruby, in press). People who are 
studying these forms are studying media in sites as diverse as villages in upper 
Egypt (Abu-Lughod 1997), fan clubs in south India (Dickey 1993), and popular 
television talk shows in Bolivia (Himpele 1996). Indeed, there is an even broader 
range of work -looking at music, print cultures, photography, and cyberspace ­
that, regretfully, cannot be encompassed in a single chapter. 
Following the lineage outlined above, a number of scholars link their work on 
media to visual anthropology (Ginsburg 1998; Banks and Morphy 1997; Hughes­
Freeland 1997; Ruby, in press), often bringing a critical revision of that field 
through the lens of postcolonial scholarship, especially on ethnographic, docu­
mentary, and popular film practices, past and present (Rony 1996; Shohat/Stam 
1994; Trinh 1989). Others focus on its counterpart in the production of a variety 
of alternative Ouhasz 1995; Downmunt 1993; Riggins 1992), diasporic (Gillespie 
1995; McLagan 1996; Naficy 1993), and small media practices (Manuel 1993; 
Sreberny-Mohammadi and Mohammadi 1994) made by people who, until 
recently, were only objects and never producers in the enterprise ofcross-cultural 
representation. 
Another related school of thought that has stimulated research is closely 
identified with the journal Public Culture; it emerges from those interested in 
how processes of modernity, postmodernity, and globalization actually work on 
the ground, tracking the cultural effects of transnational flows of people, ideas, 
and objects - often mediated by film, video, and television - that are instrumental 
in creating a sense of a social world that is rapidly "respatializing" culture and 
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power in ways that characterize fin-de-siecle cultural life. This scholarship 
builds, in particular, on the work of two key scholars, which addresses the 
mediation of the structures and processes of nationalism and consciousness: 
Benedict Anderson's insights into the role of print -- and now other - media in 
the creation of the "imagined communities" of nation states (1983), and the 
extension ofAnderson's Durkheimian frame (via Althusser, Lacan, and Jameson) 
to a broader notion of the social imaginary.4 This work also owes a debt to Jiirgen 
Habermas's articulation of the historical emergence of the public sphere, and the 
ensuing debates and critiques of that model articulated by Calhoun (1992), Fraser 
(1993), Robbins (1993), and others. More recently, the work of Arjun Appadurai 
(1996) has been influential in synthesizing their fi'ameworks with anthropological 
concerns and methods. In his model, media are a central part of public culture, 
particularly important to the articulation of national and transnational with local 
processes. His influential essay on "global ethnoscapes" and the neologism 
"mediascape" points to the significance of the spread of film, television, video, 
and photography throug'hout the world and the ways in which satellite and video 
technologies transcend nation-state boundaries that were once sustained more 
easily through print and terrestrial television. He argues that the circulation of 
media accounts for the increasing sig'nificance of "the imagination" in the 
production of culture and identity in the contemporary world as: 
more persons in more parts of the world consider a wider set of "possible" lives 
than they ever did before. One important source of this change is the mass media, 
which present a rich, ever-changing store of possible lives, some ofwhich enter the 
lived imaginations of ordinary people more successfully than others. Important 
also are contact with, news of, and rumors about others in one's social 
neighborhood who have become inhabitants of these faraway worlds. The 
importance of media is not so much as direct sources of new images and scenarios 
for life possibilities but as semiotic diacritics of great power, which also 
inflect social contact with the metropolitan world facilitated by other channels. 
(1991: 198)5 
The significance of media as a hermeneutic for entering and comprehending 
the contemporary social world is especially clear in a number of recent ground­
breaking projects that provide models for how programmatic claims about media 
can actually guide research. Lila Abu-Lughod's work on the production, circula­
tion, and impact of Egyptian television melodrama serials is exemplary, tracking 
how these are intended to operate (if not always successfully) as social techno­
logies through which modern citizens are produced and subjectivities are 
partially constituted. In one of her recent articles on the social life of these 
narrative forms as they move from producers to audiences, she demonstrates 
how, by staging interiorities through heightened emotional display, they encour­
age the embrace of individuality over kinship, a key transformation in the making 
of modern subjects (1999). 
298 
Anthropology for the World: "Mass Media" 
Finally, Pierre Bourdieu's framing of the field of cultural production (1986) ­
the system of relations (and struggles for power) among agents or institutions 
engaged in generating the value of works of art, while creating cultural capital for 
themselves - has been especially influential for those whose emphasis is on the 
institutional sites for the production of media work. For example, in a recent 
innovative ethnography, Barry Dornfeld draws on Bourdieu's model to under­
stand the production of a public television series as a "cultural field" in which 
producers are also always prefiguring audiences in their work. This position, he 
argues, calls more generally for "rethinking and bridging the theoretical dichot­
omy between production and consumption, between producers' intentional 
meanings and audience members' interpreted meanings and between production 
studies and reception studies" (1998: 12--13). 
One might think of these linked processes of the cultural production of media, 
its circulation as a social technology, and the relationship of mediated worlds to 
self-fabrication as existing on a continuum. On one end is the more se1f:'conscious 
cultural activism, in which cultural material is used and strategically deployed as 
part of a broader project of political empowerment, providing a "third space" 
(Bhabha 1994) for indigenous and minoritized groups, as well as what some have 
called Third Cinema (Pines and Willemen 1989), often created in circumstances 
where political mobilization around issues of identity is incipient (Downmunt 
1993; Juhasz 1995). In the middle range are reflexive but less strategic processes, 
in which the imaginative encounter with cinematic or televisual images and 
narratives may be expressive and/or constitutive of a variety of social worlds, 
such as the transnational links that video, television shows, films, and computer 
networks provide for diasporic communities (Gillespie 1995; McLagan 1997; 
N aficy 1993). On the other end of the continuum are the more classic formations 
ofmass media, which require institutional framings and imply some dimension of 
social segregation between producers and audiences. Anthropological research on 
these mediations focusses on the complex and divergent ways in which national 
cinemas and television in Third-World settings operate, tracking the often 
unstable relation between intention and effect as these media are put to the 
task of constituting modern citizens through a variety of forms, notably in 
popular soap operas, telenovellas, melodramatic serials (Abu-Lughod 1993, 
1995b; Mankekar 1993a, 1993b; Miller 1992; Rofel 1994; Salamandra 1998; 
Yang 1997), cultural programming (Hughes-Freeland 1997), and talk shows 
(Das 1995; Gordon 1998; Himpele 1996), and how these are intended and 
understood in relation to larger conjunctures and in a variety of settings from 
production to distribution to consumption. 
Because anthropologists so frequently locate themselves in non-Western and 
remote places, our research offers not only a thick, vertically integrated, and 
multi-sited sense of the social life of media, but also engages with how this occurs 
outside the circuits of First-World settings whieh have provided an ethnocentric 
frame for much academic discussion of media until quite recently. Ironically, 
even those arguing about and against cultural imperialism (Schiller 1969, 1991) 
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or researching the exporting of American culture through the circulation of 
popular film and television programs (Liebes and Katz 1990; Ang 1985, 1996) 
nonetheless presume the centrality of American media. In an effort to correct 
that, ethnographers and scholars in media studies are attending increasingly to 
the circulation of media in settings not dependent on Western hegemonic 
practices, such as the export of Hindi cinema (Pendakur and Subramanyam 
1996). 
At the same time, anthropological research on mass media reiterates the 
insufficiency of bounded concepts of culture as a way of understanding contem­
porary lives in our own or other societies. As Lila Abu-Lughod arg'ued in 
considering the impact of Egyptian serials in the life of Zaynab, an older 
peasant-woman living in a peasant villag'e in Upper Egypt: 
Television is an extraordinary technology for breaching boundaries and intensify­
ing and multiplying encounters among life worlds, sensibilities, and ideas .... It 
brings into Zaynab's home, her conversations and her imagination a range of 
visions and experiences that originated outside her community... produced else­
where and consumed in a variety of localities .... Even if it ultimately helps create 
something of a "national habitus" or hints of a transnational habitus, television is 
most interesting because of the way it provides material which is then inserted into, 
interpreted with, and mixed up with local but themselves socially differentiated 
knowledges, discourses and meaning systems .... Television, in short, renders 
more and more problematic a concept of cultures as localized communities of 
people suspended in shared webs of meaning. (1997: 122) 
Scholars developing' ethnographies of media usually begin with an interest in 
understanding questions generated by the phenomenon itself~ often motivated by 
a desire to comprehend the popularity, power, and/or passion attached to certain 
kinds of media production and viewing (e.g. why is Indian cinema so popular in 
Nigeria?). It quickly becomes apparent in almost every case that answering these 
questions leads to an appreciation of the complexity of how people interact with 
media in a variety of social spaces and the resulting shifts in the sense of the local 
as its relation to broader social worlds becomes almost a routine part of everyday 
life. Understanding the social relations of media production, circulation, and 
reception in this way entails a grounded focus on the everyday practices and 
consciousness of social actors as producers and consumers of different forms of 
media. Their interests and responses shape and are shaped by a variety of 
possible subject positions: cultural, generational, gendered, local, national, regio­
nal, and transnational communities of identity requiring an increasingly complex 
and plural notion of audience. Indeed, these multiple identities may be part of a 
single social subject's repertoire of cultural resources, as is clear in this hypothe­
tical example: 
An Egyptian immigrant in Britian, for example, might think of herself as a 
Glaswegian when she watches her local Scottish channel, a British resident when 
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she switches over to the BBC, an Islamic Arab expatriate in Europe when she tunes 
in to the satellite service from the Middle East and a world citizen whcn she 
channel surfs on CNN. (Sinclair et al. 1996: 25) 
While our work is distinguished by an effort to track qualitatively and with the 
kind of cultural knowledge that enables what Geertz calls "thick description,,,6 
the practices, consciousness, and distinctions that emerge for people out of their 
quotidian encounters with media are also always situated within the context of a 
broader social universe. To comprehend that reality, studies are increasingly 
multi-sited, tracking the various social players engaged when one follows the 
object ~ a television serial or film as it moves from elite directors to consumers 
(Dickey 1993; Mankekar 1993a), or cassette recorders (Manuel 1993) or radios 
(Spitulnik 1999) as they circulate through a variety of milieux. Whether in our 
own societies or elsewhere, ethnographers look at media as cultural artifacts 
enmeshed in daily lives to see how they are imperfectly articulated with (and 
sometimes created as a counter to) larger hegemonic processes of modernity, 
assimilation, nation-building, commercialization, and globalization, but in terms 
that draw attention to how those processes are being localized. 
2 The Activist Imaginary? 
Much of the work on mass media follows popular cinema, and television soap 
operas and melodramas, and interrogates how these apparently hegemonic forms 
have a more diverse interpretive life on the ground; another substantial body of 
research addresses counter-hegemonic fields of cultural production, most not­
ably in the small but influential study of media - mostly video and low-power 
television - being produced by minoritized people as a culturally protective 
response to the introduction ofdominant forms ofmass media. For First-Nations 
people, this relatively new form of cultural production - which developed in the 
late 1970s in North America, the 1980s in Australia and New Zealand, and the 
1990s in most of Latin America - was especially attractive to our profession 
because of its association with people in remote locations. 8 Such formations 
seemed particularly well suited for anthropological inquiry; small in scale and 
apparently a world apart from the mass-media industries that dominate late 
capitalist societies, they occupy a comfortable position of difference from domin­
ant cultural assumptions about media aesthetics and practices, one that parallels 
the place indigenous people are meant to occupy in traditional anthropology. 
Indeed, the initial anthropological research on such work, which began in the 
1960s with Sol Worth and John Adair's now classic study Through Navajo Eyes 
(1997),9 set out precisely to explore the impact of cultural difference on the way 
the world is envisioned by teaching Navajo, who had never made or used motion 
pictures, to do so for the first time, without transmitting the conventions of 
Western production and editing, in order to see if their films would reflect a 
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distinctively Navajo film "grammar." Like much of (American) anthropology, 
the work was guided in part by the possibility that Navajo filmmaking might offer 
both a scientific insight into another culture's literal vision of the world and an 
alternative view - a kind of embedded cultural critique - of Western presump­
tions about the way media should look and how they might produce meaning. 
From the late 1970s, indigenous people have had to deal with the threats and 
possibilities of mass mcdia entering their lives, primarily through the imposition 
of satellites and commercial television, and have struggled to find ways to turn 
that circumstance to their advantagc, a point that was effectively made by Eric 
Michaels who transported Sol Worth's idcas to the ccntral desert of Australia 
where, in the 1980s, he worked with Warlpiri people to develop their own low­
power television -- what he called the invention of Aboriginal television (1986) ­
as an alternative to the onslaught of television introduced by the newly launched 
communications satellite. Michaels' work (1994) demonstrated how profoundly 
different Warlpiri video (and television) was from Western practices of mass 
mcdia, from the complex ways in which production was organized along kinship 
lines (1984) to the centrality of sacred landscapes and slow movement that 
distinguished the formal aesthetics of pieces (1987a) to the ways in which 
Warlpiri watched (or were prohibited from watching certain images) and inter­
preted works (1987b). Since then, the work of Terry Turner with thc Kayapo 
(1991, 1992) and Dominique Gallois and Vincent Carelli with the Waiapi and 
other Amazonian groups (1995; Aufderheide 1995) also shows how video is 
embraced as part of indigenous cultural projects of cultural revival, organized 
according to existing social hierarchies and very much engaged with aesthetic 
principles (such as repetition) that guide performance of ceremonies and rituals. 
As anthropologists study the impact that media such as video might have on 
their communities, indigenous mediamakers are busy using the technologies for a 
variety of purposes, sometimes as legal documents in negotiations with encom­
passing states or to assert their presence televisually within national imaginaries. 
Such works present a kind of Faustian contract (Ginsburg 1991), or what Harald 
Prins calls "the paradox of primitivism" in which exotic imagery of indigenous 
people in documentaries about native rights, "while effective (perhaps even 
essential) as political agency, may pervert the cultural heritage that indigenous 
peoples are committed to preserving" (1997: 243). For their own people, these 
works are aimed at cultural preservation through the documenting of ceremonies 
and traditional activities with elders or creating works to teach young people 
literacy in their own languages; communicating among and between communities 
on issues such as how to confront loggers and g'old prospectors; or long-distance 
communication among' relatives separated by vast Arctic expanses. 
Much of the writing and research on this topic has focussed on remote 
communities in the Amazon, the Australian outback, and Canada's Arctic, 
where media are produced and consumed primarily by members of the same 
community (although the work circulates to other native communities as well as 
to nonaboriginal audiences via film festivals and broadcasts). Indigenous people 
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who live in or closer to metropoles also have been aspiring to be recognized as 
part of the broader world of media-imagery production and circulation, yet feel 
their claim to an indigenous identity within a more cosmopolitan framework is 
sometimes regarded as inauthentic, as if their comfort with aspects of modernity, 
including filmmaking, erased their legitimacy. Maori filmmakers were the first to 
break that barrier with films based on contemporary Maori life such as Te Rua 
(Barry Barclay, 1990) and Once Were Warriors (Lee Tamahori) which, in 1994, 
became the first indigenously made feature to become an international hit. 
Aboriginal Australian filmmakers Tracey Moffatt (Bedevil, 1996) and Rachel 
Perkins (Radiance, 1998) have both shown feature films at the Cannes Film 
Festival. Similarly, the success of the first Native-American-produced and 
-directed feature film Smoke Signals (Chris Eyre and Sheman Alexie, 1998) 
marked an extraordinary moment not only for its distinctive achievement, but 
as an index of the growth and significance of indigenous media. While such forms 
of cultural production clearly differ in scale and style from local community­
based video, these mediamakers insist that there is no absolute dividing line that 
establishes one arena of indigenous production as somehow "more authentic" 
than another. From the remote experiments in low-power TV in native languages 
to feature films meant to appeal to native viewers as well as a diversity of 
audiences world-wide, these works are all part of the efforts of indigenous people 
living in a variety of situations to claim a space that is theirs in the world of 
modernity's representational practices. 
This activist engagement with media, then, encompasses not only indigenous 
work but media being produced by a variety of other minoritized subjects who 
have become involved in creating their own representational framework as a 
counter to dominant systems, a framework that includes work being done by 
people with AIDS Ouhasz 1995), Palestinians in Israel's occupied territories 
(Kuttab 1993), or Tibetan Buddhist activists (McLagan 1996, 1997), to mention 
just a few examples. One might think of this creative and self-conscious process 
of objectification as a form of "cultural activism" (Ginsburg 1997), part of what 
George Marcus has recently termed "the activist imaginary," in which film and 
video are not only used by subaltern groups to "pursue traditional goals of broad­
based social change through a politics of identity and representation," but also 
represent a utopian desire for "emancipatory projects ... raising fresh issues 
about citizenship and the shape of public spheres within the frame and terms 
of traditional discourse on polity and civil society" (1996: 6). A particularly 
compelling instance for theorizing the intersection of media, culture, and 
power is Annabelle Sreberny-Mohammadi and Ali Mohammadi's analysis 
(1994) of the powerful role played by small media - audiocassette-tapes and 
leaflets - in the Iranian revolution that deposed the Shah, what some have called 
"the revolution of the television era." Similarly, Annette Hamilton's account of 
the role of media in the 1992 political crisis in Thailand as well as the "video 
crackdown" by the state, which, along with the import of American and Chinese 
video films, ironically undermined the Thai feature-film industry, demonstrates 
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the often contradictory ways in which new highly mobile media technologies ­
video, mobile phones, cassette-recordings of international broadcasts smuggled 
in by airline personnel - are implicated in ongoing struggles between citizen and 
state (1993). 
Some anthropologists have expressed alarm at these new practices, regarding 
them as destructive of cultural difference and the study of such work as "ersatz 
anthropology" (Faris 1992; Weiner 1997),10 echoing debates first articulated by 
intellectuals of the Frankfurt School. Evidently, the question as to whether 
indigenous people can assimilate the technology to their own cultural and 
political concerns or are inevitably compromised by its presence still haunts 
much of the research and debate on this topic. Rather than passing judgment 
on the efforts of indigenous and other people to engage with new forms of 
expressive culture, a number of us see in the growing use of film and other 
mass media an increasing awareness and objectification of culture that are part of 
much larger processes of social transformation. 
3 Objectifying Culture 
More broadly, this work can be seen as part of a spectrum of practices engaged in 
the self-conscious mediation and mobilization of culture in the late twentieth 
century. As Daniel Miller argued in the introduction to Worlds /Jpart: 
These new technologies of objectification [such as film, video, and televi­
sion] ... create new possibilities of understanding at the same moment that they 
pose new threats of alienation and rupture. Yet our first concern is not to resolve 
these contradictions in theory but to observe how people sometimes resolve or 
more commonly live out these contradictions on local practice. (1995: 18) 
This is not to deny that the presence of mass- and small-media11 technologies in 
"cultural peripheries" is part of a global process of the penetration of media 
which has multiple and sometimes contradictory effects on local communities. 
However, the assumption that the center always dominates the so-called peri­
phery too often has meant that "we g'et the history of the impact of the center on 
the periphery, rather than the history of the periphery itself' (Hannerz 1992: 
207), a lack which has been addressed by much recent anthropological work on 
mass media. In the case of indigenous media, for example, one might read this not 
simply as an adaptation of Western visual culture, but as a new form of collective 
self-production that is being used by indigenous producers to mediate historical 
and cultural ruptures within their own societies and to assert their presence in the 
polities that encompass them (Ginsburg 1993, 1995). 
Appadurai, addressing these kinds of processes in diasporic and migrant 
groups, suggests the word "culturalism" as another way to signify this kind of 
mobilization of identities in which mass media and the imagination play increas­
304 
Anthropology for the World: "Mass Media" 
ingly significant roles (1996). Such phenomena, Abu-Lughod points out, are 
produced out of unequal cultural encounters with others who may have pre­
conceived notions of their interlocutors as cultural subjects (1997: 122). Object­
ified and mediated, "culture" as such, especially for minoritized people, can 
become a source of values that "can be converted into political assets, both 
internally as bases of group solidarity and mobilization, and externally as claims 
on the support of other social groups, governments and public opinion all over 
the globe," as Terry Turner has shown regarding the work of Kayapo media­
makers (1993: 424). Ethnographic studies of media offer an interesting and 
important perspective on the arguments of Anthony Giddens (and others) that 
one of the distinguishing characteristics of modernity is "the lifting out of social 
relations from local contexts of interaction and their restructuring across infinite 
spans of time-space" (1990: 21). Media practices are clearly central to these 
processes but not necessarily in the ways that we might have expected. It is this 
unpredictability and often vitality of responses that has generated much recent 
interest in how anthropology might increase our understanding of this restruc­
turing process. 
4 Parallel Modernities 
A recent piece on the opinion page of the New York Times offered this tale of 
media, late capitalism, and the local declensions of globalization: 
John Burns, the New York Times New Delhi bureau chief, tells me a delightful 
story about his 70 year old Indian cook. Although John has four different satellite 
dishes on his roof top ("I'm practically running an uplink station" he says), he still 
couldn't get the World Cup matches off Indian TV. When he was complaining 
about this over breakfast, his cook invited John to come over to his house next door. 
When they entered, John found the cook's illiterate wife watching the BBC I said, 
"What's she doing? She doesn't even speak English." The cook explained that a 
friend of his had started a "private" cable system and strung cable into his house 
along the local telephone poles - for $3.75 a month. "Then he hands me the 
television remote," says John, "and with increasing astonishment I start at Channel 
1 and click all the way to Channel 27. He had television stations from China, 
Pakistan, Australia, Italy, France. With all my satellite dishes, I had only 14 
stations." (Friedman 1998) 
This anecdote depends for its effect on the assumption that both writer and 
reader are American and collaborate in the persistence of the smug', if occasion­
ally guilt-ridden, assumptions that media technologies of modernity (cinema and 
television) or postmodernity (cable, satellites, VCRs, and computers) are securely 
in the hands of the West. What is meant to surprise in the story is the inversion of 
those assumptions, as an elderly Indian couple of modest means and apparently 
limited cultural sophistication have set up an inexpensive and effective cable 
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system that gives them access to a globe's worth of television, while the rich 
American next door, armed with outsized technology, struggles to tune in to a 
soccer game. It is this world next door to the bureau chief, unanticipated by 
Western media theory, in which media circulates within and between non­
Western countries, that a number of anthropologists (and others) argue has 
been ignored in contemporary scholarship, despite the strong programmatic 
interest in "transnational cultural flows." 
Joining a slew ofsocial theorists discussing the place ofmedia in the emergence 
of alternative modernities all over the globe (Morley and Robins 1995; Sreberny­
Mohammadi 1996; Tomlinson 1991), a number of recent projects exemplify the 
value of anthropological research on this topic. In his study of media in northern 
Nigeria, for example, Brian Larkin uses the trope of "parallel modernities" to 
account for those who are not mobile but who nonetheless "participate in the 
imagined realities of other cultures as part of their daily lives" through circuits in 
which Western media is only one of many choices that might "offer Hausa youth 
the choice between watching Hausa or Yoruba videos, Indian, Hong Kong or 
American films, or videos of Qur'anic ta/sir (exegesis) by local preachers" (1997b: 
409). The popularity of Indian cinema is evidenced not only by cinema atten­
dance but also by a burgeoning local culture industry of littatafan soyayya (love 
stories), "pamphlet type books in which the imagined alternative of Indian 
romance is incorporated within local Hausa reality." The intense interest in the 
spectacle and plot ofIndian films and their indigenization in these soyayya books 
as well as in locally produced videos (Larkin 1997a) offers Hausa youth a medium 
through which they can "consider what it means to be modern and what may be 
the place of Hausa society within that modernity" (1997b: 434). Similarly, in his 
study of youth in Kathmandu, Nepal, Mark Liechty argues that Bombay and 
Hollywood films, "teen" magazines, pirated cassettes, and interactive radio 
shows - the cultural economy of a transnational public sphere - provide the 
experience of modernity as a space of imagined possibilities contained within a 
commodified logic (1994: 194). 
The concept of transnational encounters facilitated by mass media in the 
creation of new socio-political spaces also guides Mayfair Yang's recent work 
on mass media and transnational subjectivity in Shanghai, and what she calls a 
Chinese "traveling culture" created through interaction with Hong Kong and 
Taiwanese popular culture. She tracks how, over the last century, media played a 
part in transformations of the Chinese state in a series of "disembedding opera­
tions," first in the development of a new national community, then in the 
creation of a powerful state subjectivity. Most recently, she has analyzed the 
"reemergence of a transnational Chinese global media public and its effects on 
the modernist project of the nation-state" (1997: 287), constructing what Homi 
Bhabha (1994) has called "a third space" in which traditional lines of identity are 
blurred. She joins others in critiquing frameworks of cultural imperialism (Miller 
1998), popular through the mid-1980s, that assume Western hegemony, thus 
often reproducing the Western-centric perspective they are critiquing. The 
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point, of course, is not to assume that power is lodged in the West, but to track 
how and why media are now so closely associated with power and its embodi­
ment, such that states everywhere attempt to control the mediation of their own 
representations and that of others through regulation, censorship, and efforts to 
contain the means of distribution. In the case of China, it is not Western 
domination but reg'ionallethnic Chinese capitalist modes of power that are 
contesting the power of the Chinese state. Yang follows this process through 
the realignments of satellites, an analysis of programming, and the response of a 
workers' film criticism group in Shanghai to a popular television show entitled A 
Beijing Native in New York; through their identification with the protagonists 
who make the journey described in the show's title, they explored costs and 
benefits of mobility. As Yang points out: "While the nation and state continue to 
be imagined, now they must contend with the splintering of subjectivities into 
pluralized media audiences of gender, class, and rural-urban differences, as well 
as the emergence of a regional overseas" (1997: 311). 
Like a number of other anthropologists engaged with mass media, Yang and 
Larkin are grappling with the effects of the increasing respatialization and 
privatization of cultural production and flows, querying when and whether the 
national provides an appropriate frame of analysis, and providing helpful period­
izations of shifts in the mediation of state and popular interests. Without ques­
tion, during the 1990s certain technological and institutional changes have had 
irreversible consequences. When broadcast television was tied primarily to a 
capital-intensive terrestrial technology, its range was more easily controlled and 
tied to state interests. The increase in satellites and cable, however, has opened 
up other kinds of spaces, increased privatization ofmedia ownership, and created 
new geolinguistic markets for the reasonably well off, while video has become 
widely available to the middle classes and even the poor, providing an additional 
but less immediate means for the distribution of television products to diasporic 
communities as these media facilitate the expansion of imagined communities 
beyond national boundaries (Sinclair et al. 1996: 23-4). Indeed, research on video 
culture and other forms of decentralized small media suggests the emergence of a 
"new media era" that is more fragmented and diverse in its economic and social 
organization (Larkin 1997a), more characteristic of the expansion of informal 
markets under neoliberalism and the fluidity of late capitalism than the older 
forms of mass media. 
In a number of cases, these new media are still tied to national structures of 
feeling, if not structures of state, as a number of scholars point out (Abu-Lughod 
1993; Armbrust 1998; Ossman 1994). The national and the nation state, even 
under destabilizing political-economic conditions and massive technological 
change, are still central if increasingly contested constructs for understanding 
both the production and reception of media, 12 as a number of studies of Indo­
nesian cinema (Heider 1991; Sen 1994) and television attest (Hughes-Freeland 
1997.) 
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Despite the recent plethora of satellite dishes on Indian rooftops, India's 
national imaginary was still relevant in the early 1990s, as Purnima Mankekar 
argues in her book about the ways in which men and women interpret Indian 
state-run television (1999). In her research, she looks at the state's efforts to use 
that medium to create a pan-Indian culture, in which the discursive construct of 
"Indian womanhood" - a contested site through colonial, national, and post­
colonial regimes - is central. She shows, for example, how women engaged with 
the popular televisual production of the Mahabharata to articulate critiques of 
gender inequalities as audiences (1993b), as well as how the producer, director, 
and star of a popular TV serial about a woman police officer struggled to sustain a 
feminist message within a popular narrative, and how these efforts were, in turn, 
interpreted. Working with the expanding middle class in New Delhi, she uses co­
constructed life narratives (in relation to national narratives) to address how 
national television interpellates audiences as national and gendered subjects, 
and how a variety of subject positions - class, community, gender, ag'e, and 
household position - mediate their interactions (1993a). 
Other studies of melodramatic television serials in China (Rofel 1994), Egypt 
(Abu-Lughod 1993), and Syria (Salamandra 1998) offer helpful cross-national 
comparisons, suggesting that despite intentions to bolster national sympathies, 
televisual projects, even when sponsored by a tightly controlled state authority, 
can in fact foster debate and dissent. In Christa Salamandra's study of the 
reception of several different series produced by Syrian Arab Television in 
1993 and 1994 for the popular Ramadan period, battles over who controls public 
representations of history became apparent in the diverse responses of Damas­
cenes across the social spectrum, a reminder "not to assume that the presence of a 
state implies a strong sense of nationhood" (1998: 241). Similarly, Lisa Rofel's 
analysis of Yearnings, a seemingly innocuous 1991 Chinese television melodrama 
about two families during the Cultural Revolution, produced a national 
controversy in a post-Tienanmen world "in which intellectuals and the party­
state are grappling with one another over the effects of the violent repression of 
intellectuals' overt challenge to state power," demonstrating the powerful 
constituencies and interests attached to different narratives of the nation (1994: 
714). 
By contrast, in neoliberal national settings such as Puerto Rico, where televi­
sion is completely privatized, locally produced commercial programming serves 
equally as a vehicle of commerce and of social commentary, mirroring, in a sense, 
the way that advertising is part of everyday life. In her study of the reception of 
the popular TV show EI Kiosko BudlJJeiser, Arlene Davila (1999) argues that this 
televisual text - replete with the textures of quotidian speech, humor, and style­
has, despite its blatant commercial sponsorship by an American corporation, 
become crucial to the visibility of local artists as well as everyday cultural 
practices, and as such has become a powerful signifier of Puerto Rican national 
identity. Her work suggests, once ag'ain, the complexity of categorizing by genre, 
producer, or sponsorship the effects media have on consciousness. 
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5 Circulating Culture 
It is the increasingly evident necessity oflinking media production and reception 
in broad and intersecting social and cultural fields - local, regional, national, 
transnational - that characterizes the anthropology of media since the 1990s. 
Despite that trend, ethnographies of media continue to be stereotyped as a 
narrowly empiricist version ofmarket research (Sinclair et al. 1996) - questioning 
television-watchers in their living rooms about what they really think of certain 
programs, without placing them in wider structures or recognizing their com­
plexity. These debates, it seems, have taken place more often among those in 
cultural studies or related fields who are attempting to use ethnographic methods 
(Bird 1992; Radway 1988) but sometimes in ways not recognizable to 
anthropologists, while anthropologists have been broadening their studies and 
carrying out the research for which others have pleaded (Ang 1996; Silverstone 
1994).13 
In most anthropological studies ofmedia, audiences are varied and situated in a 
broad social field, which strategically includes both producers and audiences in 
the query as well as intertextual sources through which meaning is constituted. 
For example, in her study of Tamil popular cinema - an industry which has a 
remarkable influence in the creation of political celebrity - Sarah Dickey looks at 
the significance of film for urban poor of south India living in the small city of 
Madurai as a process of negotiation among viewers, filmmakers, film texts, and 
historical!political circumstances, and as part of a "vast system of popular 
literature, greeting cards and posters, clothing, fashions, gossip, legends, mem­
ories, and activities supporting the stars" (1993: 41), a world in which fan clubs, 
political activities, and popular opinions playa central role. Seemingly oblivious 
to this response, middle- and upper-class filmmakers, she argues, view them­
selves as imparting appropriate cultural ideals to what they regard as narrow and 
unsophisticated lower classes and unenlightened poor, while viewers "are active 
participants in the construction of an image that both represents them and allows 
them to escape who they are" (176). 
Some scholars not only argue that producers and audiences should be encom­
passed in the same frame, but call for a radical rethinking of the very divide 
between production and reception and for more attention to the important but 
theoretically and empirically neglected area of distribution as a central process 
through which media helps constitute and reflect social difference, as power and 
status are signified through spatial and temporal dimensions of exhibition. Jeff 
Himpele, for example, locates his study of processes of distribution in the pluri­
cultural metropolis of La Paz, Bolivia, where he analyzed the tensions between 
the circulation of transnational media and urban popular culture among different 
social classes and cultural groups. He did this by tracking the itinerary of Bram 
Stoker's Dracula (Sony ITristar) from its debut in the spacious CinemaMonje 
Campero in the cosmopolitan Centro of the city as it moved up the canyon walls 
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to the cine popular serving cholos (Aymara immigrants), while pirated video copies 
also proliferated, stratifying the sites through which Bolivians "emplot them­
selves in narratives about national development and modernity" (1996: 55). 
Additionally, Himpele attends to the crucial (but neg'lected) role played by film 
distributors themselves, whose "social imagination of the city clears the space for 
the traffic of cultural and financial flows across globally discontinuous spaces" 
but who also act as "timekeepers," staggering film debuts as a way to rank and 
separate social groups (53). 
Himpele and others (Armbrust 1998; Hahn 1994) also point to the significance 
of exhibition sites - from the architecture of movie theaters as a diacritic of social 
class and modernity (or its lack) to the social space of cinema as an arena of social 
experimentation for young unmarried men in Egypt and Nigeria (Armbrust 
1998; Larkin 1997b). Film festivals are also emerging as important sites for the 
analysis of new cultural formations (Lutkehaus 1995; Nichols 1994) or as an arena 
for claims to Indian modernity, as occurred in the Centenary Commemoration of 
Cinema in Bombay (Ganti 1998). These studies provide important insights into 
the relationship of media practices to public culture beyond the proverbial living 
room that has dominated reception studies as a site of analysis. They also offer an 
important counterpoint to Foucauldian and Marxist frameworks, which point to 
discourses of power as causative but fail to locate them concretely in the lives and 
motivations of social actors and the processes of everyday life. 
6 Producing Culture 
If mass media presented a kind of forbidden object to anthropologists in non­
Western settings, the final boundary (breached only by Powdermaker's prescient 
study of Hollywood in the 1950s) was fieldwork in the social worlds and cultural 
logics of media institutions where "dominant ideologies" are produced, in our 
own as well as other societies, bringing new methods and insights to the territory 
already established by a small but significant body of work by sociologists of 
media (Gitlin 1983; Silverstone 1985), a tradition which Bourdieu has recently 
joined in his lectures and subsequent book on television (1998). Several recent 
ethnographies of media focus on a variety of institutional sites, including public 
television production in the US (Dornfeld 1998) and the use of a variety of media 
in public relations in the service of human rights (McLagan 1997) as well as 
capitalism (Davila 1999). Other projects focus on the world of cinema produc­
tion, providing a rich set of comparative cases, from the production of culture in 
the Bombay film industry (Ganti 1998) to creation of film auteurs in Papua New 
Guinea (Sullivan 1993) and movie stars in Egypt (Abu-Lughod 1995a). Ethno­
graphic approaches to these fields provide grounded analyses and critiques of 
how "technologies of power" are created and contested within the intimate 
institutional cultures, shaped by ideologies balanced between logics of national 
public service, audience appeal, aesthetics, and "the audit." 
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Ethnographies of cultural production open up the "massness" of media to 
interrogation as they track the ways in which structures shape the actions of 
professionals who are in the business of making representations of other cultures, 
and how structures of power affect image-making practices. Dornfeld's recent 
ethnography of a production unit at an American public television station is 
based on his participant observation of the production of a documentary project­
a seven-hour cross-cultural series called Childhood which aired in the US in 1991 
- from conception through production and editing to broadcasting and critical 
response. Given the television documentary's contingent relationship to the 
vag'aries of "real life" and the constantly shifting status of the text at each 
point of its construction, he frames this genre as "mobile, argumentative and 
emergent." Drawing on insights from audience studies that look at reception as a 
productive act, Dornfeld argues for a "counter-reversal" in which we see 
television producers (and cultural producers more generally) as viewers, "not 
floating above society as so many approaches to the study of media forms seem to 
imply." Rather, he sees producers as particular types of agent, grounded in 
interpretive worlds through which they anticipate and accommodate the 
imag'ined audiences they anticipate will see the series (1998: 29), in this case 
an ideology of "televisual humanism," a paradoxical logic, he argues, which 
shifts authority to the presumed, predicted, and observed response of the 
"audience" (10). 
A particularly interesting arena for studying these kinds of objectifying prac­
tice has been the use of public relations in spectacles organized by social move­
ments for human and cultural rights to garner glamour and support for their 
causes. These intercultural negotiations with the media are often fraught with 
contradictions and cultural stereotypes on both sides, as McLagan elucidates in 
her groundbreaking study of the strategic deployment of Tibetan "culture" by 
Tibetan refugees and their Western supporters to mobilize political support 
(1997). Increasingly, these works underscore that oppositional logics are insuffi­
cient for grasping media practices; rather, our models must allow for the simul­
taneity of hegemonic and anti-hegemonic effects. 
7 Complicities 
Anthropologist and filmmaker Jeff Himpele describes how he "got framed as an 
attraction" for Bolivian television viewers in a rich reflexive analysis of the Open 
Forum, a network TV program (and base for a political party) in which urban 
Aymara testify to their problems and receive assistance in return. Initially hoping 
to do fieldwork there, he went with his Bolivian wife to the studio in La Paz 
where he met with the program coordinator Arturo who urged him to talk to the 
host of the show, Compadre Carlos Palenque. "Don't worry," Arturo advised. 
"It is the norm that observers also participate in the Porum." As any anthropo­
logist would, Himpelc complied. That evening, after seeing himself on television, 
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he recognized an ironic reversal that is one of the hazards of ethnographic work 
with media: 
Instead of the ethnographer representing culture for those back home, here was the 
local culture representation business fixing upon my difference in order to promote 
itself by announcing' to people in their homes that a North American anthropo­
logist thought it was worthy of study ... 
He goes on to describe a growing sense of terror that he had become like the 
show's host who exploits the difficulties of Bolivia's poor and indigenous people 
for his own professional gain. Himpele writes: 
My terror emerged because I recognized I was in the same moral sphere of 
engagement with the people I was studying. Is my ethnographic selection of social 
discourse from my informants any different from Palenque's selection and cele­
bration of his visitors' cases and social identity in populist politics? What of 
anthropology's advocacy and concern for marginalized cultural processes, material 
inequalities, and social transformation? (in press) 
Like Himpele, many ethnographers studying mass media often find themselves 
implicated in their object of study, in a relationship of complicity that places us 
increasingly in the same social universe as our subjects, if not in an activist 
relationship, then at times in an unanticipated reversal of authority over the 
representation of culture. Anthropologists have found themselves working as 
production assistants, extras in Indian films, or as momentary celebrities on 
popular talk shows (Gordon 1998). 
Perhaps because of the intensity and self-consciousness of the concern with 
media's possible deleterious effects as well their utopian possibilities, most of us 
carrying out research on media with indigenous or other subaltern groups have 
an activist engagement with this work as well (Philipsen and Markussen 1995), as 
supporters and even catalyzers of activity, bringing cameras to communities and 
assisting in the logistics of projects (Asch 1991; Gallois and Carelli 1995; 
Michaels 1994; Prins 1997; Turner 1992) or helping to develop visibility, fund­
ing, and circulation systems for the work (Berger 1995; Ginsburg 1997). In a less 
direct but equally enaged concern, Abu-Lughod points out that studying popular 
television "is particularly useful for writing against the grain [of global inequal­
ities] because it forces us to represent people in distant villages as part of the same 
cultural worlds we inhabit - worlds of mass media, consumption, and dispersed 
communities of the imagination" (1997: 128). Some have argued that these 
projects go beyond advocacy as authorial relations are reversed and "the anthro­
pologist's voice supplements that of indigenous people" (Marcus, quoted in 
Palattella 1998), underscoring the ways in which we are increasingly complicit 
with our subjects when engaged with such material. In any case, increasingly we 
find ourselves jointly engaged in the project of objectifying and representing 
culture. This relationship grows even more complex as anthropologists (and 
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fellow travelers) are beginning to study cyberspace (McLagan 1996), a site of 
sociality in which the research takes place (in part) through the medium of study 
itself. 
One can see a trajectory in the theorizing of the relationship between culture 
and media over the last half century as the objectification of the category of 
culture becomes ever more widespread and the observer becomes increasingly 
implicated as a participant. In the early work on mass media, culture operated as a 
kind of unconscious Durkheimian indicator of the national, which was inter­
preted in metaphors of personality types in the work of Mead, Bateson, and 
others in the 1950s. When, in the 1990s, anthropologists began to turn their 
attention to film and television once again, they looked at media not so much as a 
reductive mirror but as a social force in which culture is a resource in struggles 
for hegemony over representation, from efforts to shore up state control over 
television to the development of the Third Cinema movement that was part of a 
global anti-colonial project. Most recently, this scholarship is helping us to 
rethink abstract notions such as globalization, to see how new technologies and 
economies of late modernity are being framed both by "the new international 
division of cultural labor" (Miller 1998) and practices on the ground (or rooftops 
as satellite dishes proliferate!), as people at every end of the social spectrum ­
from Rupert Murdoch's STAR TV to the videographers in Hmong communities 
dispersed across the globe - are engaging with mediascapes that increasingly 
escape the control of national political structures, rearranging the ways in which 
cultural formations are spatialized and imagined in the process. For many social 
theorists interested in media as a site for either social possibilities or cultural 
decay, the question is still open as to whether even alternative media practices 
inevitably "eat their young" because of the impossibility of escaping the dis­
cursive and institutional structures that even small media require or whether they 
can be summoned for more utopian projects. While the lack of resolution is 
undoubtedly healthy for intellectual debate, an unanticipated dimension of 
continued research during an era of ever-widening penetration and availability 
of media is the way in which we are increasingly implicated in the representa­
tional practices of those we study, a social fact that brings absolute and welcome 
closure to the tendency of anthropology to distance its objects of study in time 
and space (Fabian 1983). 
Anthropologists at last are coming to terms with the inescapable presence of 
media as a contemporary cultural force engaged with the mediation ofhegemonic 
forms and resistance to them; the growth and transnational circulation of public 
culture; the creation of national and activist social imaginaries with the develop­
ment of media as new arenas for political expression and the production of 
identity. Such research offers a salutory effect on anthropology as well as 
media studies, opening up new questions regarding the production and circula­
tion of film and electronic media throughout the world, in non-Western as well as 
Western societies, potentially resituating the "looking relations" (Gaines 1988) 
that take place between cultures and across boundaries of inequality. 
313 
Faye Ginsburg 
Notes 
Thanks to Toby Miller and Bob Stam for their editorial guidance, and numerous 
colleagues for their helpful readings of various drafts of this chapter, including Lila 
Abu-Lughod, Georgina Born, Brian Larkin, Meg McLagan, and Debra Spitulnik; and to 
Jeremy McClancy for catalyzing this piece in the first place. 
During and after World War II, Margaret Mead and Gregory Bateson, as well as a 
number of other American anthropologists, were summoned by the US g'overnment 
to study Japanese and German cinema in order to help the allied effort. In order to 
carry out their assignment to report on "national character traits" and lacking the 
opportunity of doing foreign fieldwork during the war, these anthropologists used 
whatever data were available to them, in particular looking at popular cinema and 
political propaganda made available through the Museum of Modern Art and the 
Library of Congress, as well as interviews with expatriate populations who were 
living in the US. The most well-known results of this period were Ruth Benedict's 
best-selling book on Japanese culture, The Chrysanthemum and the Sword (1946) and 
Gregory Bateson's provocative psychoanalytically inclined analyses of a popular 
German propaganda film Hitlerjunge Quex (Bateson 1943). Research on the relation­
ship between films and national culture continued after the war in Columbia Uni­
versity's Research in Contemporary Cultures Project initiated by Benedict and later 
directed by Mead. A collection of studies edited by Margaret Mead and Rhoda 
Metraux, aptly named The Study of Culture at a Distance (1953), was the main 
published work £i'om this project, including analyses of Italian, French, Cantonese, 
and Soviet films. 
2	 Sol Worth's approach, developed in the 1970s, reflected the theoretical preoccupa­
tions of that time with structural semiotics and ethnoscience. Although he also 
developed an interest in the political economy and global reach of media, Worth's 
focus on the anthropology of visual communication looked primarily at how films 
made by any gTOUp of people could provide visual maps of world-views and cognitive 
categories, serving as a kind of window onto the native's point of view. Later, 
influenced by Worth's ideas and efforts, Jay Ruby, along with Worth's student 
Richard Chalfen, initiated the first Masters in Visual Anthropology in the US at 
Temple University, with a focus on culture and communication which included the 
social uses and cultural meanings of film, television, video, and photography. 
3	 Hall argues that as the mass media "have progressively colonized the cultural and 
ideological sphere" they increasingly provide "a basis on which groups construct an 
'image' of the lives, and accomplishment meanings, practices, and values of other 
groups and classes" as well as "the images, representations and ideas around which 
the social totality ... can be coherently grasped as a whole." 
4	 See a useful discussion of the concept of the imaginary in Lilley 1993. 
5	 In his 1996 edited volume Conneeted: Engagements with Media, Georg-c Marcus also 
focusses on electronic and visual media of various kinds and how they operate 
increasingly as "a direct and intimate complement to the self and self-capacity." 
6	 For an excellent discussion of how the notion of "thick description" enters into 
ethnographies of mass media, see Abu-Lughod 1997. 
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7 For a fuller accounting of this term, see Marcus 1996. 
8 \Vhile "indigenous" can index a social formation "native" to a particular area (e.g. I 
Love Lucy is "indigenous" to America), I use it here in the strict sense of the term, 
as interchang'eable with the neologism "First Peoples" to indicate the original 
inhabitants of areas later colonized by settler states (Australia, United States, New 
Zealand, Canada, most of Latin America). These people, an estimated 5 per cent of 
the world's population, are struggling to sustain their own identities and claims to 
culture and land, surviving as internal colonies within encompassing nation states. 
As Prins elaborates: "It is this condition of precarious survival that all indigenous 
peoples, regardless of their cultural differences, have in common. Shared dangers of 
physical extermination (genocide), political subordination, forced assimilation, and 
cultural repression (ethnocide) unite these culturally disparate groups as a global 
commonality known as the Fourth World" (1997: 245). 
9 Visual anthropologist Richard Chalfen, who was a research assistant on the original 
research team in 1966, updated the book for the new 1997 edition, providing a 
thorough discussion of the importance of the Navajo project and a critical assess­
ment of the reactions to it. 
10 For the debates on this see the spring 1997 issue of Current Anthropology and the 
spring 1998 issue of Lingua Franca. 
II Sreberny-Mohammadi and Mohammadi (1994) use the term "small media" to refer 
to technologies such as video- and audiocassettes, photocopiers, faxes, and compu­
ters, which differ from older "big" mass media of cinema, television, and radio 
stations. 
12 As Abu-Lughod argued in 1993 in the introduction to a special issue of Public 
Culture entitled "Screening Politics in a World of Nations": "While the movement 
of television programs across national boundaries should not be ig'nored, the nation­
state remains crucial for the deployment of mass media ... the locus of articulation 
of broadcasting policies and decisions and is the context in which viewers consume 
and interpret television programs." 
13 Audience studies, launched by Janice Radway (1984) and David Morley (1980), 
opened an important new arena for research and understanding the complex effects 
of media, a trend developed in a number of key studies, ranging from the response of 
culturally diverse viewers for exported American television shows (Liebes and Katz 
1990; Ang 1985) to the place of television in the construction of "the nation" (and 
other abstractions) in everyday life (Morley 1986; Silverstone 1994) to the creativity 
of an appropriative and irreverent female fan culture for television shows such as 
Star Trek and in the very construction of the notion of audience on the part of media 
industries (Ang 1996). 
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CHAPTER SEVENTEEN
 
Psycho's Bad Timing: The Sensual
 
Obsessions of Film Theory
 
Toby Miller 
As we have seen, screen studies is a contested area, with a plurality of methods 
vying for authority. And it is sometimes ignorant, because when these methods 
are not debating each other, they rarely converse. Here, I look at ways of reading 
two films, Psycho (Alfred Hitchcock, 1960) and Bad Timing: A Sensual Obsession 
(Nicolas Roeg, 1980), to showcase different interpretative methods drawn from 
the humanities and social sciences and identify such potential conversations (the 
References section of this chapter lists some of the critical writing on these texts). 
PIJlcho is canonical in both film theory and production, not to mention popular 
appreciation of Hitchcock and the horror genre. Bad Timing is peripheral by 
comparison. Nevertheless, it has inspired a wide rangoe of interpretative proto­
cols, which are "fresher" in film theory than those applied to Psycho; and it won 
the top award at the 1980 Toronto Film Festival. Whereas Hitchcock has come to 
be seen as the voyeur par excellence, whose spying gaze peeps in on people, Roeg 
has been described as "Hitchcock with the ice melted ... an eye in overdrive" 
(Penman 1998: 85). 
In each case, it becomes clear that a discourse about a film produced by a critic 
can transform the meaning of the object it supposedly seeks to explicate. One 
critical discourse may make the text incommensurate with that goenerated by 
another, despite the fact that they appear to commence with an identical object of 
inquiry. The purpose of this chapter is to encourage readers to utilize every 
possible method of understanding a film prior to pronouncing on it. To do less 
is to be satisfactorily neat, but to miss the meanings that accrue to movies as they 
move through time and space. After all, we are here to comprehend cinema, not 
just to trot out film theory as practiced within some priesthood of the elect. 
Prior to the release of Gus Van Sant's shot-by-shot remake of Psycho (1998), 
billboards across Los Angeles showed a hand on a shower curtain above the 
323 
Toby Miller 
following text: "Check in. Unpack. Relax. Take a shower." There was no need 
even to mention the film in order to promote it, so central is the original in 
popular knowledge. Psycho is, in this sense, very public property - not in legal­
economic terms, but in intellectual ones. How has this come to pass? 
David Bordwell looks at seven models for reading meanings into and out of 
Hitchcock's Psycho (1989: 224-48), in which spectators always feature centrally. 
For Jean Douchet (1960), the viewer of P~ycho moves through three distinct 
spheres: the everyday world of office life, the problem of a mystery in need of 
solution, and finally a confrontation with base desires and craziness. There is 
also an auteur search going on here: Hitchcock is understood (thanks to his 
endorsement in an interview of intentionality as a hermeneutic key) to be 
encouraging viewers to feel terror and to believe in the occult. Robin Wood 
(1965) develops this auteurism. He positions the director as a great artist pointing 
to the human potential for degradation, specifically the Holocaust. The film 
encourages awareness of evil and the need to treat it. We learn this by ident­
ifying, as spectators, with Marion Crane (fanet Leigh) and with Norman Bates 
(Anthony Perkins) - her evident terror no more discomforting than his disguised 
evil, potentially secreted somewhere within everyone. Hitchcock always insisted 
that his wish in making the film was to produce a sense of "fun." Wood's 
auteurism requires him to address such a remark, so he reads it symptomatically, 
as indicative of Hitchcock misrecognizing his own artistry. Raymond Durgnat 
(1967) segments the text in three: Marion's story, her death, and the demise of 
the pursuing investigator. Durgnat says that the text comprises emotional 
fractures. It attacks the American way of life via critiques of mother-love, 
money-love, country-love, adultery, and marriage. Identification is conditional, 
because all the characters are prey to these malaises. By the late 1960s, spectators 
know what happens in Psycho. They are aware that Marion "has" to be punished 
for theft because of the Hays Code, and that the text's horror-genre visual 
cues are also cues to pleasure based on filmic memory. V. F. Perkins (1972) 
stresses the film's organic unity, which he illustrates via a New-Critical reading 
of the shower scene that focusses on symbolism: descending birds, beaks, and 
knives mirror the descent ofMarion's life, as do windshield-wipers in the rain (an 
arc of meaning that is also called up in the sequence of events in the shower 
scene). 
Raymond Bellour (1979) finds perversion in Psycho, using psychoanalysis and 
a notion of fractured classical film: the highway patrol officer's dark glasses are 
said to signify surveillance and fetishistic psychosis, as power is both expressed 
and unmasked. Barbara Klinger (1982) says the text institutionalizes women's 
sexuality as a problem of narrative and masculinity. It breaks formal and informal 
laws of monogamy, sexual ownership, and the monetary economy in ways that 
are exposed and then suppressed, as the narrative shifts from Marion's crime to 
Norman's. Leland Poague (1986) restores capitalism to the center: P.\:ycho 
assaults the role of money in US life, as Ford motor cars destroy harmony, and 
Marion's NFB number plate is found to be the initials for Norman Ford Bates, 
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which suggests a connection between the murderer and assembly-line capital­
ism's strangulation of individuality (Bordwell 1989: 239-42). Truly! 
Writing after Bordwell's summary of these authors, Andrew Tudor sees 
P~ycho as a response to and sign of the acceleration by capitalist economies out 
of post-war repression, toward a sex- and gratification-driven market economy. 
The service industries and personal identity stand at the apex of life. P~ycho 
marks the violent, egregious side to this development, displacing the mad­
scientist theme of 1950s proto-horror with a melodramatically inflected monster 
within, a perversion not of technology and science, but of the very essence of 
being. Tudor notes how unusual the film is for its time in the careful chronicling 
of violence and the sense that terror is constituted within normal life rather than 
imported from communism, fluoride, or outer space. This is doubly shocking in 
the context of a documentary-style naturalism, the city establishing shot and 
teletext information about time and place. This generic revolution displaces 
grand guignol, hyperbole, and invasion by the terror of the quotidian: mundane 
theft, driving, and psychosis. Ultimately, insanity is understood not via a coher­
ent psychological or social explication, but as an everyday possibility. And the 
superimposition in the finale of mother's head on Norman counteracts the 
psychiatrist's "official" version of events, as if even custody and psychoanalysis 
cannot deal with the horror of the unconscious (Tudor 1989: 192-5). 
Barbara Creed utilizes the theory of woman as both castrator and castrated to 
explain the film's theme of femininity as monstrous, simultaneously a threatening 
force of desire and a bodily testament to dismemberment. Horror concentrates on 
son-mother lesions and ties, generally theorized via oedipal repressed desire, fear 
of the castrating female parent, the abjection of emotions, and attacks in extremis. 
In P.~ycho, Norman is psychically and physically threatened by his mother. He 
must castrate her before she castrates him: so he kills her and then becomes her. 
Marion is equally important. She embodies these contradictions, and not just for 
Norman: consider the discussion of mothers she has with her boyfriend Sam. 
Marion overhears Norman's monologue that is played out as a discussion with his 
mother, in which he represents the voice of peace and sweet male reason and she 
is the mistrustful, misogynistic figure who hates women for their power over 
simpleton males. Mothers are associated throughout with birds of prey, as in 
classical mythology, when they would fly out as night vultures in search of the 
blood and flesh of children. In P.~ycho, the beak is a castrating device, part of 
woman's capacity to swallow and diminish maleness. The shower-scene murder 
might be understood either as an expression of the wish for mother to remove a 
threat to her hold on Norman's affections, or as a form of rape. Creed favors an 
account where mother is fearsome because she is the bathroom disciplinarian who 
polices washing the naked male and prohibits masturbation with the threat of 
punishment: symbolic castration. And Marion is sometimes thought to be 
engaged in self-abuse under that shower rose (Creed 1993: 139-48). 
Clearly, film theory's "take" on P~y(ho uses two forms of knowledge. The first 
(close reading) relies on formal! stylistic cues and codes in the original text 
325 
Toby Miller 
(generally as viewed on a television monitor via tape, with frequent use of the 
rewind function). This approach pays minimal or no attention to context: the 
means of production, distribution, and exhibition, the occasion of viewing, pop­
ular public response, media criticism, or cultural difference. The second form of 
knowledge (the human sciences), generally used in tandem with the first, draws on 
techniques from a variety of theoretical systems: auteurism, genre studies, Freu­
dian, Lacanian, and Kleinian psychoanalysis, feminisms, Marxisms, and thematic 
criticism. As far as I know, postcolonial/multi-cultural critique has not thus far 
been deployed to highlight, for example, the unmarked nature of whiteness or 
symptomatic African-American metaphorizations in the text. Both close reading 
and the human sciences utilize the material sounds and images of the apparently 
originary film to underwrite their accounts, shoring up the theoretical apparatus 
(be it "understanding the text" or "exposing the suppressed 'other''') with 
reference to P.\ycho. Norman's psychosis becomes the critic's alibi. 
2 Bad Timing 
I examine film theory's account of Bad Timing for four reasons: first, the film 
disrupts the continuity system that characterizes Hollywood and most other 
cinemas; second, it can produce considerable displeasure in audiences because 
of its complex narrative and cultural politics; third, it connects psychoanalysis, 
detection, and confession, recurring themes in film theory and central to Psycho; 
and finally, it has been read from a variety of different positions, many of which 
are less central to orthodox film theory than those adumbrated above. In this 
sense, Bad Timing "performs" film theory diegetically as well as indicating how 
criticism creates its own object. The six discourses I enumerate with reference to 
the film are Foucauldian feminist theory, style and form, conversation analysis, 
mimetic desire, biographical criticism, and Jungian mythology. Each summary is 
brief and schematic, intended to encourage the reader to imagine a discussion 
between these discourses. 
The feminist account comes trom Teresa de Lauretis. It is especially signifi­
cant as the film was initially picketed by feminists because of its depiction of 
Theresa Russell's character, Milena Vodnik/Flaherty (for example, cutting from 
sex to an emergency tracheotomy, or shooting from between her legs and over her 
thighs). The distributor, the Rank Organization, complained that the text was 
pornographic and removed its logo from British prints (Lanza 1989: 55), publicly 
deriding the film as "a sick film made by sick people for sick people" (quoted in 
Penman 1998: 91). For de Lauretis, though, Bad Timing is a much more 
revelatory, and hence potentially liberatory, text than such protests would sug­
gest. She sees the cinema as a site where sex and desire are constructed through 
techniques of confession, concealment, and the drive for truthful knowledge 
about motivation, character, and occasion. Bad Timing problematizes the imbri­
cation of power and sex to produce "unpleasure" by refusing the audience's 
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"right to understand" assumed in the "classic realist text" (MacCabe 1981). This 
is not just a matter of visual complexity, but a demand that viewers consider their 
own voyeurism and will to know, just as they observe the will to know of the 
police, psychiatry, and military intelligence inside the film's story (Roeg referred 
to its capacity to expose viewers' "voyeuristic appetite for detachment" [quoted 
in Kennedy 1980: 25]). And the treatment of Milena is, for de Lauretis, emble­
matic of dominant male power structures: the law, the repressive state apparatus, 
medicine, and the psy-complexes. It illustrates their inner workings and mutual 
complicity in the regulation of women's bodies. Inspector Frederich Netusil 
(Harvey Keitel) and Dr. Alex Linden (Art Garfunkel), one a police officer and 
investigator, the other a psychoanalyst and suspect, are bonded, for example, 
when the film cuts between their two homes with Fidelio a thematic overture 
binding the two sites. And our desire to know what is going on in the text parallels 
Netusil's drive to hear a complete confession, itself a critical component of 
religion, therapy, and detection - the will to know. Some critics refer to Bad 
Timing as "the ultimate detective film" (quoted in Barber 1980: 46). The film is 
finally triumphant for Milena. The scar on her neck in the penultimate scene 
identifies her and inscribes her experience, even as she walks away from a helpless 
Alex stuck in a Manhattan cab. She is not free of the patriarchal laws and lovers 
that have sought to circumscribe her sexuality, but she is aware of them, her body 
a mnemonic of the damage they have wrought and the vitality of her resistance. 
Where de Lauretis maintains that Bad Timing denies the viewer pleasure by 
preventing identification with its narrative or visuals, through the displacement 
of conventional informational flows and a chain of events and feelings, Bordwell 
sees this as a typical distantiating trope of art cinema, a convention of the genre 
well known by spectators (1985: 268). But there is something special in the style 
of Bad Timing: the film regularly cuts on the look, moving from an expressive, 
gazing face to a shot of something other than what was being looked at. This 
technique heaves us violently across time and space. The flashback scenes in 
which Alex ravishes Milena are managed via a cut on the look of Inspector 
Netusil, which conventionally suggests, through notions of the eyeline match 
or an interior monologue, that he is seeing or remembering what follows. But we 
know he was not present at the time. So we ask whether this is happening in 
Netusil's fantasy. That questioning produces an essential ambiguity, beyond the 
moral issues of individual characters or indeed the stance of the filmmakers 
toward their product. No one confesses, and we never receive an omniscient 
narrative perspective unclouded by this cutting on the look (King 1992: 174-5). 
At the same time, the film's art direction offers some consistency, for example 
in the polysemous August Klimt paintings that Milena looks at in the opening 
sequence, repeated flashes ofEgon Schiele's pictures of coupled morbidity in the 
background, and Milena's sense of color in clothing, which stands for the cluster 
of complex human forms she iterates. Similarly, the differences between Alex 
and Milena as personality types, and the decay she suffers, are signified by the 
comparative tidiness of their domestic spaces, while incessant smoking references 
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both tension and the dirt they share and spread around (Izod 1992: 109-11). 
Recurrent blasts of "Who Are You?" - by The Who - call up the issue of how 
Alex can truly know Milena (and why he wants to "know" I control her) as well as 
providing an aural match to sudden visual cuts. These recurring symbols build 
up the spectator's store of information about the characters, in sharp contrast to 
the film's unforgiving editing, which destroys any sense of etiology or flow. 
In terms of its narrative form, Bad Timing fuses two stories. One lasts the five 
hours between when Milena swallows too many sleeping pills and Alex and 
Frederich debate the circumstances. The other diegesis is the five months 
when Alex and Milena are dating their way to obsession. The tumultuous meet­
ing of these narratives is hinted at in advance. Milena reads The Sheltering Sky by 
Paul Bowles, a novel that details failed Moroccan romance and parallels her 
rejection (in Marrakech) of Alex's marriage proposal. There is a further parallel, 
of divided characters, torn between national, individual, and intellectual loyalties. 
When Alex tells Milena that "to be in between is to be no place at all," this applies 
as much to their geopolitical position as her marital status and his frustrated rage 
at her liminality (her last name refers to a Czech legend about a serpent of 
indeterminate power and form while his last name refers to the Czech national 
tree, a symbol of national strength and community). The visual corollary finds the 
camera panning between their faces in a university cloister. And the place where 
Milena parts from her ex-husband Stefan (Denholm Elliott) is literally liminal, 
the corridor owned by no one that marks the border of Vienna and Bratislava over 
the Danube. On this occasion, the literary mirror is a German-language edition of 
Harold Pinter's No Man's Land, symbolizing her entrapment between Eastern 
and Western men (Lanza 1989: 103-4, 135-6; Izod 1992: 107). For Roeg, her 
limil1alizv drives Alex to apoplexy in just the way his criminality absorbs Frederich 
- each man pursues order and tidiness in his affairs, "pliant to their wills" (Roeg, 
quoted in Kennedy 1980: 25). This logocentric interdependence connects men 
whose subject positions seem quite distinct. Netusil complains to Linden of 
women that "[t]hey challenge our will to master reality." What is happening 
between the two men when these words are uttered? 
I turn next to dialogue, exploring conversation analysis (CA). CA grew out of 
ethno-methodology. It has not been very influential in film studies, in keeping 
with the area's comparative neglect of speech in favor of narrative, music, and 
image and its bizarre ignorance of social theory (even while mobilizing the nostra 
of race, gender, and class). CA uses the concept of membership categorization 
devices (MCDs), utterances made by people to characterize their relationship 
with others. MCDs set up rules of exclusion, inclusion, and conduct. They 
function only as they are being applied and responded to, not as overarching 
categories, such as role theory, which stand outside their moment of utterance. 
David Silverman (1993) finds CA useful in understanding the interrogation by 
the police of Dr. Linden. Consider this extract: 
Hospital Policeman: Husband? 
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Linden: no 
Hospital Policeman: Relation? 
Linden: no 
Hospital Policeman: er boyfriend? 
o 
Hospital Policeman: look what connection do you have with her? 
Linden: you could say I'm a friend 
The authorities want to know about Alex's relationship to Milena. Each descrip­
tion they present connotes certain obligations and practices, which vary with the 
degree of commitment and closeness implied. The least clearly defined MCD is 
"boyfriend," which has no status in law or lineage. The hospital policeman 
pauses before naming Linden in this way, because there is a delicacy, an 
uncertainty, an ambig'uity in that relation. Similarly, complex MCD work has 
to be done later when Netusil is interrogating Linden about ravishment. 
Netllsil: poor silly girl(.) how old is this girl? 
(Z.O) 
Netllsil: just a question 
Linden: twenty-four twenty-five 
Netl/sil: a nice age 
(3.0) 
Netllsil: she had difficulty speaking? 
( l.O) 
Linden: she seemed normal (.) it sounded like a joke 
Netl/sit: but it wasn't though 
Linden: how do you know? 
Netllsil: if someone rings you and says they're going to kill themselves now that 
isn't normal (l.O) at least for normal people (.) would you agree? 
How might we g'O about analyzing' this as a piece of audio text? We could 
emphasize the preg'nancy of the two-second space between Netusil's first question 
and his own metatextual response, which sets up an adjacency pair for Linden to 
complete. Or we might look at MCDs to see how the conversants establish 
boundaries, such as the distinction between what is funny and what is normal. 
Whereas Netusil offers abundant commentary, Linden restricts himself to 
empirical information and definitional remarks. He thereby denies any connec­
tion to Netusil or the experience that Netusil's interpretations imply, that Linden 
would be involved with a "silly girl" or himself be irresponsible in some way. 
There are other options for analyzing this complicated male relationship. 
Consider the literary anthropologist Rene Girard's concept of mimetic desire. 
For Girard, desire is essentially imitative. Human subjects attract each other 
because of their desirability in the eyes of others. Stuart Cunningham uses 
Girard's work to examine the misogyny of Netusil and Linden, finding' some 
interesting information about the controlling sub-text of such exchang·es. In a 
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scene where Netusil says women envy men's capacity to bend their wills and 
create culture through a transcendent self, he is both differentiating himsclfji-om, 
and connecting himself to, Linden's act of rape. We are presented with two 
monsters, doubling each other in refracted form. In this reading, Bad Timing 
becomes a series of triangular narratives between woman, boyfriend, lover, 
husband, detective, and psychoanalyst. Linden is engaged, enraged, and excited 
by Milena's relationships with her husband Stefan, her revolutionary Conrad, 
and her dead sibling. Netusil and Linden are rivals over the status and meaning 
of her body and their respective parental human sciences: criminology and 
psychoanalysis (Cunningham 1983: 108-10). As the investigator puts it to his 
logocentrically interdependent adversary, "We are not unalike." Just as Linden 
claims to know Milena but is forever uncertain as to her history and current 
activities, so Netusil wonders how good a detective he is (in a reference to 
Milena's husband being from Bratislava, "Netusil" translates as "he had no 
idea" in Czech). And there is authorial support for such a reading· in the 
director's statement that the "Keitel and Garfunkel characters were the same 
man." Many of his characters masquerade as the other, like Linden quiet 
in mascara and Milena hysterical in quasi-drag (Roeg, quoted in Lanza 1989: 
130). 
What of biographical critique? This places the film inside the artistic, indus­
trial, and psychological contexts of its key participants. Such an approach might 
find some continuity between Garfunkel's performance as Linden and his role in 
Carnal Knowledge (Mike Nichols, 1971) or between Keitel as Netusil and his 
charismatic, tortured figure from Martin Scorsese's Mean Streets (1973) and Taxi 
Driver (1976) (Cunningham 1983: 110). It would also note that Bad Timing was 
the third of Roeg's five pictures up to that time to feature a popular singer 
(Kennedy 1980: 26). In directorial terms, this analysis would locate Roeg at a 
turning-point in his career: after The Man Who Fell to Earth (1976), he was 
caught between the status of a cult figure and a potential Hollywood machinist. 
In a history of cinema, the film could be seen as his homage to and comment upon 
Carol Reed's The Third Man (1949). Each is set in Vienna, an urban atmosphere 
of deceit, desire, and spying. The search for Harry Lime is echoed when Alex 
tries to learn about Milena's past from an unidentified figure, while Netusil is 
very like Trevor Howard's Major Calloway from the earlier picture. It is part of 
Roeg's modus operandi to form composite characters that borrow from earlier 
actants and are hence always already intertextual (Lanza 1989: 56, 131). 
Alternatively, we could look for the signified of the text in the psyches of its 
progenitors, notably Roeg. Joseph Lanza's method-mirroring montage biography 
of the director emphasizes Roeg and Russell's relationship as constitutive of the 
text's final meaning. The director's choice of her for the part is read against their 
later parenting and marriage. Russell becomes understood as a figure drawn to­
and inside - Roeg's quixotic personality, her on-screen career producing bizarre 
portrayals of femininity across a series of features he directs. For Roeg, her 
youthfulness pulls at his life urges, encouraging him to look for himself in his 
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other. As for Garfunkel, much is made of his account of the filmic process, how 
he felt that Roeg's careful evaluation of every gesture and the darkness of his role 
brought him closer to his own unconscious, and that, during the shoot, Garfunkel 
had an off-screen vision of his fiancee, Laurie Bird, dying. Gust before the crew 
rcturned to the US, she overdosed on pills, like Milena in the text.) But then we 
also have to deal with Roeg's statement about Garfunkel, who thought "he was 
really playing me. But I told him that he was only part of it. I challenged him to 
decipher when I was wearing the trousers and when I was wearing the dress" 
(quoted in Lanza 1989: 57-8, 148, 131). The director assesses the film as having 
"fucked up more people in my crew than anything else I've done. I know five 
people whose lives were turned over by that movie, including the cameraman, 
producer and executive producer. I'm kind of glad it got a limited release" 
(quoted in Lanza] 989: 58). 
Lastly, I turn to myth criticism, derived from the legacy of Carl Jung, which 
adopts a semi-spiritual stance on the text. Such an approach cannot understand 
feminist concerns about Milena being unconscious for the duration of the plot, 
because it holds that scenes presented from her point of view have emerged as 
metaphors from her unconscious, aching to be pardoned by her husband for 
transgressing his will and their contract. In such an account, her strong desire for 
repentance animates the narrative. The scene where she rejects Alex's proposal of 
marriage is read as symbolizing the ties between libidinous energy and death: the 
characters are sitting above Marrakech's Place of the Dead, where a physical 
double of Alex appears among men performing dangerous rituals with snakes 
(Milena's danger signs, which are called up once more in the finale with Arabic 
music). And the interrogation scenes are driven by the Janus face of love and 
power, the shadows of one cast by the brightness of the other, and each peren­
nially vulnerable to displacement. Netusil's work inclines him to exercise his will 
over people, but his other side finds expression in opera and family. Alex's 
profession is supposedly dedicated to healing but functions by exercising 
power over people. Locked together as they inexorably are, these characters 
miss the boat, the way out. Only Milena is ultimately transcendent, in ways 
that surprisingly connect this mythopoeic analysis to de Lauretis's account. Her 
trials and tribulations heroize her. She achieves an individuation only dreamed of 
by the men, purifying her conscious mind of father-love and overturning her 
need for Alex and his kind (Izod 1992: 107, 116-17, 120-2). 
While some analyses of Bad Timing seem incommensurate - such as Milena's 
being unconscious either revealing the power structure of patriarchy or the 
mental structure of her guilt, Jungian versus mimetic desire, or role theory 
versus CA - others can usefully be combined to look at the operation of style, 
language, intersubjectivity, filmmaking agency, and the unconscious. Together, 
they offer rich and politically suggestive ways of knowing a complex film. The 
kind of conversation we have proposed in this volume can only occur if such 
meetings are staged as an everyday part of film theory. 
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Thanks go to Terezka Carolina Korinek. 
Note 
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CHAPTER EIGHTEEN
 
Historical Allegory 
Ismail Xavier 
1 The New Status of Allegory 
Since the early 1970s, when Walter Benjamin's ideas on modernity gained special 
attention in literary theory and film studies, the reevaluation of allegory - not 
only as a language trope but: above all as a key notion in the characterization of the 
crisis of culture in modernity - has become a significant topic of research and 
cultural debate. Contemporary theory has established an essential connection 
between allegory and the vicissitudes of human experience in time. A sense of 
history as implying an uninterrupted process of production, change, and dissolu­
tion of meanings de-authorizes old conceptions of signs and discursive practices 
as able to produce universally valid and stable interpretations with an organic and 
necessary connection to the ultimate truths of life. Modern culture is haunted by 
the radical assumption of instability, condemned to explore the implications of 
the fact that the meaning of signs - especially new cultural contexts of complex 
combination of signs - can be forgotten, displaced, and twisted when faced with 
historical forces and power systems. This new awareness of instability only 
enhances an old perception of the problematic character of signifying processes, 
a perception that nowadays is taking us away from the lost paradise of transparent 
languages. 
Allegory has come to the foreground, and one strong reason for its reawaken­
ing in modern times is the fact that it has always been the signifying process most 
identified with the presence of mediation, with the idea of a cultural artifact that 
requires specific frames of reference to be read, quite distant from any sense of 
the "natural." Moreover, allegory has acquired its preeminence in criticism 
because the accumulation of historical experience related to cultural shock, 
slavery, repression, and violence has shown its central role in the interaction of 
different cultural systems. The "conflict of interpretations" concerning basic 
values and canonic texts is a territory within which opposed traditions must 
confront or appease, struggle for their "purity" and domination, or converge to 
create a new configuration of values and lifestyle. Allegories usually rise from 
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controversies. In ancient times, it was the debate on the legitimacy of mythic 
narratives in the Greek world that became a privileged occasion for the develop­
ment of allegorical strategies of reading to account for a new conception of the 
function of myth in culture and society. And it was throug'h a particular kind of 
allegorical reading of the Jewish Bible that the Fathers of the Christian Church 
set the ground for the new religion and built its conception of history (see 
Auerbach 1974; Pepin 1976). Later, in its search for universal validity and 
domination, Christianity submitted different kinds of symbolic system and 
religious artifact to allegorical readings meant to inscribe the Other within the 
Christian frame of reference. Similarly, in different moments of a multi-focal 
historical process, the dialectics of identity and alterity has provoked a variety of 
reading strategies by which new meaning's were ascribed to old signifiers, where 
new cultural hegemonies were built on the ruins of defeated symbolic systems, in 
a process that largely obeyed, although in complex ways, the material power and 
the will of the winners of history. 1 
I say "complex ways" because not only particular cultural features but also 
overall cultural systems can outlive the material defeat of their subjects, as used to 
be said about Greek culture in the time of the Roman Empire, and as we are 
learning to say about the cultural features that came from Africa and, having 
outlived centuries of colonialism and slavery, have been showing all their 
strength in the contemporary Americas. Allegory is not a one-way process. If 
Christians allegorized pagan culture in order to dominate it, the "Others" could 
use similar strategies to give continuity to their own traditions - under disguise 
when the times were too hard, as occurred in Brazil when the African slaves 
maintained their religious traditions and rituals under the cover of Catholic saints 
and images (see Stam 1997). 
Within this general process of change and confrontation, modern history, with 
all its accelerated transformations, has shown how the unifying principles that 
provide social cohesion of shared identity depend on cultural constructs - for 
example, the idea of the nation. Together with economic and institutional 
support, the nation is produced by narration and other forms of representation, 
implying a particular blending of historical ground and mythic accounts of past 
experiences (see Anderson 1983; Bhabha 1990). We are all familiar with the 
typical mobilization of allegorical narratives in which the lives of particular 
individuals are presented as figuring the foundational moment or the destiny of 
a group, or in which the recapitulation of the past is taken as a disguised 
discussion of present dilemmas. 2 
Novels from the nineteenth centurl and films from our times -like Griffith's 
Intolerance, John Ford's The Man TYho Shot Libert;y Valance, Fritz Lang's 
NIetropolis, Glauber Rocha's Land in Anguish, Fassbinder's The Marriage of 
Maria Braun, the Taviani Brothers' Good Morning Bakylon, Manoel de Oliveira's 
Non: A va glriria de rnandar - give us examples of deliberate national allegories. 
Dealing directly with present issues and experiences, or connecting past and 
present in different ways, they show the variety of allegorical strategies available 
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to the filmmaker who wants to thematize the position of his or her country in 
human history. The representation of national destinies through an encoded 
storytelling process is a recurrent fact in film history. Both First- and Third­
World films have offered us different versions of the so-called "overt allegory" ­
when the reference to national experience results from an intentional process of 
encoding. Moreover, the presence of national allegories in film history goes 
beyond the examples of overt and intentional encoding, as I hope the observation 
of films teaches us and the examples given in my text will show. Alongside 
intentional allegories there are also "unconscious" allegories, where the inter­
vention of a "competent reader" is indispensable. Recognizing an allegorical 
dimension in a text requires the ability to perceive homologies, and national 
allegories require the understanding of private lives as representative of public 
destinies. 
This issue of the reader's capacity to detect the collective and political dimen­
sions beneath the surface of the storytelling process has been at the center of a 
recent polemic involving allegory in contemporary fiction. According to Fredric 
Jameson (1986), this kind of perception has been inhibited by the dominant logic 
of postmodern culture, especially when one thinks of literary production and its 
audience. For him, the separation of the private and the public spheres has 
produced, in First-World countries, a kind of literary fiction less concerned 
with politics, one that circulates in a cultural context where readers are not 
concerned with national questions. In contrast, he calls our attention to what 
he sees as the primacy of national allegories in Third-World literatures. Jame­
son's claims about national allegory rework the question of the "competent 
reader," stressing this intimate connection with specific reading practices and 
highlighting the role of diverse social structures that can encourage, or inhabit, 
allegorical interpretation. His controversial move was to posit a clear divide 
separating two dominant modes of literary production and interpretation, each 
closely corresponding to a certain stage of social and economic development. His 
provocative discussion of the connection between reading practices and society 
ends up, unfortunately, by presenting a schematic vision of Third-World societ­
ies and culture. The idea ofnational allegory as "Thirdworldish" has been shown 
to be a reductive image, one that provoked negative critical reactions, especially 
in the Third World (see Ahmad 1987). 
My purpose here is not to give a full account of the debate between Jameson 
and his opponents; I take it only as further evidence that critics cannot discuss 
allegory without dealing with both the structure of texts and their reception 
within specific cultural and social contexts. The dynamics ofexpression (produc­
tion) and interpretation I(consumption) here become unusually complex, even in 
those cases in which producer and reader share the same references and are able 
to close the circle of encoding and decoding without much "noise" in their 
communication. Jameson's article brought allegory to the fore at a time when 
literary criticism had already familiarized us with distinctions between overt and 
unconscious allegory or, more generally, between the author's understanding of 
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his or her own text and that of the readers. The consideration of allegory always 
seems to lead us back to some of the major questions derived from the more 
complex nature of interpretation within the literary (and art) system implicated 
in a modern culture already aware of the debates about the "intentional fallacy" 
(W. K. Wimsatt) and the "death of the author" (Michel Foucault). 
The interesting debates provoked by Jameson's polemical text form part of a 
more general discussion that has taken place not only in the English-speaking 
world but also in other contexts, usually involving the debate about the political 
efficiency and/or the aesthetic legitimacy of allegorical strategies when raising 
social questions, or involving the debate about the particular affinities between 
the modern ideas of nation and the allegorical mode. Here, I take Walter 
Benjamin's ideas and the recent debates on allegory and politics as central to 
my understanding of the status of allegory today, but I cannot limit myself either 
to Benjamin's formulations or to contemporary controversies. Although central 
today, Benjamin's notion is far from being the exclusive formulation of the 
problem, and one has to trace the history of allegory not only to provide the 
framework for clearer understanding of his original claims, but also for a better 
account of the current debates. A protean notion, allegory has been a perennial 
object of analysis, as Angus Fletcher pointed out (1970), one that changes 
definition and value according to cultural context. It is this multiplicity that I 
address here. 
Conceptions of the allegorical process vary depending on the specific location 
of a text within the cultural process (one should add "but not depending 
exclusively on the geopolitical location of a text as Third- or First-World art­
work"). The notion of allegory, in its modern form, has, on the one hand, taken 
part in the construction of "high" reflexive modernism in the making of complex 
works endowed with a sharp consciousness of language; on the other hand, 
allegory, in its more traditional forms, takes part in the routinized mass-media 
production, particularly within the tradition of popular genres - horror films, 
science fiction, melodrama, westerns, films noirs, musical comedies. 
Keeping in mind all these instances of the practice of allegorical expression and 
interpretation, I will present here a brief discussion of some structural aspects of 
allegory as a mode of discourse, buttressed with historical information that helps 
us to understand its basic mechanisms and its most common motivations within 
the cultural process. I will deal with how allegories function and with what kind 
of demand most allegories try to answer. I will also address the internal logic of 
allegorical productions of meaning - the relationship between signifier and 
signified - but I will not be engaged in a technical debate on the synchretic 
semiotics of image-and-sound. 
Analysts have already established the ways allegory can circulate through 
written texts, pictorial images, icons, and practically any kind of discourse, 
from artworks to advertising slogans and political speeches. In the twentieth 
century, cinema forms part of the very texture of our culture. It asserts values and 
produces meaning in a variety of ways, and allegory operates both in experi­
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mental non-narrative films and in more conventional film genres. When con­
veyed by a narrative film, allegory is not simply produced by a storytelling' 
process involving agents and actions, but also results from visual compositions 
that, in many cases, establish a clear dialogue with particular iconographical 
traditions, ancient and modern. Depending on the particular editing strategy 
adopted, a filmmaker can privilege the horizontal, narratological, succession of 
shots to create specific space-time structures of action, or can privilege the 
vertical relationships created by the interaction of image and sound, or by the 
intertextual connections between the film's pictorial composition and cultural 
codes deriving from painting and photography. Therefore, reading' films alle­
gorically is always a multi-focal cultural gesture, requiring the capacity to explore 
what is sug'gested both by the horizontal succession of shots and by the vertical 
effects of visual compositions or cultural codes embedded on its soundtrack. 
I begin with a description of different kinds of allegory, presented in connec­
tion with their historical origins and contexts. Then I refer to different examples 
of the allegorical process in cinema. 
2 Allegorical Intention and Interpretation 
The classical tradition lends us a notion of alleg'ory - etymologically a!los (other) 
+ agoreuein (to speak in a public place) - as a kind of utterance in which someone 
says one thing but means another, or makes manifest one thing to allude to 
something' else. This definition, however, is overly generic. It identifies allegory 
among' the other figures of speech systematized by the ancient rhetoricians, yet it 
is nonetheless helpful in our contemporary discussion. The essential element 
implied by this generic notion is the idea of a gap between the spirit (meaning) 
and the letter (words), the sense that an utterance points to a concealed or 
disguised meaning beyond its apparent content. One finds here the acknow­
ledgment of language as a nontransparent instance of meaning, a place of con­
ventions and contextualized processes that mediate the connection between 
words (or images) and lived experience. Nevertheless, this short definition does 
not say anything about the structure of allegorical speeches, or texts, or imag·es. 
We must therefore ask: what, within the text, signals those other meaning's, and 
where can the reader find the indices of alleg'orical intention? 
When we look for these signs or marks, we imply that we can clearly dis­
criminate allegory from what is not allegory, and we assume that the allegorical 
interpretation on the reader's part corresponds to an alleg'orical intention at the 
source of the message. But this is not usually the case. The answer to my first 
question about the marks of allegorical discourse would be simple if one could 
conceive allegory as an intrinsic property of a text or image. But the nature of 
language is such that sometimes there is no sign of an allegorical intention that 
can be easily "fingered." Critical motions of polysemy and ambiguity make it 
clear that the chain of intention-utterance--interpretation is complex, creating 
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effects beyond the control of the sender of the message, whatever the text's 
structure. Since we live within history, the conditions under which we practice 
reading change in space and time. 
The dynamics that typify allegory undoubtedly allow for the identification of 
encoding processes. A poet, for example, creates allegorical effects by using 
certain techniques designed to be detected by a trained reader who shares his 
or her cultural background. But this hypothesis corresponds to very particular 
cases; it does not serve as a general rule of allegory in history. In the theory of 
allegory, these questions have been raised since the beginning', whether in 
classical Greece or in the Jewish tradition, and they were seen as intimately 
connected with the basic sources of allegorical practice. The Middle Ages 
established a tradition of underlining the difference between allegorical expres­
sion (the so-called "allegory of the poets") and allegorical interpretation (the so­
called "allegory of the theolog·ians"). In that period, the distinction between 
allegory as a writer's performance and allegory as a reader's performance was 
formulated to acknowledge the distinction between an utterance produced by an 
identifiable historical subject endowed with specific talents and methods giving 
concrete form to an intention, and utterances found in canonical and traditional 
texts, produced in the remote past, not from clearly identifiable sources, requir­
ing specific and debatable techniques of reading. 
Allegorical expression meant the particular rhetorical strategies set, among 
others, by Greek and Latin poets who encoded their verses through the con­
trolled construction of disguised meanings and indirect language. Here allegory is 
a secular practice, one mode of poetic representation among' others. Allegorical 
interpretation meant specific strategies of reading established around the fifth 
century AC by the philosophers who understood that the corpus of Greek 
mythology could not be accepted as literal truth or as a constellation of narratives 
referring to a factual past, but should be read as a body of disguised messages 
conveying ancient wisdom and the basic values of Greek culture. This new 
understanding - the separation of the spirit from the letter - was a symptom of 
a crisis in the cultural status of mythology. The old narratives were no longer 
seen as accounts of true facts or the real behavior of the gods. They were just the 
product of a storytelling practice whose value lay in the mythic conveying of 
the conceptual knowledge made tangible by the narrative. This crisis affecting 
the status of ancient narratives implied a dialectics of devaluation (the myths are 
only a fiction) and recuperation (even as fiction they carry lessons about the 
essential truths of the culture, contingent only on competent interpretation). 
Taking visible stories and actions as figures for concepts, the philosophers 
inaugurated a technique of reading that saw narrative agents as personifications, 
as bodily equivalents for abstract thought. In this sense, the myth of Saturn 
eating his sons can be read as allegorizing the concept of Time. If Saturn is Time, 
Apollo is the Sun, Athene is the intellect, while Neptune is the deification of 
water, to mention some examples of what Jean Pepin calls the physical allegorism 
of the Stoics. But Pepin also tells us how allegory, as deployed by other philo­
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sophical schools, could have an ethical dimension, as when the myth of Tantalus 
was taken as an allegory of greed, Achilles as the personification of friendship, 
and Sysiphus as a rather peculiar personification of an always failing ambition to 
"stay on top" (1976: 145). 
From ancient Greece on, this kind of reading has been performed in many 
different cultural contexts and based on many different conceptual frameworks. 
What is common is the idea that a story (conveyed by a speech, a written text, or a 
film) or an image (a pictorial composition, like Caravaggio's portrait of Fame, or 
the emblems of the Renaissance and Baroque cultures) embodies a concept, an 
idea, or a moral. Other examples of pedagogical narratives that feature personi­
fications can be taken from the medieval tradition, like the battles of Virtue 
against Vice, of which Psychomachia, the narrative poem written by Prudentius, 
is a well-known example. In terms of film, D. W. Griffith's The White Rose 
(1923) reworks the principles of Psychomachia, this time as part of a modern story 
of sin and repentance. In this connection, one can also mention La Fontaine's 
fables, or the modern melodrama with its central conflict of Good and Evil. In 
modern times, the atmosphere created by the industrial revolution and acceler­
ated technical developments in Europe engendered allegories dealing with the 
"dangerous powers" placed at our disposal by scientific progress, as personified, 
for example, by the figure of Frankenstein. Other fears triggered by the labyr­
inthian paranoias of urban life in the twentieth century found expression in a 
gallery of malevolent "geniuses" seen as the perverse embodiment of privileged 
intellect. Fritz Lang's Mabuse, for example, personifies the shadowy side of 
modern technology and urban development, thus inaugurating a series of "con­
spiracy" films that Hollywood cinema has been reworking throughout the cen­
tury, with a gradual intensification of abstract, invisible, and relatively 
autonomous intelligence systems. In this connection, Fredric Jameson (1992) 
pointed out how the compression of space and time produced by postmodernity, 
together with the concentration of world power in a few "imperial" nations that 
can act on a global scale, gave a new impulse to what he calls "conspiratorial texts," 
schematic allegories in which totality features as conspiracy, involving complex 
networks of high-tech systems and a sinister "bureaucratic impersonality." 
Apart from this less obvious allegorical turn fostered by the maze-like impres­
sion triggered by contemporary society, there are other kinds of more traditional 
film genre in which a character-oriented classic narrative produces a set of 
industrialized personifications - one might call them stereotypes. Here, simpli­
fied views of social problems, or reductive explanations of historical causality, 
place on certain characters' shoulders the burden of representation, of an entire 
class, or an ethnic group, or a nationality. The specific physical, psychological, 
and moral features of a single character are very often taken as belonging to a class 
(a worker and his or her personal qualities becoming the Worker), a gender (a 
particular woman becoming the Woman), or an ethnic identity (the African, the 
Latino, and so on). Stereotype, undoubtedly, has an allegorical dimension, since 
it corresponds to a form of representation through which a g'eneral idea (namely, 
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a preconceived idea) about a social group finds its "illustration," or embodiment, 
in a sing-le image or narrative specially composed to confirm that false general­
ization. In fact, stereotypical representations provide a good example of inter­
pretations that result from a point of view located at a distance from the targeted 
subject. They symptomatically project the reader's own predicaments onto the 
person or group under observation (whether a class, an ethnic group, a gender, or 
an entire nation). Here the reader and his or her cultural bias - that is to say, the 
pole of interpretation - become the major instance responsible for the alleg·ory. 
Social groups can be seen as embodying moral values like Good and Evil. And 
certain historical scenes or faces can be seen as emblems (one could say allegories) 
of Reason, like those analyzed by Jean Starobinski in The Emblems of Reason, 
which focusses on the iconography of the eighteenth-century Enlightenment and 
the French Revolution (see Starobinski 1979). Many national allegories are based 
on personifications, as when a single character is taken as standing for the nation, 
like Maria Braun or Alexander Nevsky, or when the very idea of the nation is 
condensed in familial tropes, like Mother Russia or Mother India. And one can 
add to the allegorical realm all kinds of readings addressed to natural phenomena 
as expressing the action of cosmic entities understood as subjectivities, gods or 
goddesses. This very common, and sometimes unconscious, process of personi­
fication is very frequently identified with allegory per se (as the example of fables 
featuring animals suggests), but allegory, as a mode of representation, is more 
complex than this single mechanism, despite its position as the most popular 
instance of the allegorical process, often found in mass-media products. 
Personification can emerge from a narrative or from a sing-le image, and its 
detection in the texture of a message isn't obvious or always planned by the 
source of the message. Even this most canonical process of allegory involves 
different degrees of ambiguity involving the multiple relationship between 
expression and interpretation, the two poles of the allegorical experience that 
only present a term-to-term correspondence in restricted didactic fables based on 
commonly acknowledged similarities. 
The most interesting instances of allegory are those in which the surface of the 
text either gives unsatisfactory answers to readers' interrogations or remains 
overly enigmatic, thus inducing' a sense of recognition of the opacity of language 
and mandating the search for the concealed meaning. Apart from mythical 
narratives, we are all familiar with frag-mentary utterances, apparently inter­
rupted messag-es, suggestive juxtapositions of images that would seem enigmatic 
or "completely illogical" if our reading was restricted to what is literally there on 
the surface. The prestig-e of allegorical exegesis derives from its claims of solving 
a textual problem, of illuminating the crucial aspects of the text that are at the 
root of enigmas. 
The performance of this kind of reading depends heavily on a capacity to 
perceive "analogies," correspondences that are not easily inserted in culturally 
acknowledg'ed lines of causation, at least not in modern times. Not surprisingly, 
some authors see allegory as a mode of expression and interpretation more akin to 
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a pre-modern mentality - from either the Middle Ages or the Renaissance, 
periods more attentive to the "linked analogies" and correspondences frequently 
at the core of allegory. While this suggestion of an elective affinity between the 
allegorical sensibility and specific historical times has its grain of truth, we should 
not understand the historical changes that fostered modernization as an evolution 
from magic to rational thought, correlated with the passage from allegory to 
realism. The "disenchantment of the world" - implied in the development of 
scientific thought and the overall process of rationalization pointed out by Max 
Weber - does not mean the end of allegory. Scientific theories - like psycho­
analysis - create their own system of reference for the construction of allegories 
(and personifications) in order to solve enigmas and go beyond the surface of 
gestures or words, as clearly expressed in formulae like "father figure", Oedipus 
complex, or in the topology ego, id, and super-ego. 
In cases where scientific theories provide systems of reference for alleg'orical 
interpretations of fictional texts, the acts of reading presumably do not involve 
any supposed allegorical intention. Such cases are normally instances of uncon­
scious allegory, which cannot be seen either as an intrinsic property of the text or 
as the product of a writer's intention. Here the allegory results from specific 
reading strategies that, whatever their validity in relation to the text (or fact) 
under scrutiny, depend heavily upon the context of reading itself. In this sense, 
allegory comes to express the historicity of human experience and values, even 
when rooted in an impulse to achieve a timeless truth. Allegory, as a particular 
method of reading historical facts, or supposedly historical facts, tries to reconcile 
the imperative of "fixed truths" with the acknowledgment that time is an 
essential dimension of human experience. This method has engendered a kind 
of allegorical reading that has had a clear impact on human history in the last 
2,000 years. I am referring to the rise and consolidation of Christianity by means 
of an original performance of reading addressed to the Jewish Bible in order to 
turn it into a set of narratives and specific imagery bearing the signs, the 
prophecies, of the advent of Christ as the Messiah. 
Within Christian "figural realism," to borrow Eric Auerbach's phrase, two 
historical facts, widely separated in time, illuminate each other and show a 
specific connection that confirms the idea of God's design in history. The first 
fact "prefigures" the second, which is announced by it, fulfilling the prophecy 
inherent in the first. Moses' act of leading his people to salvation from slavery in 
Egypt prefigures the act of Christ who, through his sacrifice, saves all human­
kind. This allegorical operation is also called "typology," referring to the "ver­
tical relationship" established by the type and anti-type, complementary figures 
that occur in different moments of history but arc the reiterated signs of the 
unfolding of a teleological process in time. What is essential in this Christian 
conception of allegory is its temporal dimension: we go from one historical fact to 
another, in contrast with the connection between a narrative and a temporal 
abstraction found in the Greek understanding of allegory. This allegorical read­
ing opens up an entire set of relationships, beginning with the sense that the 
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"cosmic order" endows human history with an internal logic that leads the 
succession of apparently disconnected events toward a specific final term - the 
telos. This conception will have many consequences in Western thought, espe­
cially in the development of a historical consciousness that opposes itself to the 
circular view of time in classical culture. In modern fiction, it will be present in 
many novels and films as a guiding principle presiding over the character's 
destiny, particularly in works in which Providers form part of the set of deter­
minations shaping the unfolding of the plot, this hidden force that can save the 
heroes and help them punish the villains, assuring the final triumph of Justice. 
Canonical melodramas from the nineteenth-century popular theater and fi'om 
industrial cinema, especially from the silent period, follow this guiding principle. 
The exaggerated appeal to coincidence in the overall design toward salvation 
becomes one of the typical marks of providential fictions that, even when covered 
by a tapestry of realistic presentation, reveal their allegorical overtone in the way 
they shape the characters' final destiny. 
Considering the primary formulation of Christian allegory by the Fathers of 
the Church, we can see it as a modality of allegorical interpretation addressed to 
given texts produced in a remote past under unknown circumstances by 
unknown authors, texts that are endowed with a sacred dimension within the 
culture. Allegorical interpretations addressed to remote or sacred texts, whatever 
their content and context, respond to a demand for identity and continuity over 
time, revealing an impulse to "heal the gap between the present and a disappear­
ing past which, without interpretation, would be otherwise irretrievable and 
foreclosed" (Fineman 1980: 49). 
These examples suggest that whatever its method, the process of allegorical 
reading in the past involved an operation of unveiling the concealed truth, a sense 
that meaning had an origin in the past and the work of interpretation corres­
ponded to a removal of the layers added by time, providing the conditions for the 
revelation of naked truth. In our period, different kinds of reading can be 
performed without the old concerns for the degree of consciousness or intention 
experienced by the supposed subject who is taken as the source of the message. In 
our cultural process readers are no longer searching for "intended" or conscious 
meanings, but for what the interpreter can say on the occasion of his or her 
encounter with the text, an encounter that cannot, however, be seen as only a dual 
(reader-pIus-text) relationship, isolated from all kinds of contextual influences. If 
today the text is seen as acquiring different and sometimes unexpected meanings 
regardless of the intentions of the author, the dominant reading practices tend to 
inscribe it within a network of intertextual connections that also form part of the 
interpretation. The very nature of this process fosters allegorical strategies that 
refer the given text (or narrative) to a Master Code or Narrative taken as a key 
reference. In this sense, it is curious to see various scientific or para-scientific 
theories replace the Bible as the Great Code that readers take as the guide for 
interpretation. As pointed out above, different conceptual systems - psycho­
analysis, linguistics, anthropology, Marxist social theory, physics, or biology ­
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can be the reference mobilized by the reader to interpret some passages or an 
entire text that can become an allegory of class struggle, or an allegory of the 
formation of the subject, or an allegory of language itself when allegory is set in 
motion by deconstructionist readings. 
Given that allegory is not necessarily an intrinsic property of a text, one can ask 
whether it is still possible to discriminate between allegorical and nonallegorical 
texts. Given this question, Northrop Frye might claim that the structure of the 
text is "neutral" with regard to allegory. But this would be an unfortunate move. 
One might better acknowledge the importance of form and syntax with the 
condition that, instead of speaking of a text "with an allegorical structure" as 
opposed to texts "with no allegorical structure," one should propose the distinc­
tion between texts which, by their structure, encourage an allegorical reading and 
texts which, by their structure, do not encourag'e any special decipherment. In 
this sense, the more enigmatic a text, the greater its chance of provoking allegor­
ical interpretations. Texts that give us a sense of incompleteness or fragmentation 
(the sense that something is lacking) are more susceptible to allegorical readings 
than texts that seem clear and satisfactory in a first reading. Indeed, Angus 
Fletcher's discussion of allegory implies exactly this line of opposition. On the 
one hand, he links the invitation to alleg'orical readings with incompleteness, 
opacity; on the other, he suggests that typically naturalist narratives, like those 
found in classical cinema, with a clear, amusing or easily read story-plot, are also 
entitled to allegorization. In other words, there are structures that lend them­
selves to a secondary reading more convincingly than others, but any text can be 
submitted to what Frye calls "alegorises," such as a move from narrative and 
images to ideas and concepts, because after all this is the canonical task of critics. 
3 The Dialectics of Fragmentation and Totalization 
Angus Fletcher also comments on the discontinuous nature of allegorical ima­
gery. While discussing the "analytic frame of mind" into which allegory forces its 
reader, he reminds us that "any fragmentary utterance takes on the appearance of 
a coded message needing to be deciphered" (1970: 37). His contention implies a 
connection between allegory and incompleteness that goes beyond the modern 
configuration of the process, reminding us of the theological disputes derived 
from the lacunae perceived in sacred texts. The traditional conception of allegory 
as a text to be deciphered implied the idea of an a priori "concealed meaning," a 
conception that turned the production and reception of allegory into a circular 
movement composed of two complementary impulses, one of concealing the 
truth beneath the surface, the other of making the truth emerge again. It is this 
circular movement that Jean Pepin posits in his understanding of the dynamics of 
allegorical expression and interpretation. Pepin's analysis is more concerned with 
theology, a realm in which the "fragmentary utterance" is seen as something akin 
to an "intentional" disguise, necessary for the safeguarding of "truth." Sacred 
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texts present various degrees of concealment in order not to be understood by the 
uninitiated, or their allegorical dimension is seen as fulfilling a pedagogical 
function, since the dissembling surface is understood as a stimulus to the reader, 
increasing the pleasure of revelation following an effort of decoding. 
The encoding of messages, understood as a deliberate concealment, can pre­
sent similar operational schemes, regardless of the motivation behind the allegor­
ical strategy. Apart from theological motives, more pragmatic and less 
metaphysical motives often lie behind the production of disguise, as when the 
analyst needs to outwit censorship in a specific political conjuncture. Through­
out history, the powers that be (religious or secular) have protected their interests 
by censoring texts and images, and allegory has been a frequent weapon against 
authoritarian rules. 
In modern times, critics are suspicious ofcalculated allegories when they result 
in too obviously didactic fables from which the reader can easily draw a conven­
tional moral lesson. And their objection to allegory becomes stronger when 
disguise and opacity are seen as merely a matter of rhetoric, without any special 
challenge or any difficult question at stake. Apart from those occasions where a 
clear political motive justifies this kind of allegory as a form of resistance to 
oppression, the effect of the encoded message becomes weaker, especially when 
the only obvious intention seems to be embellishment. Away from the immediate 
challenges of the political arena, the rhetoric of pedagogical allegory runs the risk 
of reducing art to a schematic but elegant illustration of a priori ideas, a piece 
which engages our senses to communicate worn-out ideas or abstract theories. 
Allegory as illustration becomes an exploration of terrains already well mapped, a 
confirmation of established meanings, which is precisely how the romantics saw 
the neoclassical allegory, given its subordination to conventional thought. 
In defense of their own creative process, the romantics privileged the symbol, a 
form of expression that would offer a particular experience for which there is no 
theoretical system. For them the symbol epitomized an organic movement 
toward expression. The irreducible experience of the artwork would guarantee 
access to a truth which could never be grasped using other channels. In opposi­
tion to allegory, the symbol corresponded to a fresh and genuine intuition about 
experience. Untranslatable into concepts, the symbol had its own value and 
original meaning, resulting from a process that provided a direct expression of 
human experience in a revealing text, object, or image. According to Goethe, 
allegory takes us from the general concept to the particular configuration pre­
sented to the senses, while symbol takes us from the particular (sensible) to the 
universal idea, without the help of established conventions. This distinction can 
be seen as a reductive definition of allegory, conceived to fit the romantic strategy 
of defense against classicism; however, in its own terms it had enormous reson­
ance in the aesthetic debate ever since its formulation in the late eighteenth 
century. Just to remember one example, Georg Lukacs grounded his aesthetic 
theory in the romantic hierarchy of symbol over allegory in order to criticize the 
fragmentation of modern art. The incapacity for totalizing simply would be a new 
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version of the alleg'orical enterprise as one that appeals to transcendent principles 
to talk about social experience. In opposition, realism, as a form of representation, 
would be akin to the symbol (as conceived by the romantics) in its power to grasp 
the historical movement of society in its immanence, providing an org'anic and 
illuminating' expression of totality. Given this formulation, it was not an accident 
that Lukacs, in Realism in Our Time, written in the 1950s, engag'ed himself in a 
polemical dialogue with Benjamin's The Origins of the Baroque Tragic Drama 
(1916) (see Lukacs 1964; Benjamin 1977). On the one hand, he acknowledged 
Benjamin's acute characterization of the baroque (and its affinities with modern 
art); on the other, he took the very applicability of the notion of allegory to 
modern texts as all the more reason to question them. 
In our century, the Lukacs vs. Benjamin confrontation has been one of the key 
chapters of the debate on modern art, and on alleg'ory as well. And its point of 
departure -- Benjamin's 1916 dissertation - was a seminal book for the aesthetic 
thought of the twentieth century. It combined, in a sing'le movement, various 
critiques - of the symbol as conceived by the romantics, of the Christian teleology 
ofhistory, of the secular version of the latter embodied by the bourgeois notion of 
progress, and of the reformist social democratic theories also based on a tele­
ological view of history. 
From Benjamin's reflections on baroque disenchantment and from his melan­
choly view of history as catastrophe, there emerges a peculiar theory of allegory, 
now taken as the primary expression of the temporal dimension of human 
experience when seen as separated from God and condemned to natural decay. 
Christian (and Hegelian) teleology took that temporal dimension as the gradual 
unfolding of a destiny of salvation in whose path every pain had a meaning; but 
Benjamin states that the sense of progress in history can only be experienced by 
those who win and dominate others, and who as a consequence can regard time as 
the continuous and gradual expansion of the same positive principles. In opposi­
tion to what he characterizes as the winner's view, his theory of history is 
g'founded on the notion of disaster, time as a force of destruction and corrosion. 
Instead of a manifestation of embodied Spirit in its path toward self-conscious­
ness and totalization, history is a realm of suffering and permanent conflict, not a 
purely logical chain of constructive events, but a directionless piling' up of 
violence. There is no teleology, but only a collection of discontinuous, ephemeral 
configurations of culture. On the surface of our planet, time crystallizes itself in 
ruins that give a fragmentary and devitalized testimony ofpast experiences; in the 
realm of thought, alleg'ories do the same, crystallizing in fragmentary utterances 
the action of time on culture, emphasizing' what remains incomplete. Allegory 
does not take our own time or the future as a fulfillment; rather it reminds us of 
our own status in the future, we whose traces are bound to be a fragment among 
others within a collection of cultural fossils available for allegorical readings 
performed at a distance. The allegorists of the future, for their part, will perhaps 
have a chance to "communicate" with our own present, depending on specific 
analogies, like those existing between modernity and the baroque seventeenth 
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century, both haunted by a deep sense of crisis, alienation from God or from any 
meaningful History. For Benjamin this is why allegory refuses to provide 
humanity with an aesthetic redemption of the world in perfect forms, or beautiful 
totalities that celebrate an illusory sense of unity and harmony. Rather allegory 
tends to interact with historical fractures and violence, especially when observed 
from the point of view of the defeated. For him, the privileging of the symbol as 
the beautiful form that offers an immediate intuition of Truth is a kind of mythic 
regression, the residue ofAdam's legend in Paradise - harmony between man and 
his environment - or simply the optimistic rationalization of the winners. 
With his notion of mythical regression applied to more conventional art forms 
(like those more frequent in mass media), Benjamin introduces a more politicized 
version of the same attack that modernist thought has launched toward the notion 
of symbol, now seen as a residue of the "age of innocence" in its assumption of an 
organic continuity, close identification oflanguage and experience, signifier and 
signified. Modernity questions this transparency, underlining a kind of inevitable 
discontinuity between experience and its expression, between past and present, 
humankind and nature. An acute sense oflanguage as bearing a degree of opacity 
consolidates the sense that interpretation is always a problematic task, and the 
modern sensibility, to avoid what it considers past illusions, has to deal with a 
multi-leveled gap implied in any reading process: that between what is given to 
the senses and its meaning, that between a past which must be read and a present 
which must read the past, and that between the first text and a second substitute 
text which renders apparently explicit the thought behind the surface. This gap 
corresponds, in its own way, to the theological tradition - of conceiving deity as a 
"hidden God" - acknowledged as the starting point of the allegorical process; but 
that tradition saw totalization and the access to Truth as its horizon, provided that 
one could perform the correct reading of signs and utter the right prophecies. 
Now the multi-leveled gap acquires a different sense, coming to the foreground as 
the beginning and end of the process. Instead of being attacked or reduced to its 
more pedagogical versions, allegory is revealed by Benjamin and his followers, 
and taken as that privileged process that brings to light the reiterated tension 
between the impulse to totalize and its inevitable incompleteness. The necessary 
connection between allegory and fragmentation is seen in a different perspective: 
the enigmatic surface does not derive from concealment of an existing meaning; 
rather it is conceived as expressing the very nature of allegory as a discourse 
whose texture is a privileged instance of the consciousness of language. 
In this new theoretical framework, the romantic opposition symbol/allegory, 
which degrades allegorical expression as arbitrary, nonorganic, mechanical, is 
reversed. The idea of an unmediated experience of meaning embodied in the 
symbol is now seen as an illusory attempt to deny the mediation of language, and 
allegory is redeemed as the discourse that immerses itself "into the depths which 
separate visual being from meaning" (Benjamin 1977: 165).4 
This modern conception of the allegorical has derived from the ongoing debate 
that involves different ideological positions within the realm ofart criticism, since 
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the changes in the philosophy ofart in this century owe much to artistic practices. 
Modernist art elicited the perceptions and critical discourses adequate to its own 
processes and generated the categories adequate to describe it. The modern 
characterization of allegory as a fragmented and incomplete discourse matches 
the view that posits modcrnist art as an instance of discontinuity and opacity, 
incompleteness and ambig·uity. The impact of French surrealism on Walter 
Benjamin is well known, and the effect of modern art on the development of 
contemporary research concerning the baroque has been acknowledged. Fletcher 
cites surrealism and the work of Eisenstein as vivid examples of the principle of 
alleg'orical juxtaposition, emphasizing their common anti-realist techniques of 
isolation (the perfect delineation of contours, the relative autonomy of each image 
forming part of the montage). 
In terms of filmic structure, the issues of fragmentation, opacity, and discon­
tinuity arise within the context of the critique of illusionism. The rejection of the 
dominant codes in classical narrative, based on spatio-temporal continuity, have 
been unevenly radical, bring'ing to film production a dialogue with modern art 
that had its special moments in film history. Modernism first entered the filmic 
sphere after World War I, when German Expressionism, the French avant­
garde, and Soviet constructivism exemplified a film practice that associated the 
critique of illusionism with different, sometimes antithetical, allegorical strate­
gies. In Caligari (Robert Wiene, 1919), new codes of mise-en-scene, scenery, and 
lighting, all taken from the German theater of the time, were central for the 
construction of that sense of estrangement derived from an allegorical space in 
which enigmatic characters lived their drama. Other experimental filmmakers, 
dialoguing' with the historical avant-gardes (futurism, cubism, surrealism), cre­
ated a more intimate connection between film and the modern allegorical strate­
gies of space fragmentation, consolidating the montage principle in the new 
medium. In surrealist films like Un Chien Andalou (1928), despite all the polem­
ical claims from Buiiuel concerning the refusal of any interpretation, an enig­
matic sequence of images and discontinuous action elicited all kinds of allegorical 
interpretations, starting with the most directly associated with its internal logic -­
the psychoanalytical reading that searched for figures of desire in Buiiuel's 
imagery. In another context of the 1920s, the montage principle typical of 
modernist prose provided the ground for Eisenstein's intellectual cinema, 
which refused a more conventional political pedagogy based on classical narrative 
and proposed instead a rich variety of experiments in film language that trigg-ered 
a level of conceptualization rejected by the Soviet bureaucracy and by film 
industries everywhere. Instead of a straightforward narrative, Eisenstein wanted 
his spectators to learn how to think dialectically based on the way he presented 
and commented on historical facts. The succession of images should not follow a 
line of action within a continuous space-time, but a line of conceptual thought 
concerning the facts evoked on the screen. As occurs with other allegorical texts, 
commentary prevails over narration, discontinuous juxtaposition of imag-cs over 
continuous evolution of action and drama. 
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Eisenstein's intellectual cinema, as a modernist text, faced a major challenge: 
to reconcile its ruptures - with conventional forms of perception and historical 
narration - with the pedagogical dimension of a cinema designed to perform 
immediate political tasks. On the one hand, his film affirmed the principle of 
fragmentation of space and time, allowing for enigmatic juxtapositions of images, 
typical features of modern allegory, which he incorporated in his constructivist 
way; on the other, the overall design of each film implied an ultimate movement 
toward totalization and toward a clear diagnosis of recent political conflicts, 
"unequivocal" imagery able to express a teleology of history constructed to 
legitimize the 1917 revolution. These tensions shaped the peculiar drama of his 
cinema and his thought, as a filmmaker who was deeply engaged in the purpo­
sefulness and the love for the concrete common to Marxism and constructivism, 
but here with an aesthetic sense akin to the metaphysical overtones common to 
the tradition of religious iconography and nineteenth-century symbolist art. 
Within the context of narrative-dramatic cinema, the articulation of political 
concerns and the modernist enterprise found again a privileged manifestation in 
the 1960s, when the atmosphere created by the politique des auteurs, and particular 
readings of the phenomenology embedded in Italian neorealism, produced a new 
relationship between cinema and modern allegory, in the work of filmmakers like 
Jean-Lue Godard and Pier Paolo Pasolini. Godard, in particular, placed himself 
at the crossroads of the Bazinian-like phenomenological approach to images and 
the montage principle. He reworked the montage principle in terms of provocat­
ive pop effects created by the mixture of materials and styles - high and low, 
avant-garde and kitsch. Giving' emphasis to voice over commentary, written texts 
on the screen, and documentary-like interviews, he created a new relationship 
between the verbal and the visual in cinema, whereby ironic anti-illusionist 
commentaries interact with continuous narration or naturalist drama. Intertexu­
ality, a taste for quotations and for the disruptions of conventional cinematic 
procedures, made each of his films a critical essay on cinema, a conceptual work 
that embodied the views of the leftist filmmaker convinced that a socially critical 
cinema could only begin with an aesthetic critique of cinema itself. Through this 
deconstructive dimension, Godard's work produced a variety of allegories of 
cinema, giving more emphasis to a disjunctive "vertical montage" in which 
sound and image collide to produce those estrangement effects associated with 
Brecht. The filmmaker indeed borrowed some reflexive strategies from the 
German playwright, but Godard also searched for new methods of reflexivity 
typical of the 1960s, a period in which the atmosphere created by Pop Art and the 
challenges brought by the new stages of modernization engendered a peculiar 
taste for quotations, usually taken as a compromise between a critical and a 
sympathetic view toward industrialized culture and kitsch. Godard's style, with 
its mixture of different materials - film genres, high and low culture, narrative 
and conceptual discourse - displays, on another register, the same tension found 
in Eisenstein. IIis dialectics of fragmentation and totalization is again a way of 
dealing with a historical time. Now the sense of fragmentation comes from the 
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use of collage, the mixing of narrative genres and materials, while the sense of 
totalization results from the series of ironical allusions to French contradictions at 
the time of the consolidation of a consumer society in Europe. Those allusions 
give shape to a general diagnosis of his time that emerges from the collection of 
brief commentaries. In this sense, his cinema forms a kind of parallel discourse 
when examined in connection with Roland Barthes's constellation of short essays 
on mass-media mythology (Barthes 1957). 
In the US, the emergence of an oppositional film culture that reworked the 
spirit of the historical avant-garde from the 1920s established, beginning in the 
late 1940s, a new context for alleg'orical works in the post-Benjaminian modern 
sense. An independent film production, more decisively eng'aged in the devel­
opment of cinema as an art form, started a new dialogue with painters, sculptors, 
and poets, as had already occurred in the 1920s work of Germaine Dulac, Jean 
Epstein, Luis Buiiuel, and Sergei Eisenstein. A succession of experiments - that 
began with Maya Deren films and developed in a variety of directions - made 
cinema share the vicissitudes of high modernism in its last stages of development. 
The American underground cinema, although multiple in style and concerns, has 
always involved a gesture of interrogation addressed to cinema as an institution 
and an art form (sec James 1989). 
4 National Allegory 
Allegory, when viewed as an expression of a modern sensibility, moves away from 
its traditional image as conventional art concerned with pedag'ogical effects. It 
becomes a sign of a new consciousness of history where the appeal to analogies 
and to a vivid memory of the past is now taken not as the celebration of an 
identity connecting past and present, but as an experience able to teach us that 
repetition is always an illusion, and that old facts, like old signs, lose their 
"original" meaning when looked at from a new perspective. Seen from our 
present experience, allegories make evident their vocation to express the central 
role played by time in culture and in individual lives. For Paul de Man (1969), 
they form a kind of "rhetoric of temporality," when the impulse to memorize and 
identify with a previous moment (of history, of a personal life) ends up commu­
nicating the sense of crisis and separation from the irretrievable past. 
While the modern view that associates allegory with an acute consciousness of 
time is significant in aesthetic theory today, there is more to say about the role 
played by allegory in our century. First, there is the question of spatiality. The 
process of economic expansion of globalized markets has been producing a 
compression of space and time that affects everyone, and it becomes more 
difficult to have a sense of one's own experience when one keeps looking at the 
real world on a local basis. Personal stories become deeply connected with large­
scale social processes that transcend individual perception, establishing clear 
limits for any narrative concerned with the linear development of a life story in 
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its continuity guaranteed by a circumscribed person-to-person interaction and a 
stable environment. The logic of lived experience has become more abstract, and 
modes of representation based on juxtapositions, discontinuities, and large-scale 
and invisible networks seem to be more able to grasp the logic of a personal action 
and its social destiny. In light of these changes, Fredric Jameson has proposed 
new developments within the Marxist tradition concerned with modes of repre­
sentation, in order to grasp the social process in its totality at a g'iven moment of 
history. For him, one needs to "historicize" the question of realism, acknow­
ledging that the canonical forms of realism engendered in the nineteenth century 
could not accomplish that same illuminating function today; the social reality that 
they were able to account for was, in its internal logic, quite different fi'om 
present society, belonging to a different stage of capitalist development. The new 
configuration of space and time and the more abstract nature of the social process 
in postmodern times reveal the realist form as unable to account for totality, 
creating the demand for new art forms able to offer not so much a representation 
in the classic sense, but rather a lucid "cognitive mapping" to help us understand 
society and our position within it (1991: 51-2). In his view, the challenges 
brought by postmodernity call for a revision of the entire question of allegory, 
and of its dialectics of fi'agmentation and (perhaps now impossible) totalization. 
One of the challenges brought by the contemporary scene is its destabilization 
of otherwise consolidated political and aesthetic categories, like that of the nation, 
together with its correlates: national culture and national literature, art, or 
cinema. Nationalism had its most powerful moment in Europe and in the US 
in the first half of the twentieth century; from the post-World War II period to 
the early 1970s it became more directly associated with Third-World countries 
and their struggle for liberation (see Hobsbawm 1990). "The Nation," as a 
problematic, constantly reworked category, has had its vicissitudes in recent 
times, but national allegories continue to be present in our contemporary 
scene, although in new forms that express the ways that the new configurations 
of space, time, economic exchange, and political power have created a sense of 
crisis in this terrain. This is made evident in films that try to reach encompassing 
views of contemporary experience or of politics in certain regions throug'h overt 
allegorical strategies. Here one might mention films like Underground (1995) by 
Emir Kusturika, U(ysses' Dream by Theo Angelopoulos, the Kieslovski trilogy 
that refers to the three colors of the French flag (Blue, White, Red) as related to 
the three emblematic values of the French Revolution (Liberty, Equality, Fra­
ternity), The Age of the Earth (1980) by Glauber Rocha, and EI viaje (1991) by 
Fernando Solanas. The list could also include numerous national allegories made 
in Hollywood, from the Oliver Stone films to Short Cuts (1993) by Robert 
Altman, Wag the Dog, and Primary Colors, films that express a tense relationship 
to myths that, in the past, reinforced a certain self-image of the United States. 
They present different points of view, more or less critical of the status quo, but 
all reveal how a general perception of the nation is crucial for a thematization not 
only of clearly political issues but also of private lifestyles. 
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The persistence of national allegory and its significant presence in our times 
suggest its force within the realm of representation even when the national 
question has lost its centrality. Recapitulating specific moments of film history 
in which nationalism had a stronger hand in the shaping of filmic texts, I would 
now like to explore the way in which narratives oriented by a teleological frame­
work found in the category of the nation a privileged sphere within whieh they 
could operate effectively. A retrospective look at film production in the twentieth 
century reveals how more conventional modes of allegorical practice made a 
resurg'ence as the idea of nation came to replace religious doctrine in the creation 
of discursive frameworks and teleologies. 
Specific trends of modernity since the late eighteenth century, nation and 
nationalism, as forces shaping representation, motivated and, at the same time, 
were produced by many narrations that became canonical texts within the 
allegorical tradition, first in the literary realm, later in film. As historians and 
political scientists have taught us, the nation is not a substance, nor a natural way 
of subsuming a conglomerate of people under the same category. It is a product of 
modernity, of market culture and industrialization, a social construct able to 
create a sense of totalization, a cohesive collective entity that refers to hetero­
geneous groups belonging to a complex society at a time when any single 
homog'eneous community of experience is out of reach. 
Benedict Anderson's (1983) idea of the nation as "imagined community" 
clarifies how the nation can be seen as a substitute for religion and other unifying 
principles related to the sense of a "cosmic order." But unlike the radical 
universality of the "eternal" order, the nation, in a more restricted historical 
scale, offers guiding principles that create a sense of totality able to establish a 
horizon to coordinate certain collective experiences in time, a horizon clearly 
manifested in problematic expressions like "national destiny" or "national char­
acter." As I pointed out earlier, "the nation," despite its secular roots in modern 
history, solicits personifications in fictional narratives, and other allegorical 
strategies as well, thus confirming its affinities with the sense of the sacred. 
Some of the debates mentioned in connection with allegory, myth, language, 
and religion emerge when we discuss the way in which historical or overtly 
fictional narratives treat the national question. This is especially relevant for film 
studies, due to the particular role cinema has been playing within the contem­
porary public sphere where the question of national identity has hardly disap­
peared. 
Film as a popular medium emerged at a time in which nationalism was one of 
the forces shaping history in Europe and in the Americas, and film history in the 
first half of this century was intimately connected with the competition among 
national powers. Cinema took part in the expression of national rivalries in 
Europe and in the construction of American hegemony after World War I, a 
process that consolidated the United States' domination of Latin America and 
other "underdeveloped" regions of the globe. Given this historical context, film 
production - like the industrial fairs and the crystal palaces of the nineteenth 
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century - became one more forum for the exhibition of national values and 
technical achievements within the international arena. Film itself became an 
index of modernization and power, so that different countries saw their efforts 
to improve their cinema as a privileg-cd strategy of national affirmation and, at 
times, as a celebration of hegemony. That strategy would find its ultimate 
fulfillment in cases where the subject of the film was national history itself or a 
disguised representation of a "national vocation" to conduct or to save human­
kind in a time of crisis. 
The close connection between film and politics was obviously a central issue 
after the Bolshevik revolution and the official Soviet rhetoric affirming the 
centrality of the cinema. But in fact politics and strong' national concerns have 
made their presence felt in film history since the very beginning of the century, 
paving' the way for the strong political impact produced by a single film in a 
national context: The Birth ola Nation, Griffith's racist film released in 1915. 
The film provides a striking example of how film narrative and rhetoric was then 
deployed to develop an argument about American history, a theory of war and a 
theory of the natural role reserved for the different ethnic gTOUpS in American 
society. Griffith's allegory offers a lesson in the deployment of personification 
within a melodramatic and Manichean value system. His subsequent film Intol­
erance (1916), by far more complex and more interesting, again mobilized certain 
universal principles supposed to govern human history, building a historical 
teleology in which a trajectory of centuries was sugg'ested as a succession of 
different "stages" that prepared for the emergence and consolidation of the 
United States in modern times as the privileged expression of God's plan, the 
nation that materializes the basic principles that will guarantee human salvation 
in the future. In Intolerance, Providence is taken as the guiding principle, as the 
spiritual force is made visible through different forms of typological relationships 
that connect different characters living in distant historical times. The Christian 
Passion and the paradigm of blessed motherhood as the natural vocation for all 
virtuous women are placed at the center of the intertwining' of the four parallel 
narratives that unfold the Great Design of history: the Fall of Babylon in ancient 
times, the Passion, the Saint Bartholomew's Day Massacre in sixteenth-century 
France, and the vicissitudes of a young couple in the modern United States. 5 
During the course of film history other teleological designs place a nation at 
the center of the historical process. Eisenstein's October (1927), a film made to 
celebrate the tenth anniversary of the Bolshevik revolution, confirmed the sense 
of history as teleology but tried to displace its basic principle, contesting the 
hegemonic role played by the categ'ory of nation. Here the central category was 
that of the proletarian state, and class consciousness replaced national values as 
the unifying force of people in modernity. Instead of Providence as the covert 
force to guide the unfolding of the revolutionary teleology, Eisenstein proposed 
the idea of Reason as embodied by the revolutionary leadership, and his recapit­
ulation of the events ofl917 gave more room for the theory of revolution than for 
any other aspect of the conquest of the Winter Palace. 
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This highly intellectualized sense of history, culture, and film language created 
severe political tcnsions bctween the filmmaker and a Soviet power suspicious of 
the film's modernist aesthetics and its understanding of political allegory. Eisen­
stein's film is an intercsting example of the dialectics of fragmentation and 
totalization, continuity and discontinuity, typical of modern allegories, a feature 
dctectable in other films, ineluding Intolerance, as Miriam Hansen (1991) has 
demonstrated. Apart from her discussions of the role of Motherhood as a central 
moral forcc in the film, Hansen underlines the proccss by which Griffith's 
concern with emblems and iconography, expresscd in his emphatic use of 
tableau-likc compositions and extcnded visual commentaries throughout the 
film, collides with his concern with flucnt and accelerated narrative, creating a 
dialectics of continuity and discontinuity in the texture of the film. Intolerance, 
with all its awkward passages, is a good example of this mixture of an impulse 
toward naturalism (and elassical decoupage) and an impulse toward allegorical 
constructions based on the "graphic isolation" of images. Hansen's analysis 
suggests how the development of film narrative in its formative period involvcd 
something more than the acquisition of skills related to the construction of a 
naturalist space---time structure, verisimilar action, and psychology. At that time, 
as later in film history, narratives to be read required specific cultural codes, as 
well as logical expertise. Among those cultural codes, one finds "foundational 
narratives," like the Bible or more specific cultural artifacts that account for a 
national past and its values. 
Sometimes a central love-story involves a couple whosc struggle and final 
blessed union form an allegorical allusion to a national destiny as viewed from a 
restricted pcrspective, as occurs not only in Griffith films but also in many John 
Ford westerns. Observing a film like The Searchers (1956), we cannot fully grasp 
the meaning of particular actions performed by its central characters without 
referring their experience to the foundational narrative of the conquest of the US 
West. This particular Ford film is an allegory which emphasizes the territorial 
expansion of the American nation state, as represented on the screen by the 
gradual occupation of the diegetic space by the US Army. This is seen as an 
institutional force that brings the consolidation oflaw and regular family life aftcr 
a time of instability and violence. As in other westerns, one finds here the elegiac 
celebration of the legendary hero - in this case, Ethan Qohn Wayne), a typically 
transitional figure for whom the pacification of the territory means his melan­
cholic "retirement" and his sense of being out of place in that very order he has 
helped to enforce. 
A variety of films from different countries provide interesting examples of the 
use of myth or traditional story lines to give shape to an experience lived in the 
present or even in the future. The genre of science fiction is full of allegorical 
references of a national kind. Metropolis, made by Fritz Lang in 1927, was one of 
the first major examples of a complex network of past references informing a 
fictional story that takes place in the future yet refers to the present. The story of 
the young son of the Master who commands the allegorical city brings with it all 
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kinds of Christian paradigms, combined with a gray view of technological society. 
Its environment exhibits high technology, skyscrapers, machines, robotized 
workers, alienated life, dehumanization - in short, a nightmarish view of indus­
trial society. Nevertheless, as the story develops we encounter fragments of a 
g'othic battle between Good and Evil, perverse science against pure feelings, the 
pure young virgin against the femme fatale, father against son. The melodramatic 
texture of actions and characters turns the critique of the dehumanization of 
society into a celebration of the role of a Messiah as the messenger of Love. Here 
again mythical paradigms shape both story line and iconography, suggesting the 
connections between Nletropolis and specifically German forms of Christian piety 
which also played a role in German modern nationalism (see Greenfeld 1992: 
278-309). 
If formal analysis helps to characterize allegorical structures and identify their 
narrative or iconographical sources, one needs to go further and ask about the 
meaning that those narrative paradigms and traditional imagery acquire when 
incorporated by a film: that is to say, we have to understand the film as situated in 
its own time, the ways it can be taken as an allegory referring to the specific 
political juncture from which it arose. Here, our question converges with the 
kind of inquiry usually addressed to historical films which, while they represent 
the past, are taken as a disguised comment on the present. I refer to those 
narratives that can be seen as "pragmatic allegories," those in which the under­
lined analogies between past and present are taken as a piece of rhetoric, a form of 
raising a question about the present using the past, given that the episode 
focussed on by the film had similar issues at its center. In Jean Renoir's La 
Marseillaise (1936), the representation of specific episodes of the French Revolu­
tion was taken as a form of asserting the position of the Popular Front in 1930s 
France; Andrej Wajda's Danton (1982) takes the same historical event as a pretext 
to discuss Polish politics of the 1980s; and Ken Loach's Land and Freedom (1995) 
takes the Spanish Civil War of the 1930s to present an allegorical representation 
of the filmmaker's large-scale view of the shape of European history in the 
twentieth century. 
Apart from these pragmatic allegories, there are cases where the analogies 
linking past and present are more than merely pedagogical references, and the 
film gets closer to a radically conscious figural realism of the Christian kind 
(Auerbach), reworking typological relationships as confirmations of the sacred 
truth embodied in historical facts that unfold the Grand Design administered by 
Providence. I have already mentioned Griffith's Intolerance as a major example of 
this, but Intolerance, Metropolis, and October arc also suggestive examples of the 
construction of historical allegories where magnified visual spectacle serves as a 
kind of animated national monument or tableau vivant. The mobilization of 
material resources, technical skills, and the proverbial "cast of thousands" 
could be exhibited as a sign of a nation's (or of a social regime's) strength and 
legitimacy. They form instances of a self-conscious representation of a nation's 
role within the international order or, even more broadly, in universal history. 
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From the period of silent movies, Abel Gance's Napoleon (1928) in this sense 
forms a national allegory that celebrated on a monumental scale the glorious 
times of the French hegoemony in Europe, praising' the national spirit and its 
vocation to lead humanity toward a better future. Produced in France, the US, 
Germany, and the Soviet Union - that is to say, by the major forces of Western 
history at that point (with the exception of England) - these filmic monuments 
form a suggestive quartet related to the exacerbated nationalism of the early 
twentieth century. Political rivalries among the nation states (or the socialist 
confederation) had an impact on film history, as they would again in the 1930s, 
when the nationalist monument took the form of Riefenstahl's Triumph of the 
Will (1934), Eisenstein's Alexander Nevsky (1938), and Victor Fleming's Gone 
with the Wind (1939). 
More recently in film history, Latin America, Asia, Eastern Europe, and 
Africa became privileged areas for the production of films concerned with the 
way in which social problems and power struggles can be shaped by particular 
national contexts. From the 1960s on, the rise of different national cinemas made 
Third-World film culture a new source of allegorical strategies of representation. 
At times, as in Sembene's case, historical films with allcgorical overtones, like 
Ceddo, formed part of a discussion of national politics and culture that included 
reflection on the complex question of building a national cinema in adverse 
conditions (Rosen 1993). In Latin America, Brazilian Cinema Novo, "Third 
Cinema" from Argentina, and the Cuban post-revolutionary cinema from the 
1960s took national destiny as a central theme. A concern with social issues such 
as poverty, labor exploitation, oligarchy, and foreign domination brought a new 
point of view on modern history, in opposition to the Eurocentric perspective 
usually expressed by North-American and European cinema. The decolonization 
in Asia and Africa, the anti-imperialist consciousness raised in Latin America, 
and the Cuban and Algerian revolutions all created a sense of a dynamic historical 
change issuing from the "peripheral" countries, all of which foregrounded the 
cinema as an instance of the affirmation of emerging national values, a key factor 
in the construction of national identity (at least before television began to play 
this role in the context of mass culture from the 1970s on). 
The 1960s and early 1970s were a time of intense political debate, and film 
production became politicized as never before. The ideological atmosphere 
favored global critiques and a "state of the nation" discourse. The idea of 
revolution as national liberation fostered the creation of political films that 
focussed on past events to find examples of struggle and change with suggestive 
resonances for the present political movements. Here we find "pragmatic alle­
gories" based on analogies aimed at raising class consciousness and a willingness 
to participate in the national struggle for liberation. The reflection on history is 
found in Manoel Octavio Gomez's The First Charge of the Machete (1969), a 
Cuban film that reenacts an episode of the struggle against the Spaniards in the 
nineteenth century in order to assert a post-revolutionary view of Cuban history. 
A film which also uses past events to comment on a current revolution (in 
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Arg'entina) is Hector Oliveira's Rebellion in Patagonia (1972), just as Miguel 
Littin's The Promised Land (1972) narrates an earlier episode of popular strug'g'le 
as a way of raising some questions about popular unity, the politics of Salvador 
Allende's government in Chile. Inspired by Brecht, a bitter recapitulation of the 
past was performed in the Brazilian film, The Conspirators (1972), made by 
Joaquim Pedro de Andrade. The director questions the behavior of the intellect­
uals who led a famous rebellion against the Portuguese colonizers in 1789 in order 
to launch a delicate debate on intellectuals, armed struggle, and the guerrilla 
warfare that was taking place in Brazil at the time of the film. 
Reworking the tradition of what Carlos Monsivais calls "the cinema of the 
Mexican Revolution," Paul Leduc directed Reed: Insurgent Mexico (1971), intro­
ducing the documentary-like strategies of modern cinema in a film that placed 
the question of the Mexican national character in a new perspective (see Para­
nagua 1995: 117~27). Leduc discards the kind of national allegory that, since the 
1930s and 1940s, had turned the early-century revolution and values into a folk 
show (Carlos Monsivais's term). Here we are far from the monumental, specta­
cular version of that crucial historical event in Latin America, an event that 
created special conditions for the affirmation of a national imagery before that 
kind of celebration of national-popular values could have a similar presence in 
other countries of Latin America. The experience of Mexican cinema with 
national allegory, by its force and specific role in society, has been unique in 
the continent, as one sees in its major emblem, the monumentally pictorial 
melodramas directed by Emilio Fernandez and photographed by Gabriel Fig­
ueiroa in the 1940s and 1950s. 
Although outstanding female stars like Dolores Rios were the basis of their 
commercial success, Emilio Fernandez's films gave continuity to a reformist 
patriarchal view that celebrated the traditional roles played by men and women 
who personified the positive values of the nation. Latin-American cinema had to 
wait until the 1960s to promote woman to a central and transgressive role, 
understood as a condensed representation of national history. In different c01-In-­
tries, historical films or quasi-documentary representations of present conjunct­
ures adopted allegorical strategies, placing the female protagonist as a 
personification of the national predicaments or hopes within the historical 
process. The Cuban cinema developed even more intensively this kind of 
national allegory, as Marvin D'Lugo suggests (1993). The best synthesis of that 
tradition is Humberto Solas's Lucia (1968), made at a period of rich aesthetic 
debate and film production in Cuba. Solas's work presents a very original 
structure based on the alleg'orical juxtaposition of three stories made in different 
moments of Cuban history: the time of the struggle for political independence 
from Spain in the nineteenth century, the time of a frustrated attempt to radically 
change the country by liberating it from a right-wing dictatorship in the 1930s, 
and the time of ideological change and new proposals on gender relationships that 
opposed the macho tradition in the post-revolutionary 1960s. Adopting in each 
episode a filmic style adequate to the tone of the historical time and the specific 
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conditions of female mentality in Cuba, Lucia gives us a lesson on how to use film 
style allegorically in order to make statements about the country's political 
history. "Lucia is not a film about a woman; it is a film about society. But within 
that society, I chose the most vulnerable character, the one who is most trans­
parently affected at any given moment by contradictions and change" - this 
statement by Humberto Solas (quoted in D'Lugo 1993: 279) is very similar to 
Fassbinder's explanation of his strategy in The Marriage a/Maria Braun (1979), a 
film where the construction of the female protagonist as the personification of 
German experience in the post-war period invited a sense of irony also produced 
by style and acting, as one also sees in Lucia. 
Apart from Cuba, and its women characters as personifications, one can 
mention other examples of the treatment of female characters as national alle­
gories in modern Latin-American cinema. Bodansky and Senna's Jracema (1974) 
focusses on the prcdatory dimension of the expansion of economic activities in 
the Brazilian Amazon, and centers its analysis in the pathetic and representative 
story of a young native female who is destroyed by her contact with people 
coming from Southern Brazil at the time of the construction of the transamazon­
ian highway. The Official Version (1985), madc by Carlos Pucnzo in Argentina, 
adopts a melodramatic tonc in its discussion of the kidnapping of children born 
inside the dictatorship's camps of torture and execution. The female protagonist 
condcnses, in hcr own experience and in her "will to know" thc truth, the 
experience of Argentinian society after the 1983 redemocratization occurred. 
The film places family affairs at the centcr of a humanist approach to the political 
question, and thus Puenzo inscribes his film within a long and diversified 
tradition of mclodramas that work out social questions, taking a nuclear family 
as the exemplary microcosm that condenses the entire nation. This was typical in 
the American classical cinema, as onc can see in Griffith, King Vidor, John Ford 
(remember Young Mr. Lincoln among others), Frank Capra, and Douglas Sirk, 
and in Italian cinema, from Visconti films, especially in cases like Rocco and His 
Brothers (1960), or the Taviani Brothers' films, such as Good Morning Bal~ylon 
(1987). The modern Latin-Amcrican cinema also explored this kind ofallegorical 
strategy, whether in Mexico in films like Arturo Ripstein's The Castle ofPurity 
(1972), or in Brazil in films like Arnaldo Jabor's ft's All Right (1972). The 
Ripstein and Jabor films form typical examples of the construction of the Family 
House as an allegorical space representing the nation, in narratives that take place 
almost entirely within four walls, creating a sense of claustrophobia that is unlike 
allegories' political conjuncture of the nation. 
In opposition to this kind ofallegory based on confinement and family dramas, a 
great number of national allegories in Latin America are based on picaresque 
percgrinations, or on the experience of exile, or on the migration caused by 
famines or chronic poverty. They explore the social experience of a continent 
whose modern history has been shaped by immigration and migration since the 
beginning of the European colonial enterprise. The displacement of human 
beings, the experience of the frontier, the building ofnew cities and the occupation 
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ofland has been an emblem throughout the Americas, and film production almost 
inevitably takes advantage of this historical background. Hollywood, for its part, 
produced the western, with its "Manifest Destiny" ideology. And in Latin 
America, a variety of social dramas featured migrating people observed as though 
reenacting a frustrated version of the search for the Supreme Good, or Eldorado. 
In opposition to the North-American popular fiction, the theme of the promised 
land has not been treated in euphoric and epic ways (a prerogative of the winners), 
either in the Amazon - see Oswaldo Caldeira's Ajuricaba: The Rebel ofthe Amazon 
(1977) and Gustavo Dahl's Uira: An Indian in Search ofGod (1972) - or in Mexico 
- see Cabeza de vaca (1990) by Nicolas Echevarria - or in the entire continent in a 
journey started in Patagonia - see Fernando Solanas's El viaje (1991). 
Authoritarian regimes, censorship, and repression produced a specific motiva­
tion for journeys that inspired allegorical representations in which exiled people 
take the experience of separation from home and the new conditions of life to 
reflect upon their native land and on their national history and character. 
Solanas's Tangos: The Exile of Garde! (1985) is the most typical example of this 
kind of fiction in Latin America, and Tarkovsky's Earth is a well-known example 
in Europe. 
The films testify to the significant presence of national allegory in modern and 
contemporary cinema. Although set in a changing' world and increasingly cir­
cumscribed by a globalized market dynamics, allegories maintain their dramatic 
interest as operati ve totalities of reference for the fictional works engaged in the 
production of general statements about our historical moment. The presence of 
the category of the nation and the invitation to teleology that comes with it do not 
mean that all these national allegories can be inscribed in the more traditional 
type of figural totalization. Many of them are effectively engaged in reflecting on 
the crisis of the category of nation as a social and political framework, exhibiting 
most of the features of a modern fiction that problematizes its own status in the 
face of the real world, showing awareness of the limits of language and its 
discontinuity in relation to experience. No one definition of allegory can account 
for all the films under consideration, since artworks, even mass-mediated art­
works, have confirmed that protean nature of allegory pointed out by Angus 
Fletcher. 
The malleability of this mode of representation has been made more than 
evident throughout film history. Cinema, because it came late and could assim­
ilate an enormous repertory of forms and themes, has been able to resume, in a 
few decades and at an accelerated pace, certain processes of change that, in other 
art forms, took centuries to develop. Even in a single decade or in a single 
country, one can follow the gradual change in the allegorical strategies that 
confirm this strong dialogue with the tradition and with the ruptures of modern 
times. The example of modernist Brazilian cinema illustrates this diversity, since 
a whole set of political and cultural motives engendered, in that specific national 
context, a rich collection of national allegories which set up an interesting play of 
intertextual relationships between 1964 and 1970. This happened partly because 
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of the leading role played by Glauber Rocha (a major allegorist), partly because of 
political censorship, and partly due to the filmmakers' strong inclination to forge 
a synthesis, to produce a condensed and totalizing view of national history. 
Before the coup d'etat - therefore without the obstacles presented by political 
repression - an allegorical narrative expressed revolutionary hopes and used 
history to legitimize violence as a valid instrument within class struggle: Rocha's 
Black God White Devil (1963-4) placed the process of national liberation at the 
center of an ambiguous allegory, allowing for a condensed representation of 
society in a single story able to articulate issues concerning the entire nation. 
Here we have a canonical example of figural realism, or typological allegory, in 
cinema, with its teleological view of history. With this film on the changes in the 
political life of the country, from the early 1960s to the mid-1970s, there was a 
correlated process of transformation in the allegorical design of the narratives. 
After this first allegory of hope, the 1964 military coup d'etat placed the leftist 
filmmakers in a difficult position, obliging them to perform historical revisions 
and a kind of autocritical recapitulation of the recent past which found its best 
translation in the baroque drama of disenchantment made by Rocha in 1967, 
Land in Anguish. The most celebrated political allegory made in Brazil, this film 
presented a hard critique of populist illusions and of the Christian-like teleolo­
gical schemes incorporated by leftist thought in Latin America. Other develop­
ments included a satirical approach to the crisis of patriarchal values caused by 
accelerated modernization, such as in Red Light Bandit (1968) by Rogcrio 
Sganzerla, where allegory as collage emerged in Brazilian cinema, featuring the 
juxtaposition of fragments borrowed from other texts. Macunaima, made by 
Joaquim Pedro de Andrade in 1969, took an ironic view of the traditional 
question of a "national character" that had engaged Brazilians since the nine­
teenth century. The film connects the account of the adventures of Macunaima, 
the central personification in the film, with the ideological debate on the lack of 
political consciousness among the Brazilian people in the late 1960s. Finally, in 
the same year of 1969, a deconstructive turn addressed to old nationalist con­
structs engendered films like Killed the Family and Went to the Movies (1969) by 
Jl:l1io Bressane and Bang Bang (1970) by Andrea Tonacci, examples of an anti­
teleology in which allegory performs a radical critique of narrative itself. 
As a rule valid for different national contexts, allegorical representations in 
films have charged significantly in the 1980s and '90s, revealing' the intimate 
connections between forms of representation and specific social conjunctures. 
Filmmakers from different continents now share a common historical ground 
that, in spite of all difficulties, challenges them to express encompassing views of 
the contemporary scene that engenders allegories. These end up revealing their 
contemporary appeal as the language of crisis, satisfying the demands presented 
by dramas that are typical in periods of transition and accelerated technical­
economic changes which enforce people to revise their views of identity and 
shared values. Recent films made in Eastern Europe express the labyrinth of 
political ideologies and national identities that shape the contemporary history in 
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areas that, being at the crossroads of collective migrations and economic stagna­
tion, suffer from a chronic instability, as in the films of Kusturika and Angelo­
poulos. 
From the 1980s on, the new debates related to a visible increase in the speed of 
exchange in the world market, the continuous displacement of people in search of 
jobs despite the big-power control of borders, and the compression of space-time 
created by high technology have engendered new challenges for narrative prac­
tices and visual representations of human experience. And there has been a 
symptomatic increase of migrating characters and cross-border love affairs (and 
friendships) on the screen. A new trend of story lines involving multi-national 
encounters of protagonists who belong to distant cultures but are led to an 
unexpected interaction, most of the time of a clearly private nature, is one of 
the main reasons for the impact created by contemporary international co­
productions that engage different European countries and for the high market 
value of recent films made by Wim Wenders, who came to specialize in "plane­
tary allegories" which run from Eastern Europe to Australia, crossing America, 
Japan, and Portugal. A Third-World film like the Macedonian Bej(m the Rain 
can take some charm from its fresh landscape and scenes involving the local 
population, but there is also the allegorical dimension related to its sense of 
international connections created by the love affair between the photographer 
and the English woman. 
5 Coda: Allegory in History 
Allegories, as I suggested earlier, often emerge from controversies, conflicts of 
interpretation, confrontations related to struggles for hegemony in a world in 
which the shock of cultures and the network of material interests and symbolic 
systems tend to produce instability in people's lives. Although not an effective 
mode of representation when reduced to conventional pedagogical functions, 
allegory has acquired a new meaning in modernity - more related to the expres­
sion of social crisis and the transient nature of values, with special emphasis given 
to its connection with the sense of the fragmentation, discontinuity, and abstrac­
tion provided by compression of space and time in our contemporary technolo­
gical world. So allegory is bound to reemerge today as an ingredient of the "spirit 
of the time," a privileged signifying practice that brings to light all the ambi­
guities related to national identity and interests, or related to an omnipresent 
mediasphere shaping' our everyday life. 
Here, I have emphasized the ways in which allegory, as a mode of representa­
tion (or a mode of expressing' the crisis of representation), remains inscribed in 
the very dynamics of our time. And I would like to conclude by observing how 
the relevance of allegory in film studies does not come only from the actual 
conditions that surround film practice in recent years. Film studies - history and 
theory - will always have to deal with the question of figuration. In other words, 
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how are certain conceptions of human experience in time or an encompassing 
view of history presented in a condensed way, sometimes requiring personifica­
tions, sometimes requiring an appeal to juxtapositions or to the montage prin­
ciple left as a legacy by the historical avant-gardes? 
Film criticism needs to explain the structure and identify the sources of a given 
allegorical design (given models, iconographies, narrative patterns), and should 
also be able to perform a historical analysis that would explain what the powers of 
those paradigms and iconographies are and what they mean within that specific 
context, given the social conjuncture into which the film is inserted. The 
clarification of the notion of allegory and the scholarly research on its history 
help to clarify the way in which a film can intervene in cultural and political 
debates. I have referred many times to the ambiguity of the idea of nation, and the 
new essays on the subject make clear the connection of this political category with 
historical narratives ~ and, I would add, with allegorical narratives. For anyone 
concerned with the dangers of globalized systems of domination that monopolize 
information and interpretation, or for anyone who lives under particular author­
itarian regimes inspired by an exacerbated nationalism rooted in secular or 
religious doctrines, the clarification of the structure and sense of allegory in 
modern times is helpful in the struggle against various kinds of mythical reduc­
tion and false totalization, especially those leading toward fascism. The dynamics 
of allegory, with its typical dialectics of fragmentation and totalization, is far from 
a closed system; rather it is a signifying practice deeply involved in, and formally 
permeable to, the vicissitudes of historical change. 
l'Jotes 
For allegorical strategies and projects of colonial and neocolonial domination, see 
Shohat and Stam 1994, especially the chapter "Tropes of Empire" (137-77). 
2 Danton, made by Andrej Wajda in 1982, is a clear example of the use of the back­
ground provided by the French Revolution to discuss present-day politics in Poland 
and Eastern Europe. The debate on Young A1r. Lincoln launched by the critics of the 
Cahiers du cinema in the 1970s involved a dispute about the film's allegorical refer­
ences to the 1930s political scene in the US. For other examples, see Burgoyne 1997. 
3 In the case of Latin American literature, see Sommer 1993. 
4 Although apparently "deconstructive," Benjamin's formulation has a different sense 
more connected to his concern for theological questions. 
5 For an analysis of Intolerance, see Hansen 1991: 127-241. 
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CHAPTER NINETEEN
 
Every Picture 1"'ells a Story: Jose
 
Guadalupe Posada's Protocinem.atic
 
Graphic Art
 
Charles Ramirez Berg 
At its inception, cinema joined a larger, well-established representational system 
that included the fine arts (painting, sculpture, drawing, etching, engraving, 
print-making) and the popular media (photographs and illustrations in news­
papers, pictorial magazines, advertisements, slideshows, dime novels, posters, 
handbills, and broadsides). Though there have been some studies of the recipro­
cal influences of image media and the beginnings of First-World moving pic­
tures, l no one has made more than a passing comment on these mediated cross­
fertilizations in Mexico's early cinematic history.2 To address this under­
researched topic, I want to look at the illustrations of the prodigious penny 
press in M.exico, and particularly at the work of its greatest artist, Jose Guadalupe 
Posada (1852-1913). I am specifically looking for the pictorial and compositional 
techniques Posada developed that would eventually find their way into classical 
cinematic narrative practice in Mexico. 
For those seeking to understand the transition in Mexico from static to 
moving-image narrative, Posada is a pivotal figure. In his own way, he was as 
important to the unfolding of Mexican cinema as Winsor McCay and his comics 
were to the early development of US film. To begin with, there is the length and 
breadth of his career. The prolific Posada was an illustrator for more than 40 
years, from the pre-cinematic era (he began illustrating in Leon in the 1870s and 
moved to Mexico City around 1887) until well into Mexico's initial documentary 
film stage (roughly 1896-1916). Moreover, his etchings and engravings encom­
passed an extremely broad range of subjects, from religious portraits to carefully 
drafted views of Mexico City to depictions of news events, satirical ca/avera 
(skeleton) drawings, and miracles. 
Furthermore, Posada produced an imposing number of images. By the turn of 
the century, the penny press was the most popular image medium in the country, 
and Posada was its master graphic artist. In documenting Mexican life, legend, 
and folklore, he created thousands of images (most estimates have put the total at 
between 15,000 and 20,000, though the actual number will never be known3) in 
various media: woodcuts, type-metal engravings, and zinc relief etchings (Tyler 
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1979: 5-6). These were published in popular journalistic forms -- broadsides and 
chapbooks - that "had virtually disappeared in Europe and the United States" 
(Elliott 1980: 11). It seems reasonable to assume that popular imagery affected 
the development of cinematic representation, and in its formative years Mexican 
cinema coexisted with a rich, evocative, and markedly distinct pool of images. 
Therefore a third important reason for studying Posada's work in the cinematic 
context is that at the turn of the century the common image-containing media 
available in Mexico were very different from those in the First World. 
Yet another reason is the built-in kinship between journalism and early 
Mexican cinema. From 1896, when the Lumieres' and Edison's representatives 
introduced moving pictures to the nation, until 1917, when Mexican filmmaking 
turned away from documentaries and embraced fiction films, the national cinema 
was predominantly documentary. The new medium was considered a branch of 
journalism and generally understood as a moving variant of illustrated magazines, 
which were gaining popularity in Mexico in the 1890s. Though at first these 
periodicals were exclusively foreign, Mexico's own production of such magazines 
began in 1895 with the publication of EI mundo ilustrado, which combined 
engravings, lithographs, and photographs (de los Reyes 1987: 22). In those 
early decades of cinema, Posada and Mexican filmmakers saw themselves --- and 
were seen by others - as essentially in the same business: reportage. Concept­
ually, then, the ties between the Mexican press and moving pictures were very 
close indeed. So much so that Antonio Vanegas Arroyo, the owner of the 
prominent penny press where Posada did most of his Mexico City work, was 
involved in the early history of film in Mexico (though it is not clear in exactly 
what capacity).4 
The purpose of this essay is to look at the linkages between Mexico's early 
cinema -- from the documentary films that dominated domestic screens from 
1896 to 1916 to the fiction films that came of age in the short span of time 
between 1917 and 1919 - and the array of journalistic images available at the 
time. My main goal is to demonstrate that, in the midst of Posada's prodigious 
output, he discovered, developed, synthesized, and consolidated representational 
techniques we would call "cinematic," techniques that would eventually be 
available for incorporation into the classical Mexican cinema, which for me 
begins with EI automovil gris (The Gray Automobile) in 1919. 
To do this I will focus on the dominant form of Mexican journalistic practice 
during this period: the ubiquitous penny press. From the 1890s to the rise of 
newspapers and other mass media in the 1920s, the penny press was the most 
widespread, accessible source of images for the Mexican public. In Mexico City 
in the 1890s, for example, at least 18 such presses were in operation, and from 
1900 well into the 191Os, a period considered the heyday of the medium, there 
were more than 40 (Tyler 1979: 300--2 app. 2, 3). During this time, these presses 
mass-produced countless one-sheet broadsides and small newspapers, with 
press runs in the hundreds or thousands and sometimes in the millions. 5 
These were sold by agents, newsboys, and hawkers for one or two centavos6 
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"on street corners, in market places, at fairs, ranches and haciendas" (Gamboa 
1944: 16). In addition, these editorial houses printcd a number of other image­
containing items such as board g'ames, cookbooks, songbooks, storybooks, and 
chapbooks. 
This wily, fertile turn-of-the-century medium surely influenced the evolution 
of image narrative in general in Mexico, affecting films just as it must have been 
affected by them. By producing and watching both the penny-press illustrations 
and film images projected on the screens of the new cinemas springing up around 
the country, Mexican artists and filmmakers learned to use images to relate a tale. 
That is to say, through this intertextual stream of protocinematic images, Mex­
ican graphic artists and movie-makers acquired the skills of representational 
narration, a crucial step in the development of what became the classical Mexican 
film narrative, Simultaneously, audiences and readers learned to comprehend 
these carefully structured images as stories. 
1 Film as Journalism: Mexican Cinema's Documentary Stage 
(1896-1917) 
A key distinguishing feature of Mexican cinema is the fact that for its first 20 
years, from 1896 until 1916, Mexican film production was almost exclusively a 
documentary practice. In contrast, both European and North-American cinemas 
gravitated toward narrative much earlier: US films, for example, made the 
transition during the 1903-7 period (Thompson 1985: 159-60; see also Bowser 
1990; Musser 1990: ch. 11). And in the 191Os, while foreign films -- mainly 
French, Italian, and North American - commanded more and more attention 
from filmgoers in Mexico, the onset of the Mexican Revolution (1910-20) 
provided an impetus for Mexican documentary production to continue, as news­
reel footage brought events of the civil war to life for thousands of Mexican 
spectators. 
But the rush to capture current events was not the only reason that Mexican 
cinema remained almost entirely a documentary practice, despite the unrelenting 
trend toward narrative films in First-World cinema. First of all, Mexican doc­
umentaries were enormously popular. Second, they provided native filmmakers 
with a ready-made market niche. Third, documentaries were cheap to make and 
economical to market - entrepreneurs like Enrique Rosas and Salvador Toscano 
shot, edited, promoted, and exhibited their films in their own theaters (see de los 
Reyes 1987: 25--7). Fourth, they fed the desire of Mexicans to see themselves on 
the silver screen.7 
Fifth, from the 1870s, Mexico - through its intellectual and political leader­
ship - was under the sway of positivism. As promoted by Gabino Barreda, who 
transplanted the French philosophical movement to Mexico, positivism was a 
means of moving Mexico from anarchy to liberty. This belief was based on two 
assumptions: first, that economic evolution preceded political evolution (and 
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ultimately liberty), and second, that the proper means of achieving economic 
evolution was through order. Order, organization, a scientific approach to 
the nation's problems, and education of the masses were the cornerstones of 
Mexican positivism (see Romanell 1952: 29-53). "In that context," writes film 
historian Aurelio de los Reyes, "fiction cinema was rejected because of its 
potential to dupe the public: the cinema was a science and as such should show 
truths" (1995: 65). 
Finally, a nationalistic side-effect of positivism led artists in the last decades of 
the nineteenth century toward a celebration of the native and away from the 
imitation of foreign traditions. As part of this movement, the representational 
arts, from paintings to illustrations to photographs, were called upon to depict 
Mexico, its people, and its culture (de los Reyes 1987: 35-8). To the degree 
that cinema in Mexico was regarded as a science as well as an art (early 
comparisons likened it to etchings, painting, and theater [de los Reyes 1987: 
17-22]), it was clear that it should promote nationalism like the other repre­
sentational arts. Mexico's 20-year documentary-film stage, therefore, was not 
simply a case of arrested development, but rather the result of the convergence 
of complex technological, political, economic, philosophical, and nationalistic 
factors. 
The decline of the Mexican documentary came in 1915, when interest in 
nonfiction films waned significantly. By 1916, revolutionary documentaries -­
along with domestic documentaries in general - had all but disappeared from 
Mexican movie screens (de los Reyes 1983: 202). Shortly thereafter, in 1917, a 
small band of enterprising Mexican filmmakers initiated Mexico's first sustained 
fiction-film stage by producing story films. Only a fi'agmentary record of this 
early wave of narrative films survives, but it appears that they took two forms, 
one derivative and the other nationalistic.s Among the first were imitations of 
Italian melodramas, which were very popular in Mexico at the time. For exam­
ple, Mexico's first narrative feature, La luz (The Light, 1917), was a faithful 
reconstruction of the Italian film Il f(JUco (1915), which had enjoyed enormous 
success in Mexico in 1916. The five films starring the Mexican stage actress 
Mimi Derba and produced by documentarian Enrique Rosas in 1917 were also 
clearly under the spell of Italian melodramas. A second kind of film produced 
were "truly nationalistic" stories that would exhibit the landscape, folkways, and 
customs of Mexico (such as the first film version of Federico Gamboa's popular 
1904 Mexican novel Santa in 1918) (de los Reyes 1987: 68-72). 
This brief experimental-fiction stage culminated in the national cinema's first 
legitimate narrative blockbuster, the docudrama El automovil gris (produced by 
Enrique Rosas, directed by Rosas, Joaquin Coss, and Juan Canals de Homes). 
The film, originally released as a 12-part serial, now survives only in a two-hour 
version, having been reedited for a successful feature-length rerelease in the 
1930s. Nevertheless, it is so accomplished cinematically that it can be said to 
mark the beginning of the classical era in Mexican cinema that stretches to 1960 
(Berg' forthcoming). 
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2 Narrational Representation in Turn-of-the-Century Mexico 
As an image medium, cinema was subordinate to the penny presses upon its 
arrival in Mexico. And for more than two decades afterwards, cinema existed and 
competed within a spectrum ofpopular image-laden media- Mexico's represent­
ational discourse system. But I am not looking for causal links between penny­
press illustrations and cinema. Given the fact that of the 24 feature fiction films 
made in Mexico up to 1919, only a few remain, and that only about 1,000 Posada 
images of the many thousands he produced have survived, such an argument 
would be impossible to support. Nevertheless, I am intrigued by the intertextual 
evolution of image narration in both print and moving pictures in Mexico from 
the 1890s to the release of El autom6vil gris in 1919. I am seeking a better 
understanding of the dynamic, cross-pollinating' influences that must have 
flowed among the media as filmmakers, still photographers, and graphic artists 
alike worked toward a coherent narrational system by which images could clearly 
and efficiently relate a tale. Artists like Posada learned how to utilize images 
narratively and helped develop a representational syntax, some of which would 
eventually find its way into the classic Mexican cinema. Early mediated images 
such as Posada's - together with moving images from Mexican documentary 
films and foreign fiction and nonfiction movies - provided a foundation from 
which Mexican filmmakers learned to transmit comprehensible, coherent nar­
ratives. 
Before beginning my analysis, a word on the use of the term "narrative" when 
dealing with Posada. I use "narrative" in the Bordwellian sense, as "the activity 
of selecting, arranging, and rendering story material in order to achieve specific 
time-bound effects on a perceiver" (Bordwell 1985: xi). And although useful in 
categorizing the two general types of emerging early film, I deemphasize the 
nonfiction/fiction dichotomy when speaking of Posada's imagery because, by 
Bordwell's broad definition, all of his illustrations were narrations: that is, each 
drawing required him to select, arrange, and render story material- whether real 
or imagined - clearly, coherently, and emphatically, in order to provoke an 
interested response from a potential customer. 
3 Posada's Cinematic Techniques 
Surveying the work ofPosada, one notes several cinematic techniques that would 
become part of what is now called "film language." By "cinematic" I mean 
characteristics unique to moving pictures, techniques that could not be duplic­
ated by other media, that were not common practice in other media at the time, 
or that would be extremely difficult to achieve in other media. For example, 
when watching a play on a stage, a spectator is presented with the entire 
proscenium view. Cinema is able to capture that in a long shot (LS), and in 
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fact much of early cinema framed the action from such a front-row-center, 
proscenium vantage point. Later, however, cinema began to record closer shots 
via the medium shot (MS) and the close-up (CU). Providing- more detailed 
information with these shots is something cinema can do that stage drama cannot 
and is one example of a cinematic feature of the medium. Others include cinema's 
capturing of serial motion through still photographs, the manipulation of time 
and space via editing, various moving camera shots (pans, tilts, and tracks), and 
dissolves and fades between one scene and the next. 
Here, then, is a summary of Posada's cinematic pictorial techniques which 
would eventually be adopted into classical Mexican narrative film practice:9 
3.1 Nearer vantage point to provide partial-figure andlacial representations 
In film these would be called medium shots and close-ups. They became 
prevalent with the advent of analytical editing, one of the hallmarks of Holly­
wood's and the gTeater Western cinema's classical style. It involves breaking 
down the action of a scene into separate shots: LSs to establish the setting, MSs 
to place the subject within the context of its immediate environment, and CUs to 
provide a significant detail of the subject or action. Early on in Western cinema 
history, films were made up almost exclusively of frontal, proscenium-like, full­
figure LSs or medium long shots, and it was not until the mid-191Os that films 
began using a wider array of shots with any regularity. However, it appears that 
Posada created medium and dose-up imagoes of subjects frequently before they 
became standard cinematic practice. 
Figure 1 
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Figure 1, Gran fandango y Fancachela de todas las calaveras (Happy Dance and 
Wild Party ofthe Skeletolls, no date), gives an example of the frontal, proscenium 
style common to both illustrations and early cinema. The image is self-contained 
in that the entire scene is depicted, and the diegetic world - and the story - end at 
the image edge. Contrast it with figures 2 and 3, two of 13 images from the front 
and back pages of a two-sided broadside, Ulla calavera chusca (A Funny Calavera, 
no date), in which Posada and his corrido (ballad) lyricist poked fun at local 
market vendors. While some of the cala-vera characters are drawn in full figure, 
many are drawn in "medium shot." Of course portraits were a common artistic 
genre, and Posada produced many in his time. But thcse pictorial MSs are less 
poscd, formal portraits than they are shots of active individuals caught in the 
middle of a working day. As such they have a documentary immediacy, and 
despite their being calavera figures, they possess recognizable human character­
istics. These MSs approach the cinematic by providing closer details of the 
vendors, which identify thcm not only by the foods they sell, but also by eosturne 
and utensil (the fish, striped skirt, and apron-vest of Aurelia thc fish vendor 
[figure 2]; the large knife of Dona Antonia the butcher [figure 3]). This sort of 
indication of individual traits was something that evolved in Hollywood and 
Western cinema throughout the 1910s and was standardized by around 1917. 
One of Posada's best-known pieces is the close-up calavera of the fashionable 
lady, La catrilla (figure 4). This, we could say, is a portrait, though not of a 
Figore 2 
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Figure 3
 
Figure 4
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particular person, but of a class of women. Posada's commentary -- death over­
taking wealth - is much more forceful in this near view, whieh allows the viewer 
to see how she clings to the pretensions of her upper-class standing, even beyond 
the grave: plumes and flowers decorate her fancy hat and ribbons adorn her bony, 
hairless skull. 
A fascinating example of another Posada "medium shot" is a cinema-style 
two-shot in a skeleton composition (figure 5) included in the corrido Aqui la 
calavera esta, senores, de toditos los buenos valedores (Here Is the Calavera, Gentle­
men, ofAll the Good Friends, 1910). Interestingly, these figures can be found as 
separate subjects in other broadsides (for example, Calavera de cupido, 19] 3). 
Someone - Posada, Vanegas Arroyo, or the person composing the later page ­
realized that the two-shot image could be manipulated into individual CUs, 
prefiguring cinematic shot selection (over-the-shoulder shots) and editing (cut­
ting from a MS two-shot to individual CUS).IO 
Leaving the calaveras for the moment, another Posada MS is of the strange 
case of a man who was said to have a foot protruding from his side (fig'ure 6, not 
dated or otherwise identified). Obviously the nearer vantage point is called for in 
order to provide important aspects of the freak occurrence and to satisfy viewer 
curiosity. 
3.2 Framing to impzy a world outside the composition 
One additional feature of medium and close-up images is that their partial 
views insinuate a diegetic world beyond the "frame." Figure 7, Alegoria de 
Figure 5 
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Figure 6
 
Figure 7
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revolucionarios (Allegory of the Revolutionaries, not dated), shows the crouched, 
full body of one soldier, but only three-quarters of the wounded man he is 
protecting. The compact composition's limited information, together with the 
look of the soldier toward the upper right part of the composition, imply the 
existence ofwhat is called in cinema "off-screen space." Another characteristic of 
the maturing cinematic style, the acknowledg'ment of and reference to off-screen 
space goes hand in hand with advancements in editing. Were this an image from a 
classical-era film, we would expect it to be part of a scene whose progression of 
shots would typically begin with a LS (establishing the location), then this image, 
then probably glance-object cutting (the next shot might well be of the person or 
object holding the soldier's gaze). Beyond editing', camera movement (a pan, tilt, 
or tracking shot) from this shot would provide important information and thus be 
well motivated. 
3.3 Placing the vie'lJer inside the narrative space 
In Hollywood cinema, from 1909 and throughout the 191Os, cameras were 
positioned closer to the subject in order to feature details of a scene. The camera's 
entry into the spaee of the narrative is another clearly cinematic trait. A good 
example of Posada doing the same thing is figure 8, an undated, unnamed image 
of women who have gathered to observe Siamese twins. The viewer is placed at a 
very near vantage point, perhaps even closer to the twins than the women, and 
has clearly entered the narrative space. 
Figure 8 
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3.4 Angled compositions to accentuate depth 
Two typical characteristics of early cinema compositions were their frontal, 
front-row-center perspective and their shallow depth, both of which drew 
considerably from stage conventions. By shooting actions at an angle, film­
makers began emphasizing depth, something the camera could capture but 
which was severely limited on the stage. While Posada, in figures 1 and 17 for 
example, did sometimes rely on this head-on proscenium style, he often 
broke with it to compose the action on an angle and add depth. The broad­
side image in fig'ure 9, Los patinadores (The Street Cleaners, 1890), presents 
the action at an angle as films would gradually begin doing, particularly in 
the first decade of the new century. In those early films, a pattern of shooting 
seemed to be adhered to by which interior shots maintained the frontal, 
flattened, proscenium perspective while exteriors were angled. Interestingly, 
although Posada began angling on action much earlier than cinema, as with Los 
patinadores, or with figure 10, i Terribles .y espantosisimos estragos! habidos por la 
suma escasez de semillas y el terrible TIFO ... (Terrible and Frigh(fid Ravages 
Caused ~y a Grain Shortage and the Terrible Typhus ... , 1893), he appears to 
have followed the same proscenium interior / angled exterior representational 
practice. 
Figure 9 
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Figure 10 
3.5 Multiple images to provide shifts in time and space 
In narrativizing events, Posada sometimes found that one image was not enough 
to relate the tale he had to tell. This is the case with figure 11, from a broadside 
with the headline Tristisimas lamentaciones de un enganchado para el Valle Nacio­
nal (Vel:Y Sad Lamentations o/a Contracted Laborer at National Valley, 1903). The 
broadside is an expose of the oppression of humble Mexicans kidnapped or hired 
under false pretenses to work in the plantations of the Valle Nacional region, a 
common practice during the dictatorship of Porfirio Diaz. In a LS on the left, 
Posada illustrates a survivor relating his cautionary tale to a crowd of astonished 
listeners. Then, in an extreme LS enclosed in an oval bubble, he depicts the 
laborers working the fields. The broadside image provides views not only of 
two different locations, but perhaps of two different times. (Is the balloon 
showing what befell the worker in the past or what is still occurring as he tells 
his story?) 
A similar example is found in figure 12, Un sentenciado en capilla (A Prisoner in 
Solitary Confinement, no date). Here there is more ambiguity (which the accom­
panying text, now unavailable, may have clarified). It is not clear in the leap in 
space and time from the main illustration to the bubble image whether the 
execution is that of the prisoner or the man's imagining of it. Similar problems 
in transmitting plot information existed in cinema as primitive narrational 
systems struggled with standardizing conventions (like thought and dream bal­
loons) and ways to denote a character's thoughts as distinct from simultaneous or 
subsequent actions. 
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3.6 Sequential images to relate a narrative 
Sometimes Posada used several illustrations to tell a complex story, the equival­
ent of separate film shots to capture a scene. The three images in figures 13-15, 
for example, all appeared on a two-sided broadside entitled Gran Chasco que se 
pego Don Chepito A1ariguana: Por andar en amores con una mujer casada (The Great 
.Joke Played on Don Chepito Mariguana: Because He Pursued a A1arried Woman, no 
date). The comical corrido, featuring one of Posada's recurring characters, Don 
Chepito, tells ofhis ill-fated attempts to woo a married woman. Don Chepito first 
declares his love for her on the street (figure 13), then is accosted by the woman's 
husband (figure 14), and is finally taken to jail (figure 15). Of interest here is first 
of all Posada's rendering of sequenced events, which required him to isolate and 
dramatize the key incidents of the story. But beyond that is the fact that in the 
broadside they appeared in a different order, beginning in medias res on the front 
side with figure 14, then continuing on the back with figure 13, the start of the 
tale, and figure 15, the end of it. This order in effect creates a flashback from the 
middle of the narrative, then a flash-fiJrward to its conclusion, and anticipates 
complex movie narratives that would be common in Mexican classical cinema. 
A variation of Posada's representation of sequenced events is an illustration in 
which he collected four different shots in successive panels, as in a comic strip. 
Figure 16, De nuestros dibl!iantes, momentos antes de los acontecimientos (From Our 
Artists, Moments Before the Event, 1903), showing the attempted theft ofa clock, is 
an illustration Posada did for a small penny periodical called El diablito 
Figure 13 
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Figure 14
 
Figure 15
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Figure 16 
bromista (Bailey 1979: 116). In the first panel, a garbage collector empties a 
customer's household waste. In the second, he presents the bill inside to the 
lady of the house. When she leaves the room to get the money (panel three), he 
tries to steal the clock, but it chimes on the three-quarter hour and he is caught 
and attacked (panel four) (Tyler 1979: 230). 
3.7 Framing with partially sluJlvn figures in the foreground 
Posada's crowd scenes generally have one fascinating detail in common: they 
have foreground figures that are cut off by the bottom edge of the composition. 
For example, though one of Posada's courtroom drawings, figure 17, Jurado 
(Trial, no date), has the typical frontality. of many of his interior drawings, it 
varies from the proscenium style in the way the soldiers and onlookers at the 
bottom of the drawing are cut off above or at the waist (even the two wi tnesses or 
defendants, seen at the center bottom, are cut off at the ankles). Another similar 
courtroom example is figure 18, EIJurado do los asesinos del Sr. Tomas Hernandez 
Aguirre (The Trial ofthe Killers ofMr. Tomas Hernandez Aguirre, 1890 or 1891). 
Compositions like these possess several cinematic qualities. They give viewers 
a privileged view they could only have if they were so close to the scene that they 
couldn't see the entire bodies of the nearer people: that is, it positions them 
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Figure 17 
Figure 18 
within the narrative space and gives the picture documentary immediacy. In 
addition, the foreground figures frame the action occurring in the middle and 
background, thus accentuating depth in the frame and taking viewers' eyes from 
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Figure 19 The trial scene from EI Autom6vtl Gris (1919) 
fore- to mid- to background. Despite the frontality of these drawings, they are 
composed in depth, a key characteristic of both Hollywood's and Mexico's 
classical cinema. Note that the shot from the trial of the bandits in EI automovil 
gris (fig'ure 19) exhibits the same pictorial qualities as the Posada prints. 
4 Toward a Participatory Theory of World Cinema History 
An analysis of Mexico's popular image media at the turn of the century allows us 
to rethink some significant issues in Mexican film history. To beg'in with, looking 
at a more complete array of image media available at the time, not only cinema, 
suggests a different slant on Mexico's initial, documentary-intensive, cinematic 
experience. Maybe its 20-year love affair with the documentary film was not as 
developmentally stunting' as it might at first appear. Perhaps Mexican cinema did 
not fall "behind" other national cinemas in constructing image narratives, 
despite its focus on nonfiction, because other segments of the country's greater 
representational discourse were busy developing a narrative language. From this 
view, Mexico's visual storytellers may have gained expertise with image narrat­
ives by creating and viewing them in various media: in domestic nonfiction films 
(which appear to have become more narrativized as time went on as well as long'er 
and more complex) and in Mexico's vibrant penny press. To this, of course, must 
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be added their awareness of foreign fiction films, which dominated Mexican 
movie screens. 
Second, the variety and compositional complexity of image narratives available 
in the nation's penny press may help explain one of the nagging questions of early 
Mexican film history. How, in the short span of time between 1916, when 
documentary cinema fell out of favor, to 1919 and the smashing success - and 
narrative sophistication - of EI automovil gris, did Mexican filmmakers become so 
quickly adept at film narrative? The easy answer, which considers the cinematic 
evidence exclusively, is that the film's co-director/producer/promoter Enrique 
Rosas (a) capitalized on his experience of two decades of documentary filmmaking 
and his brief foray into narrative films as director / producer ofthe five Mimi Derba 
melodramas in 1917, and (b) copied what he didn't know about narrative filmmak­
ing from foreign models. An alternative - and more comprehensive -- account 
would factor in advancements in narrative techniques made by all of those, like 
Posada, who contributed to Mexico's turn-of-the-century image discourse. 
Finally, this study of Posada's graphic art and its linkages to Mexican cinema 
may induce us to consider the global development of narrative film conventions 
in a different light. One fairly standard way to think about the dominant narrative 
film paradigm goes like this. It was mostly (or totally) developed by Hollywood 
and solidified by 1917. Because of Hollywood's world-wide market dominance, 
other national cinemas dutifully followed suit and imitated the style which then 
became the standard manner in which to relate narrative in film. 
This cultural imperialistic account allows for very little creative participation 
by filmmakers outside of North America, implying that the rest of the world's 
filmmakers, particularly those in the Third World, were dupes who copied the 
narrative conventions arrived at by pioneers in the US. Accordingly, one view of 
Mexican cinema is that it was in effect forced into adopting the Hollywood 
paradigm, having fallen so helplessly behind by concentrating on documentaries 
for 20 years. As Aurelio de los Reyes has put it: "While other nations developed 
the language of cinema and produced fiction films without neglecting newsreels, 
Mexico seemed permanently bound to the Lumiere-style documentary tradition 
and to the observation of moving, proto-cinematic phenomena" (1995: 65). 
Let me propose a different version of the evolution of Western movie narrative 
practice, in general and in Mexico. It begins with a different assumption about 
movie narrative that was standardized throughout the 191Os. Maybe movie 
narrative was not "created" by Hollywood, then imposed on and imitated by 
the rest of the world. Maybe, instead, it evolved out of a well-established 
narrative tradition in the West of representational imagery and theatrical pre­
sentation. Because of the United States' economic superiority, expanding indus­
trial and technological base, political stability, and good fortune in not having to 
fight World War Ion its soil, its burgeoning cinema had the best opportunity to 
make the most films. Therefore, US filmmaking, which migrated to Hollywood 
by the 1910s, was simply the first to formalize the conventions of cinematic 
narrative. It did so as a result of its being the leading film producer in the world, 
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which in turn allowed it to experiment extensively in the process of making 
thousands of films. 
From this point ofview, the reason the narrative style Hollywood developed was 
adopted in most Western countries was that it was a fairly predictable culmination 
of a long history of image narratives, one that stretches from religious iconography 
to fine painting to magic lantern shows, comic strips, broadside illustrations, and 
political cartoons. To this representational lineage cinema also appropriated the 
parallel innovations of theatrical narration. Finally, there was the flow of films ­
and cinematic influences - from country to country. Indeed, due to the early 
cinematic cross-pollination from one country to another, Thompson and Bordwell 
have called the film style that emerged in the period up to World War I "interna­
tional"; after that the Hollywood style was standardized and became dominant 
(1994: 39). What if these were not two separate styles, but rather different stages 
of a single evolutionary cinematic trajectory? The first, international, phase was 
one of synthesis - the gathering and selecting of narrational techniques from 
various image media. The second, "classical," stage was the consolidation and 
application of these techniques to the specifics of the new medium. 
A couple of interesting possibilities devolve from such a hypothetical scenario. 
The first is that, given the right state of affairs, the classical narrative paradigm 
might have been developed somewhere else. The style standardized by Holly­
wood, and adopted by Europe and many of its colonized nations, might have been 
first developed in France or England or Italy had it not been for World War I. 
Who is to say that it might not have been developed in Mexico, but for the 
decade-long turmoil caused by the civil war in 191O? 
This alternative hypothesis also allows us to think about national cinemas 
differently. Rather than seeing Hollywood's hegemonic style as superseding and 
effectively erasing the possibility of other national styles (e.g. the view that the 
Hollywood style eliminated the possibility of a "true" Mexican cinema), we 
might instead think of an international stylistic "template." Such a narrative 
style would be sophisticated and highly structured, yet flexible enough to allow 
for the incorporation of local representational traditions. The result would be, as 
with classical Mexican cinema, a narrative practice that was similar to the Holly­
wood paradigm but contained distinctive regional inflections. This would help 
explain how the classical Mexican cinema could share the same basic stylistic 
components as Hollywood's and at the same time remain distinctly and undeni­
ably Mexican. Culture and ideology, within this model, exist independent of this 
cinematic style; rather, what is known as the classical Hollywood style has the 
potential to express a number of cultural traditions and/or ideological positions. 
Notes 
The art of Jose Guadalupe Posada reproduced in figures 1-18 is courtesy of the Nettie
 
Lee Benson Latin American Collection at the University of Texas at Austin. Figure 19,
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the still photograph from EI automovil gris, IS courtesy the Agrasanchez Archive of 
Mexican Cinema. 
See especially Fell 1974, 1987. Charles Musser makes references to other image 
media throughout his excellent study, The Emergence oJ Cinema (1990). His first 
chapter is a very useful survey of pre-cinematic media. Similarly, Musser's Befilre the 
Nickelodeon (1991) makes several mentions of comic strips and newspapers in relation 
to early US cinema. 
2	 See de los Reyes 1987; Berg 1994. There is also this single tantalizing comment in one 
study of the work of Posada: "The relationship between popular [Mexican] graphic 
art ... and the imaginative inventions of the earliest film-makers was strong in all 
countries, and there must have been cross-fertilization from the very beginning" 
(Berdecio and Appelbaum 1972): 152 n. 174. 
3	 The note to figure 234 in Tyler (1979: 297) argues that the first estimates of Posada's 
output numbering 20,000 prints gave Posada credit for all the images produced at the 
Vanegas Arroyo print shop. It is now generally agreed that other artists produced 
some of the prints originally attributed to Posada, not the least of whom was Posada's 
mentor, Manuel Manilla (who died in 1893). Another early estimation was 15,000 
prints, made by Toor (in Tool' et al. 1930). Most of his work has been lost, so we will 
never know the exact tally. Nevertheless, in more than 40 years of constant work 
Posada must have created several thousand prints - still a tremendous number. 
4 Fernando Gamboa notes that Antonio Vanegas Arroyo, "aided by his son BIas, was 
one of the first to bring movies to Mexico in 1903" (1944: 17). 
5 Arsacio Vanegas Arroyo, the gTandson of Antonio Vanegas Arroyo, the publisher of 
many of Posada's etchings, claimed that some of the published ballads sold millions of 
copies. One children's game illustrated by Posada, "La oca" ("The Goose"), is said 
to have sold as many as 5,000,000 copies throughout Mexico. This astounding market 
saturation would make Posada without a doubt the best-known artist in Mexico at the 
time (Arroyo 1943). 
6	 Appendices 2 and 3 in Tyler (1979: 300-2) list selected penny newspapers and give 
their prices. Most sold for un centavo, though some sold for two centavos, with an 
occasional one selling for three or five. Some of the broadsides in the Edward 
Larocque Tinker collection of the Humanities Research Center at the University of 
Texas, Austin, had prices of five and ten centavos. 
7	 This was, in fact, a popular tactic of itinerant Mexican filmmakers. They would visit 
a town and announce that they would photograph the congregation leaving the next 
Sunday's mass. A crowd would gather to be captured by their camera the next 
Sunday, and the following Monday the same crowd would attend the screening of 
this local aetualitie. See de los Reyes 1995: 64-5. 
8	 There had been sporadic attempts at eljilme de argumento (narrative films) before, but 
never had there been a sustained effort of the kind that began in 1917. 
9	 In one form or another, I believe I have seen most of the approximately 1,000 Posada 
prints. To assemble this list of cinematic techniques, I made use of the following 
collections of Posada's art: several hundred images in the Edward Larocque Tinker 
collection of the Humanities Research Center at the University of Texas, Austin; 
numerous illustrations in rare books and periodicals held in the Nettie Lee Benson 
Latin American Collection at the University of Texas; the 272 illustrations collected 
in Berdecio and Appelbaum's Posada's Popular Mexican Prints (1972); and the several 
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hundred Posada images in Posada's klexico (Tyler 1979), which is thc catalogue of 
an exhibition of Posada's work held at the Library of Congress in 1980. 
10	 There are numerous other examples of larger etchings and engravings being cut 
down to smaller compositions, evidently depending on what was needed by the 
layout artist at the time. 
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CHAPTER TWENTY
 
"Historical Poetics," Narrative, and 
Interpretation 
Ira Bhaskar 
Literature is an inseparable part of culture and it cannot be understood outside the total 
umtext 4' the entire culture (![a given epoch, , , 
Mikhail Bakhtin, "Response to a Question from the Navy Mir Editorial Staff" (my emphasis) 
Interpretation takes as its basic subject our perceptual, cognitive and affective processes, but 
it does so in a roundabout way - by attributing their "output" to the text "out there," To 
understand a film interpretively is to subsume it to our conceptual schemes, and thus to 
master them more fully, if only tacitly, 
David Bordwell, Making Meaning 
In Making Meaning, David Bordwell proposes the project of "historical poetics" 
as an alternative to an interpretation-dominated criticism of the cinema, which, 
he feels, has been ill-founded precisely in that interpretive activity can be 
characterized by the highly suspect ascription of implicit and symptomatic 
meanings to a text,] While most scholars would not contest, but would rather 
welcome, Bordwell's call for a historical contextualization of the study of cinema, 
there would be several who would not respond as positively to his characteriza­
tion of interpretive activity per se, despite the excesses of interpretation that he 
has outlined. Bad examples of any activity do not deny its inherent validity. 
However, Bordwell's objections to interpretation do not function at the level of 
inadequate or misplaced application of interpretive principles in current criti­
cism. Rather it is the fundamental nature of the interpretive activity itself, which 
both accounts for its central place in critical practice and prevents other more 
worthwhile inquiries, that Bordwell finds difficult to accept or endorse. For even 
if the interpretive practice were revamped, it would still not "push the ascription 
of implicit or symptomatic meanings out of its central place in critical practice" 
(Bordwell 1989b: 263). The problem for Bordwell, then, seems to lie in the idea 
of implicit and symptomatic meanings which interpretation deals with, as 
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opposed to referential and explicit meaning' which is the domain of comprehen­
SIOn. 
An adequate response to Bordwell's hostility to interpretive practice and the 
alternative of "historical poetics" that he sug'g'ests would need to confront his 
characterization of both interpretation and the enterprise of historical poetics, in 
order to examine their intrinsic worth and whether the two are in fact as inimical 
as Bordwell makes them out to be. This is not an unqualified view thoug·h. For 
despite a rhetoric ofhostility to interpretation throug'hout Making Meaning, there 
are points at which he actually states that he would not like to repudiate inter­
pretation altog'ether, but just to place it "within a broader historical inquiry" 
(266). In that case, "within the framework of a poetics, interpretation [would take 
on] its proper importance" (273). He also concedes that the work of Bazin, 
Burch, and some other historian-critics does indicate that the "construction of 
implicit and symptomatic meaning can co-exist with the study of form and style 
in g'iven historical circumstances" (267). This would lead one to respond that 
perhaps Bordwell's problem with interpretive practice is that it does not in fact 
realize its potential, does not do what it is meant to do. However, that is not quite 
the case. For, despite his attempt to recuperate interpretation within the domain 
of "historical poetics" at the end of Making Meaning, there is throug'hout the 
book a suspicion of the enterprise per se, a suspicion that leads him to dismiss 
the significance of the interpretive work that he does, in fact, think has some 
value. There are, then, "unresolved ambig'uities and tensions," not only, as Berys 
Gaut has pointed out, in Bordwell's neoformalist theory's key notion of con­
struction (Gaut 1995: 9),2 but also in his conception of the interpretive project 
itself. 
These tensions and contradictions in Bordwell's discussion of interpretation 
come from a misconceived notion of the enterprise itself. Further, it is the 
contention of this chapter that Bordwell's misconception of interpretation 
comes from an inadequate understanding of narrative and its functions, effects, 
and significances, and an incomplete understanding' of history. Bordwell sees a 
sharp division between comprehending' the narrative of a film and interpreting its 
meaning, just as he sees a division between referential and explicit meanings on 
the one hand, and implicit and symptomatic meanings on the other. There is a 
similar schism in Bordwell between narrative and ideology, between form and 
content, and perhaps even between history and culture. At the root of these 
divisions lies a notion of narrative as story or "fabula" and its presentation as the 
plot or "syuzhet." Constructing the fabula from the syuzhet becomes the privi­
leg'ed activity of comprehension, so that the meaning's that are relevant, according' 
to Bordwell, are only those that have to do with the dieg'esis of the narrative 
(referential) and its explicit "moral" or "messag·e." Any other kinds of meanings 
that critics see in a narrative are those that they bring' to bear from semantic fields 
of critical institutions that lie outside the narrative. 3 Interpretation is, therefore, 
an activity that is suspect to Bordwell because it is always done at the expense of a 
consideration of the "form and style" of a film (1989b: 261), for the interpretive 
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critic is much more involved with abstract theoretical ideas than with construc­
tional principles and the effects of those principles. 
Conceived in these terms, interpretation does seem like an extraneous activity, 
for all that is valuable as a response to narrative is comprehension- of its 
referential and explicit meanings and, beyond that, of its constructive principles 
and its effects. How would "historical poetics" reform the activity of interpreta­
tion? As Bordwell defines it, "historical poetics" seems much more concerned 
with locating the elements of style in a historical context, with studying the 
historical development of style and the constructive principles of films and their 
effects historically, than with the meanings that are central to the interpretive act. 
Would understanding how film style developed historically and what the effects 
of film have been at different points of time help us to understand the entire 
range of meanings that a film generates and thereby create better interpretations? 
The answers to problem-centered questions that neoformalist historical poetics 
would ask would certainly enhance our knowledge of what "constructional 
options" filmmakers were faced with at different "historical conjunctures" 
(Bordwell 1989a: 381), and what impacts those choices had on different audiences 
at different points in time. But in order to understand why there were certain 
choices before filmmakers and why there were certain effects on certain audi­
ences, apart from the history of styles, concepts, and the determinations of the 
economic and technological systems of filmmaking which Bordwell emphasizes, 
we would also have to look at the entire field of socio-cultural life that generates 
what Bakhtin and Medvedev call "the ideological horizon" of an epoch (1978: 
17), the determining matrix of all representational forms of the age as also of 
responses to those forms. Bakhtin and Medvedev's view that "the qualitative 
development of existence and the ideological world that is history [was] com­
pletely inaccessible to formalism" (97) can be applied in part to Bordwell's 
formulation of "historical poetics" as well. It is unfortunate that Bordwell did 
not take into account the entire Bakhtinian critique of formalism: while he does 
consider what Bakhtin and Medvedev would call "the unity ofliterature" and the 
"unified socio-economic laws of development," it is the missing link of "the 
unity of ideological and historical life'" from the Bakhtinian paradigm4 that makes 
Bordwell's characterization of history in his "historical poetics" inadequate. Had 
he acknowledged Bakhtin's formulation of "historical poetics,"S he might have 
been able to confront and enter into a dialogue/debate with the latter, which 
might have led to a more comprehensive notion of history that would certainly 
benefit the project of "historical poetics" that Bordwell proposes to revitalize the 
field of cinema studies. 
Further, would answers to the questions regarding the constructive principles, 
functions, and effects of film that Bordwell's "historical poetics" proposes help 
us to understand the meanings of a film text - even the referential and explicit 
meanings that Bordwell thinks are worth pursuing? Not entirely, for the refer­
ential or dieg'etic implications and the explicit messages or morals of the film 
text form the content, which reflects, in Bakhtinian terms, "the whole of the 
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ideological horizon" of which literature or cinema is itself a part (Bakhtin and 
Medvedev 1978: 17). And if content is generated by the ideological environment 
of an age, then implicit and symptomatic meanings would be as contained within 
it as referential and explicit ones. It is not just symptomatic meanings that can be 
traced, as Bordwell says, to "economic, political, or ideological processes" 
(l989b: 9; see also note 3), but all the types of meaning which are contained in 
both the content and the form of the work. For if we follow Bakhtin, form and 
structure arc as ideologically shaped as themes and content.6 Understood in this 
manner, interpretive activity would have to confront the meanings of a text and 
would therefore have to deal with the narrative at hand directly, and not in the 
"roundabout way" that Bordwell describes. 7 
However, this demands a view of narrative as culturally and historically 
rooted, as embodying within it the life-world of its times: in other words, as 
embodying the forms of cultural life, the life processes, the ideologies, the values, 
in fact the very conceptual schemes that Bordwell sees as the subject of inter­
pretation. If narrative were to be understood in this way, as encoding within its 
fabula and syuzhet, its form and style, the vision of its world, then the inter­
pretive act would not be schismatically separated from the comprehensive one, 
and explicit, referential meanings would carry within them the implicit, sympto­
matic ones. Interpretation would not be seen as dealing with the text in a 
"roundabout way" by attributing our "perceptual, cognitive and affective pro­
cesses" to the object "out there" (Bordwell 1989b: 257), but rather it would be 
possible to see interpretation as confronting the text much more directly in an 
empathetic, exploratory, comprehensive mode. The resultant "understanding"S 
of a narrative text would thus imply an understanding of both the cultural, 
historical world that has produced the narrative and the one that it represents. 
The reader/viewer's response to the narrative would dynamize his "perceptual, 
cognitive and affective processes," and the act of interpretation would then be 
concerned as much with understanding the text as with understanding our 
conceptual schemes and our temporal location in a world that mayor may not 
be similar to the world of the text. Interpretation, then, is a dual-pronged activity 
- directed both outward to the text and its world and inward to ourselves and our 
context, in a mutually illuminating move. 
What is at issue here is a conception of narrative that is implicit in Bordwell's 
discussion of making meaning. It can be identified with Genette's theorizing of 
narrative as "narrative discourse," in which his definition and distinctions of the 
three different meanings of the term comprise the language or means of expre­
ssion, the story or content, and the act of enunciation or narration (Genette 1993: 
25-6). While Genette does point out that the analysis of narrative discourse 
"implies a study of relationships," and that describing anyone of the three 
aspects of narrative necessarily involves the others (27-9), he does not locate 
the three dimensions of narrative in culture. Without cultural and historical 
contcxtualization, the analysis of narrative discourse can become just an exposi­
tion on the act of enunciation, the means of narration or expression, and when it 
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does deal with the story or content at all, it can face the problems of unsituated 
auteur or thematic criticism - a fault that Bordwell has correctly related to the 
excesses of explicative criticism. 9 
Against Genette's theory of narrative can be juxtaposed the Bakhtinian idea of 
a narrative text as situated in a matrix of cultural discursivity that penetrates it 
and manifests itself in obvious, as well as latent, content and significance. From 
the Bakhtinian perspective, a narrative text cannot be understood without a 
decoding of the cultural meanings that are embedded, and have accrued over 
centuries, in the strata of popular languages, in the forms of cultural expressions, 
and in the "forms of thinking" that are specific to a particular culture lO and 
which the text has woven together into patterns of cultural signification (Bakhtin 
1986b: 5).11 "Narrative comprehension" would therefore involve understanding 
how the "form" of a particular work embodies the "forms of thinking" that are 
specific to a particular culture. Furthermore, the Bordwellian "referential and 
explicit" meanings of a text are actually forms of cultural expression which carry 
"the implicit and symptomatic meanings" that g'ive voice to "the powerful deep 
currents of culture" (3). 
This is not to suggest, however, that meanings are fixed for all time and that 
audience experience has no role to play in making meaning, but rather that 
whatever orientations audiences bring to texts, they would still have to negotiate 
their cultural "meanings," for, as Bakhtin points out, every utterance is a 
historical and social act, and an "organic, historical, and actual connection is 
established between the meaning and act (utterance), between the act and the 
concrete sociohistorical situation" (Bakhtin and Medvedev 1978: 120). A histor­
ical poetics must, therefore, confront the historical context of the utterance with 
all the socia-cultural significances that this would imply. A Bakhtinian response 
would demand not only a contextual location of texts, which Bordwell does not 
adequately emphasize, but also the contextual location of the audience, to which 
he does pay attention in his proposal that since historical poetics is concerned 
with "effects," it will study the "practices ... of reception" as well as those of 
"production" (1989b: 270). As cultural, historical situations change, there are 
various interpretations that become possible in contexts other than those in 
which the text has been produced, because of the emergence and development 
of newer discourses and theoretical formulations which, as Bordwell correctly 
points out, form the interpretations of critics. However, what Bordwell does not 
accept is that the institutional framework is only one of the determining elements 
in the process of building interpretations and would form the important other 
dimension of reader/spectator positioning in the active "interaction" between 
the text and the receiver. Bakhtin, in fact, maintains that "the work is never a 
ready message given once and for all," but rather it is constructed as "a kind of 
ideological bridge" in the interaction between the author and the reader, and that 
this process "causes both the thematic unity of the generating work and the form 
of its actual realization" (Bakhtin and Medvedev 1978: 151-2). Using the 
Bakhtinian perspective, then, it would be possible to avoid the kind of problem 
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that Bordwell's constructivist account is meant to overcome, that meanings of 
texts seem to vary historically and culturally, thereby justifying his account of 
meaning-making as dependent on the frameworks that spectators!readers bring 
to texts rather than on finding them in the text. In contrast, what the Bakhtinian 
perspective would suggest is that while readers!spectators bring their cultural, 
political awareness constituted outside the text to the literary!filmic experience, 
thereby inflecting it with their various "perspectivallanguages,',12 they still have 
to negotiate the "ideological horizon" of the text, and in this interaction the 
"meanings" that are justifiable are those that owe some allegiance to textual 
features, structures, and intentions. In other words, the extrinsic theoretical 
frameworks that Bordwell would say critics use to interpret films would only 
become relevant in the text-audience interaction if there are elements in the text 
which respond to them: that is to say, the audience--film text interaction still 
functions within limits - limits imposed by textual features as much as by 
historical and cultural conditions and conditioning. 
Read in this way, comprehending narrative would not mean just understand­
ing how stories are constructed and the effects they have on people, though it 
would certainly imply that. It would also mean understanding why they have the 
effects they do, whieh would bring us face to face with the messages, both overt 
and covert, that narratives carry - messages that are "powerful" and evocative 
because they touch a deeper substratum of chords in a culture that, once touched, 
resonate with a multiplicity of implications that interpretation articulates. Com­
prehension and interpretation are thus closely imbricated, precisely because the 
meanings they deal with cannot be schismatically separated from each other. This 
imbrication of what Bordwell calls the referential, explicit and the implicit, 
symptomatic meanings could perhaps be better understood if one were to use 
the Barthesian idea of the integrated functioning of the five codes or voices which 
a narrative text comprises. While the hermeneutic and the proairetic codes deal 
with the central enigma and the actions of the narrative, the semic, the symbolic, 
and the cultural or the referential codes are concerned with signification and are 
therefore involved with the meanings that a culture articulates through its texts 
(Barthes 1994). The semic code articulates the emotional and cultural associa­
tions of a word!image and can thus be seen as contextualized in the referential. 
The symbolic is, according to Barthes, the "province of the antithesis" (17) that 
orchestrates the oppositions of the narrative. These oppositions are culturally 
determined and the play of the symbolic negotiates the antinomies through which 
cultural meaning is articulated. All five codes are "bound by the heavy weight of 
convention and tradition - centuries of what Barthes calls the 'what's already 
been written and done'" (Lesage 1985: 478). The Bakhtinian notion of "dialo­
gism" as the "necessary relation of any utterance to other utterances" (cited in 
Stam et al. 1992: 203) that are rooted in socio-culturallife and history can thus be 
related to Barthes' sense that "alongside each utterance ... offstage voices can be 
heard," voices that are woven together in the text and thus embody "the plurality 
and the circularity of the codes" (1994: 77). The Bakhtinian-Barthesian 
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paradigm is an important counter-thrust to readings of narrative as "narrative 
discourse," a formulation that Bordwell implicitly identifies and sympathizes 
with. If the former formulation of narrative were to be used to understand the 
impulses of interpretive activity, the tensions and contradictions in Bordwell's 
response to interpretation could be easily resolved, and one would also have a 
historical and cultural contextualization of interpretation, without which no 
"historical poetics" of narrative art or cinema is either comprehensive or ade­
quate. 
II 
A call to reinstate, along with Bakhtin's, the Barthesian model of narrative 
construction and interpretation must, however, take into account the fact that 
Bordwell rejects both the communication (Bakhtinian) and the signification 
(Saussurean) models of meaning in favor of an inferential model whereby the 
perceiver uses cues in the film to "execute determinable operations, of which the 
construction of all sorts of meanings will be a part" (198%: 270). Bordwell does 
not examine or debate the values and drawbacks of the two models that he rejects, 
and neither does he examine the internal coherence of the inferential model that 
he espouses. His formulation of a neoformalist poetics, which rests on an 
inferential model where meanings are constructed by viewers, applying schemata 
to cues in the film, contradicts inherently the rational-agent explanatory scheme 
of filmmaking, proposed by neoformalism, which foregrounds the voluntary 
control over the meanings of a film that the filmmaker exerts, and which is 
demonstrated in the deliberate constructional choices that she or her team make 
during the process of filmmaking (270). 
If meanings are made by filmmakers in the process of making very self­
conscious choices, as the rational-agent model of filmmaking implies, then how 
would this position be reconciled with the inferential model, in keeping with 
which Bordwell asserts throughout A1aking Meaning that "meanings are not 
found but made" (3)? It is true that Bordwell uses the rational-agent model to 
explain the construction of films and the perceptual-cognitive or the inferential 
model to explain the "effects" of films, and he does concede that "to some extent, 
the filmmaker ... can construct the film in such a way that certain cues are likely 
to be salient and certain inferential pathways are marked out." However, he 
asserts quite correctly that the filmmaker cannot control "all the semantic fields, 
schemata and heuristics which the perceiver may bring to bear on the film," and, 
therefore, audiences may "use the film for other purposes than the maker 
anticipated." Furthermore, he maintains that critics operating within "the insti­
tution of film criticism" are likely to "produce implicit and symptomatic mean­
ings, regardless of the filmmaker's intent" (270). While it is true that viewers/ 
readers and critics often make of texts significances that may not have been 
intended, Bordwell does not adequately emphasize that viewers/critics do often 
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attempt to locate their own readings in a contextual situation which not only takes 
the constructional choices of artists into account but also locates them in a larger 
context that explains why these choices were necessary.13 The inferential model 
that Bordwell uses to explain reception needs both the rational-agent model and 
the institutional model14 as much as it needs a larger socio-cultural contextuali­
zation if it is to adequately explain why films have the effects they do. To use 
different models to explain different aspects of filmmaking and reception without 
emphasizing the interactions between processes only foregrounds contradictory 
conclusions: for example, that artists voluntarily control meanings which they 
translate into constructional choices on the one hand, and that audiences make 
their own meanings which they do not find in the texts they receive on the other. 
These contradictions in his account of making meaning, which Bordwell neither 
confronts nor resolves, could be worked out if the Bakhtinian account of recep­
tion discussed above could be incorporated into Bordwell's schema. The result 
would be a "historical poetics" with interpretation truly absorbed within it, as 
Bordwell desires. 
Further, Bordwell's inferential model, which grounds his theory of narrative 
comprehension, has been critiqued by Richard Allen, who demonstrates that 
since the cognitive theory of perception, upon which Bordwell's theory of 
narrative comprehension is based, misconceives the nature of seeing, it is not 
an adequate explanation for narrative comprehension (Allen 1997).15 Berys Gaut 
has proved that the constructivism of Bordwell's inferential model is seriously 
flawed and does not explain the comprehension and interpretation of films (Gaut 
1995).16 So while Bordwell may have rejected the communication and the 
signification or semiotic models because they are rather simplistic and inadequate 
explanations of the processes of comprehension and interpretation (either of 
them would commit neoformalism to a detectivist view of interpretation, 
whereby the task of the interpreter would be either to grasp the message 
transmitted by a sender or to decode a previously encoded message), the infer­
ential model to which Bordwell is committed is also contradictory and an 
inadequate explanation of comprehension and interpretation. Perhaps the answer 
lies in understanding that comprehension and interpretation do not rigidly con­
form to anyone of these models exclusively. Rather, they use methods from all 
these models, and, moreover, the models are not mutually exclusive. Viewers do 
use schemata while comprehending and interpreting films; but they also grapple 
with the messages of a text, just as their response to narrative texts involves them 
in the activity of decoding messages that have been previously encoded. Neither 
the communication model nor the signification model need commit one entirely 
to intentionalist explanations, for by locating these models and the messages they 
communicate in the contexts of culture and history, we would see in the 
individual act of making meaning, whether in the construction of the text or in 
its interpretation, the life-rhythms, the values, and the belief structures of its 
context. By reconciling the processes of the models that Bordwell opposes, and 
by using the Bakhtinian and the Barthesian sense of signification, we would have 
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a "hermeneutics" and a "poetics of interpretation" 17 that would be free from the 
contradictions we find in Bordwell's account. 
In fact, the contradictions in Bordwell's response to interpretation persist 
because he insists on the division between comprehension and interpretation, 
with the latter seen as the ascription of implicit and symptomatic meanings to a 
text. There are two ruptures here that are important and that need to be 
addressed. The first has to do with the schism between the different kinds of 
meaning in a text, so that the referential and explicit meaning's, which are 
connected with the syuzhet and the fabula of a film and are the domain of 
comprehension, are seen as distinct from the text's implicit and symptomatic 
meaning. George Wilson has demonstrated that it is impossible to see the implicit 
meanings of narrative film as separated from its referential ones for "the 
implicit meanings of a film are inextricable from the network of relationships 
that constitute a fabula portrayed in film" (Wilson 1997: 226). Similarly, the 
symptomatic meanings of a text, which Bordwell identifies with its repressed 
ideology, cannot be seen as a priori meanings that critics superimpose on films, 
for ideological questions are inherent in the constructional choices that 
filmmakers make - choices that relate to genre, form, style, and characterization 
as much as they are related to any repressed meaning that the narrative 
discloses, despite the director, through "its gaps and fissures.,,18 Bordwell has 
appropriately pointed to the Cahiers and Screen critics' work for this sense of 
ideological determination. Thomas Schatz's work on genres also emphasizes 
the inextricable relationship between genres and ideologies (see Schatz 1981: 
esp. chs 1, 2). 
As a historian of genres, forms, and styles, the neoformalist poetician begins 
with, Bordwell asserts, the concrete assumptions embedded in the filmmaker's 
craft (1989b: 269). But genres, forms, and styles involve more than the craft of 
the filmmaker. As Bakhtin points out, genres "accumulate forms of seeing and 
interpreting particular aspects of the world" (1986b: 5). Genres codify cultural 
responses, are semically coded, and carry within them the weight of signification 
from history and culture. A study of genre would have to confront the implicit 
and the ideological questions that genres carry within them. Thus, any attempt to 
understand generic, formal, and stylistic features in themselves, and purely at the 
level of craft, would be to divorce "form" from the particular historical and 
cultural "content" and context of the narrative. Even though Bordwell is ostens­
ibly against a form-content split, by separating the referential and explicit mean­
ings from the implicit, symptomatic ones and by privileging the study of 
constructional form over "thematics" he is in reality doing just that. Any 
"historical poetics" of genre, form, and style that does not study the implicit 
and symptomatic questions of a text - in other words, does not study the text 
holistically - would be as inadequate as a history of narrative art as it would be as 
an interpretation. 
This brings us to the second rupture that results from Bordwell's separation of 
comprehension and interpretation. By seeing interpretation as the ascription of 
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implicit and/or symptomatic meanings to a text, and with the sense that these 
meanings come from the schemata of critical institutions that the critic then maps 
almost randomly onto cues in the film, Bordwell implicitly divorces the inter­
pretive activity, and also the text, from the world and culture of which they are a 
part. This is also clear from his characterization of the interpretive activity. 
According to Bordwell, "knowledge of the text is not the most salient effect of 
the interpretive enterprise," which does not aim at providing either "causal" or 
"functional" explanations (198%: 257). It is not the "text" but "our perceptual, 
cognitive and affective processes" that are the subject of interpretation. By 
characterizing the activity of interpretation in these terms, Bordwell brings 
about a disjuncture between the text and our "perceptual, cognitive and affective 
processes" that are the "effects" of the text (257), thereby locking us completely 
outside the world of the text with no means by which to access it. The ordinary 
experience of comprehending and interpreting texts is otherwise. Within Bord­
well's definition of interpretation, the text would function merely as a catalyst or 
a prompt to encourage "a disciplined speculation on the possibilities ofmeaning" 
(258). The text thus loses its specificity 19 and its value as a representation of a 
world, which, when we respond to it, increases our "knowledge" in the sense of 
"understanding,,20 understanding of a world perhaps similar to ours or perhaps 
even a little different, as well as of ourselves and our emotional, mental, 
and intellectual responses. While Bordwell is quite right in seeing that 
interpretation "answers to a widely felt interest in motives, intention, and ethical 
responsibility by showing that artworks which do not offer explicit guides for 
behaviour can raise significant issues of thought, feeling and action" (198%: 
258), he doesn't see that interpretation is only able to do so by explicating and 
interpreting the situations and the network of relationships that a text represents. 
If indeed interpretation "reactivates and revises our common frameworks of 
understanding" (257),21 it does so only because the subject of interpretation is 
the text, and interpretation is about understanding the world of the text, 
the culture from which it is produced, and, by extension, human societies and 
life processes. Neither a text nor our "perceptual, cognitive, and affective 
processes" exist in a vacuum, and it is only when we recognize the contextual 
nature of life, and also speculation, that the interpretive act can be correctly 
valued. 
It is because Bordwell values "interpretation's greatest achievement" as "its 
ability to encourage reflections upon our conceptual schemes"22 that he actually 
undervalues the real benefits and achievements of interpretation. Having created 
a schism between interpretation and historical criticism, and with his heavy bias 
against the former, he has no option but to be either reductive or appropriative 
when responding to interpretations that cannot be dismissed as wayward, cava­
lier, or wholly "finalistic" (i.e. based upon a priori codifications of what a film 
must ultimately mean23 ). Speaking of the positive contribution that interpreta­
tion-dominated criticism has made to the creation of a tradition for film studies, 
Bordwell says: 
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Conceiving of the text as symptomatically revealing cultural tensions introduced a 
powerful frame of reference. To claim unity across an auteur's output, to posit that 
cinema contains three looks, and to suggest that a genre may constitute an inter­
section of nature and culture organized a great deal of information within a new 
perspective. (l989b: 256) 
The benefits of interpretation as characterized by Bordwell here seem rather 
ineffectual, even insignificant. Do effective interpretations add only "powerful 
frame[s] of reference" or organize "information within a new perspective"? Does 
interpretation not add to our understanding of the value, the everlasting appeal 
and functions of narrative art in society? It is typical of Bordwell not to speak of 
the insights into human life, social processes, the intricate nature of human and 
social interaction, and the historical and cultural determination of human action 
that we gain from an interpretation-centered criticism. While no one would 
challenge Bordwell's critique of inadequate interpretations, it would be devaluing 
the force and function of interpretation to see its positive examples as merely 
"innovative frames of reference" that "have heightened our awareness of what 
can be noticed and appreciated in artworks" (256). To render positive interpret­
ive activity as one that permits innovative semantic fields to pick out hitherto 
unperceived cues in the text impoverishes formal and stylistic, as well as the­
matic, analysis. 
At the same time, when Bordwell does have examples of interpretive activity 
that also meet his demand for a "sensuous criticism" (264) and a study of formal 
elements, he appropriates the work as a form of "historical poetics" and states 
that "the construction of implicit and symptomatic meaning can co-exist with the 
study of form and style in given historical circumstances" (267). The writings of 
Bazin and Burch are examples.24 The point is not that Bordwell is wrong in this 
statement, but rather whether the two activities - a sensuous criticism that 
recovers "art's sensuousness" (264) and the construction of implicit and sympto­
matic meanings, with the assumption that film's composition and effects are 
vehicles of the former - are mutually exclusive and contradictory. Bordwell's 
formulation of a difference and division between interpretation and historical 
criticism demands this polarity. Otherwise, a historically and culturally nuanced 
study of form and style that sees them as bearers of explicit, as well as implicit, 
symptomatic meanings can be seen as the most comprehensive form of inter­
pretation. Just as a historical and cultural study of form and style need not be 
opposed to a sensuous criticism, so also an emphasis on the sensuousness of art 
can complement and enhance the interpretive understanding of a text and its 
world. 
Despite his hostility and objections to interpretation, Bordwell declares at 
various points that to outlaw all the conventions of interpretation would be to 
impoverish film studies. And yet the charge remains that interpreters have 
scarcely paid any attention to film form and style. He seems opposed to what 
he calls the concentric-circle model, whereby aspects of setting or camerawork 
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amplify or comment on characters' interaction. This would be to subordinate 
film style to issues considered important on other counts (260-1). While Bord­
well is quite right to warn us that doctrinal readings of films can see any aspect of 
form and style in terms of a master narrative, and his many examples quite 
correctly point to the often absurd formulations that come from an approach that 
applies predetermined meanings to read visual images or film style (for example, 
to see mirrors as signifying reflexivity), it would be equally disastrous and 
lopsided to concentrate only on "the principles according to which films are 
constructed and by means of which they achieve particular effects" (1989a: 371), 
especially when these principles are not located in the larger socio-cultural 
ideological environment of the time. 
The other equally important question for historical poetics is how and why 
these principles have arisen and changed in particular empirical circumstances. 
This historical study of the changing principles of film construction is commend­
able. However, it is important to realize that a consideration of "why" construc­
tional principles have evolved as they have would bring us face to face with 
questions of economics, ideology, ethics, and the morality and values of the 
society in which the films are being' made,25 with questions of how and why 
genres uphold ideological, psychological formations and are tied into the deeper 
determinants of the cultural psyche -- in fact, all those questions that are central 
to the implicit and symptomatic meanings of films, considered the domain of 
interpretation. And any study of constructional principles that does not confront 
these issues would fall short of the very yardsticks that Bordwell himself for­
mulates for "historical poetics." In the same vein, neoformalism's identity as a 
historical poetics, with its emphasis "on historically changing norms, devices, 
systems and functions" which "requires that the analyst complement the scru­
tiny of single films with the study of a wide range of films" (l989a: 382), would 
be incomplete without a study of history, society, and culture that give form its 
content.26 Form itself carries a symptomatic meaning, and therefore a hostility to 
the latter would mean that one does not read form at all. Bakhtin's suggestion that 
"scholarly poetics should be adequate to the whole generating series of literary 
development" (Bakhtin and Medvedev 1978: 159) would be an important cor­
rective to Bordwell's sense of cinematic history as dealing only with filmic series 
in interaction with the laws of socio-economic development without any con­
textualizing in "other ideological series. ,,27 
What is at issue here is that ideolog'ical questions which Bordwell banishes to 
the realm of "symptomatic interpretation" are central to any understanding' of 
form or "constructional options" open at various "historical conjunctures" 
(l989a: 381). Any understanding of the latter must accept a view of film history 
that is not a linear, teleological trajectory which moves throu(Sh classical narrative 
cinema through Soviet montage cinema and then art cinema and so on. 
Bordwell's understanding that Hollywood cinema, Soviet montage cinema, art 
cinema, and other kinds ofcinema use different constructional forms (1989a: 381) 
must also admit that, along with historical positioning, ideological questions are 
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important to the choices that different kinds of artist have made. So his sugges­
tions for a "sensuous criticism" of form and style, which recovers the 
"palpability of the object" (Victor Shklovsky, cited in Bordwell 1989b: 264), 
and a historical study of particular films, with special attention to the processes 
that brought them into being, must accept that form can only be properly 
understood when all the meanings that it carries - explicit and referential, 
implicit and symptomatic - are allowed to body forth. Bordwell's own example 
of Vance Kepley's sensuous and historical reading of Dovzhenko's work demon­
strates that form carries ideological and symptomatic meanings. 29 To therefore 
divorce the study of form from the meanings that it carries is an extremely 
misplaced impulse, and one that would counter the project of historical poetics. 
Interpretation and historical poetics may not be as inimicable as Bordwell has 
assumed in his account of making meaning. 
Furthermore, to see meaning as related to the "effects" of a work (270) is as 
misplaced as divorcing meaning from form. A text's form and meaning together 
generate effects. In the same way it would be inadequate to deal with themes 
merely as "constructive principles" or "effects of constructive principles," as 
Bordwell proposes (I 989a: 375), for themes embody the meanings of a work, 
meanings which structure the significance of the text's cultural context. While 
Bordwell sees meaning, structure, and process -- the three aspects of any repres­
entational system - as central to historical poetics (376), he doesn't see the 
contradiction in his statement that thematics are important only if they are seen 
as constructional principles. Themes contain the meaning of a work, but they are 
structured and given form and, therefore, significance only through the construc­
tional principles ofa film. As Bakhtin would say, "there is no formless content and 
there is no contentless form" (Bakhtin and Medvedev 1978: 140). To deal with 
themes as existing outside the form and structure of a text (which Bordwell 
critiques) is as misplaced as what he himself suggests. For to see themes as 
constructive principles or their effects would be to read the meaning of a film 
purely in terms of "stylistic/perceptual/logical" (Carney 1989: 45) and affective 
principles and thus to read narrative as essentially about the means of expression 
and its affective implications. What is left out is the entire spectrum of situations, 
conflicts, and choices with their concomitant thoughts, feelings, and ideas that 
present the reader/viewer with hypothetical possibilities to entertain and follow, 
which may constitute the perennial appeal ofnarrative - possibilities that may not 
present themselves in our lives but offer explanations of our world and the human 
condition and equip us to deal with our own situations more appropriately. 
The effects of a work are multiple and can range from pure "pleasure," which 
Bordwell is aware of,30 to speculation about the potentials and possibilities open 
to individuals, to meditations about the human condition. Bordwell is quite right 
in maintaining that constructional principles and the effects they have are the 
results of carefully deliberated choices made by filmmakers (I 989b: 268-9). 
However, the particular effects that a work has are not only the result of the 
meanings that its themes have structured, but are also deliberate ideological 
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choices that the makers have made.31 If poetics involves, along with a study of the 
construction of a text, a study of its effects, as Bordwell maintains (1989b: 270; 
1989a: 383), .then a study of a text's reception would involve not only an under­
standing of the ideology of the text, but also the assumption of its effectivity 
which comes from a recognition that the ideologies, the meanings, and the 
messages of a text will have a reception that is sympathetic. Readers/viewers 
do, in fact, bclong to "reading communities" or "reading formations," and a text 
has its effects precisely because readers do interprct texts as they comprehend 
them, and therefore the critic does have a rhetorical warrant for his "enlightening 
enterprise," which Bordwell is skeptical about (1989b: 255).32 It is ironic that in 
formulating a difference between the reader/viewer's activity and that of the 
critic, Bordwell goes against one of the fundamental assumptions of any study of 
the "effects" of a text: that a text can have effects only if the audience recognizes 
its significances. In the same way, a critic can only interpret a text ifhe recognizes 
the emotional responses and assumptions that the elements of the text are meant 
to evoke. And he can only do this if he participates in the ritual, in however 
distanced a manner. Therefore, if historical poetics is to be as much about effects 
as it is to be about the principles of constructive form, it must take into account 
all those meanings that Bordwell sees as the domain of interpretation - the highly 
suspect implicit and symptomatic meanings that contain symbolic and ideological 
implications. 
III 
Bordwell claims at the end of Making Meaning that his intention is not one of 
"repudiating interpretation but of situating its protocols within a broader histor­
ical inquiry" (1989b: 266). He believes that neoformalist poetics, "while con­
centrating on historical context, narrative form and cinematic style, does not 
exclude thematic interpretation. It absorbs them into a dynamic system" (1989a: 
385). However, so deep is his suspicion of implicit and symptomatic meanings, 
and so committed is he to an exposition of form and style and their historical 
location without necessarily relating them to thematic significances, that his own 
readings of cinematic texts often end up displaying "the film as intriguing or 
challenging, perhaps because its operations lie beneath or beyond interpretation" 
(1989b: 271).33 I will use the example of his reading of Carl Dreyer's Ordet to 
demonstrate that while Bordwell presents the film as intriguing and challenging 
through an analysis of its style, his reading is inadequate and impoverished 
because he refuses to encounter its themes or to see the embodiment of the 
content in the form. 
Dreyer criticism is polarized between the "traditional-thematic" and the 
"perceptual-formalist" kinds (Carney 1989: 22). Unlike the thematic critics, 
David Bordwell is extremely aware of the importance of style. Holding himself 
at a distance from the three main kinds of critical responses before him - the 
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religious, the humanist, and the aestheticist - Bordwell maintains that his 
formalist position equips him to respond adequately to the question of style, 
and he therefore reads Dreyer's work as essentially about "the problems of 
order" and "the problems of interpretation" (1981: 1-3). But, as Raymond 
Carney points out, Bordwell's reading reduces Dreyer's films to a "set of 
stylistic/perceptual/logical permutations" and completely denies the emotive 
and psychological dimensions of the experience. Moreover, his reading of 
Dreyer's style as functioning independently of the narrative is problematic, for 
in locating the value of his work in defamiliarizing both "ordinary perceptual 
reality" and the expressive forms of "other art works," Bordwell posits the only 
creative function of style as essentially a negative one - to deconstruct, parody, or 
play with forms of representation, which, as Carney points out, is "an utter 
trivialization of the possibilities of artistic expression" (1989: 45-8). Bordwell 
thus sees narrative as essentially about the means of expression and its affective 
implications. 
The limitations of Bordwell's approach to Ordet become obvious in that he 
misses completely the contemporary significance of Dreyer's concerns because of 
the anachronistic form of the medieval miracle play within which Dreyer embeds 
his realistic narrative. So, to Bordwell, "so great was Dreyer's attachment to the 
ahistorical" that his films cannot be seen as "reflecting contemporary ideological 
positions." Even religion, which one would normally associate with ideology, 
Bordwell sees as taking on ideological weight only as a form of "planing the action 
in an asocial, atemporal frame of reference ... validating it as representation, 
theorizing the film's very production of narrative" (1981: 192-3). Instead of 
reading the religious concerns as themes that require interpretation, Bordwell 
transforms them into formal elements with no thematic reverberations or sig­
nificance. In doing this he misses the significance of the film and impoverishes its 
concerns. He sees in Ordet "Dreyer's typical narrative unity" which found "its 
most thoroughgoing justification - religion" and "Christianity becomes Dreyer's 
most overpowering formal device" (146-7). Bordwell's formalist reading of 
Christianity in Ordet is problematic precisely because it is a reading of the 
hermeneutic and proairetic codes of the narrative, without perceiving that the 
significance of these codes cannot be understood outside of the context of 
the semie, referential, and symbolic ones. 34 Christianity is not just a formal 
device in Ordet, but rather the very fabric and texture of the social and cultural 
life Dreyer wishes to explore, as well as what is endangered in the pervasive and 
destructive disbelief of the contemporary moment. In retelling an old story in a 
modern context, in using an older form (the miracle-mystery play) to structure 
the meaning of a modern experience, he not only demonstrates the generic 
continuity of cultural experience, but also expresses a collective wish for resur­
rection from the despair of doubt into which modernity has plunged Western 
culture. The "powerful deep currents of culture" (Bakhtin 1986b: 3) are indeed 
demonstrably palpable if we are sensitive enough and take the suggestions of 
Bakhtin and Barthes to read narrative as cultural signification. 
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Bordwell's inability to link thematic and formal issues is obvious in that he 
converts even thematic concerns like the examination of religion into formal 
devices and therefore misses the contemporary significance of Dreyer's use of 
forms and objects from earlier times. He sees the centrality of art objects in 
Dreyer's work as "symptomatic of Dreyer's tendency to impress the social into 
the characters' surroundings, but at one remove through decorative objects 
selected by the characters" (1981: 195). It is clear that Bordwell doesn't quite 
understand the abstraction for which the process of simplification works in 
Dreyer's film. The portraits of patriarchal figures on the walls of the two houses 
in the film subtly suggest the forces that control the forms of social interaction in 
this world. Interestingly, the scenes of the meeting and the discussion between 
Morten and Peter are composed like Rembrandt's paintings, just as earlier Inger 
is often shot in a Vermeer-like composition which transforms the simplicity of a 
routine gesture into a transcendental act. The intertextuality is not incidental, 
for, as Raymond Williams points out, opening a film text to a broader context 
traces relations between the different signifying systems of a culture (Williams 
1982: 12-13; cited in Gunning 1991: 11). 
It is ironic that Bordwell, who is so committed to an understanding of form 
and style in a historical context, misses the historical and contemporary signific­
ances of Dreyer's form. This is precisely because he does not imaginatively 
engage with the thematic concerns of Dreyer's work, so that his reading of 
form is not impregnated with the vision of the work. A brief discussion of a 
crucial scene in the film will make this clear. As Inger struggles with her life in 
labor, her daughter Maren and the supposedly mad brother-in-law Johannes 
briefly communicate in the parlor outside. This scene between Johannes and 
little Maren is in direct contrast to the one in which she comes to her grandfather 
with the prediction ofher mother's death. While he humors her and sends her off 
to bed, without answering any of her questions or taking her seriously at all, 
Johannes and she both take each other seriously, and Maren convinces him of the 
power of both human love and faith, a faith that will make even the resurrection 
of the dead possible. Composed centrally for the first time in the film by a 
simultaneous arc-and-pan movement of a mobile camera, Johannes is once again 
semically coded as the Savior,35 and when the movement ends with Maren and 
Johannes composed centrally and in the foreground, with Inger's door in the 
background, the vital connections between these three individuals and the forces 
they represent become clear. If there is a true faith, it is in this triumvirate, with 
the coming together of childlike faith, infinite trust in the divine, gentleness, 
compassion, understanding, and a vast and tender love. Despite Johannes's 
seeming aloofness and distractedness, he has the qualities to belong to this 
alternative faith and is in fact a key member, something that only Inger and 
Maren implicitly realize. Bordwell insightfully analyzes the technical accom­
plishment of this sequence. He describes the movement of the camera as it arcs 
and moves in one direction while it pans in the opposite one. The resultant effect 
is to maintain an equidistance from the figures which emerge sculpturally as the 
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space becomes dynamic (1981: 156-8). However, he fails to see the narrative 
significance of this movement as described above. 
Any adequate analysis or description of form and style must confront its 
thematic and philosophical significance. The style of the film, which Dreyer 
believed communicated the truth of the artist's vision or personal interpretation 
of his reality (Dreyer 1973),36 does not in any way work at odds with the narrative 
concerns of this film, for both are engaged in the task of signifying a reality and 
therefore a context and a culture. The universal is not a free-floating essence that 
needs to be either caught in the net of artistic vision or realized through a 
meditation on vague eternal verities. Rather, it is to be realized through the 
concrete specificities of a culture and a reality that is rooted in time and space. 
And it is such a reality thaf Dreyer addresses in all his films, despite the 
abstraction of his technique and the seeming atemporality of his subject matter. 
Grdet comes from a deep confrontation with the implications of modernity with 
its crisis of faith, and it is the meaning of this crisis that the film explores, 
providing at the same time a utopian vision of faith which, in its affirmation of 
Life, gifts an object lesson on the value of faith that transcends the rationalistic 
forces of modernity. Like other modernists, Dreyer withdraws into history to 
search for forms that would convey the range of meanings his themes demand. In 
doing that, what he actually achieves is to demonstrate the continuities of culture 
which persist despite the rupture of modernity. If "forms of thinking" (Bakhtin 
1986b: 5) persist over time in a culture, then generic insights can be mobilized to 
establish a creative, meaningful relationship with tradition in the context of the 
divisive force of modernity, even as the past with its retrograde social structures 
is critiqued and the present looked to for the possibilities of an authentic form of 
human relatedness. In either case, it is the "map of meanings in a culture" (Hall 
1972: 65; cited in Lesage 1985: 481) that narrative discourse is concerned with, so 
that "narrativization,,37 is merely the means by which the narrative, or the artist 
for that matter, signify the culture in which they are rooted. The Bakhtinian 
notion of a heteroglossic context38 would be an important starting point for the 
examination of the Barthesian codes which form the narrative and, in the 
decoding of which, the reader/spectator confronts the meanings of a culture, 
rooted in a time and a place. Narrative discourse is thus the means of cultural 
signification, and it is only through the acceptance of the particular context that 
any universal meaning is generated. 
IV 
Bordwell's most serious allegations against interpretation come in his attack on 
SLAB theories, which, he feels, are the basis for most current interpretive 
practices (1989a: 385-92).39 By setting historical poetics against SLAB theory, 
he critiques the latter for being doctrine centered, for not being based on 
systematic research, and for using concepts to construct interpretive narratives 
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rather than explanatory propositions. Bordwell's tendency to polarize positions 
and impulses is problematic and ultimately unprofitable. While the excesses of 
SLAB-based criticism are unquestionable and need to be given up, should we 
throw out the baby with the bath water? SLAB theories (not the critical excesses 
that have followed from them) have insights into society, history, culture, and 
representation that would benefit any attempt at analyzing and interpreting 
texts. Moreover, Bordwell himself concedes that to give up the practices of 
interpretation would be to impoverish film studies (1989b: 258). Without inter­
pretation, historical poetics would also be inadequate. On the other hand, with it, 
not only would historical poetics definitely be enriched, but also its study of form 
and style in historical terms can only be complete, as Bakhtin suggests, if it also 
addresses issues of cultural determination, ideological formation, and their var­
ious manifestations. If Bordwell were to reformulate his idea of interpretation 
and embed it in a Bakhtinian conception of history and a Bakhtinian-Barthesian 
conception of narrative, as suggested in this chapter, then the project of historical 
poetics, with interpretation truly absorbed within it, would definitely become the 
most promising and fruitful course for film studies to take.40 This might involve 
a radical revisioning of its key notion of construction and meaning and its 
polarized opposition to interpretation. To begin with, one could start by reinstat­
ing the traditional notion of hermeneutics. Ricoeur's definition of interpretation 
as "deciphering the hidden meaning in the apparent meaning, in unfolding the 
levels of meaning implied in the literal meaning" (1980: 245; cited in Bordwell 
1989b: 2) can work as a way of seeing that explicit, referential meanings contain 
within them implicit, symptomatic ones. And with meaning seen as embedded in 
history and culture, cultural representational forms would be charged with the 
significances that otherwise are not seen by Bordwell as relevant to historical 
poetics, but rather are banished to the polarized realm of interpretation. Thus, to 
realize the potential of his proposed revitalization of the field with historical 
poetics, Bordwell must confront the contradictions and tensions in his formula­
tion and not reform interpretation with historical poetics but vitalize the latter 
with the values and benefits of the former. 
Notes 
I would like to thank Robert Stam, Richard Allen, and Malcolm Turvey for their 
invaluable comments on an earlier draft of this paper. The paper has benefited from 
their responses, and I am grateful to them for their interest. 
In the last chapter of Making Meaning entitled "Why Not to Read a Film," Bordwell 
states that "to interpret a film is to ascribe implicit or symptomatic meanings to it" 
(1989b: 249). Here he brings to a culmination his critique of interpretation and 
examines whether it is time to bring about "the end of interpretation." He has 
various recommendations to rectify the excesses of interpretive criticism and feels 
404 
"Historical Poetics," Narrative, and Interpretation 
that the "questions of composition, function and effect that interpretive criticism sets 
out to answer are most directly addressed and best answered by a self-conscious 
historical poetics of cinema," which he defines as "the study of how, in determinate 
circumstances, films are put together, serve specific functions, and achieve specific 
effects" (266-7). He also discusses the concept in the essay "Historical Poetics of 
Cinema" (l989a). My discussion of Bordwell's concept of "historical poetics" 
is based on these two texts. However, my understanding of "historical poetics" is 
conditioned by Bakhtin and Medvedev's formulation of a "sociological" and "histor­
ical poetics" in their response to and critique of Russian formalism. While their 
"sociological poetics" shares several attitudes and features with Russian formalism, 
including the latter's emphasis on the problems of literary specification and the 
importance of understanding the "constructive functions of each of (the) elements," 
it critiques and is directly opposed to the loss of "full semantic meaning and 
ideological significance" that Russian formalism saw as necessary for the elements 
of the work acquiring "constructive significance." Bakhtin and Medvedev's "socio­
logical" and "historical poetics," then, is committed to understanding the literary, 
artistic work in the context of the "unity ofliterature," which cannot be understood 
outside the "unity of ideological life," which in turn "cannot be studied outside the 
unified socioeconomic laws of development." While Bordwell's formulation of "his­
torical poetics" takes "socioeconomic laws of [the] development" of form into 
consideration, it ignores the crucial, organic connection between all these dimen­
sions. According to Bakhtin and Medvedev, the "historian must reveal the very 
mechanics of ideological generation," a charter that Bordwell does not think is 
necessary for either the historian of artistic forms or the historical critic. For 
Bordwell's views see Making Meaning (l989b). For Bakhtin and Medvedev's 
formulations see their The Formal Method in Literary Scholarship (1978: 30-1,45, 
62,49, 27, 20). 
2 Gaut's argument in this paper is that the neoformalism of Bordwell and Thompson is 
"seriously flawed." While Thompson and Bordwell do not confront the tensions of 
their theory's key notion of construction, Gaut demonstrates that viewers do not, in 
general, construct the meanings of films. There is a limited role for construction 
within a detectivist framework which is obscured by Bordwell and Thompson. 
3 Bordwell believes that in the activity of comprehension, the perceiver constructs the 
textual world, or referential, diegetic meanings as also explicit meanings that have to I'll 
do with the direct "message" of the text. The perceiver also constructs "covert, 
symbolic, or implicit meanings" that could be identified as "'problems,' 'issues,' or 
'questions.' " The spectator also constructs repressed or symptomatic meanings "that 
the work divulges 'involuntarily.'" Symptomatic meaning may either be treated as 
"the consequence of the artist's obsessions" or taken "as part of a social dynamic" 
and "traced to economic, political, or ideological processes." Implicit and sympto­
matic meanings are the domain of interpretation. For these definitions, see Bordwell 
1989b: 8-9. For a discussion of Bordwell's notion of narrative and his constructivist 
model of narrative comprehension see Bordwell 1985: esp. 29-62. For a discussion of 
different kinds of meaning and the activity of interpretation see Bordwell 1989b: esp. 
1--42, 105-45. 
4 Bakhtin and Medvedev feel that "the work cannot be understood outside the unity 
of literature. But this whole unity ... cannot be understood outside the unity of 
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ideological life. And this last unity ... cannot be studied outside the unified socio­
economic laws of development" (1978: 27). 
5	 It is intriguing that Bordwell does not even refer to Bakhtin in either of the two texts 
in which he defines and discusses "historical poetics," especially given that one of his 
sharpest criticisms against the "Grand Theory" of the SLAB theorists (those who 
employ tenets based upon Saussurean semiotics, Lacanian psychoanalysis, Althus­
serian Marxism, and Barthesian textual theory, and those whose work Bordwell calls, 
"acronymically and a little acrimoniously, SLAB theory") is that they do no "home­
work in the history of [their] concepts," and that his own account of the history of 
criticism in Making Meaning is rigorously historical. See Bordwell 1989a: 385, 388, 
and 1989b: ch. 4, respectively. In their critique of Russian formalism, Bakhtin and 
Medvedev propose as a corrective a "sociological poetics" of art with "historical 
poetics" as a necessary corollary. According to them, the distinction between a 
"theoretical sociological poetics" and "historical poetics" is "more technical than 
methodological in nature. And theoretical poetics must be historical." That the two 
are closely imbricated is obvious in the development of their formulations in the 
entire book, while they also state clearly that "the role of historical poetics is to 
prepare the historical perspective for the generalizing and synthesizing definitions of 
sociological poetics." We can therefore assume that the social, cultural, ideological 
concerns of "sociological poetics" inflected with a historical perspective would be 
central to a "historical poetics" as conceived by Bakhtin and Medvedev. See The 
Formal Method (1978: 30-1) for the definitions. That Bakhtin was consistently 
interested in a "historical poetics" of literature is reflected in his other work as 
well. His essay "Forms of Time and of the Chronotope in the Novel" is subtitled 
"Notes Toward a Historical Poetics," and he attempts "a total evolution of the form 
being defined." See, respectively, Bakhtin 1994: 84, and Bakhtin and Medvedev 
1978: 31. The Bakhtinian sense of history, then, refers not just to the resonances of 
the contemporary time and context, but to the entire weight of the past as it 
reverberates both formally and thematically in a text. 
6	 Bakhtin and Medvedev speak of the "deep ideological meaning to form itself' and 
point to plot as "the formula of ideologically refracted life" with its structure shaped 
by "ideological values" (1978: 49,17). 
7	 "Interpretation takes as its basic subject our perceptual, cognitive, and affective 
processes, but it does so in a roundabout way - by attributing their 'output' to the 
text 'out there' " (Bordwell 1989b: 257). 
8	 Bordwell concedes that the aim of interpretation is not to produce "knowledge" as 
the natural and social sciences do, but rather to yield "understanding (verstehen)" 
which it may do "through a more or less disciplined speculation on the possibilities of 
meaning." As opposed to interpretation, the aim of historical poetics is to produce 
"knowledge" and therefore other "object-centered questions" about the film's 
"composition," and its "effects" and "functions" are important (l989b: 258, 263). 
Throughout Bordwell's discussion of interpretation and historical criticism there is 
this tension between "understanding" and "knowledge." Isn't the polarization of the 
two as problematic as that of interpretation and comprehension and different kinds of 
meanings? Bordwell's assertion that historical poetics will produce knowledge as the 
natural and social sciences do, and his constant emphasis on being' scientific, perhaps 
misconceive the goals and aims of the arts. However, this question is outside the 
scope of this chapter. 
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9	 Criticism that deals specifically with the "implicit" meanings of a text. See Bordwell 
1989b: ch. 3. 
10	 Bakhtin states that "it is impossible to understand the concrete utterance without 
accustoming oneself to its values, without understanding the orientation of its 
evaluations in the ideological environment" (Bakhtin and Medvedev 1978: 121). 
Using the Bakhtinian suggestion would facilitate a confrontation of the historical 
and cultural resonances of a text and would prevent the kind of wild interpretations 
that have little to do with the text because they are much more intricately involved 
with working out the hypotheses of the theories or the critical institutions that have 
produced them, and that Bordwell rightly condemns. 
II	 For an understanding of Bakhtin's ideas about dialogism and the text-context 
relationship, I have used Bakhtin 1986b, Bakhtin and Medvedev 1978, Stam 1989, 
and the section on intertextuality in Stam et al. 1992: 203-6. Robert Stam's use of 
Bakhtin to critique Metzian cinesemiology has sharpened my own arguments 
ag'ainst Bordwellian formalism. See Stam 1989: esp. ch. 1. 
12	 Robert Stam points out that the "Bakhtinian notion of heteroglossia, as the diverse 
perspectival languages generated by sexual, racial, economic, and generational 
difference, is eminently compatible with spectator-oriented approaches." While 
both Bakhtin and latter-day reception theorists would be in "favor of a multiplicity 
of spectatorial positions, sometimes coexisting within a given spectator," Stam also 
points out that the spectator is "historically situated ... in both a biographical and a 
larger historical sense" (1989: 43). 
13	 This could rang'e from the spectatorial awareness of production conditions with 
which they may be familiar through the circulation of journalistic discourse to the 
more academic kind of criticism that takes pains to research the kinds of detail that 
Bordwell himself suggests good criticism should do (I 989b: 263). 
14	 Bordwell points out that neoformalism relies upon three explanatory schemes: a 
rational-agent model, an institutional model, and a perceptual-cognitive model. He 
explains the institutional model as the "social and economic system of film-making, 
involving tacit aesthetic assumptions, the division of labor, and technological pro­
cedures [which] forms the horizon of what is permitted or encouraged at particular 
moments" (l989a: 382-3). 
15	 Allen points out that the cognitive theory of perception misconceives the nature of 
seeing "since perception cannot be defined as an inferential process thoug'h some 
forms of looking involve making inferences e.g. a detective trying to interpret what 
it is that she sees ... therefore, film cannot be conceived as something that makes 
explicit the inferential processes that are implicit in everyday seeing, as the theory 
claims." Allen also points out that narrative comprehension and narrative inter­
pretation cannot be so sharply divided as Bordwell makes out: "By misconceiving 
narrative comprehension as an objective process (based on a misconceived theory of 
seeing), Bordwell mistakenly draws an erroneous distinction between narrative 
comprehension and narrative interpretation that sounds the clarion call to abandon 
the activity of interpretation in Making Meaning" (from the abstract of the unpub­
lished paper presented at the conference). I am grateful to Richard Allen for sharing 
his ideas with me. 
16	 Gaut extracts three different notions of construction from Bordwell's arguments 
and examines them to see whether any of them prove that "meanings arc made, not 
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found." The first, "conceptual construction," in which concepts are mapped onto 
cues using background knowledge in keeping with the constructivist theory of 
perception, is no ground for thinking that the objects of perception and meaning 
are constructs. The second, "normative construction," according to which viewers 
are directed to imagine what they see, also does not prove that viewers therefore 
determine what they ought to imagine. And finally, the strongest version of con­
structivism, critical school constructivism - inherent in Bordwell's claims about the 
nature of interpretation as an activity in which critics map semantic fields onto films 
using schemata, heuristics, assumptions, and hypotheses, all of which derive their 
validity and effectiveness from critical institutions - is a false theory of interpreta­
tion. This is so because Gaut demonstrates that the norms that should be appealed 
to in interpretation are not the norms of critical institutions but the norms that 
govern the film in its historical context. Thus, the neoformalist has failed to prove 
that genuine construction lies at the heart of comprehension and interpretation of 
films. Gaut further suggests that Bordwell and Thompson's recommendation of 
"historical poetics" should be freed from the burden of general constructivism, 
which is actually incompatible with the renewed attention to historical context that 
they advocate. However, as this chapter has argued, their concept of historical 
context needs to be widened in its scope. 
17	 Bordwell opposes these two and states that he offers "not a hermeneutics -- a scheme 
for producing valid or valuable interpretation - but a poetics of interpretation" 
(198%: 273). One wonders whether the distinction between the two is as obvious as 
it is to Bordwell. In fact, Aristotle, from whom Bordwell would definitely claim a 
critical descent, seems to have done both in his Poetics. 
18	 This sense of symptomatic meaning gained critical currency from Jean-Louis 
Comolli and Jean Narboni's editorial "CinemalIdeology/Criticism" in Cahiers du 
cinema in 1969. Subsequently it formed the impetus for much critical interpretation 
in the 1970s, especially in Cahiers and Screen. Bordwell's chapter 4 of Making 
Meaning, "Symptomatic Interpretation," is a very comprehensive and useful 
account of the history of critical ideas and movements in film studies and criticism. 
While the descriptive account is very valuable and is a wonderful example of a 
historical poetics of criticism, it is not very clear in the chapter what Bordwell's 
objections are to the forms he is describing. 
19	 The argument against Bordwell here is similar to the one that Malcolm Turvey 
makes about Murray Smith and Noel Carroll's theory of the spectator's emotional 
response to fiction films in Turvey 1997. Turvey argues that by identifying a mental 
entity - i.e. imagination or thought - as the "causal agent of the spectator's emotion 
during her viewing of fiction films," Smith and Carroll divorce the spectator's 
emotional response from "the sensuous particularit[y] of the cinematic medium," a 
position that is contradicted by "ordinary language descriptions of the experience of 
fiction films," and is one that Smith and Carroll find difficult to either prove or 
bypass. See pp. 432-8 for this argument. 
20	 See note 8. 
21	 Bordwell sees "interpretation's greatest achievement" as "its ability to encour­
age ... reflections upon our conceptual schemes. By taming the new and sharpening 
the known, the interpretive institution reactivates and revises our common frame­
works of understanding." 
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22	 See note 21. 
23	 Bordwell borrows the term and the idea from Tzvetan Todorov, who says that "it is 
fore knowledge of the meaning' to be discovered that guides the interpretation" 
(1982: 254; cited in Bordwell 1989b: 260), 
24	 Throug'hout Making Meaning and the "Historical Poetics of Cinema," Bordwell 
sees Bazin's work as an example of the highest standards of historical criticism and 
an exemplary model of "cinematic poetics." He concedes that Bazin also does 
interpretive criticism. While he says that Bazin's work, along with that of Burch 
and the Soviet filmmakers, does demonstrate that the "construction of implicit and 
symptomatic meanings can co-exist with the study of form and style in given 
historical circumstances," he is not willing to see that this constitutes perhaps the 
most comprehensive form of interpretation, as it does of historical poetics (1989b: 
267). 
25	 In "Historical Poetics of Cinema," Bordwell says that "nothing prevents the 
poetician from arguing' that economics, ideology, the class struggle, or inherent 
social or psychological dispositions operate as causes of constructional devices or 
effects" (374). This is very much like the formalist conception of "material" that 
Bakhtin criticized: "the formalists called the motivation of the device, 'material', 
and considered everything ideologically significant to be 'material' as well." But, as 
Bakhtin points out, "the reduction of the material to mere motivation condemns the 
device to complete emptiness," and therefore "the division of the poetic construc­
tion into device and material is clearly untenable" (Bakhtin and Medvedev 1978: 
112,116). 
26	 To study "a wide range of films" without studying the context of those films would 
be to look at cinema only in terms of the filmic series with no understanding of the 
relatedness of the filmic series with "other ideological series." This is also Bakhtin's 
criticism of the formalists who, according to him, considered "the series of literary 
history, the series of artistic works and their constructive elements to be completely 
independent of the other ideolog'ical series and of socioeconomic development" 
(Bakhtin and Medvedev 1978: 159). While Bordwell does consider socio-economic 
development, he does not consider adequately enough the importance of other 
ideological spheres for film history. 
27	 See note 26. 
28	 Bordwell states that there is no need "to assume anyone model of causation and 
change" when involved in the enterprise of historical poetics. He points out that 
Bazin, in the "Evolution of the Language of the Cinema" (1967), gives a 
"teleological explanation" of the development of film form (1989a: 374). Bordwell 
points to other models of causation than the Bazinian, teleological one. The 
"intentionalistic" one "centers on more localized acts of choice and avoidance." 
As opposed to these, his own model is a "functionalist" one "whereby the 
institutional dynamics of filmmaking set up constraints and preferred options that 
fulfill overall systemic norms" (374). While his use of a functionalist model may be 
true of his discussion of Hollywood cinema in The Classical Hollymood Cinema 
(Bordwell et al. 1985), his discussion of the different kinds of cinema when he 
emphasizes the historicizing of the different "constructional options" available to 
filmmakers at "various historical conjunctures" implies a teleological model of film 
history (1989a: 381). 
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29	 Bordwell understands that Vance Kepley "has shown that the films' mysterious 
mythographic elements had concrete extratextual references for the director's 
audiences, and that the films' explicit messages are the trace of various, sometimes 
conflicting, political purposes. Kepley can go on to describe ideological projects and 
propose informed symptomatic readings on the basis of the sort of specific historical 
evidence that Macherey and the Cahiers critics were never able to muster." But he 
sees this as an example of how, by turning "to history," we "discover that films have 
functioned in ways that are not already known to us," without admitting that 
symptomatic interpretation can actually aid the understanding of how films func­
tioned in different historical contexts (l989b: 265-6). 
30	 However, Bordwell is skeptical about the the pleasure of film interpretation: "in 
1975 Laura Mulvey wrote that her theory sought to take the pleasure out of film 
viewing. Perhaps now is the time to do something more controversial: take the 
pleasure out of film interpretation" (1989b: 262-3). 
31	 A typical genre film, for. example, perpetuates certain ideologies that are not only 
coded with those genres but are also used very consciously by the filmmakers to do 
so: see Thomas Schatz's work on genres, especially in Hol~ywood Genres (1981). 
32	 Bordwell is critical of the tendency of critics to project their interpretive activity 
"back onto 'ordinary' or ... 'naive' viewers" who belong to "'reading communities,' 
or are constituted by 'reading formations' " because, "by defining whatever viewers 
do as interpretation, the critic secures a rhetorical warrant for his more enlightened 
and enlightening enterprise." 
33	 But, as I have argued in this paper, are these two activities - that of interpreting and 
that of "poetics" - inherently opposed, as Bordwell makes them out to be? 
34	 See discussion on pp. 392-3. 
35	 Throughout the film, Johannes is presented in iconic terms that are semically 
evocative of the Christ figure, though there is some ambivalence in the presentation 
as well. This is clear in the first scene, when Johannes walks out onto the moors and 
addresses an imaginary audience, condemning them for their lack of faith in the 
risen Christ. While the scene is semically evocative of Christ's Sermon on the 
Mount, there is also a sharp contrast between the two figures through the disjunc­
ture produced by the difference in their respective sermons, namely that Johannes 
condemns the imag'ined congregation for their lack of faith in him as the risen 
Christ, while Jesus' sermon to his disciples and others contained the Beatitudes and 
other important fundamentals of Christian teaching (see Matthew 5-7; Luke 6: 20­
49). Through the ambivalence of the first scene, Dreyer indicates Johannes's 
delusion but at the same time suggests the possibility of vision and the potential 
to be a savior through the image-seme used to present him. 
36	 "[T]he style ... is the artist's way of giving expression to his perception of the 
material .... Through style, he gets others to see the material through his eyes" 
(Dreyer 1973: 127). 
37	 Tom Gunning adds this fourth category to Genette's "triad of story, discourse and 
the act of narrating" to account for the specifically cinematic mode of narration 
(1991: 17-18). 
38	 In a different sense from Bakhtin's "heteroglossia" of popular discourses, especially 
in carnival forms, would be the many voices of faith and religious belief that 
obviously formed the context of the everyday life of the Jutland countryside that 
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Dreyer and Munk (on whose play the film is based) were using to contextualize their 
explorations of these issues. 
39	 See note 5 for details. 
40	 Bordwell states this at the end of Making Meaning (273-4) and in the concluding 
paragraph of "Historical Poetics of Cinema" (392): "In this respect, historical 
poetics becomes not one method but a model of basic research into cinema." 
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